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# Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of minority, sub-state, terrorist, democratic, irredentist and post-communist nationalisms have been used as evidence of a phenomenon generically termed ‘the rise of nationalism’. Some have resulted in violent and bloody conflicts, as in the break-up of Yugoslavia, while others have had an impact on well-established democracies like the United Kingdom, where in 2007 nationalist parties came to power in Scotland (a position spectacularly consolidated in 2011) and in Wales (as junior coalition partner for four years). At the same time, however, the widely anticipated decline of the nation-state in the face of globalisation does not seem to have materialised (Ohmae 1996). Interpreting the principle of national self-determination to mean different degrees of autonomy, or sovereignty, is one pragmatic response to the evolution of globalisation and regional governance, of which the European Union is the most advanced example. Alan Milward (1994, 3) showed the European Community to have been the ‘buttress [...] of the nation-state’s post-war construction’, and nation-states still rely on the returns of regionalisation for nation-building. However, contemporary sub-state nationalists in the likes of Scotland and Catalonia also use the process of regional integration to support demands for greater autonomy from precisely those nation-states. This is just one example of how nation-states and nationalist movements are responding to the current political context, which is different to that faced by nineteenth and even twentieth-century nationalists. Regionalisation, in turn, is one among a range of contemporary phenomena which can be broadly termed the cosmopolitan challenge, and which exist in creative tension with both sub-state nationalism and nation-building. Building on these trends and concepts, this text sets out to explore various aspects of nationalist ideology in the context of twenty-first-century politics.

What is meant by the cosmopolitan challenge? The cosmopolitan challenge is more than an abstract alternative to national loyalties; cosmopolitanism is not merely a utopian vision for doing away with national allegiances and the existing nation-state system. Instead, the cosmopolitan challenge is used here to denote a range of pressing issues confronting contemporary nation-states and nationalist movements alike, including globalisation, regionalisation, transnationalism, migration and diaspora.

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These five components of the cosmopolitan challenge are interconnected. To begin with, migration denotes the movement of peoples. This could be for any number of reasons, including work, rejoining family members, claiming asylum or taking refuge abroad. The destination country will consider migrants to be legal or illegal, depending on how they have entered the country and the system of visas, quotas and other legislation in place. Migration is an important aspect of the cosmopolitan challenge for nationalist ideology because the relationship between migrants and the national construct must be managed. Governments will therefore set parameters as to how migrants should 'integrate' into the 'host' society through naturalisation procedures, required language competence, citizenship tests and so on. Nation-builders will decide how inclusive to make their national construct and accordingly erect higher or lower barriers to belonging. Official attitudes towards migrants are thus a good way of gauging the openness or otherwise of a nation-state to new citizens.

Turning to diaspora, this denotes a group of migrants who share a common bond to the homeland they or their forebears left behind. That is, the members of a diaspora will be migrants or their descendants. Not all migrants belong to a diaspora, however, because they might not identify with their country of (ancestral) origin. Neither can we assume that a diaspora represents a homogenous group. On the contrary, we can detect 'the presence of both cosmopolitan anti-nationalists and reactionary ethno-nationalists within diasporas' (Vertovec 2009, 11). Members of a diaspora will feel and express their sense of belonging to the homeland in different ways, be it through upholding its customs and cultural traditions, some form of political activism, or economic solidarity in providing remittances and other types of financial support. They will have other identities, including perhaps several national allegiances. With regard to contemporary nation-building, the growing number of countries that allow dual citizenship testifies to a gradual acceptance of 'divided loyalties', not least in order to ease the flow of remittances and investment. The Philippines, Egypt and the Dominican Republic are just some examples of economies heavily dependent on remittances. Countries like India and Vietnam have also begun courting their respective diaspora communities in recent decades with rights short of citizenship (Barabantseva & Sutherland 2011). Nation-states' developing relationship with their respective diasporas suggests that they are looking beyond their own territorial boundaries to draw those they deem co-nationals into a new sphere of influence. This aspect of the cosmopolitan challenge has resulted in nation-states playing

an active role in ‘reconfiguring traditional understandings of sovereignty, nation and citizenship’ (Levitt & De la Dehesa, cited in Vertovec 2009, 97). On the other hand, possible disadvantages of ‘hosting’ a diaspora from the point of view of nation-states include uncertainty surrounding military service and readiness to defend the nation in times of crisis, more diffuse concerns about (inter)national security and stability, and worries about diaspora members’ willingness to engage fully with their country of residence by actively contributing to its culture and society. As we shall see in Chapter 5, this rests on the problematic assumption that either citizenship or diaspora identities necessarily reflect a clear sense of commitment and solidarity to a single, specific community.

The concept of transnationalism encompasses migration, diaspora and much more, from complex trade routes and capital flows, through a reconceptualisation of place away from a clear territorial frame, to a concomitant growth in alternative social formations, virtual communities, multiple identities and the like. Transnationalism, as distinct from international exchanges between states, refers to the myriad ‘sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders – businesses, non-government organisations, and individuals sharing the same interests’ (Vertovec 2009, 3). Although these linkages have the potential to introduce multiplicity and complexity into national configurations and allegiances, they can also be used to underpin more conventional forms of nation-building and sub-state nationalism. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the advocacy, money and influence of some among the Indian diaspora have helped support so-called *Hindutva* nationalism in India, while sections of the Tamil diaspora long supported a Tamil autonomous zone within the majority Sinhalese Sri Lanka. In sum, the concept of transnationalism analyses economic, cultural and political flows between and among networks of non-state actors, thereby seeking to capture social formations which criss-cross nation-state boundaries, including migration and diaspora. In turn, the ‘transnational connections between social groups represent a key manifestation of globalization’ (Vertovec 2009, 3). As its name suggests, globalisation is an even wider-ranging phenomenon than transnationalism, diaspora or migration.

As we shall see in Chapter 6, there are no clear principles regulating the relationship between globalisation, regionalisation and nationalism. Regionalisation and globalisation have been variously interpreted as beneficial or detrimental, not only to each other, but also to nation-states and nationalism more generally. If we follow the zero-sum analysis

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epitomised in so-called ‘Euro-sceptic’ discourse, namely that member states ‘lose’ sovereignty as European integration progresses, then regionalisation appears to work against both the survival of nation-states and the aspirations of sub-state nationalists for autonomy. If, on the other hand, we follow the approach of Alan Milward (1994), and indeed that of sub-state nationalists like the Scottish National Party (SNP), then support for European integration can apparently bolster both nation-states’ and sub-state nations’ capacity for action in a globalising world. Looking beyond the European Union at other forms of regional integration also suggests that regionalisation does not necessarily entail a loss of sovereignty. For example, organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are premised on intergovernmental cooperation, which does not mean ceding sovereignty but rather aims to enhance domestic legitimacy, national prosperity and international clout (Sutherland 2009).

Globalisation denotes an increase in the speed and impact of cultural, technological, economic and financial flows that is qualitatively different in scale to the important global exchanges taking place in centuries past through trade and tribute, colonialism and cultural links. With regard to the interplay between globalisation and nationalism, both phenomena are much too wide-ranging to detect either a positive or negative correlation between the two. Some nationalists will rail against globalisation’s alleged dilution of their culture and traditions. Others will point to the way in which globalisation can bring prosperity and thereby support both nation-building and nationalist appeals for greater autonomy. One useful way of approaching specific cases is to distinguish between globalisation as a macro-level phenomenon on the one hand and globalism, understood as an ideological response to that phenomenon, on the other (Gamble 2007, 27). This separates the multifaceted process of globalisation from the political project of globalism, thereby enabling a clearer assessment of their respective relationships to nationalism. Together, then, migration, diaspora, transnationalism, regionalisation and globalisation give a sense of the scale of the cosmopolitan challenge. We now turn to our second key concept, namely nationalist ideology.

#### **Ideology**

This text is not primarily about nations, or nationalism studies more generally, but rather about contemporary nationalist ideology and its encounter

with the cosmopolitan challenge. According to this reading, the challenge is upon us, and the text examines how nationalists and nation-builders are coping with it. This form of cosmopolitanism challenges nationalism to respond to and even incorporate aspects of current global developments, but it does not strip it of 'local colour' for all that. Indeed, the sheer diversity of nationalist ideology is one of its most striking features. This text focuses on contemporary, or 'neo' nationalism (Nairn 1981, 32), but it does not attempt to find either specific or general causal mechanisms to explain nationalism. Rather, it seeks to interpret nation-building and nationalist movements within their unique, twenty-first-century context. The aim is to supplement existing explanatory theories with an interpretive framework that can be applied to a range of contemporary nationalisms, hence the rather summary treatment of nationalism theory in Chapter 1. The text sets out from the premise that nationalism is an ideology, something that tends to be acknowledged in the literature but rarely provides the focus for research (Guibernau 1999, 7; Keating 2001, 28, but see Malešević 2006). The interpretive framework used here is based on four key propositions. Firstly, that nationalism is ubiquitous but manifests itself in myriad ways, making it an important contemporary phenomenon worthy of study. Secondly, that the concept of ideology can help make sense of this diversity and offer insights into the structure and strategy of nationalisms today. Thirdly, that the notion of 'national identity is as much implicated in "banal nationalism" as in "hot nationalism"' (Reicher & Hopkins 2001, 101), so we should also consider cases that are neither extreme nor violent as expressions of nationalist ideology. Fourthly, that ideology is a useful concept for accessing the meaning, though not the origins, of nationalism. Accordingly, this text is not interested in examining the roots of a nationalist movement, but rather its contemporary construction: 'There is a case for saying that nationalism is, above all, an ideology of the first person plural. The crucial question relating to national identity is how the national "we" is constructed and what is meant by such construction' (Billig 1995, 70).

Ideology can be defined as a set of principles combined with a strategic plan of action for putting them into practice. However, it could be argued that a good number of nationalist variants are so strategic or opportunistic as to have lost sight of their core principles. Michael Freeden (1998, 765) nevertheless answers the central question posed in his article 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?' with a 'yes', and seeks to confirm that nationalism continues to be a distinct, determinate category of ideology in contemporary politics. His account of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies is

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illuminating, since it makes a clear distinction between core and peripheral ideological concepts. Freeden defines a thick ideology as one ‘containing particular interpretations and configurations of all the major political concepts attached to a general plan of public policy that a specific society requires’ (Freeden 1998, 750). A thick ideology therefore consists of a complete set of principles that can be applied to problem-solving in all policy areas, providing solutions that are recognisably in keeping with the world-view in question. A thin-centred ideology, on the other hand, leaves conceptual vacuums. It does not provide ‘chains of ideas [...] stretching from the general to the practical, from the core to the periphery’ (Freeden 1998, 750). According to Freeden (1998, 750), nationalism is a thin-centred ideology, as it has few immutable characteristics beyond that of prioritising the nation. Freeden’s approach also helps to account for the variety of nationalist forms, because each interprets the core principle of prioritising the nation differently according to a wide range of factors; from the colonial legacy, through cultural norms, to the national status quo and the potential for ethnic conflict.

Ideology is a very useful concept for analysing nationalism because it combines the principles of a coherent world-view with a practical strategy for realising abstract goals. An approach to nationalism based on ideology posits that all nationalists share a core commitment to prioritising national loyalty and legitimacy, but also provides a framework for distinguishing between the principle and practice of different forms of nationalism and nation-building. That is, it helps to categorise the concepts that are core and peripheral to nationalist ideology. Accordingly, Freeden’s understanding of ideologies is adopted here;

[Ideologies] prioritize certain concepts over others, and certain meanings of each concept over other meanings. The external manifestation of this thought practice is a unique conceptual configuration that competes over its legitimacy with other conceptual configurations.

(Freeden 2000, 307)

The notion of conceptual configurations points towards the empirical study of ideology as a construct, and chimes with Michael Billig’s definition of nationalism, cited above, as the construction of the national ‘we’. It also incorporates a sense of rival ideologies competing to decontest the meaning of core concepts (Norval 2000). Freeden’s understanding of a core ideological principle overlaps with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s

(1985, 112) definition of a nodal point of discourse, which they gloss as a privileged discursive point, or a particularly meaningful and enduring concept from which others are derived. This applies well to nationalism; ‘Some unusual discursive formations may tend to be organised around a single and relatively stable nodal point – such as a nationalist discourse that has achieved an unusual degree of predominance and stability’ (Smith 1998, 98). Prioritising the nation, however defined, is thus the core principle or nodal point of nationalism. It is crucial in bringing together the diverse strands inherent in each manifestation of nationalist ideology to form a more or less coherent world-view. In other words, the nodal point of nationalism is the nation, which corresponds to the core of nationalist ideology in Freeden’s terms (Sutherland 2005a). This is what all forms of nationalism have in common, and is a useful way to identify them for purposes of comparison. Positing the nation as nodal to nationalist ideology is also one way of capturing nationalist parties and movements which may not self-identify as such (Sutherland 2001). For instance, the concept of *Heimat*, or homeland, can be understood to be a nodal point of the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union’s (CSU) ideology equivalent to the nation, as discussed further in Chapter 4 (Sutherland 2001).

Focusing on the core principle of prioritising the nation by achieving a degree of national self-determination or preserving nation-state sovereignty provides a reference point for studying various nationalist ideologies and their evolution. Accordingly, this text also looks in some detail at nation-building, defined here as official, state-led nationalism. Nation-builders and neo-nationalists alike are part of a constant struggle to establish their ideology as dominant. Ironically, they celebrate the moment at which their ideology becomes ‘banal’ (Billig 1995). This is the point at which it is generally accepted by a given society until successfully challenged by an alternative world-view. The diversity of contemporary nationalist movements can be traced to different definitions of the nation and understandings of how it should best be represented politically. However, all nationalisms are based on the same fundamental principle of politicising a feeling of national belonging. In a world of nation-states, sub-state nationalist movements attempt to mobilise voters behind their alternative ideological interpretation of the nation. They posit the existence of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991), justified by means of ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), and attempt to mobilise this identity in order to achieve some form of national self-determination. Nation-builders, meanwhile, strive to maintain legitimacy and solidarity within the existing nation-state

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(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, 13). These two, often conflicting, strands of nationalist ideology show that nationalism may be all-pervasive, but is not an analytically useless concept for all that. Ideology and its agents – governments, political parties and movements – can be used to frame the analysis of all nationalist forms.

Nation-builders strive to maintain or reform the existing link between nation and state, while sub-state or irredentist nationalists aspire to redefine the nation or its status. Ultimately, however, both strands aspire to national self-determination of some sort, ranging from full external and internal sovereignty to limited cultural or political autonomy. The concept of ideology thereby lends itself well to theorising both the adaptability and diversity of contemporary nation-building and nationalist movements, and the following empirical chapters set out to show how some contemporary nationalist ideologies combine a flexible, active political strategy with underlying justifying principles. In sum, the first overall contention of this text is that the huge variation in contemporary forms of nationalism can best be understood in terms of ideology, characterised as a combination of core and peripheral principles. The second contention is that, despite their apparent diversity, contemporary nationalists and nation-builders share the core principle of prioritising the nation and its self-determination, and aspire to some form of autonomy or sovereignty in the face of the cosmopolitan challenge. To quote Michael Freedon (2000, 304) once more; ‘To analyse an ideology (as distinct from to participate in formulating one) is to categorise, elucidate and decode the ways in which collectivities in fact think about politics’. Chapter 1 will show that the potential of ideology to illuminate and characterise nationalism has been under-exploited in the theoretical literature. First, however, it is necessary to attempt definitions of nation and nationalism.

### **Nationalism**

Though we are all imbued with the language of nation, nationalism is notorious for its multi-faceted nature and the difficulty of defining its central component, the nation. Most of us have a ready answer to the standard question, ‘Where are you from?’ that identifies us as members of a national community, or as citizens of a nation-state. Classifying everything from Olympic teams, through statistical surveys, to school history books in national terms most often strikes us as common sense. Yet the nation is also

a contested concept (Gallie 1962). That is, neither scholars nor ideologues agree on its meaning. Some define the nation as a ‘psychological bond’ (Connor 1978, 379) uniting members of a community. Others consider it purely a creature of ideology. Still others confuse the nation and the state, a key distinction discussed below. In specific cases, markers like language, religion and descent are also used to set the boundaries of national belonging. Theorists mostly agree that it is pointless to try to identify an objective ‘checklist’ of nationhood criteria. Instead, contemporary theorising often centres on questions of identity and ethnicity. The present text, by contrast, analyses nationalism first and foremost as an ideology within the twenty-first-century context. From migration to globalisation, current trends are affecting the evolution of nationalist ideology, and this text explores some specific cases of this process.

It is difficult to treat nationalism as a single phenomenon, given the huge range and number of nationalist movements across the world, each one of them unique. We have seen how the concept of ideology can offer a useful framework for analysing nationalism. This is by no means the prevailing view, however. Benedict Anderson (1991, 5), for one, doubts the usefulness of analysing nationalism as an ideology, arguing that it might better be classified ‘with “kinship” and “religion”, rather than with “liberalism” or “fascism”’. There is also the danger of incorporating value judgements into distinctions between what is ideological and what is not (Kolakowski 1980, 124; Sutherland 2005a). Accordingly, Craig Calhoun (2007, 9) prefers to call nationalism ‘a conceptual framework, a discursive formation, a rhetoric, a structure of loyalties and sentiments’ rather than an ideology. Yet this only complicates the analysis by introducing a whole range of new concepts, each requiring its own clarification and justification in order to bring us closer to the nature of nationalism. The concept of ideology, on the other hand, encapsulates both the principle and practice of nationalism, thereby offering a simple and solid basis for empirical enquiry.

The concepts of nation and state are so tightly bound together that they are commonly used interchangeably. The term ‘nation-state’ sums up how closely the nation is identified with the state as a territorial entity and a reservoir of power. Indeed, the adjective ‘national’ is often used to describe matters pertaining to the state, as in the phrase ‘the national interest’. This is because the nation has become the key means for states to legitimate their power over people and place, and exercise both domestically and internationally recognised authority. Nevertheless, it is crucial to distinguish between these two concepts: the nation refers to the

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cognitive, legitimating basis for authority, whereas the state embodies the territorial and institutional dimensions of authority. As the primary focus of nationalist ideology, the nation is a way of justifying where borders are drawn and a means of contesting those borders. It serves both to underpin the legitimacy of modern states and the conflicting claims of sub-state nationalists. Therefore, a nation need not have a state, but states need some kind of national construct to legitimate their control. The means of achieving this is through nation-building, understood here as state-led nationalism. Nation-building thereby goes beyond nationalist party ideologies in its aim of legitimating the state itself. Governments of whatever stripe are the key actors in nation-building, whereas a whole range of movements may claim to represent sub-state or irredentist nationalism, from inclusive democratic parties to neo-fascist or terrorist organisations.

The link between popular sovereignty, the nation and state legitimacy is now often taken for granted in ‘helping people to imagine the world as composed of sovereign nation-states’ (Calhoun 2007, 8). This conceptual triad is not a given, however. Feudal and imperial forms of government preceded today’s so-called ‘Westphalian system’, and scholars are also exploring alternative ways of organising the political communities of the future (Archibugi 2003; Kostakopoulou 2008). The increasing use of the term ‘post-national’ in scholarly discourse also seems to suggest that nations and nationalism are being transcended. Prominent advocates of post-national politics, such as the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (2003, 193), argue for a form of ‘constitutional patriotism’ whereby national loyalty is replaced by an allegiance to democratic values (although the people, or *demos*, may yet be contained within a state). Others go further in arguing that it is time to move on ‘from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook’ (Beck & Sznaider 2010 [2006], 382). Still others wish to see global solidarity derived from shared human rights, or even a world democratic order (Archibugi 2003; Held 1995). This last is certainly a noble ideal, but it requires a common basis of rights and values, which is far from undisputed. The ‘Asian values’ debate, for instance, has revolved around the argument that existing human rights declarations are not necessarily universal, and that achieving a truly global consensus would be neither possible nor desirable (Sutherland 2006). The present text is not post-national in its orientation, because it does not seek to transcend nationalism or nation-building analytically. Instead, it aims to explore precisely how these ideologies respond to the cosmopolitan challenge, leading us to the next key term of cosmopolitanism.

## Cosmopolitanism

The word cosmopolitan derives from the Greek term *cosmos*, or universe, and *polis*, or city. In the small-scale democracies, or city-states, of Ancient Greece, early cosmopolitans sought to undermine the boundaries of the *polis*. The concept is also strongly associated with Immanuel Kant, who argued for an individual's right to hospitality when travelling abroad (for an overview of the conceptual history of cosmopolitanism, see Axtmann 2011; Delanty 2009; Harvey 2009; Kostakopoulou 2008). In the social sciences, the study of cosmopolitanism experienced a revival at the turn of the twenty-first century (Glick-Schiller 2010), and this text is concerned with its contemporary manifestations. Like nationalism, the concept of cosmopolitanism covers a wide variety of phenomena today, which can be broadly divided into its cultural, political and ethical dimensions. Of these, the cultural cosmopolitan is perhaps the most readily recognisable, as embodied in the men and women of means, who travel the globe for work and play. One should not be too quick to associate this kind of cosmopolitan only with professional or educated classes, however, since migrant workers taking on menial jobs also build up transnational networks through diaspora communities, remittances and a concomitant hybrid culture (Werbner 1999). Politically, cosmopolitan democracy demands supranational institutions capable of tackling and managing global issues, with or without the coexistence of state governance (Archibugi 2003; Held 1995). Finally, ethical cosmopolitanism aspires to achieve a worldwide standard of human rights based on common values, and to tackle social disparities on a global scale (Guibernau 2007, 159). Examples of cosmopolitanism's normative impact would include embracing the politics of difference within nation-states, or looking beyond state-based governance to envision global systems of rights and justice. Such views need not be directed towards a global 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) to replace the nation, even though the cosmopolitan outlook certainly transcends nation-state boundaries. Neither must these different strands of cosmopolitanism overlap, or even pursue the same goals. Ethical cosmopolitans, for instance, tend to emphasise what people have in common, whereas cultural cosmopolitans highlight their diversity. For the purposes of the present text, it is important to look at some of the consequences of a cosmopolitan perspective for how we understand the nation.

In his book *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (2009), David Harvey surveys a number of so-called 'adjectival cosmopolitanisms'

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that all attempt to reconcile ‘respect for local differences with compelling universal principles’ (Harvey 2009, 114). These include the ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ put forward by Anthony Appiah (1998, 2006), which echo Ulf Hannerz’s view that ‘home is not necessarily a place where cosmopolitanism is in exile’ (cited in Harvey 2009, 169). Though keen to avoid essentialising the concept of culture, Appiah argues that local loyalties are a necessary springboard for pursuing universal goals, if these are to be historically informed and respectful of diversity. In other words, the multiculturalism explored in Chapter 3 is an important basis for Appiah’s approach. David Harvey, on the other hand, sees in this and other cosmopolitan projects the need to convert those who do not conform, to denounce violence and fundamentalism in the name of recognition and tolerance, and thereby run the risk of sliding into the very forms of chauvinism and exclusionary nationalism they seek to condemn (Harvey 2009, 119). According to Harvey, simplistic constructions of the ‘Other’ writ large, which are such a potent part of nationalist ideology, are partly to blame here. For instance, both former United States president George W. Bush’s depiction of an ‘Axis of Evil’, and the British Labour government’s use of a diffuse terrorist threat to link conflict in Afghanistan with security on Britain’s streets, created an evil ‘Other’ designed to foster international solidarity and support for foreign wars. Indeed, the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ and the ‘war against terror’ could also be read as a form of ethical cosmopolitanism long championed by the United States in its self-professed role as a beacon of liberty for the world (Billig 1995, 90; Harvey 2009, 8). At the same time, however, this cosmopolitan conceit is built around nation-states as unitary, unified entities that can allegedly be rendered more secure through interstate warfare. In such cases, then, the demands of nation-building coincide with appeals to shared, cosmopolitan values.

States’ continuous need for nation-building demonstrates that notions of belonging are never cemented and secure; maintaining a sense of national solidarity in order to support nation-state legitimacy is an ongoing process. For instance, soldier and civilian morale must be boosted with assurances that the country’s cause is right and good, and even the most patriotic citizen’s loyalty can be eroded if the state continually disappoints or fails to deliver. To take another example, government appeals for individual sacrifices during an economic downturn are routinely justified on grounds of national solidarity, but this is not always a winning argument. In the wake of the global, so-called ‘credit crunch’ of 2009–10, strikes

and demonstrations greeted news of large government cuts in Greece and Spain, which were badly hit by economic mismanagement and unemployment respectively. The scaled-down political cosmopolitanism embodied in the European currency union, one of the world's most advanced experiments in supranational solidarity, was also put under severe strain by the financial crisis. This directly pitted the need for member states to stand together in defending the single currency against public opinion hostile to transnational bail-outs. In the face of domestic opposition, for example, Germany's government eventually opted to contribute to supporting Greece, Ireland and Portugal's flailing economies. Although the issue was often presented in the German media as a fundamentally irreconcilable conflict, the strength and stability of the euro currency was as much in the national interest of each Eurozone member as that of the group as a whole (*Economist* 2010b, 48). Nevertheless, a zero-sum analysis organised around the opposition of nation-state sovereignty and supranational solidarity remained dominant, illustrating one way in which contemporary nationalism and cosmopolitanism collide in practice. How else do the cosmopolitan and the national combine?

As a geographer, David Harvey (2009) is concerned with the concepts of space, place and territory, and how they ground our understanding of everything from local knowledge, through living in our homeland, to a more inchoate sense of national belonging. He distinguishes between absolute space, exemplified by border posts and the idea of sovereign states as bounded power containers, and spaces that are partly defined through their relationship to periods in time, emotions, symbols and other associations (Harvey 2009, 250; see also Closs Stephens 2010). Harvey is interested in what links territory as a basis of political organisation with the emotional power invested in people's sense of place. He also thinks about how people's loyalties are most effectively mobilised across these dimensions: 'While regions, states, or nations may appear at one level as mere imagined abstractions, the sense of a territorial bond and of an affective loyalty to it has enormous political significance' (Harvey 2009, 171). This suggests that territorial bonds continue to shape both individual allegiances and state practices, without necessarily excluding the cosmopolitan dimension. There are scholars, like Martha Nussbaum (1996), who urge individuals to 'construct relational loyalties with everyone living on planet earth' (Harvey 2009, 163) by imagining a set of concentric circles around the self, family, community, nation and finally all of humanity. However, this approach seems to employ the same notions of bounded

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communities, territories and regions that an analysis of contemporary nation-building as flexible, porous and open to the cosmopolitan challenge seeks to transcend (Sutherland 2010, 22). Thinking about nations in territorial terms may make them easier to grasp, but it can also distract us from the many other markings of belonging – including myths of common descent, hostile constructions of the ‘Other’, heroic sacrifice and sporting symbolism – which all serve to bind people to their nation. Nation-building is also premised on enforcing borders, and the sort of policing and passport checking that are relatively recent innovations. Yet the main thrust of the cosmopolitan challenge lies precisely in confronting nationalism with the oft-divided loyalties of diaspora communities, with how to integrate migrants and other transnational flows, and with how to respond to regionalisation and globalisation. This questions the assumption that state sovereignty simply derives from controlling territory, when information, trade and population flows pierce state borders at every moment of the day or night. These flows do not magically make borders disappear, because borders continue to have life-changing meaning for the identity and status of asylum seekers, so-called illegal immigrants and irredentist movements among others. However, the increasing porosity of borders suggests the need for a reappraisal of territorial boundaries and how these relate to wider, multidimensional understandings of belonging related to cosmopolitanism. An analysis in terms of concentric circles or other bounded metaphors does not do justice to these complex networks of criss-crossing population flows and transnational allegiances (Sutherland 2010, 22). By contrast, an analysis of nationalism within the context of the cosmopolitan challenge incorporates some of these dynamics.

As discussed above, some critical studies of cosmopolitanism have moved away from its universalist tradition as a commitment to a global community of human beings, in order to locate it in a more ‘rooted’, particularist philosophical tradition (Robbins 1998, 1). Gerard Delanty (2009, 17), for one, ‘reject[s] a purely dichotomous view’ of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, pointing out that the ‘national has never been entirely national, but has always been embroiled with immanent cosmopolitan orientations’. Mary Kaldor, in turn, while condemning the backwardness and violent exclusivity of much ‘new nationalism’ and lauding a cosmopolitan alternative, still deems it possible that ‘nationalisms could be harnessed to a cosmopolitan politics that reflected the complexity of contemporary conditions’ (Kaldor 2004, 176). In a discussion of nationalism and cosmopolitanism published in 2007, Calhoun sees ‘tensions between two different ways of imagining

the world' (Calhoun 2007, 8). A later intervention, however, suggests that we 'need not simply oppose cosmopolitanism and belonging [...] They can be complements to each other' (Calhoun 2008, 434). Similarly, the interplay between nationalism and the cosmopolitan challenge is not understood here as an inherently conflictual, zero-sum game; it is not a question of two ideologies confronting one another, or 'national identity versus cosmopolitan identity' (Guibernau 2007, 159). Instead, there seems to be potential for complementarity between the two.

Gerard Delanty's wide definition of cosmopolitanism as a transformative process, whereby the dynamics of cultural and societal interaction create the conditions for 'new ways of thinking and acting' (Delanty 2009, 252), provides a useful starting point for exploring the evolving relationship between the cosmopolitan and the national. This approach does not see cosmopolitanism as an 'alternative to globalisation or the nation-state' but rather as an orientation 'embedded [...] in current societal developments' (Delanty 2009, 250). Neither does it regard identities, ideologies or communities as either mutually exclusive or essential categories. People will flit or gravitate between any number of these depending on time and circumstance, and no single label can sum up any individual. This interpretation of identities and cosmopolitanism is also open to – and indeed premised on – transnationalism, since it is composed of cross-cultural encounters. Yet at the same time, the transnational 'signifies the resilience of nations and the state' (Binnie 2003, 599) because the concept of 'transnational' also presupposes the existence of national borders to be crossed. Accordingly, contemporary nationalism is informed by transnationalism both across and within nation-state borders, since multiculturalism also highlights the 'transnationality that is arising inside nation-states' (Beck and Sznaider 2010 [2006], 389). This suggests that the cosmopolitan challenge is not necessarily on course to clash with nationalist ideology.

## **Methodological Cosmopolitanism**

Leading scholars of cosmopolitanism agree that classic, bounded, territorial sovereignty – if it ever existed – is being redefined, and that new legal frameworks are emerging at a supranational level (Beck & Sznaider 2010 [2006]; Glick-Schiller 2010; Held 2010, 54; Soysal 2010). In Beck and Sznaider's view (2010 [2006], 382), it is time to move on 'from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook [...] and

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raise some of the key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the cosmopolitanisation of reality poses for the social sciences'. This provides one starting point for a critique of state-centred reasoning and policy-making spanning a whole range of ethical, legal and political issues. At the same time, cosmopolitanism refers to the global trend that Beck and Sznaider called 'the cosmopolitanisation of reality'. This approximates to the cosmopolitan challenge as defined here, and sums up the range of pressures confronting contemporary nation-states and nationalists alike. By considering how cosmopolitan theory and methodology can be applied to the social sciences – which have long been structured around nation-states – Beck and Sznaider propose a 'critique of methodological nationalism' (2010 [2006], 382). In so doing, they question the frequent equation of states with societies in both qualitative and quantitative academic analyses, as well as the assumption that nation-states are the 'natural and necessary form of society' (Chernilo 2006, 129). An alternative approach might, for instance, focus on transnational flows rather than bounded communities, or seek to deconstruct 'the unexamined territorial frame of the nation-state' (Harvey 2009, 267). This signals a shift away from nation-states as rather monolithic units of analysis and comparison towards an emphasis on relational, heterogeneous identities, and the transnational dynamics which shape our ever-evolving understanding of the nation-state. In other words; 'Methodological nationalism needs to be transcended because, rather than allowing us to capture the actual complications of the history of the nation-state in modernity, it turns the nation-state into the natural organizing principle of modernity' (Chernilo 2006, 137). According to this view, analysis of change trumps tradition, and emphasis on transformation is deemed to hold greater analytical power than the tendency towards reifying, or essentialising, national identities and interests. Following Delanty (2009, 70), examples of cosmopolitanism as a dynamic process of transformation range from the limited horizon of mutual recognition and a consumption-led appropriation of other cultures, through liberal multiculturalism, to new forms of national unity as a result of contact with the 'Other'. Far from requiring the transcendence of the nation-state, this last form of cosmopolitanism takes place through the nation-state.

The empirical encounter of nationalism and cosmopolitanism can best be grasped, then, by an analytical perspective that looks beyond the boundaries of methodological nationalism. For instance, a cosmopolitan perspective could be helpful in understanding the impact of international

communism and capitalism on nation-building in the likes of Germany, China and Vietnam (Delanty 2009, 253; Sutherland 2010). The German nation-state, with its long-standing commitment to European integration, its globalised economy, its experience of reintegrating a German diaspora, and its mixed record in coping with migration and asylum-seekers, is one particularly interesting case for studying nation-building from a cosmopolitan perspective. Beyond the focus on nations and nationalism, the approach also allows for integrated study of wider international dynamics, not only in the field of migration and population flows, but also concerning security questions, international law and intervention, transatlantic relations, economic networks, and trading regimes, among other issues. From this point of view, the nation-state remains the nodal point of analysis where diverse aspects of the cosmopolitan challenge intersect. Globalisation, transnationalism, migration, diaspora and regionalisation all have an impact on the evolution of contemporary nationalism and nation-building through a transformative process summed up as the cosmopolitan challenge. Self-consciously cosmopolitan approaches seek to capture these flows both analytically and methodologically.

As we have seen, cosmopolitan thinking encompasses much more than a utopian vision for doing away with national allegiances or the existing nation-state system. Scholarly work is also well under way to link social enquiry with political theory (Delanty 2009; Harvey 2009; Kostakopoulou 2008). This endeavour has both normative and methodological implications for the way in which we study politics in general and nationalism in particular. By privileging the analysis of cross-border flows rather than stopping at state frontiers, a cosmopolitan approach disrupts the binary distinction between 'home' and 'abroad'. At the conceptual level, a cosmopolitan orientation leaves behind so-called 'methodological nationalism' by also looking beyond borders for the sources and routes of transformation. At the empirical level, it examines 'a process of globe-spanning fundamental social change that is making new theoretical insights possible' (Glick-Schiller 2010, 415). Nations nonetheless remain a key subject for investigation, because cosmopolitan transformations occur through the nation-state empirically and also offer new conceptual perspectives on those nation-states. Some forms of contemporary nationalism will emerge as more multicultural, others as less tolerant and open in response to the cosmopolitan challenge. What is certain is that, as an eminently flexible ideology, nationalism today is reacting and adapting to that challenge, and this text explores some of the ways in which this is taking

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place. The overall approach is therefore more ‘analytical-empirical’ than ‘normative-political’ (Soysal 2010, 409), though a brief word on ethical cosmopolitanism is warranted here.

### **Ethical Cosmopolitanism**

In addition to its role as a conceptual framework and a tool of empirical study, cosmopolitanism has an important normative dimension, which, as we have seen, can be portrayed as a desirable alternative to nationalism. Calhoun (2008, 429) points out that as a ‘normative program,’ cosmopolitanism ‘offers an ethics for globalisation’, and charts its rise as an elite project of ‘world citizenship’ in which particularism, unless it is of Anthony Appiah’s liberal, tolerant stripe, is frowned upon. Calhoun opines that ‘[c]osmopolitanism may be a cultural orientation, but it is never the absence of culture. It is produced and reinforced by belonging to transnational networks and to a community of fellow-cosmopolitans. There are different such communities – academic and corporate and NGO, religious and secular’ (Calhoun 2008, 442). This raises the question as to whether, and if so how, allegiance to a cosmopolitan community can co-exist with belonging to a national community. For example, much of the debate and soul-searching surrounding Germany’s ‘normalisation’ following its reunification in 1990 turned on exactly this issue. In normative terms, a sense of solidarity towards other human beings can conceivably go hand in hand with a sense of national belonging. To put it another way, it should be possible to celebrate at once the unity and diversity of peoples, a formula that has often been used within the European Union and other regional organisations (Sutherland 2005b). As Calhoun (2008, 444) reminds us, ‘Nationalism was also (at least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism with felt community. This doesn’t mean that we should not seek more cosmopolitan values, cultural knowledge, and styles of interpersonal relations in modern national democracies’. When Calhoun (2008, 444) goes on to pose the seminal question ‘Does cosmopolitanism actually underpin effective political solidarity, or only offer an attractive counterbalance to nationalism?’, he asks whether it can potentially be reconciled with a form of nationalism that is inclusive, aware of porous borders and shifting populations, and espouses an ever-evolving self-understanding. Setting the parameters of this ideal-type nationalism has exercised many scholars (Canovan 1996; Millar 1995; Kostakopoulou 2006; Tamir 1993;

Viroli 1995). However, Partha Chatterjee (2005, 940) doubts whether it is possible to ‘experience the simultaneity of the imagined collective life of the nation without imposing rigid and arbitrary criteria of membership’. This necessarily endangers the ethical cosmopolitan ideal by distinguishing a relatively privileged ‘in-group’ of citizens from an ‘out-group’ of non-members. Notwithstanding this sobering warning, a pragmatic combination of cosmopolitanism and nationalism would seem more attainable than jettisoning nationalism altogether in favour of an all-but-unrealisable global community. Contemplating such a community would simply mean constructing a form of nationalism writ large, insofar as it would replicate its need for solidarity, loyalty and legitimation on an impractical and unmanageably broad scale. Neither is the tantalising but radical alternative of uncoupling national markers from citizenship regimes likely to make much real headway in the foreseeable future (Baubock 1994; Kostakopoulou 2008). In the meantime, as Calhoun (2008, 19) puts it, ‘We need to be global in part through how we are national’.

On the one hand, cosmopolitanism shines the spotlight on diversity within nation-state boundaries as they are currently recognised. On the other, insofar as it scrutinises cartographic, political and legal boundaries, it reveals their porosity and limited applicability to how people’s lives actually map out ‘on the ground’. However, to use this spatial metaphor suggests some sort of tiered analysis of territorial levels; namely the local, national, regional and perhaps global. Similar to Martha Nussbaum’s approach to cosmopolitanism, this soon encounters its self-imposed limits, and therefore limitations, which critical geographers have done much to illuminate (see Sutherland 2010, 14). By contrast, the wider, more dynamic understanding of cosmopolitanism put forward here attempts to reflect the multifaceted nature of the cosmopolitan challenge by bringing globalisation and regionalisation together with transnationalism, migration and diaspora so as to examine their interplay and the creative challenge to nationalism that they represent. Using a term like the ‘cosmopolitan challenge’ to cover such a variety of phenomena inevitably masks a great deal of conceptual complexity and debate surrounding seminal questions, including the sources of human solidarity and the best way to organise societies. It may also be criticised for simply serving old wine in new bottles (Welch & Wittlinger 2011). Nevertheless, it serves as useful shorthand for describing the contemporary situation, to which nationalists and nation-builders must respond in order to remain resilient in the current global political climate.

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Borderlines are useful concepts only inasmuch as we know they can be disrupted, redrawn, undermined and reorganised in the process of building nation-states and defining their members, interests and policies. A cosmopolitan perspective goes some way towards capturing the complexity of contemporary nation-states and nationalist movements. The empirical concern with the impact of globalisation, regionalisation, migration, diaspora and transnationalism on contemporary nationalist ideology can be usefully brought under the banner of the cosmopolitan challenge, because together these encourage a reassessment of the bordered definition and delimitation of nation-states, or 'methodological nationalism', which the twenty-first-century global context demands. If we look beyond Martha Nussbaum's focus on a single universe of human beings, we encounter a whole range of possibilities: 'adjectival' cosmopolitanisms, 'situated' cosmopolitanisms and cosmopolitanisms, which commingle a global perspective with a national or local level. Writing in 1998, Bruce Robbins already observed that '[f]or better or worse, there is a growing consensus that cosmopolitanism sometimes works together with nationalism rather than in opposition to it' (Robbins 1998, 2). Despite the changes to sovereignty and control over populations wrought by globalisation, states and sub-state movements still use appeals to national solidarity in order to mobilise loyalty and foster legitimacy. This is reason enough to explore the implications of the cosmopolitan challenge for contemporary nationalist ideology.

### **Structure of the Book**

The very flexibility of nationalist ideology does not preclude support for regionalisation, globalisation, migration or another ideology. If nationalism is viewed as a 'thin' ideology capable of being supplemented with a variety of policies and strategies (Freedman 1998), then it is not necessarily incompatible with the cosmopolitan challenge. This is one of the text's core contentions, and provides the basis for discussing a range of contemporary nationalist cases. The first three chapters focus on nationalism theory and nationalist ideology, in order to understand why nationalism is so wide-ranging and how it is combined with other ideologies. The second three chapters of the text look at nationalism from a sub-state, state and supra-state perspective in turn, using the cross-cutting nature of the cosmopolitan challenge as a unifying theme.

The first chapter examines theories of nationalism. A long-standing academic debate between so-called ethno-symbolist and modernist scholars has sought to pinpoint the origins of nations and nationalism. As their moniker suggests, ethno-symbolists trace the roots of nations far back in time to a symbolic ethnic community, whereas modernists variously argue that nations are a product of modern industrialisation, urbanisation or mass communication. Few scholars adopt positions at these extreme poles, however, and most share some common ground. The chapter examines the usefulness of these established theories in explaining contemporary nationalism. Theoretical approaches to contemporary nationalism are also surveyed, and so-called ‘neo-nationalisms’ (McCrone 1998) are shown to be extremely flexible in their pursuit of legitimacy. Postcolonialism is also addressed in the final section. The chapter concludes that contemporary nationalisms differ from older variants, but that the debate between ethno-symbolists and modernists continues to be relevant today insofar as many nationalists themselves claim to represent an ancient nation, and demand recognition on that basis. National divisions are not immutable but constructed, and yet nationalist ideologues continue to mobilise followers using appeals to primordial symbols.

Chapter 2 explores some of the many variants of nationalism. Just as nationalism can be chauvinistic and exclusionary, so it can be defined more openly by offering a share in a common project. The analytical distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism is used as a starting point for discussing the question of precisely ‘who belongs?’ Another useful way of thinking about nationalism is to contrast ‘hot’ nationalism, which may be virulent and violent, with ‘banal’ nationalism (Billig 1995), understood as taken for granted markers of national loyalty and belonging. The chapter argues that it is a mistake automatically to associate ‘hot’, or violent nationalism with atavistic ethnic loyalties and long-standing tensions. Such animosities can also be instigated for political ends where previously there was peaceful cohabitation. The chapter discusses a few of the many forms that nationalism has taken in providing the ideological underpinnings for both peaceful and violent struggles to create new nations. It suggests that the reasons for an extreme response must be sought in the degree of economic, political, social and cultural conflict in each case. What emerges from the discussion is that nationalism is an infinitely adaptable, protean ideology which continues to play a central role in politics all over the world.

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Chapter 3 explores how nationalism interacts with other ideologies, principally communism and liberal democracy. All forms of nationalism draw on a recent or more distant past in their reading of the current climate, be it the injustices of the Soviet system or pre-modern myths. The ideological cleavage of the Cold War may have largely melted away, but post-communist countries continue to grapple with its legacy. In Eastern Europe, the break-up of the Soviet Union formed the basis for demands formulated in ethnic nationalist terms, which have proved difficult to reconcile with multiculturalism. Estonia provides a case in point. Elsewhere, as in Vietnam, combining nationalism and communism is still a current concern. The chapter also considers whether democracy is compatible with nationalism. It argues that the people, or *demos*, can be equated with the civic nation in an ideal-type nation-state based on the principle of popular sovereignty, but that a concomitant sense of national belonging cannot be taken for granted. The cases of Fiji and India are used for illustration here. The practical strategies and successes of communists and democrats alike often rest on a combination of their core ideological principles with nationalist appeals. The precise form these take will depend on many factors, including economics, leadership, emotion, (perceived) injustice, oppression, conflict and the nature of the 'Other' with which campaigners are confronted.

Chapter 4 focuses on sub-state nationalism. Every variant of nationalism – from terrorist nationalists, through democratic independence movements, to established nation-states – aims to represent the nation through some control of territory and institutions. Minority nationalists seek to reinvent sub-state territories as hubs of social, economic and political activity, as well as an alternative locus of identity to the existing nation-state construct (Keating 2001). Today, these nationalists tend to show flexibility in articulating the link between the individual and the collective. To be successful in achieving greater autonomy, competence in economic matters is also important. Indeed, some use 'emotional-economic' rhetoric in an attempt to channel potentially conflicting sentiments into support for their movement. Contemporary sub-state nationalism therefore often displays a mix of civic and ethnic markers, mobilised differently according to the changing constellations of power at state and international levels. Yet the nationalist ideology of individual parties must be carefully distinguished from a more diffuse sense of national identity, which is not (party) political. With reference to cases spanning three continents, the chapter argues that contemporary sub-state nationalism is capable of adapting evidence of long-standing

community links to the current political environment, but also of manipulating and inventing traditions along the way.

Chapter 5 looks at nation-building, or official state nationalism, and its links with citizenship and migration. The chapter argues that a decoupling of the concepts 'nation' and 'state' remains unlikely in contemporary politics, where citizenship legislation still derives from nation-based criteria. Further, some forms of nation-building continue to emphasise ethnic or cultural markers over civic ones, which are usually understood as shared rights, obligations and democratic values. This has important implications for migrants and their wish, or ability, to naturalise as citizens. In practice, contemporary nation-states tend to advocate some cultural homogeneity in the population through integrative measures. Once avowedly multicultural states such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, for instance, are now using citizenship and language tests as a response to fears of social fragmentation. The chapter concludes that nationalist principles continue to underpin government legitimacy at the state level, and permeate current debates surrounding immigration and citizenship.

Chapter 6 asks how contemporary nationalism responds to globalisation and regionalisation. Like their nineteenth-century predecessors, contemporary forms of nationalism have evolved in an environment where statehood and sovereignty play a central role. Unlike them, however, they now also have to contend with globalisation and supranational integration. Some states are accustomed to international cooperation. Indeed, nation-builders may even use globalisation's economic potential to bolster their legitimacy through rising living standards, in return for national and labour solidarity (Brown 2000, 87). In turn, regional integration may be deemed to underpin rather than undermine nation-building, as in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and in some interpretations of African regionalism. The chapter begins by discussing the evolution of the Southeast Asian region, which, like the nation, is itself a construct. The tensions inherent in reconciling nationalism and supranational integration are then discussed in the context of African regionalism, before returning to Southeast Asia to examine the interplay of nationalism and globalisation there. The chapter looks at different responses to reconciling nationalism and nation-building with supranational cooperation and globalisation, concluding that they can be complementary.

Since the end of the Cold War, the ideological rift which once divided the world has been superseded by the cosmopolitan challenge to

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nation-states and sub-state nationalisms. Nevertheless, nationalism continues to provide states with a sense of community on the one hand, and helps fuel movements for self-determination on the other. The text concludes that contemporary nationalism is a multi-faceted and evolving ideology, which shapes both state legitimacy and demands for sub-state autonomy. Regardless of whether it is 'hot' or 'banal', primordial or modern, nationalist ideology is here to stay, underlining the need for a differentiated understanding of its many variants. It is a powerful and flexible political instrument which resonates with every individual – the vast majority – who identifies with a particular nation. The distinction between state and sub-state nationalism may become less relevant to a globalising world, in which the locus of power and authority is increasingly fluid and diffuse. The cosmopolitan challenge has prompted reappraisals of nationalist ideology and strategy, but it will not change the fact that nationalism remains a nodal point of twenty-first-century political debate, since the global political map is still established and reconfigured in predominantly nationalist terms.

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