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Introduction

The British encounter with India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries generated a rich and prodigious volume of published texts (and images) from a breadth and diversity of genres that included drama, poetry, histories, polemical materials, travel narratives, newspaper accounts, and translations and scholarly investigations of Sanskrit and Indo-Persian texts. This encounter also engendered significant cultural production of Indo-Persian texts and images – much of which was parallel in terms of genre – but the vast majority of these materials circulated in manuscript as opposed to printed and published form. *British Encounters with India* anthologizes British, Anglo-Indian, and Indian representations of various facets of the cross-cultural engagement and interaction between Britain and India that were published, discussed, and debated within the public spheres of both urban Britain and India between 1750 and 1830. Interrogation of this material evidences not only the complex character and nature of the encounter within emerging British colonialism in India, but it also recovers the means by which issues of identity and cultural (mis-)understanding shaped (and were shaped by) these texts and images and how both changed over time. Our introduction here provides contexts to facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the materials within the anthology, first by examining the historical background and historiographic renderings of the British engagement with India between 1750 and 1830, and then by investigating the means by which postcolonial theory has clarified and complicated representations of the British encounter with India.

Historical Background

The English East India Company (EIC), chartered by Queen Elizabeth at the end of 1600, initiated English links and contacts with India.[1] It was a joint-stock company that was granted by patent a monopoly of English trade to Asia and given the right to engage in diplomacy with foreign polities, as well as to arm in defense of its interests its vessels and factories (i.e., its trading settlements with warehouses where EIC "factors" collected commodities for maritime shipment). Unlike the Portuguese in India, the English state committed no capital or military resources

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1 While English at its inception, the EIC was of course British after the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707. From the beginning, the EIC employed significant numbers of Irish, Scots, and Welsh.

to trade in Asia. Consequently, the unique corporate structure and monopoly right encouraged private investment, spread risk, and allowed for the protection of assets in distant and uncertain markets. Like its main European competitor in Asia, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established in 1602, the EIC was centrally organized, with a 24-member Court of Directors. These Directors were elected by shareholders (the proprietors) and oversaw a corporate structure and systems of communications and accountability with staff (often referred to as servants, writers, or factors) recruited and developed with specific skills for employment both in London and in Asia. Historians have generally seen these East India companies as important antecedents to the modern corporation.[2]

In the seventeenth century, the EIC found it difficult to compete with the stronger and better-capitalized VOC in the lucrative spice trade with the Indonesian archipelago and therefore focused its commercial efforts in India. With the exception of Malabar pepper, India provided little of value in the lucrative global spice trade. Instead, the EIC prospered through the marketing of different Indian products such as saltpeter (used in the manufacture of gunpowder), indigo, and most importantly, by the end of the seventeenth century, hand-loomed cotton textiles. This trade was sustained by the so-called commercial and consumer revolutions in late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Britain that were nourished by higher rates of agricultural productivity, buoyant overseas trade, and heightened domestic consumerism. These developments were associated with a growing "middling order" in society, increasing literacy, and a greater cultural sense of fashionability, materialism, and acquisitiveness. By the late seventeenth century, EIC designers in London were developing "oriental" and *chinois* patterns to outsource to servants in India to have manufactured through Indian brokers by local hand-loom weavers. Indian cottons became a major English re-export to its American settler colonies, and the profits gained were used to secure staple products like tobacco and sugar, but also silver from colonial Latin America. They were also sold as guinea cloth in West Africa, an increasingly important commodity in the conduct of the Atlantic slave trade.

An inherent challenge always faced by the EIC in Asian trading was the absence of an appropriate English commodity to export in exchange, woolen textiles and metal goods having little market in Asia. Consequently, EIC trade was for the most part conducted in American silver which was drawn from Britain's positive trade balance with Spain and its colonies, and which was highly valued in India, where no silver mines existed. However, the development of the trade in cottons helped lessen the reliance on silver bullion as a sole means of exchange. Working with Indian merchants on the Coromandel coast in the southeast of the Indian subcontinent, the EIC used these cottons to make inroads in the spice trade with

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2 See Nick Robins, *The Corporation that Changed the World: How the* East India Company *Shaped the Modern Multinational* (2006). Further readings and sources for the historical background are found in the Bibliography and Further Reading.

Indonesia and to procure cheaper sources of silver from Japan. Likewise, Gujarati merchants used Indian cottons in trade with Persia and the Yemen and secured the EIC sources of silks and coffee, as the coffee house – a place of literary and cultural exchange – became increasingly popular in urban Britain. Hence, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the EIC's activities, servants, and factors were focused upon India. At the same time, the EIC and its Indian brokers and merchants conducted trade that extended from Japan to the Red Sea and indirectly through British Atlantic merchants to West Africa and the Americas.

While prosperous, the EIC by the end of the seventeenth century was almost completely dependent on the Mughal emperor for its security and commercial position in India. The Mughal empire in India was established by the Central Asian invader Babur (1483–1530), who was descended directly from the last great nomadic emperor Timur (1336–1405), and more distantly from the Mongol Chingiz Khan (1167–1227). The Timurid dynasty of Mughal emperors lasted until the British deposed and exiled Bahadur Shah Zafar to Burma after the Revolt of 1857. Contemporaneous with the great early modern land-based Eurasian "gunpowder" empires (i.e. the Ottoman, Safavid, and Qing), the Mughal Empire reached its largest spatial extent under the emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707), when it encompassed virtually all of South Asia. The Mughal empire was an Islamicate state,[3] and its ruling elite was drawn not just from Central Asia but from diverse elements, most notably migrant Shi'a Persians, locally born Sunni Muslims, and some Hindu Brahmans and Rajputs. This ruling elite was a service elite who received the right to collect taxes (the *jagir*) on pieces of land as a salary for civil or military service. These landholders (*zamindars*) in receipt of the *jagir* were also responsible for collecting taxes locally and in theory accountable to provincial governors (the *nawabs*). Hence, like other early modern states, the Mughal empire was a centralized state unified not by religion, in this case, but by an ideology of loyalty to the emperor and by a Persianate culture of administration where its lower civil and military levels of officialdom were predominantly non-Muslim. While political accommodation to a non-Muslim majority was practical, the Mughal empire was decidedly cosmopolitan – in spite of British impressions otherwise (1.4). It witnessed considerable innovation and hybridity in cultural production from architecture and the visual arts to science and philosophy between and within both Northern and Southern India, and drew from Persian, Sufi, and Vedic traditions and cultural forms that can be considered Indo-Persian.[4]

The Mughal emperors in the seventeenth century had granted the EIC the right to establish factories in specified localities partly as a consequence of the EIC's naval capacity, but also as a means to promote a profitable commerce and to

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3 This term was coined by Marshall Hodgson, who explains that it "refers not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims." See Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Volume I: The Classical Age of Islam* (1977), p. 59.

4 See in particular Catherine Asher and Cynthia Talbert, *India before Europe* (2006).

encourage European competition (and higher prices) between the Portuguese, Dutch and, by the 1670s, the French. In contrast to the Portuguese and French, who supported the Jesuits, the British promise to forbid Christian missionary proselytizing from its settlements in India was important in gaining these rights and privileges from the Mughal emperor. Partly for purposes of defense, but mostly to concentrate trading functions and facilitate entrepot activities near important textile producing regions, the EIC by the early eighteenth century had established three Presidency capitals: Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. It should be noted that the number of EIC servants and factors resident in India at this time numbered no more than in the hundreds in each presidency and that a considerable percentage were Irish or European. While many of these servants could build considerable fortunes through "private trading" (i.e., profiting from trade internal to India and Asia) or lending to local Indian merchants and elites, the majority of wealth earned through official trading by the EIC went to its relatively small number of shareholders in London.

The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed considerable shifts in the politics and governance of both Britain and India. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 was instrumental in shifting the diplomatic and foreign policy concerns of the English state to develop a standing army and expand its navy to defend the Protestant Succession from French aggression and support for Catholic Stuart claims to the English Crown. This led directly to expansive and expensive wars with France between 1689 and 1713 and indirectly to the creation of the state of Great Britain with the unification of Scotland with England, Wales, and Ireland in 1707. These wars and the anxiety about the security of Protestantism created significant pressure upon the British state to develop means for raising revenue for strategic expenditure on warfare, with two significant consequences. First, it led to important innovations in state financing, referred to as the Financial Revolution, whereby the Bank of England was founded (1694) and new forms of public revenue and credit created, from state-issued annuities to traded government financial instruments and lottery schemes. This gave the British state the ability to generate deficits in times of war and to fund a National Debt systematically. This was an essential feature of the British fiscal–military state that would facilitate its ability to fight war in the eighteenth century on a global as opposed to European scale.[5]

Secondly, this system of public credit ultimately relied on the ability of the state to derive more revenue to maintain payments to, and the confidence of, financiers and citizen creditors. This ensured that Parliament met annually after 1688 to create and sustain financial legislation, and of course this massively increased the volume of state regulation in other realms as well. Parliament became in essence sovereign, and governance became increasingly a public exercise as

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5 See John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (1990), Tim Keirn, "The Reactive State: English Governance and Society, 1689–1750" (1992), and Stephen Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (2009).

opposed to the private conduct of government that had taken place within the closed confines of the King's Privy Council characteristic of the period before 1688. Parliamentary government and elections, in conjunction with the end of press censorship in 1697, led to a distinctive political culture in eighteenth-century Britain that was characterized by a rapid expansion of print in the forms of newspapers (1.11, 2.3, 2.7, 3.7, 4.5, 4.7–8, 5.3–5, 5.10, 6.1–4, 7.5), journals (1.11, 4.11), travel narratives (3.2, 3.6, 5.6, 7.11, 7.13, 7.16), broadsheets, and pamphlets (2.1–2, 2.5–6), as well as poetry (2.9, 3.2, 4.4–5, 5.1, 6.1, 6.8), drama (1.4), and the novel. In this well-developed public sphere, a vigorous political discourse was conducted through conversations across all genres. In particular, it is important to realize that poetry in this period was not a means of personal expression, but a format for serious cultural and political discussion.

The EIC was not immune from these important political and financial developments. In the 1690s, its monopoly came under attack in Parliament by supporters of private traders who sought to end its monopoly upon Asian trade. Anticipating events in the late eighteenth century, an extensive pamphlet war broke out between EIC propagandists and its critics; the latter drew attention to the EIC Directors who were accused of exporting valuable silver bullion and endangering the war effort for their own private gain. In the end, a New East India Company was created in 1698 with a patent of monopoly by parliamentary statute in exchange for a £2 million loan to the government from its new shareholders. The two companies continued to coexist and carry on their public grievances and in 1712 were unified by Parliament in exchange for another significant contribution to the funding of the National Debt. This EIC's charter, and with its monopoly right, came before Parliament periodically for renewal until its monopoly was completely repealed in the Charter Act of 1833, a turning point in Britain's encounter with India that serves as the approximate chronological end of this anthology.

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Mughal empire began to unravel. This was partly a consequence of local resistance to heavy taxation, but it was also a result of the considerable economic independence of some *nawabs* such as those in Bengal and the Carnatic (Arcot) and the *nizams* of Hyderabad that was made possible by the wealth provided by European maritime trade. Moreover, the general prosperity and commercial expansion that took place under the Mughals in the seventeenth century gave rise to new mercantile and financial social groups who could in essence oversee tax collection through tax farming, and finance through borrowing, the independence of local rulers and regional states. In addition, ties of kinship and religious solidarity, such as those among the Jats and Sikhs of the Punjab, provided the political unity to revolt successfully against the Mughal. The greatest military threat to the Mughal were the Hindu Marathas, who were effectively confederated under the competent minister (*peshwa*) Baji Rao (1720–40), who successfully raided the Mughal capitol of Delhi in 1737 and did nothing to stop the brutal sacking of the city by the Persian Nadir Shah in 1739. By the middle of the eighteenth century,

the Mughal emperor had lost control of much of southern and western India and maintained sovereignty in name only in many other regions.

The middle of the eighteenth century was transformative in terms of Britain's encounter with India as it shifted from a relationship that was strictly commercial to one of conquest and dominion. By the 1740s, Anglo-French rivalry was enacted on a global scale, and the War of Austrian Succession (1740–8) was fought not only in Europe, but in India and North America as well. The French Governor General Joseph-François Dupleix in Pondicherry involved France in the succession crises of the Nawab of Arcot and Nizam of Hyderabad, supporting claimants with French troops in exchange for preferential trading conditions relative to Britain. In 1746, Dupleix drove the British out of Madras. In 1748, Madras was returned to the EIC at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle only after the British returned the fortress of Louisburg in Canada to France. In other words, Empire and imperial rivalry in both hemispheres were inseparable.

With Madras restored, but still concerned about French military and commercial interventions in the Carnatic, the EIC under Robert Clive captured Arcot in 1752 and restored their claimant to its throne, Muhammad Ali, to authority. The Nawab was commanded to pay the EIC for the cost of the conflict and to depend on the EIC army for its defense. In addition, the EIC gained the *jagir* from the Nawab in the outskirts of Madras, its initial entry into revenue collecting in Southern India. At about the same time, a far more significant "beachhead" was established in Bengal. With the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756–63), the EIC began to refortify their factory in Calcutta in fear of a French attack. The Bengal Nawab Siraj-ud-daula saw this as a violation of his authority and marched his army on Calcutta and defeated the remaining inhabitants, imprisoning them in the incident known as the "Black Hole of Calcutta" that was sensationalized in widely published accounts and informed British opinions about India well into the nineteenth century (1.6). In quick retaliation, Clive's army from Madras recaptured Calcutta and routed the forces of Siraj-ud-daula at the Battle of Plassey (1757) with the connivance of a group of Bengali bankers led by Jagat Seth and the general Mir Jafar, who was installed as Nawab. In a last gasp move of Bengal *nawabi* independence, Mir Jafar's successor Mir Qasim (himself put in power by the British) led an unsuccessful revolt against the authority of the EIC with the support of the Nawab of Awadh, Shuja-ud-daula (7.2, 7.4, 7.15), and the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II. At the battle of Buxar in 1764, the EIC army defeated Mir Qasim's allied army and at the Treaty of Allahabad in 1765 secured the *diwani* (i.e., the right to administer tax collection) of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa from the Mughal emperor.

The revenue that came to the EIC from the creation of dominion in Bengal was astounding. Not only did the EIC procure the land taxes of Bengal, but it also took over the inland trade in salt, saltpeter, and other valuable commodities. The Nawab of Awadh was forced to maintain EIC garrisons. Mir Jafar paid the EIC the equivalent of £3 million to be made *nawab*, half of which went to private EIC individuals, including Clive (who also received a *jagir*). The wealth that accrued to Clive and other servants of the EIC from gifts and private trading

became the basis of their "nabob" (i.e., a corruption of the word *nawab*) status, i.e., supposed wealth and political influence back in Britain. This status soon became the target of much public ridicule (in works like Samuel Foote's 1772 comedy *The Nabob*), especially in the wake of the EIC's financial difficulties in the late 1760s and 1770s when its official revenues – disrupted by private trading and the economic dislocations of the Bengal Famine – could not keep up with the rising costs of administration and defense in India (6.9). The 1772 parliamentary inquiry into the activities of Robert Clive and the EIC, while acquitting the former, did much to advertise and disseminate notions of the corrupting influence of those who worked for the EIC in India. However, many portrayed figures like Clive in patriotic and heroic terms, and not all writers perceived the influx of Indian capital into Britain as negative (2.3–4, 2.8–10).

By 1765, the beginnings of the British empire in Asia had been established by a commercial trading company that had become a "company state" with its own army. Militarily, the success of small numbers of European troops with disciplined infantry and effective light artillery was notable in the 1740s and the 1750s. However, the spread of empire was very much a consequence of local as opposed to metropolitan forces. Fearful of the costs of war and its disrupting impact on official revenues, the Directors of the EIC generally did not support the aggressive diplomatic and military actions of its servants. Instead they generally sought support from the British army and navy in defense of its interests in India – an argument more compelling when made against the French. However, the British government had no diplomatic agenda for Asia in the late eighteenth century, and consequently the Director's desires were rarely fulfilled. Instead, the EIC servants took matters of defense into their own hands by beginning to recruit and train Indian troops (*sepoys*), mainly higher-caste Hindu from Awadh and Bihar. At the Battle of Buxar, the EIC army numbered about 7000, while only 800 were European. By 1789, the EIC *sepoy* army numbered 100,000, and by the end of the Napoleonic Wars 150,000.

In the 1770s, the EIC was therefore faced with the challenge of how to govern, and there was much public discussion and debate concerning the EIC's activities and the extent to which the British should govern and interact with Indian elites and polities (1.1–3, 2.1–2, 7.3). As a consequence of the first Regulating Act (1773), the position of Governor General was established over the presidencies with a new capital in Calcutta. The first Governor General, Warren Hastings, who served until 1785, was instrumental in creating EIC structures of governance in India. From the outset, he rejected both the idea that a British system of government was appropriate for India and the suggestion that a structure similar to the one collapsing in the American colonies could be installed. Instead, Hastings believed that the fundamental difference between Britain and India should be acknowledged and that the British should apply a rule of law in India that was disassociated from despotism. This led to attempts to codify Hindu and Muslim law (4.2), as well as efforts to support the study of indigenous languages (4.6) in order to recover the ancient texts from which they were derived. This in

turn meant that the British had to address religious differences in India (4.7–8). Hastings also initiated decades of British study of India's culture, religion (4.1), history, and geography (3.3–5, 3.7) by promoting and patronizing individuals such as Nathaniel Brassey Halhed (4.2), Charles Wilkins (4.3), and Sir William Jones (4.4–6), and supported popular amateur enthusiasm for such endeavors as the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784. In this sense, he was inspired both by an Enlightenment enthusiasm for the construction of knowledge and by the desire to develop better understandings of India from which to govern it. This enterprise was promoted by the introduction of printing to Calcutta in 1777: Over 350 books had been published in India by 1800. In addition, in patronage Hastings was keeping an older form of literary production alive that was soon to be replaced by literature written for the marketplace. He also sought to reform and improve revenue collection, initially abiding by maintaining the legitimacy of Mughal titles and systems of expropriation but seeking to increase its efficiency from within. Ultimately, this process reached its conclusion with Lord Cornwallis's Permanent Settlement (1793) that established a contract between the EIC and the *zamindars* of Bengal, whereby the latter were admitted as the absolute owners of landed property to the colonial state system in exchange for paying a land tax that would not change.

During Hastings's tenure, interaction between British and Indians as equals or at least as friends perhaps reached its zenith, and a distinct Anglo-Indian culture evolved (7.6). Many British men smoked *hookahs*, watched Indian entertainments such as *nautch* or dancing girls (5.6), and took Indian *bibis* (mistresses or unofficial wives), so issues such as cohabitation (5.8) and mixed-race children (5.4) arose. Later, British women came to India as wives and lead households, so they had to oversee Indian servants (5.2–3). Both British men and women were fascinated by the practice of *sati* or widow-burning (5.1, 5.5, 5.9–10, 7.1) and the idea of the *zenana*, where Muslim women lived in seclusion (5.11). However, early Indian observers contested the emerging stereotype that Muslim women were less free than their British counterparts (5.7). Calcutta, a place of high-class life and a never-ending circle of visits (6.1), was known both as a commercial center (6.4) and as the "City of Palaces" (3.6, 6.10). Life in Calcutta was portrayed in the first British novel set in India, Phebe Gibbes's *Hartly House, Calcutta* (1789). At the same time, Madras was an important commercial and administrative city (3.4, 6.6), while, across the country, the British explored cities like Benares (6.10) and sites like the Taj Mahal (6.2–3).

However, public criticism of EIC activities and behaviors in India continued (2.7). Hastings's return to England in 1787 was met with charges of impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. The parliamentary trial was led by Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox and was driven by continued concerns with "nabob corruption," but also by anxieties of the EIC's absolute government in India. The trial in itself was indicative of growing public sentiments questioning the propriety of commercial trading company governing what was becoming an increasingly important part of the British Empire (7.7–10). Beginning with the Regulating Act of 1773, Parliament

gradually expanded state interference into EIC affairs through a number of statutes. In 1784, a Board of Control in London was established that in essence audited the EIC's non-commercial activities. The theatrical and highly-charged trial lasted seven years until 1795, and at the end of it Hastings was acquitted.

The subsequent Governor Generalship of Lord Wellesley (1798–1805; 6.5) inaugurated an important period of imperial expansion that lasted for the next two decades. Since 1766, the EIC had fought three wars against the Sultans of Mysore, Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan (7.12). However, Tipu's apparent diplomatic communications with Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 meant that the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War was fought with greater urgency. Tipu's defeat in 1799 (7.14) was influential in formulating a patriotic shift in public consciousness toward the EIC and British rule in India. This shift was marked by a move towards greater British imperial bellicosity and self-confidence in India (1.7–9), and a number of independent Indian polities were defeated in the coming decades, most notably the Maratha in 1818. But perhaps the greatest change in the character of the British encounter in India in the early nineteenth century was initiated by a proviso in the Charter Act in 1813 – engineered by evangelicals in Parliament, over the objections of the EIC lobby – that permitted Christian missionaries to enter India (4.9–12). Prior to 1813, the EIC had prohibited Christian proselytizing out of fear that it would be disruptive to trade, diplomacy, and political stability in India. The arrival of missionaries in India, in conjunction with the establishment of Haileybury College (1806) in England for the training of civil servants prior to departure to India, meant that more British men went to India with wives and family, and much of the Anglo-Indian cultural and social intimacy and interaction characteristic of the late eighteenth century was lost in the early nineteenth (3.9, 7.17).

Economically, the profitability of the trade to India continued to expand in the early nineteenth century, but its nature changed considerably as tea became the EIC's most valuable traded commodity. This tea, valuable because of the dramatic expansion of tea-drinking in Britain in the late eighteenth century, was purchased from China with Bengali opium (3.1, 3.8). Trade between Indian and China, and between China and Europe, became more important than trade between Britain and India, and private trading dwarfed the EIC's legitimate commerce. In 1813, under pressure from private traders armed with Smithian notions of *laissez faire*, the EIC also lost its monopoly over most of its trading functions, with the exception of tea. The remainder of its monopoly was repealed with the aforementioned Charter Act of 1833. In the wake of the 1857 Revolt, the EIC was essentially abolished and lost of all its administrative functions with the Government of India Act of 1858, permanently changing the nature of the British encounter with India.

Historiography

Scholarship since the last few decades of the twentieth century investigating historical but also cultural and literary developments has increasingly moved

beyond a focus upon national histories and has upheld instead an increasingly global perspective and transnational approach. The development of World History as a distinct sub-discipline within the historical profession is a significant marker of this expansion in the spatial scales of scholarship. The approaches of the so-called New World History in particular – with its focus upon global economic and cultural connectivity and the roles of trade, empire, and migration in cross-cultural exchange and interaction – are clearly relevant to and inform an examination of British encounters with South Asia, which in themselves were cross-cultural exchanges promoted by the same agents.[6] The focus of current World Historical scholarship not only on cultural connectivity, but also on the construction of new – often hybrid – cultural forms is also an important lens from which to examine this encounter in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, recent World Historical scholarship has drawn attention to the significance of this time period as one in which a general pattern of cultural convergence in Eurasia was quite suddenly altered by the divergence through science, imperialism and industrialization of Western European culture.[7]

The influence of global perspectives and cultural exchange – as well as the influence of subaltern and diaspora studies – has also informed shifts in the ways in which Imperial History is conducted. The "New" Imperial History resituates and complicates the directionality of historical connections between the metropole and locality and seeks to recover the means by which the colonized changed the colonizer.[8] At the same time, this approach seeks to break down the binary of colonizer and colonized to examine Empire more holistically and transnationally.

Informed by these new approaches, early British colonialism in India has come under significant revision over the past few decades. Older representations of British imperial and Indian national historians stressed the significance of the chronological threshold of the Plassey Revolution, viewing it as a significant and radical break with the past. The agency of the collapse of the Mughal empire was seen as critical, and its sudden collapse in the eighteenth century (generally attributed to the aggressive and overbearing diplomacy of Aurangzeb) was represented as violent, anarchic, and economically dislocating and destructive. According to this older historiography, the resulting vacuum was exploited by the British in one of two ways: either haphazardly through the actions of local EIC servants without metropolitan coordination, or deliberately in a planned act

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6 For the New World History see Jerry Bentley, "The New World History," in Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (eds.), *A Companion to Western Historical Thought* (2002); Ross Dunn, ed., *The New World History* (1999); and Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (2003).

7 See for example: C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914* (2003); Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (1998); Ken Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Growth of the Modern World Economy* (2001).

8 For the "New" Imperial History see: Stephen Howe, ed., *The New Imperial History Reader* (2009); Kathleen Wilson, ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (2004).

of aggression based on military advantage and hostility motivated by forms of cultural chauvinism and superiority.

In contrast, revisionists now paint a very different picture of the eighteenth century that argues that British colonialism was a more gradual process that maintained greater continuities with the Indian past (e.g., in observing Mughal forms of administration and utilizing Indian tax collectors and financiers). Revisionists also tend to downplay the coordinating role and significance of the metropole and argue that the expanse of colonialism was much more a consequence of local agency and actions, both British and Indian. Most importantly, the decline (as opposed to collapse) of the Mughal empire did not engender economic decline, and Indian prosperity and commercial expansion remained, especially in the successor states. Economic prosperity and the ascendancy of new commercial social groups (merchants and financiers) made regional states viable and stable, and the expansion of the British presence in India – like that of the other regional states – depended on a significant level of cooperation with local elites in the interstate system. In this sense, there was still considerable convergence between the vibrant commercial worlds of Britain and India for much of the eighteenth century.[9]

These new and revisionist historical approaches also complicate the means by which the British encounter with India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is understood. Indeed, the currency in scholarship of the use of the term "encounter" itself reflects how the directionality, motivations, and consequences of cultural exchanges between Britain and India have been resituated. Older scholarship generally depicted British representations and understandings of Indian culture in the late eighteenth century in terms of divergence and distance or of a "clash" of cultures, with particular emphasis on metropolitan cultural chauvinism and denigration and appropriation of Indian culture. These scholarly perspectives still resonate in much of the literature associated with the terminology of colonial and imperial projects. In contrast, new scholarship stresses the complexity of British cultural interactions with India and their representations, especially in the late eighteenth century. These scholars remind us of the cosmopolitanism still resonant in Britain – and convergent with that of the Mughal empire – and the significance of "border crossers" and "white mughals" in the lived experience and cultural behavior of those who physically encountered India.[10] This genuine engagement and appreciation for India was also an important part of the British encounter with India.

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9 For examples of this revisionism, see Muzaffar Alam, *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India, Awadh and the Punjab, 1707–48* (1993); Christopher Alan Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (1990); Peter John Marshall, ed., *The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution?* (2005); and David Washbrook, "Progress and Problems: South Asian Economic and Social History, c.1720–1860" (1988). For a rejection of revisionism, see Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (2001).

10 For these approaches, see Muzaffer Alam and Seema Alavi, *A European Experience of the Orient: The I'jaz i-Arslani (Persian Letters, 1773–1779) of Antoine-Louis Henri Polier* (2008); William Dalrymple, *The White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (2003); Maya Jasanoff, *Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750–1850* (2005); and Thomas Trautmann, *Aryans and British India* (1997).

Postcolonial Theory

In literary studies, the theoretical approach that focuses on the relationship of the West (mostly Europe) and the rest of the world as represented and produced in writing (fictional or non-fictional) is called postcolonial theory. This approach deals with postcolonial literature, but it can also be helpful in analyzing the writings of the colonizers, and in the widest sense it examines more generally relationships between power, knowledge, and resistance.

On one level, "postcolonial" refers to a nation that was formerly colonized (or a citizen thereof) but is now politically independent. The "post-" in postcolonial can be ambivalent in that it sometimes means literature after the initial moment of colonization and sometimes after independence. Usually, postcolonial authors write in the language of their former colonizers. In this sense, Indian authors writing in English today, such as Arundhati Roy or Aravind Adiga, are postcolonial writers, as are African authors writing in English or French depending on their former colonizers. However, the term is also used to describe writers who maintain their original languages. In a wider sense, postcolonial means nations that were formerly colonized mostly as settler colonies, often because the indigenous population was too small, murdered by the colonizers, or eradicated by foreign diseases. For instance, there is of course indigenous Canadian and Australian literature (though it is debatable whether that would have developed the same if colonization had not occurred), but the writers of these countries with mostly English rather than First Nation or Aboriginal heritage are also considered postcolonial. Finally, in the widest sense, postcolonial might indicate a long-term political, legal, and cultural oppression that has more recently been lifted – in this sense, African-American writers and even female authors can be considered postcolonial.

Postcolonial theory assumes that all of these postcolonial writers and societies have their colonial experience in common and that therefore their literature offers a unique perspective on a range of historical, cultural, political, literary, and moral issues. At the most basic level, postcolonial critics analyze how postcolonial writers intervene in cultural debates about these issues. On a larger scale, however, postcolonialism is interested not just in the colonized, but also in the (former) colonizers and how their writings negotiate that subject position. In other words, postcolonial criticism approaches writing from at least two perspectives: It examines the literature of the colonizers dealing with their colonies, and it investigates the literature produced by the former colonists. Thus, postcolonial criticism is interested in the nexus of power, knowledge, and aesthetics from any perspective.

The first major work of postcolonial criticism and theory, Edward Said's *Orientalism*, focused on the latter of those two perspectives. The Arab Palestinian Said offered a comprehensive framework to analyze the literary reaction of the West (which he reduced primarily to Britain and France, but also the USA) to what he called "the Orient" (mostly Turkey, the Middle East, and Egypt). Said argued

that Western writing about this East was characterized by Orientalism in three related forms: the academic discipline concerned with the study of the Orient; the "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'"; and "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient […] a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."[11]

The first form of Orientalism came into being in the eighteenth century when academic disciplines first arose in the Western academy and when Western scholars tried to understand the East, especially India and China. As Said portrayed it, most of these scholars claimed to be – and perhaps believed they were –motivated by the Enlightenment philosophy of universal reason, i.e. they believed in objective knowledge and were trying to acquire such knowledge about their Eastern subjects. For instance, Sir William Jones (4.6) argued that Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin had common roots, and Nathaniel Brassey Halhed (4.2) became the first European scholar to master Bengali and compose a grammar for that language. However, these Orientalists' unconscious impulses may not have been quite as disinterested and altruistic: They were, after all, often members of a trade institution (the EIC) that was trying to make profit in India and then exert rule there. In that context, the studies of the Orientalists can also be seen as instrumental to better political control of India.

This aspect of early Orientalism is perhaps best exposed in the debates between the Orientalists and the Anglicists in India in the early nineteenth century. The Orientalists wanted EIC officials coming to India to be educated in Indian culture and languages such as Persian and Urdu (the official court languages), as well as Hindi, and had little objection to Europeans "going native" (6.5). In contrast, the Anglicists wanted their representatives in India to remain as English as possible and ultimately wanted to recruit Anglicized Indians as intermediaries between the EIC and the local rulers and populace (6.11). In addition, the debate concerned the allocation of the EIC's small budget for education for either Oriental scholarship or Occidental learning. However, both groups advocated for their model because they believed it would make EIC rule most efficient, so even the Orientalists were (at least in this matter) interested in learning about India for utilitarian purposes. The defeat of the Anglicists by the Orientalists in the 1830s, which ultimately led to the abolition of Persian as the official language of the administration in British India, marks one chronological boundary of this anthology.

For his second definition, Said argued that by the early nineteenth century at the latest Europeans could only apprehend Asia in terms of binary oppositions. In this view, Europe was rational, moral, masculine, democratic, Christian; Asia was irrational, immoral, effeminate and oversexualized, despotic, religiously fanatic and superstitious (1.10). This distinction was "ontological and epistemological,"

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11 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (1978), pp. 2, 3.

i.e., it was presented not as culturally and historically contingent, but as a description of what constituted the essential and defining characteristics of the West and the East (ontological) and of what could be known about these cultures (epistemological). In academic practice, this meant that the results of purportedly objective investigations of non-European cultures, societies, literatures, and governmental systems were always already predetermined: The non-European was intellectually inferior. Some Orientalists (in this second mode) explained the situation by characterizing the non-European as an earlier stage in human development; other Europeans argued that the non-European was simply intrinsically less valuable. Examples of this practice can be seen particularly in the section on religion, along with writing that challenge the paradigm (4.1). Perhaps most prominently, Thomas Babington Macaulay exemplified this position when he wondered "who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia" (6.11).

From Said's second to his third definition was only a small step – European superiority was simply inscribed in political and economic matters as well. On the most obvious level, most of the rest of the world became European colonies. Earlier, there had certainly been non-European colonial empires such as the Mongol and Byzantine empires. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, though, Europe – starting with Spain and Portugal and later led by Britain and France – carved up the world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, almost the entire globe – with the exception of Russia, the USA (themselves imperial polities), and of course Western Europe – was made up of European colonies (or had been, in the case of South America), with Britain and France the most aggressive colonizers. But Orientalism in Said's third sense also extended to cultural and economic matters. The East, Said argues, now saw itself as inferior and hence emulated the West in matters of art and literature, even as global trade was largely dominated by Western corporations who restructured local economies to fit their countries' and financial systems' needs. According to some postcolonial critics, this situation has not changed much, but has simply been replaced by Western (particularly US) neocolonialism.

The combination of Said's three versions of Orientalism meant that equal or open relations between Europe and the rest of the world were and remain impossible. According to Said, even Orientalists with every intention of learning objectively about the East were incapable of escaping preconceived stereotypes and unable to work outside the institutions that perpetuated Western dominance. These institutions for their part had no interest in the East as such, but only in versions that allowed them to control it. To some extent, these were conscious decisions, but mostly Orientalists of all stripes were unaware of their biases. As Said argues, there is no "real" Orient since it is too diverse and since it always has to be mediated through representation – but the specific form of representation was determined by Orientalism in its three forms. In turn, this Orientalism was internalized in the East, so even there artists, writers, traders, and politicians could soon only imagine and identify themselves in terms of the

categories established by the West – a claim that is challenged by the presence of texts supposedly and actually by Indian authors in this anthology (1.5, 1.11, 2.5–6, 4.2, 4.12, 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, 6.7–8). Said hoped to expose these mechanisms, but it remains unclear to what extent he believed they could ever be changed.

Sophisticated and complex, Said's reading of Orientalism inspired several decades of interpretations of Western literature about the rest of the world (and vice versa). Much of this literary criticism was illuminating and meticulously exposed the biases of seemingly objective observers of the East in careful readings. At the same time, in cruder interpretations claiming to use Said, every text by and about Asia became little more than a propaganda work for Western superiority. As recently as 2008, Pramod Nayar claimed that all British writing about India "served proto-colonial and colonial purposes of knowledge-gathering, categorizing, transformation and rhetorical control,"[12] surely an oversimplification considering the material in this anthology. Even the brilliant Lata Mani focused on "the knowledges that developed alongside, mediated, and helped secure European conquest and domination, and … the rhetorical strategies that predominated in the representations of colonized peoples, societies, and cultures."[13] This left little room either for these peoples to represent themselves or for Europeans to have any agenda other than conquest and domination.

In a similar vein, the important postcolonial critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak answered the title question of her influential article "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (first published in 1987) in the negative. Subaltern studies, a variant of postcolonial theory mostly developed in India and coming from a Marxist background, did not focus on the elites or even the middle classes. Instead, it investigated various subaltern groups, i.e., groups subordinated to others (alternates) because of race, class, or gender (the traditional triad) or for other reasons such as religion, politics, sexual orientation, economic status, ethnicity, or disability. Instead of seeing history from the point of view of those in power, subaltern studies constructs its narratives from below. One of the most important contributions of subaltern studies lies in its origin in India: This was the first approach that was not developed by European theorists and then applied to the colonies, but created mostly in Asia for the Asian context (or any other). However, in a strict application of Said's ideas, Spivak challenged the very basis of subaltern studies by arguing that it was ultimately impossible to recover marginalized voices – a problematic argument in view of the very vocal subalterns in some texts presented here.

Certainly, many critics recognized the danger of applying Said's ideas about Orientalism too rigidly and too simplistically. In an excellent survey of representations of India in British literature and culture from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries, Balachandra Rajan proposed, "It can be argued that all we need to do is detect the imperial presence in a work and then devalue it

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12 Pramod Nayar, *English Writing and India, 1600–1920* (2008), p. 6.
13 Lata Mani, *Contentious Traditions: The Debate on* Sati *in Colonial India* (1998), p. 3.

according to the prominence of that presence," but rejected that approach as too facile. While acknowledging the importance of Said's work, Rajan worried that *Orientalism* "allows little space for agency or for voices of protest."[14] These voices and their interaction with the dominant colonialist discourse are the main subject of Indian critic Homi Bhabha, who inaugurated a new wave of postcolonial studies with a series of essays in the 1980s collected in his book *The Location of Culture*.

The key terms in Bhabha's version of postcolonial studies are mimicry and hybridity. Colonial mimicry, Bhabha writes, "is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite.*" In other words, the colonizers want the colonized people to be like them, but not exactly. In nineteenth-century India, which Bhabha often refers to in his arguments, this means a class of Anglicized Indians who think and act British but are still distinguishable as different. Bhabha argues that mimicry exposes the limits of Enlightenment thinking, which claims to appeal to universal reason and perfectibility but does not actually allow that in the colonized people. At the same time, mimicry is psychologically dangerous in two senses. For one, it threatens the identity of the colonizer: If the subject can only be produced as a not entirely exact simulacrum, the colonizer's identity is equally suspect. Mimicry "necessarily raises the question of authority that goes beyond the subject's lack of priority […] to a historical crisis in the conceptuality of colonial man as an *object* of regulatory power, as the subject of racial, cultural, national representation." Secondly, mimicry creates a space for the colonized to resist: It can never be clear to the colonizer if the mimicry is emulation or mockery, and "mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal." In the end, since "[t]he success of colonial appropriation depends on a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its strategic failure, […] mimicry is at once resemblance and menace." This menace is of course not simply theoretical but has very real consequences for the body of the colonized, as is visible throughout this anthology.

Bhabha's second key term, hybridity, takes one particular aspect of mimicry and develops it further. In a passage worth being quoted at length, Bhabha writes:

> Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name for the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal (that is, the production of discriminatory identities that secure the "pure" assumption and original identity of authority). Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects.

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14 Balachandra Rajan, *Under Western Eyes: India from Milton to Macaulay* (1999), pp. 13, 16.

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More prosaically, hybridity is what is produced in the meeting of colonial and indigenous culture. According to Bhabha, this is not a one-sided product of colonial domination *or* a pure artifact of native resistance, but something incorporates both to some extent – consciously or unconsciously, willingly or not. On the one side, the colonial culture attempts to force itself on the indigenous one, but in that process it becomes dislocated and refigured, either because it tries to accommodate native ideologies and political structures or because it meets resistance it has to respond to. As Bhabha puts it, "the colonial presence is always ambivalent, split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation as repetition and difference."[15] In turn, the indigenous culture resists the colonial one, but ends up adopting and integrating parts of it. According to this theory, there is no such thing as pure indigenous culture that precedes the colonial encounter (or pure colonial culture, for that matter), but a diverse combination of various native culture*s* that can simply integrate the colonizer as one more aspect. This is not to deny the real force and consequences of colonialism, but to look at the interaction with less ideology and more nuance. In his analysis of hybridity, then, Bhabha deconstructs the binaries of Said's ideas and replaces them with a theory that allows for more interaction (and uses more jargon).

Bhabha illustrates this mutual process in a famous example of Indians looking at a bible in 1817, squarely within the area and period of this anthology. The Indians do not take its authority for granted, but interrogate its meaning and function. As the missionary insists that the Bible is the revealed word of God, the Hindu Indians point out that the book they are holding was presented to them at a specific point in time and location. They refuse to accept that it is a European book since it is God's gift. The missionary sees the Bible as existing in a fixed, printed form, but at the same time it is replicated by the Indians in writing. The Indians acknowledge the possibility of conversion, but defer it (on the grounds of the impending harvest) to the following generation when the Bible will supposedly have done its work. They are willing to be baptized, as the missionary suggests, but will not take the sacrament since they claim it conflicts with their dietary restrictions. Thus, both parties bring their beliefs and assumptions to the proverbial table, neither is entirely dominated by the other, and both presumably end up taking away what is best for them in the situation. Together, they integrate elements of both ideologies and traditions to create a hybrid discourse.

Bhabha's theories have been applied fruitfully to eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century writing in or about India by a number of critics. Kate Teltscher's *India Inscribed*, the first book to deal comprehensively with this topic, frequently invokes Bhabha in her discussion of missionary accounts, EIC rule, Sir William Jones, the sultans of Mysore, and the trial of Warren Hastings.

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15 Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (1994), pp. 86, 90, 86, 86, 112, and 107, respectively.

In her words, "writing about India is […] not monolithic or univocal. European and British texts create a network of intersecting and contending discourses about India." She "tests Said's thesis that the Orient is consistently represented as Europe's inferior Other" and comes to the conclusion that "[i]n eighteenth-century representations of India, the oppositions posited by Said – East/West, Other/Self – are significantly fragmented and eroded."[16] Michael Franklin's chronological focus overlaps with Teltscher's: His body of work is concerned with the middle of the eighteenth century, when the EIC first became a significant political player on the Indian subcontinent, until the middle of the nineteenth century and the Indian Revolt or "Mutiny" in 1857. In *Romantic Representations of British India*, Franklin attributes "sly civility" (another term from Bhabha) to the Indian historian Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai writing about the British, and Haji Mustapha, a French Creole who had converted to Islam and changed his name from Raymond (and who translated Ghulam Husain), is characterized in terms of hybridity (1.5). As Franklin sees it, "the binary opposition of colonizing self/colonized other is undermined as Mustafā moves between the roles of Oriental actor and Orientalist commentator." Furthermore, even Governor General Warren Hastings was trying to create a culture that would "allow India to represent itself."[17] Another critic, Michael Fisher, covers the entire period 1600–1857, but in his groundbreaking *Counterflows to Colonialism* he looks rather at South Asians living in or visiting Great Britain (5.7, 6.7). Fisher points out that "[c]ompeting British authorities and individuals in India and Britain followed contradictory policies and practices, while various Indian tried divergent strategies in dealing with them." His book "shows how changing representations by Indians and of Indians resonated with growing British economic, military, cultural, and political assertions there."[18] In other words, Fisher sees colonial interaction not just as a hierarchical, one-way street, but as a back-and-forth between the British and Indians on both continents.

Thus, Bhabha's theories about mimicry and hybridity, Spivak's discussion of the subaltern, and Said's ideas about Orientalism have been equally inspiring to the field of postcolonial studies. At the same time, all three are unsatisfactory in that they ultimately cannot account for the actual texts that do not fit neatly into the theoretical categories, so no paradigm is endorsed here. Instead, the material collected in this anthology should be used to test these theories. Nevertheless, that examination should consider existing ideas and debates. For instance, one major fault-line in postcolonial studies has been laid out between those critics who focus on oppression, resistance, and confrontation and those who emphasize mixing and transformation. In addition, postcolonial theory has been enriched by contributions from other fields. For instance, feminist theory

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16 Kate Teltscher, *India Inscribed: European and British Writing on India 1600–1800* (1995), pp. 2, 7, 8.

17 Michael Franklin (ed.), *Romantic Representations of British India* (2006), pp. 6, 10, 14.

18 Michael Fisher, *Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travellers and Settlers in Britain 1600–1857* (2004), pp. 2, 3.

has drawn attention to the frequent double marginalization of native women through gender and through color. Marxism continues to call attention to the conditions of material and ideal production – another fault-line in contemporary postcolonial studies is between those critics who see their enterprise mostly as academic and theoretical, analyzing past or present texts, and others who consider their work a prelude to political activism for a better future, often against a globalization they characterize as neocolonial. Increasingly, theorists and critics from the developing world have become more vocal in these discussions, occasionally accusing Western critics of instituting a global division of labor where the West develops theories that have to be adapted in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, all of these critics remain united through their interest in the way colonial relations have produced, and have been produced by, literature and culture worldwide.

Revisiting the British Encounter with India

Considering the availability of postcolonial theories focusing alternately on Orientalism or hybridity, and of historiographical approaches focusing either on divergence or on convergence, the British encounter with India warrants serious re-evaluation. Arguably, this reassessment cannot be effective in the absence of a body of primary material that gives access to various positions. In an attempt to answer that need, we offer the material collected and excerpted in this anthology to represent a variety of historical, literary, and cultural approaches, at the same time being fully aware that no choice will satisfy all readers. The anthology is organized by topics and chronologically within each chapter, but of course we realize that the topics and chapters overlap frequently (and hopefully productively). Our chronological scope does not end strictly with 1830, but allows for some documents outside that scope that in our estimation reflect the ideas of our time frame. The sections can be read in any order, though it is perhaps advisable to start with the chapter on politics and governance to acquire that background. As a whole, we have consciously chosen selections that allow for multiple interpretations, for we hope that this anthology will give rise to new and more sophisticated interpretations of the British encounter with India between 1750 and 1830.

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Complete selections are indexed in bold under their authors or source of publication (e.g., newspaper title). The maps are not indexed.