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1 Introduction

One of the characterising theses of early analytic philosophy is that psychological questions should be distinguished from philosophical and logical questions. Psychology is therefore not understood as an important science for the origin of analytic philosophy. Those readers of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore who have stressed the importance of British idealism for the origins of analytic philosophy have shown that anti-psychologism was already an important feature in the writings of F.H. Bradley. Mathematics and a non-psychological treatment of mathematical problems have shaped the early development of Russell’s philosophy towards analytic realism. These characteristics of early analytic philosophy do not imply, though, that psychology did not have any influence on the origins of analytic philosophy. The thesis of this book is that analytic philosophy can partly be understood in light of the development of psychology as an empirical science at the end of the nineteenth century. Not all kinds of psychology will be relevant for this thesis. Franz Brentano has made a distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology. Genetic psychology investigates the development of the mind and gives inductive laws; descriptive psychology is able to give exact laws, because it is concerned with a descriptive analysis of the mind. Examples of such exact laws are, for Brentano, that every mental act has an object, and that every act of judgement is founded on an act of presentation. Descriptive psychology makes distinctions that are of use in the inductive parts of psychology, and in philosophy as well. Descriptive psychology gives the ultimate parts of the mental from which more complex mental phenomena can be reconstructed; it can thus be understood as a *characteristica universalis*. Because descriptive
psychology is understood to be foundational to philosophy, it provides a universal language of thought. It is thus psychological analysis rather than grammatical analysis that is a guide to philosophy. When Brentano’s ideas became known in Britain through the teachings and writings of G.F. Stout, the term ‘analytic psychology’ was used as a translation of Brentano’s term *deskriptive Psychologie*.

What role did psychology play in the emergence of British analytic philosophy? Because the question what guarantees the objectivity of thought and judgement is central to early Moore and Russell, the theory of judgement plays an important role in their reaction to idealism. The objectivity of judgement and truth, they claim, is guaranteed by the fact that the proposition, the bearer of truth and falsity, is independent of the act of judgement. Russell and Moore thus defend a variant of logical realism, which at first sight seems to be identical to the logical realism of Lotze and Frege. It will turn out that the British variant of logical realism differs in an important sense both from Lotze’s and from Frege's variant of logical realism. What role did psychology play in the emergence of the British variant of logical realism? The distinction between act and object is a central distinction in analytic psychology. This psychological distinction played an important role in the emergence of logical realism in the nineteenth century in general. Traditionally, the object of judgement, the proposition, has been understood as being constituted by the act of judgement, and the terms ‘judgement’ and ‘proposition’ were used both for the act of judgement and the object of judgement. A clear distinction between the act of judgement and the object of judgement, the proposition, made it possible that the object of judgement is understood as being independent of the act of judgement. Like the sentence, the proposition is a complex entity with a unity of its own. Just as the declarative sentence is more than a collection of arbitrarily chosen words, the proposition is not merely a collection of senses. The question of what constitutes the unity of the proposition is thus going to play an important role as a result of the distinction that is made between act and object. This means that one is in need of a theory of wholes and parts, and psychology in the second half of the nineteenth century is able to provide such a theory.

The philosopher and psychologist G.F. Stout was the teacher of Moore and Russell in Cambridge in 1893 and 1894, when Moore and Russell were influenced by the British idealists. Moore and Russell had quite a few discussions with Stout, and read Stout’s central work *Analytic Psychology*, shortly before their turn from idealism to analytic realism in the second half of the nineties. Stout’s psychological theories may
thus have influenced the early Moore and Russell. It is thus possible that psychology partly determined that special variant of logical realism and analytic philosophy that the early Moore and Russell were soon to present. The writings of Brentano and his students, such as Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels and Twardowski were an important influence on Stout, as will be shown here. Through Stout's ideas, Moore and Russell became more familiar with the writings of the Brentano School and started to read these works for themselves. Through Stout these theories may thus have given direction to the way in which analytic philosophy developed.

From 1900 on, Stout applies his psychological theories to ontological questions, and is defending a form of logical realism, too. Given the importance of psychology for Stout's philosophy, the question of to what extent Stout has been a psychologist cannot be neglected. Stout's variant of logical realism agrees in many aspects with the logical realism of the early Moore and Russell. There is one important difference, though, and it is in this sense that Stout is a philosopher of interest on his own. According to Stout, the meaning of a sentence cannot be understood in isolation. One needs to know to what question the sentence is an answer in order to determine which proposition is expressed. Or, to put the same point in terms of judgement, a judgement is essentially the answer to a question. Just as Stout's psychological theories were opposed to the atomistic association theory, his philosophy discusses the weak points of Russell's logical atomism, and his multiple relation theory of judgement. The thesis that the meaning of a sentence is determined by a preceding question is also used by Stout to criticise Russell's account of definite descriptions as incomplete symbols. How did Russell change his position under pressure of this critique?

A necessary condition for the possibility of judgement and other propositional attitudes is predication. Stout's theory of predication makes use of the notion of dependent part or trope, a concept that Stout has introduced in his early psychology. Stout's ontology of tropes has been an important influence on the development of analytic metaphysics in recent decades. Is Stout's theory of predication still of value for philosophy today, or are there important problems with this theory that cannot be neglected? If it is true that Stout is defending an inheritance theory of predication, how is he to account for relations? For a relation cannot be said to inhere in either of the terms of the relation. In the end Stout's philosophy needs to be evaluated. On the one hand, we seem to be in need of notions that have their foundation in psychology, when we address questions concerning thought and
judgement. On the other hand, there is a danger of psychologism when we base our philosophy on purely psychological notions. Is Stout able to make fruitful use of psychological notions and theories without becoming a psychologist?

2 G.F. Stout

George Frederick Stout was born on 6 January 1860 in South Shields, a place in the North of England not far from Scotland. There he attended a private school run by C. Addison. Addison, who was a brilliant classical scholar, made it possible for Stout to go to Cambridge. Stout started his career in Cambridge, became a professor in Scotland and married a Scotchwoman. At the end of his life he went with his son to Australia, where he died in 1944.

2.1 Stout in Cambridge

Stout stayed at Cambridge from 1879 until 1896. As a student of St John’s College he gained a first class both in the classical tripos (1882), with special distinction gained in ancient philosophy, and in the moral sciences tripos (1883), with special distinction in metaphysics. His teachers were Henry Sidgwick, an advocate of Reid’s commonsense philosophy, and James Ward, a philosopher-psychologist who reacted towards the atomistic association theory, and had studied under Lotze in Göttingen. In 1884 Stout became a fellow of St John’s, and was appointed university lecturer in the moral sciences in 1893. From 1884 on Stout turned his attention towards psychology through the influence of James Ward. Ward directed Stout’s attention towards philosopher-psychologists on the Continent, such as Herbart and Beneke. One of Stout’s earliest writings is an extensive article on the Herbartian psychology (1888). From 1891 until 1920 Stout was the editor of Mind. During this long period Mind changed from a mainly psychological journal to a philosophical one, just as Stout’s interests did.²

Stout took an active part in the Moral Sciences Club. Among his colleagues were Henry Sidgwick, James Ward, J.McT.E. McTaggart and W.E. Johnson. Stout was Russell’s tutor in the history of philosophy in the year 1893/1894. Moore attended Stout’s lecture series on the history of modern philosophy in 1894, and he had a good deal of discussion with Stout (Moore 1942, 18). Moore and Russell also attended lectures by Stout on Lotze, who was, together with Herbart, an important figure in the transition from idealism to a more pluralistic metaphysics, in which logic plays an important role.³ The chief books that Moore
himself recommended to his students when he was a lecturer included Stout’s *Analytic Psychology* (1896) and *A Manual of Psychology* (1899) – Moore read these books with a great deal of attention.

Stout was not an impressive teacher like Ward. The distance in age between Stout and Russell was not great, Stout being 12 years older than Russell. He was a man with a small voice but a sharp mind, who preferred to discuss philosophical problems with his students sitting around a table. Being a pluralist himself, he was the right man, together with Ward, to have stimulated Moore and Russell in developing a critical attitude towards absolute idealism. And because Stout was familiar with the theories of judgement, intentionality and wholes and parts on the Continent, especially those of Brentano and his students, he could easily have introduced Moore and Russell to those ideas. Stout himself presented his views on these matters in his *Analytic Psychology*, published in 1896, read by Russell the very same year (cf. Russell 1902, 357). Before 1896, Stout had already published important elements of his philosophy in earlier papers, which means that the influence of Stout’s work on Moore and Russell could also be of an earlier date.

2.2 Stout in Scotland

Stout showed some interest in Scottish philosophy already at the time when he was in Cambridge. He used the works of Thomas Reid, of Reid’s follower Dugald Stewart, and of Thomas Brown. These Scottish philosophers expounded a philosophy of mind founded on common sense and on scientific method. This general interest in the philosophy of mind made it possible for Alexander Bain (1818–1903) to expound an empirical psychology at Aberdeen.

From 1896 until 1899 Stout was Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology in Aberdeen. Here he hoped to have more freedom to satisfy his interest in psychology. His lecture syllabus reveals the pattern of *A Manual of Psychology*, which later became a widely studied book in psychology.

From 1903 until his retirement in 1936 Stout was Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St Andrews, Scotland. His interest in psychology never disappeared; for example, he made it possible for a laboratory of experimental psychology to be established at St Andrews. His main interests, though, were in philosophy of mind, logic, epistemology and metaphysics. From 1919 to 1921 he gave the Gifford lectures at Edinburgh, published in a revised form as *Mind and Matter* (1931) and *God and Nature* (1952). At St Andrews C.D. Broad was his assistant for several years from 1911 onwards.
As the editor of *Mind*, Stout never lost contact with English philosophy. His career in Scotland was broken by a period of several years spent at Oxford. From 1899 until 1903 Stout was the first Wilde Reader in mental philosophy there. At that time Oxford had become less hostile towards psychology, although psychology was not fully accepted into the academic fold until 1947; this in contrast with Cambridge, which has one of the oldest and strongest schools of psychology in Great Britain. In Oxford his colleagues were F.H. Bradley, Samuel Alexander, John Cook Wilson, who was an influential philosopher at that time, H.W.B. Joseph, and H.H. Joachim. By that time Bosanquet had left Oxford for London. Stout took a great interest in the logic of Bradley: he wrote an article on Bradley’s theory of relations, and one on his theory of judgement during his time at Oxford.

### 2.3 Stout and the Continent

During Stout’s editorship, *Mind* always contained a considerable number of reviews of books from the Continent. Some of them were provided by the editor himself, such as the reviews of Külpé’s *Einleitung in die Philosophie* and Martinak’s work on Locke’s logic (both in 1895). Remarkable are several reviews and critical articles on Meinong’s work by Russell and Broad, and a very positive critique in 1915 by A.E. Taylor of the Felix Meiner edition of 1914 of Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre*.

Stout did not travel to the Continent to meet like-minded philosophers. He planned to do so in 1911 in order to present his paper on the object of thought and real being (Stout 1910) at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy at Bologna, but he had to cancel this journey. His paper, though, was read out by someone else. Other participants at this congress were Meinong, Selz and Külpé. Stout met Husserl in Cambridge in 1922, but, because Stout was hard of hearing, he was not able to hear Husserl, and Husserl was not able to understand Stout’s English. Stout sent one of his students, Grant Purves, to Husserl and Fink in 1933. There was some reception of Stout’s philosophy of mind on the Continent. There is an extensive review of *Analytic Psychology* by Th. Lipps (his 1898), and a review of *A Manual of Psychology* by Alexander Pfänder (his 1900b). Later Koffka (in his 1935) showed some interest in Stout’s theory of wholes and parts.

### 2.4 Stout in Australia

The last period of his life Stout spent in Sydney, Australia. He left Britain for Australia in 1939, when his only son was appointed to a chair in moral and political philosophy in Sydney, and stayed in Australia until
his death. Stout took an active part in philosophical life again, and he came into contact with the Scottish-born philosopher John Anderson, and with John Passmore. Stout's ontology has still an impact on Australian philosophy.\textsuperscript{7}

As a man Stout was a liberal in politics; theistic but non-Christian; interested in literature and history, especially military history; and he liked to play chess. He enjoyed philosophical debate, and it is said that Alexander Bain asked for protection when Stout was among the debaters. During a brief visit to Cambridge Stout met Wittgenstein; this was probably in the early thirties.\textsuperscript{8} Stout must have been ‘utterly free from anything approaching pretentiousness or pomposity’, as Moore describes him (Moore 1942, 18).

The most important of Stout’s articles that appeared between 1888 and 1927 are published together in \textit{Studies in Philosophy and Psychology} (1930). Some other articles were published after 1930, of which ‘Truth and Falsity’ (1932) and ‘Things, Predicates and Relations’ (1940) are the most important for the theory of judgement.
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