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Introduction: Contemporary Conditions and Diagrammatic Trajectory

‘The only acceptable finality of human activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion.’ (Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 1995)

I.1 Contemporary conditions

At the same time as a turn to the object, there has, in some recent continental philosophy, been a concomitant turn to, and renewal of interest in, the question of the subject. A return to philosophy as a speculative realm of enquiry (that is, to metaphysics), and a return to philosophy as a way of life. In fact, this is not necessarily a subject that is opposed to the object. It is not a subject that is barred from what Quentin Meillassoux calls the ‘great outdoors’ (Meillassoux 2008b, p. 7). Rather, it is a subject that is itself part of that object, a finitude that is woven from the very fabric of the infinite. This is to suggest a continuum of sorts between the finite and infinite, and also to foreground the heterogeneity of forms (and times) that such a subject might take. In fact, it is to foreground subjectivity over and above a subject, when the latter is understood as a single homogenized entity. It is also to emphasize the processual nature of this subjectivity as always a work in progress: an ethical and aesthetic programme aimed at producing a certain autonomy contra the dominant technologies and logics of subjection of our present moment. We might say then that this subjectivity is both pragmatic and speculative in the sense that its production must be carried out in our contemporary world, but that it is not reducible to those lifestyle options that are typically on offer. The present book is
concerned with the production of what we might call future-orientated diagrams of this different kind of subjectivity.

The genesis of what follows, however, does not lie in this more recent turn of (philosophical) events, but in an insight arrived at towards the end of writing my previous book, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari*. At that time I came to realize that questions about the production of subjectivity were central to debates around contemporary art and politics (and also that art practice itself was a key technology in the production of subjectivity). Following Félix Guattari, it was apparent that the subject, that is to say I myself, was the site and locus of a kind of battle against the homogenizing powers of capitalism, and especially its reduction and standardization of heterogeneity. This was a point arrived at theoretically, but it was also a lived experience. A lived problem we might say.

Back then I had yet to read Alain Badiou on the subject, beyond a few minor works, and so it was very much Guattari that operated as my compass (and, subsequently, provided the title for the present book). In many ways this sets the tone of what follows as a kind of confrontation between Guattari and Badiou, whom I subsequently encountered, although only if this is thought of as part of a larger confrontation between Spinoza–Bergson–Deleuze and a framework marked by Kant and Lacan. In fact, Spinoza and Bergson are a constant presence throughout my book (hence the time taken to introduce aspects of their philosophy in Chapter 1). It is my contention that both philosophers offer powerful frameworks for thinking contemporary subjectivity outside its typical understanding and habitual instantiations. I do attend in Chapter 4 to perhaps the chief philosophical contretemps of the present, between Badiou and Gilles Deleuze (and, in one very long footnote to this chapter, survey some of the secondary material that has been written on it), but it is Guattari who, I think, marks the real difference with Badiou. This is the case not only in content, but also in intention and style inasmuch as both Badiou and Deleuze are philosophers, whereas Guattari, although he may be claimed by that discipline, cannot be limited to it (indeed, it seems to me that Guattari, insofar as he was also an activist and analyst, might be better characterized, in Badiou’s terms, as specifically a non-philosopher).

That said, Deleuze is certainly the more conceptually thorough of the two collaborators, and it is his take on ontology and on the three passive syntheses that, to some extent, grounds Guattari’s own project (both of them presenting what we might call ‘creaturely’ accounts of lived life). It must also be said, however, that Deleuze’s own philosophical
project is less concerned with subjectivity *per se* than with a certain ‘larval’ or pre-subjective state. We might compare this with Badiou for whom, as we shall see, the subject is precisely non-creaturely and certainly non-larval. This difference between Deleuze and Badiou has been commented on and is exemplified by the simple opposition: animal versus matheme.

Guattari’s solo writings on the production of subjectivity were then instrumental in setting the intention of the present book which might be seen as a contribution to the ‘aesthetic paradigm’ that Guattari’s writings inaugurate. In fact, *both* Badiou and Guattari foreground art as also an increasingly key technology of politics today insofar as it offers a model for subjectivity beyond the impasses in which the latter can find itself within late capitalism. For Guattari it is the idea of a kind of aesthetic event – ‘mutant nuclei’ – around which a different subjectivity might cohere, that is so suggestive for recent expanded art practices and for what we might call ‘bottom up’ political organization. For Badiou the idea of an event of art, which involves the coming in to form of that which hitherto was formless, is similarly suggestive for art theory, but also for a certain kind of aesthetic militancy. As we shall see, for Guattari, the event is very much of the world and common, whereas for Badiou it is extra-ontological and rare. Two technologies of the subject are attendant on this: production versus fidelity.

In fact, although in what follows I am often critical of Badiou as someone who, despite his own words, keeps the finite–infinite gap open, I do see many resonances between Badiou and Guattari, especially in terms of this attunement to the aesthetic. There are also profound resonances between Badiou and another thinker influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, but from whom Badiou is often keen to distance himself – Antonio Negri. For both Badiou and Negri, as we shall see, a re-theorization of the body, as the site of the finite–infinite relation (however this is thought), is crucial to a reinvigorated materialist project.

The other key motivating factor for this book was Michel Foucault’s late work on ancient philosophy and especially his ideas about the ‘Care of the Self’. Pierre Hadot’s thesis on ‘philosophy as a way of life’, although I only attend to it in a few footnotes in what follows, was also instrumental in focusing my intention.³ In many ways I see Guattari as ‘updating’ the technologies that Foucault (and Hadot) had excavated from the Ancients, especially in the attention he pays to capitalism’s production of an increasingly homogenized time of the subject. Foucault and Guattari might both thus be said to be involved in mapping out an ethico-aesthetics of the subject: ethics naming here an
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enquiry, pace Spinoza, into what a body, and thus what thought itself, is capable; and aesthetics naming an account of the forms of experience, but also the will to experiment and go beyond those very forms. In both Foucault and Guattari it is this turn to ethics and aesthetics that marks especially their later writings, and that works as a parallel to their interest in politics.

Indeed, although not always explicit in what follows, the urgency of what sometimes is a quite technical/abstract discussion is, as Negri has remarked, that there has been a total subsumption of society by Capital. It has now colonized lived time itself. In relation to this I am very much in agreement with Franco Berardi’s analysis of semio-capitalism as that which increasingly stymies any real life. It is in this sense that the writing of this book was motivated by a desire to think alternative models for the production of subjectivity beyond those proffered by neo-liberalism which, despite its claims, increasingly produces an alienated, atomized and homogenized individual. Indeed, at a moment when time as well as space has been colonized, these alternative diagrams of the subject – and of the finite–infinite relation – become crucial and in and of themselves politically charged.

In many ways, and to give all this a further personal slant, the different chapters of the book are a record of my own attempt to work through what different thinkers might offer in aid of my desire to reconnect with life and specifically a form of life that might be lived against the dominant injunctions and regulative speeds of the market (thinkers that, as it were, offer a different thinking of time and of temporality).4 Certainly my initial interest in Henri Bergson, and what I call the ‘gap’ (between stimulus and response) was precisely in a certain hesitancy and stillness: the deployment of slowness against the sometimes alienating speed of contemporary living. Likewise, with Nietzsche the initial interest was in the eternal return understood as that which names a different kind of temporality of life (a non-human temporality perhaps?).

A further early insight was that the question of subjectivity was also one of a subject’s connection to an outside, however this may be conceptualized. At the beginning of my project I figured this very much as an outside to any particular institution that a given individual might be part of. I had in mind Guattari’s thoughts about the ‘writing machine’ and about Kerouac’s connections to the mountains, to yoga, to a life outside the literary institution.5 In the course of writing this book it became clear to me that I was actually interested in a ‘larger’ outside – and that my understanding of subjectivity was part of a larger issue,
as I mentioned above, to do with the relation of a finite being to the infinite. This finite–infinite relationship is perhaps one of the oldest philosophical questions, and might also be seen as the theological question (it is, after all, the question of our own mortality). In fact, it might be said that what I am attempting to locate in this book is a specifically non-theological solution to the problem of our finitude. To complicate things further, it occurred to me that this relation was also capitalism’s terrain of operation insofar as it now exploits our very potential, or capacity for, production. Indeed, the infinite as a ‘resource’ of the finite subject constitutes, it seems to me, perhaps the key site of political contestation in the contemporary Western world.

Having said this, it is important for me to point out at the outset that my book does not attend to the realm of politics per se, nor does it discuss the specifics of our late capitalist condition beyond the brief section on Italian autonomist thinkers at the end of Chapter 3, and certain marginal comments and footnotes throughout. What is implicit, however, in what follows is a view of late capitalism that sees it as morphing from a transcendent enunciator to an immanent operator, and the resultant ideas of the production of subjectivity that this implies and invites. Thus, for example, in Chapter 1, there are certain suggestions as to how a subject might be produced ‘outside’ capitalism (albeit with various reservations, qualifications and caveats that appear in the footnotes). However, the kind of subjectivity implied in the final chapter is one that is produced, following Anti-Oedipus, by a desiring-process that is immanent to capitalism. In a sense this move tracks the more philosophical movement of my book – from diagramming a topology of sorts (for example, Bergson’s actual/virtual dyad, or Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge, both in Chapter 1) to something more horizontal, with Chapter 3 operating as the passage between the two (the latter chapter thus also evidencing a certain tension between the two accounts of capitalism).

It goes without saying that what is offered here is a selective and to a certain extent idiosyncratic choice of thinkers. When deciding on my resources I was particularly interested in those thinkers who specifically seemed to posit a bridging, or continuum, between the finite and the infinite. Indeed, in its selection, as it were, of certain conceptual personae, my book identifies a kind of counter tradition to a post-Kantian philosophy that maintains the gap between phenomena and noumena, subject and object – again, a gap between the finite and the infinite. This is not to say that thinkers such as Deleuze and Foucault do not follow Kant in some respects. Both, after all, are interested in the transcendental
conditions of experience – an interest they directly inherit from Kant as the founder of transcendental philosophy (although both wish to shift these conditions from possible to real experience). Nevertheless my book is marked by a desire to untie the subject from a certain bind that is given its most rigorous and exhaustive account in Kant’s philosophy (although the latter does not explicitly appear in the book).8

A fundamental idea of this book follows from the above, namely, that any subject comes after, or is secondary to, a given process that is primary. It is this positioning of the object and then the subject that seems crucial to the thinkers collected here. It is also in this sense that the subject at stake in this book is not the Cartesian one, or what I occasionally call the subject-as-is, but something altogether stranger (indeed, it is really these states ‘beyond’, or outside of, typical subjectivity (a pre and post subjectivity if you like) that interests me). Again, this is especially apparent in my final chapter.

Related to all this is my interest in affirmation over negation. This is in part the subject matter of Chapter 1, so I will only say here that I affirm affirmation over negation for two reasons. The first, a ‘molar’ reason, is that negation can become trapped by the very thing which is negated. Or, put differently, negative critique (when this is not instigated by creativity/affirmation) can produce just more of the same – a mirror image of the thing critiqued insofar as it must use the same terms, operate on the same terrain as its object. Critique can operate as a trap for thought in this sense. It seems to me that the production of subjectivity cannot but be an affirmative project if it is to escape this logic of doubling (or what, as we shall see, Deleuze calls a logic of the possible). Second, a more ‘molecular’ reason: affirmation is both the character of an ethical life when this is truly lived, and the character of all life in general. If, with the first of these, I have in mind Spinoza’s Ethics (and the progression in a certain kind of knowledge about the world) as discussed in Chapter 1, then with the second, which I engage with in Chapter 4, I am thinking of Deleuze’s idea of a passive synthesis of life (that is also a joyful auto-affection). The notion of affirmation seems to me to be implicit in what I have already said about a continuum between the finite and the infinite, just as the positing of a gap lends itself to the production of a melancholy subject.

In relation to this idea of affirmation, feeling – or affect – becomes an important register of subjectivity, giving as it does a privileged access to this non-subjective infinite understood as a non-discursive and asignifying ground. Indeed, we might say that it is a subjectivity of intensity, a ‘felt sense’, rather than a subject per se that is named here. We might also
identify here a strategy of speeding up – of accelerating intensity – as a line of flight away from typical subjectivity. Speed constitutes a paradoxical parallel to the hesitancy and slowness I mentioned above. This, it seems to me, is what is at stake in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*, which I look at in the first part of Chapter 5. In a situation in which it is sometimes difficult, conceptually, to tell the difference between subjection (that can appear to offer self-determination) and subjectivation (our own processual self-production), or simply between those practices that control versus those that free (we might call this the creativity of capital versus creativity against capital), affect also becomes a kind of test. Simply put: does what we do in our lives produce sadness or joy? Are we rendered impotent and paralysed, or active and generative? It is in this sense that the battleground of subjectivity, it seems to me, is affect.

Although only mentioned briefly in the main body of the present book (though there are a few footnotes that follow up the idea) there is also, arising from the various ontological diagrams and theories of the subject, a philosophy of history as a lived archive. Indeed, for many of the thinkers deployed here, but perhaps most explicitly Badiou and Negri (the latter of whom I look at only briefly at the end of Chapter 3), history is to be tested in a present that is in and of itself generative. It is this that both Badiou and Negri take from Marx. In *Anti-Oedipus*, as we shall see, this is pushed to an extreme in the exploration of a subject that is in and of itself historical – insofar as it is composed of ‘past’ intensive states. We might say, in this sense, that the production of subjectivity is future orientated but also looks back to previous moments, reactivates previous events.

A further important interest – only fully grasped by myself towards the end of writing this book – is about retroactive causality and the subject assuming responsibility for itself. This is the avowed ‘goal’ of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as we shall see in Chapter 2, but it is also, it seems to me, the end point of Spinoza’s ethical programme – as well as being an important factor in the notion of the subject in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus*. It is also a definition – at least of sorts – of Nietzsche’s eternal return. As far as this goes I firmly believe there is a larger project involved in looking at the later writings of Lacan – on the RSI knots and on the sinthome – and bringing them into encounter with Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* around this idea of the self-production of an ‘individual’. As Lacan remarks in his own *Ethics*, the important thing for analysis is to know how ‘one eats the book’ (and what transpires after), but also whether one might write the book itself – or, in Deleuze
and Guattari’s case, how one might inhabit and/or scramble existing codings, but also produce autonomous ones. In relation to this there arises also the difference between assuming a name and becoming imperceptible. I will be looking a little at this issue in Chapter 4, again in relation to Badiou and Deleuze. Suffice to say here that a holding of these two together (the name and imperceptibility) – and thinking their relation – might be an interesting avenue for future enquiry.

I.2 Diagrammatic trajectory

Although instigated by my interest and previous work on Deleuze and Guattari, in this book I was especially keen to look at other writers on subjectivity, to engage with different thinkers (and not to have, as they say, just one guru – albeit a collaboration). As it turns out the book, although about a selection of different thinkers – or really the bringing into encounter of different thinkers – actually returns to Deleuze and Guattari and, in fact, often approaches the others through a Deleuzian optic (this is especially the case with Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson who were, of course, Deleuze’s self-claimed precursors). In many ways all this makes my book a work of commentary more than anything else, when commentary is understood as that which attends closely to, but also occasionally departs from, an original.

Each particular chapter lays out what I call a diagram for subjectivity, or of the finite–infinite relation. More often than not this is a composite diagram that involves components from different thinkers. Indeed, this was my desire in writing the book, not to be partisan, but to take parts from different systems depending on their ‘usefulness’, particularly in relation to what I have written above about the deployment of a different kind of time of and for the subject. In this sense I might be accused of neglecting important differences between the resources I utilize in favour of a more synthetic programme. It is certainly the case that on more than one occasion the encounters are indeed forced, and that I make claims that the different philosophers involved would perhaps dispute. The book then offers a series of polemical readings and reflections, a ‘cross section’ of the work of different thinkers; each of the latter contributes a part towards what we might call the overall diagram, but the book unfolds with a particular logic and intention that is its own.

The diagram itself is becoming an increasingly popular ‘tool’ in philosophical work, and, of course, has always played a key role in Lacanian psychoanalysis. I will say more about this formalism in the book itself, but we might note here that the diagram, for myself at any rate, is an
especially useful method for exploring the relations between thinkers, and indeed, for demonstrating surprising compatibilities and odd couplings that might in themselves produce further thought. In this sense the diagrams are an example of what Guattari calls ‘metamodelization’, involving as they do a combinatory and synthetic logic. As others have pointed out, the diagram is not merely a signifying form, nor, indeed, a form of representation. It does not necessarily need to be interpreted, but ‘communicates’ more formally. I would like to think that the diagrams in my book could be extracted from the accompanying textual account and still give a sense of the book’s trajectory and argument (in fact, in the first part of my Conclusion I do just this). Indeed, some of the diagrammatic experiments that follow lack an extensive discursive explication and explanation, but, I hope, this is also their suggestive strength. As far as this goes it seems to me that the diagram can operate as a kind of short-circuiting of the discursive, or put differently (and following Lacan) as something that does not necessarily need to be fully explained in order that it ‘works’.

At certain points in what follows (especially in the first section of my final chapter) the diagram often leads the synthesis rather than merely illustrating a synthesis already made (it begins as an illustration ... then spirals out ...). It operates at a different speed to the discursive, and certainly in a more experimental manner. Diagrams are like fictions in this sense. They produce thought. I mean this in two senses: (1) as I have just mentioned, they often run ahead of the discursive work like a forward hurled probe (after which discursive work might follow); and (2) they operate as a map for thinking life more broadly, for spotting passageways, openings and lines of flight. As far as this goes diagrams are a picturing of things from the outside as it were (a view from nowhere as the saying goes). However, insofar as we are always, ourselves, in the middle of things as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, the diagrammatic perspective is a fiction, albeit, to borrow a phrase from Badiou (who is actually writing about Lacan’s notion of the infinite here) this is an ‘operating fiction’. A kind of ‘speculative fiction’ perhaps? Might we even say that the diagram is a kind of ‘conceptual art’, although somewhat distinct from Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the latter?

I intended the chapters to work as stand alone ‘case studies’, but they are also in sequence, each one building on the work of the previous. They are also, to a certain extent, written in different styles or tones. This is partly because they track my own attempts to get to grips with my subject matter, and, as such, they increase in complexity and,
I think, philosophical engagement as they progress (although the very last section of the final chapter was the first to be written). The sometimes quite lengthy footnotes are often evidence of a back stitching of later conclusions in to previous chapters. This difference in style is also, however, because it seemed to me that the different thinkers and texts I look at demanded different kinds of writing, not least because I wanted to extract different things from them and thus approach them with a wider or more narrow focus in order to ‘see’ at the appropriate detail. So, for example, in Chapter 1, the material on Spinoza is fairly introductory and indeed, free from quotes. This is because I am dealing with a whole book and was keen here to give an overview of the three kinds of knowledge (and, indeed, draw a diagram of the latter) that did not get bogged down in Spinoza’s own complex and geometric system (and, indeed, his somewhat dry exposition). On the other hand, in the same chapter, I only look at a part of a book by Bergson in order to extract a particular diagram, thus I provide a closer reading – and there are many more quotes. Or, to take Chapter 3 as another example, it seemed to me that Guattari’s thought needed to be addressed on a detailed and more abstract level, and on the terrain of the technical language and neologisms that he invents, insofar as this is what specifically characterizes his thinking, hence, again, the closer reading and commentary.

To provide a brief synopsis of the chapters: Chapter 1 begins with a reading of Spinoza’s *Ethics* paying particular attention to the account of the three kinds of knowledge found therein. The third kind of knowledge, especially, is irreducible to our more typical ‘knowledge-economy’ and further, involves a stepping ‘outside’ of what might be called the habitual time of the subject. The chapter goes on to examine some of Nietzsche’s aphorisms collected in Book Five of *The Gay Science*, again, understood as a resource for the production of an affirmative and creative subjectivity. The final and longer section of the chapter explores a further temporal anomaly, namely the gap between stimulus and response addressed by Bergson in *Matter and Memory*. In terms of my own book’s trajectory then, Spinoza and Nietzsche offer, albeit in different ways, the idea that it is possible for a finite subject to prepare for, and have an experience of, the infinite, while Bergson’s addition to my own assemblage is the gap, or hesitancy, that allows access to this infinite, understood as a realm of pure potentiality.

Chapter 2 involves an examination of the later writings and teachings of Michel Foucault on the ‘Care of the Self’. Again, it is the notion of there being a certain special kind of knowledge, what Foucault terms ‘truth’, that is explored. Such truth is only accessible to the subject in a
very particular condition (one that has been produced through practice), hence, as Foucault argues, the importance, for the Stoics and others, of certain pragmatic technologies of the self (we might say technologies of transformation). The chapter begins, however, with a Lacanian ethics (through a reading of *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*), in many ways as a foil and corrective to the above; a move, we might say, from the *care* of the self to a *suspicion* of the self. Time is again an important issue here. Indeed, it is Lacan’s rethinking of the time of the subject – its always retroactive formation – that links him back to Spinoza since both attend to the necessity, in an ethical life or via analysis, of understanding the causes of one’s self but also of becoming a cause of one’s self. Lacan provides a crucial thinking of the subject as non-identical to the ego and also as that which is ‘to-come’ and yet, paradoxically, must be *assumed*.

Guattari’s solo writings, and especially his last major work *Chaosmosis: Towards an Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, offer perhaps the most sustained, and certainly the most complex thinking through of the terrain of the production of subjectivity today, not least in the radical rethinking of the subject/object split in terms of an expanded machinics. Equally important is Guattari’s careful consideration of new technologies as well as his interest in art, gesture and ritual. In general then, and in contradistinction to Lacan, Chapter 3 foregrounds the importance of asignifying elements in the production of subjectivity – and of a certain molecularity that operates beneath molar aggregates such as our identity. This is to attend to Guattari’s own idea of subjectivity as a diagram between the finite and the infinite (or the actual and the virtual) in which there is a reciprocal determination (the infinite is not barred, nor deferred, but is in fact folded into the finite). The chapter also briefly considers some Italian autonomist writings (Paulo Virno, Franco Berardi and Antonio Negri) that develop Guattari’s interests, specifically in relation to our late capitalist context.

Badiou is perhaps the key thinker of the subject alive today and my fourth chapter concerns itself with his two major philosophical statements. Beginning with an exegesis of his ‘Theory of the Subject’ from *Being and Event* this chapter goes on to contrast Badiou’s subject with Deleuze’s individual, specifically in relation to *Difference and Repetition*. The chapter then looks to Badiou’s theorization of the body in *Logics of Worlds*, which is, in many senses, a response to some of the problems of *Being and Event*. At stake here, again, is a puzzling through of the finite–infinite relation in terms of the subject (and, in Deleuze’s case, what we might call ‘larval subjectivities’). The distinction between the thinkers might be figured as involving a certain horizontality within Deleuze
(a transversality, or becoming-animal) versus a certain verticality with Badiou (an ascendance, or becoming-subject). In general then this chapter might be said to be defending a certain kind of Deleuzian (and Spinozist–Bergsonian) finite–infinite diagram of the subject against what might be seen as its most trenchant and rigorous critique.

The final chapter of my book looks at Deleuze’s work post *Difference and Repetition*, and specifically his collaborations with Guattari, namely the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project and *What is Philosophy?* The former creative philosophical endeavour, perhaps the most inventive and experimental of recent times, offers a distinctive diagram – or what the authors call an abstract machine – for thinking the experimental, constructive and ‘future-orientated’ nature of the production of subjectivity understood as a specifically aesthetic and ethical pursuit. The chapter begins with an oblique return to Lacan in the consideration of ‘desiring-machines’ (from *Anti-Oedipus*) as a radical framework for thinking subjectivity, before going on to excavate a strange notion of ‘chaos-subjectivity’ from *What is Philosophy?* The chapter then turns to *A Thousand Plateaus*, and specifically to the concept of ‘probe-heads’ that points to a break with dominant state regimes, but also to the need for new forms of organization or simply new forms of subjectivity. This concept also involves the deployment of different times of and for the subject, and, as such, the chapter also attempts something slightly different – a more ‘practical’ exploration of the latter in terms of contemporary art practice (as future orientated) and modern paganism (as utilization of the past). Indeed, it is in this final part of the main body of my book that I lay out what, I think, a Deleuze–Guattarian production of subjectivity might look like.

My conclusion involves a restatement, via diagrams, of the trajectory of the book. I also provide a brief sampling of some of the philosophical viewpoints of what has become known as ‘Speculative Realism’ with some comments about the distances and proximities to my own project, insofar as the latter might itself be thought of as notes towards a speculative subject.
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