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Emotionalizing Organizations and Organizing Emotions – Our Research Agenda

Barbara Sieben and Åsa Wettergren

1 Tackling the topic of emotion in organizations

Organizations and organizing constitute a field of research where sociologists and social scientists from business and management schools typically meet for a fruitful exchange (e.g. Clegg et al. 2006; Adler 2009). This observation may be echoed for the study of emotion in organizations, and has inspired the conception of this volume.

Formerly, emotions were not at the top of the agenda in either sociology or organization and management research. However, in the last two decades, from 1990 onwards, there has been a considerable rise in scholarly interest in the role, function and importance of emotions – for society in general (e.g. Kemper 1990a; Clark 1997; Scheff 1997; Barbalet 1998; Collins 2004; Turner/Stets 2005; Wettergren et al. 2008; Hopkins et al. 2009; Röttger-Rössler/Markowitch 2009; Scherke 2009), for politics and social movements (e.g. Goodwin et al. 2001; Ahmed 2004; Flam/King 2005) and for organizations (e.g. Fineman 1993a; Albrow 1997; Fineman 2000a; Flam 2000; Hochschild 2000; Ashkanasy et al. 2000; Schreyögg/Sydow 2001; Lord et al. 2002; Payne/Cooper 2004; Bolton 2005; Fineman 2006; 2007; Sieben 2007a; Lewis/Simpson 2007; Rastetter 2008). These latter publications also testify to the trans- and interdisciplinary interest in emotions in organizations, as do a whole range of special issues of journals on ‘emotions at work’ or ‘emotions in organizations’, e.g. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (1999, 561(1)), Work and Occupations (2000, 27(1)), Human Resource Management Review (2002, 12(2)) and Human Relations (2007, 60(4)). Since 2005 there has also been a specialist journal on
the subject; the *International Journal of Work Organization and Emotion*. Despite different research aims and foci, writers in this field agree on one point at least: they all refute the idea of the purely ‘rational’ bureaucratic organization in the classic Weberian sense (‘*sine ira ac studio*’, Weber 1948: 215f.) and highlight the myriad ways in which organizations can be seen as ‘emotional arenas’ (Fineman 1993b; 2000b).

The studies by the US American sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild have been described as path breaking for this upsurge of interest (e.g. Simpson/Smith 2005: 1). In 1979 Hochschild published the article ‘Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure’ in *The American Journal of Sociology*. There she outlined an interactive account of emotions and an emotion management perspective. In brief, Hochschild argued that human beings continuously – consciously or ‘latently’ – subject their own and others’ feelings to cognitive assessments and attempts to fashion and control them. They do so by performing emotion work in relation to feeling rules that apply to the frames of each situated interaction. Thus, emotions do not ‘happen’ to people as the conventional stress on the irrationality of emotions would have it, but are part and parcel of the social and cultural world we live in. Work in organizations belongs to this world. Its distinguishing feature is that in this realm an alienation from the private experience of emotions may occur, as the management of emotion is required and performed in return for a wage.

When the manager gives the company his enthusiastic faith, when the airline stewardess gives her passengers her psyched-up but quasi-genuine reassuring warmth, what is sold as an aspect of labour power is deep acting. (Hochschild 1979: 569)

Consequently, as Hochschild argues, emotion work is becoming commoditized as part of middle-class wage labour. She developed this argument on emotional labour further in the book *The Managed Heart* (1983), which was to become a fundamental building block and an obligatory reference work for researchers interested in emotions in organizations, be they emotion sociologists (e.g. Wouters 1989; Flam 2000) or organization and management researchers (e.g. Morris/Feldman 1996; Grandey 2000; Bolton 2005; Rastetter 2008).

While the growing interest in emotions in the social sciences is of course ultimately intertwined with a general societal attention to the subject, there are a number of possible explanations with regard to the social sciences in particular, among which we suggest some here. First,
the cultural turn in the social sciences beginning in the 1960s brought with it a massive critique against the scientific production of knowledge and its implicit assumptions about objectivity. The main arguments have been that there are neither clear boundaries between ‘reality’ and its description, between an external (objective) and an internal (subjective) world, between knowledge and opinion (e.g. Rorty 1989), nor between culture, politics and economy or between private and public (e.g. Best/Kellner 1997; Seidman 1997; Jameson 1998); that power constitutes and saturates social relations through knowledge regimes and praxis (e.g. Foucault 1976; 1995; Laclau/Mouffe 1985) and that the binary thinking of western logics distorts and represses the body, the senses, the sociality and interdependency of individuals (e.g. Butler 1993; Williams 2001; McDonald 2006). Hence, the cultural turn, while not per se leading to an interest in emotion, certainly opened up an academic space for it – or, as Kleres (2009: 7) puts it regarding the sociological theorization of emotion, the ‘so-called emotional turn (…) is arguably bolstered by the other turns in our own and cognate disciplines’.

Second, a growing amount of research and literature from both the natural (e.g. Damasio 1999; 2005) and social sciences (notably Barbalet 1998, Flam 2000 and Fineman 2006) deals with the critical and radical approaches to emotions by arguing that emotion is inherent to rationality and rational decision-making rather than – as the conventional approach holds – opposed to it. As Barbalet (1998) argues, the conventional approach is based on cultural representations that obscure the role of ‘background emotions’ by labelling them ‘attitudes’ instead of feelings (ibid.: 60). Instead, feelings serve as internal guides, and they help us communicate signals that can also guide others. Moreover, feelings are neither intangible nor elusive. As Damasio (2005) shows in his elucidation of *Descartes’ Error*, emotions are inextricably intertwined with cognitions and rationality – an observation that is taken up by numerous management researchers as it promises to deliver a more holistic understanding of organizational life (Callahan/McCollum 2002; Fineman 2006).

Third, a theory of emotions promises to account for the link between social structure and individual actors. This may enhance our understanding of the ways in which social structures are not only maintained and reproduced, but also altered, in social interactions through the mechanisms of power and status (Collins 1990; Kemper 2006), as well as through mechanisms of group conformity (Goffman 1959), the emotional orientation in the complex social landscape and the construction and internalization of social roles, identities and self-perceptions.
This aspect renders the topic of emotions pertinent to management and organization research. For instance trust (Kramer/Tyler 1996; Kramer 1999) is a relevant topic with regard to the emergence of ‘flat’ organizations, to the blurring of boundaries between home and work life (Hochschild 2000; Pongratz/Voß 2003) and to the augmentation of globally distributed and virtual work (Fineman et al. 2007).

Patterns of the management and representation of emotions in organizations (or emotional regimes in the sense of Reddy 2001) have often been ascribed to structural changes, e.g. the exclusion and delegation of emotion to private life in the course of industrialization (e.g. Stearns 1988) or the upgrading of emotional labour due to the growing service sector (e.g. Gerhards 1988). Hence, authors describe the transformation of the ‘passionless bureaucracy’ into the ‘emotional organisation’ (Bolton 2005: 14), along with an increasing disciplining followed and accompanied by an informalization of emotions (Mastenbroek 2000; Wouters 2007), a progressive management of emotions (Rafaeli/Worline 2001) or an advanced routinization of control. Meštrović even (1997) argues that we are living in a post-emotional society where the continuous assessment and management of emotions (in relation to feeling and display rules) leads to the loss of ‘authentic emotions’.

On the other hand, it can be argued that there have never been a-emotional organizations, any more than a-emotional societies. The Weberian ideal-type ‘sine ira ac studio’ is rather to be seen as an organizational emotional regime where emotions are viewed with suspicion (Stearns 1994). For management concepts and practices it may be shown that the valorization of emotions (as either negative/destructive or positive/constructive) has always been ambivalent and has undergone several changes (Sieben 2007a). Today this is changing into an emotional regime that renders explicit the display and embrace of ‘positive’ emotions – such as trust, love, enthusiasm, niceness, happiness, self-confidence, self-love and self-enhancement – while it requires the control and management of ‘negative’ ones (anger, jealousy, envy, resentment, disappointment, sadness, ironic or disengaged distance) (cf. Wettergren, forthcoming). The contemporary focus on emotions is not equal to ‘letting emotions out’, rather it recognizes their existence and value while simultaneously demanding their use in accordance with norms of an ‘intelligent’ management of emotions (cf. Goleman 1996; for critical analyses: Fineman 2000c; Sieben 2007a; Neckel 2009). This argument brings us to the point where the very existence of ‘authentic emotions’ must be brought into doubt, because if there is no such thing as an a-emotional society, there can also be no society where emotions
are not controlled and managed. The extent and variety of societal emotional regimes have been pointed out by social anthropologists (c.f. Harré/Parrott 1996; Reddy 2001) and historically oriented scholars (Elias 1982; Reddy 2001; Stearns 1994; Wouters 2007), as well as by research into the historically changing emotional regimes of organizations (e.g. Mastenbroek 2000; Krell/Weiskopf 2006). It thus makes sense to speak of emotional regimes as internalized emotional dispositions, analogous to Bourdieu's (1999) notion of habitus (cf. Illouz 2007). The perception of authentic emotions thereby becomes tied to the notion of an ‘authentic self’ (Tracy 2005; Tracy/Trethewey 2005), which is also a pervasive cultural representation that tends to enhance the autonomous biographical self as essence on behalf of the fragmented and situated self as it is produced in social interaction (Mead 1976; Garfinkel 1984; Collins 1988).

2 Defining emotions

Following Hochschild (1990: 119; cf. also Thoits 1990: 191f.) an emotion comprises four elements: ‘a) appraisals of the situation, b) changes in bodily sensations, c) the free or inhibited display of expressive gestures, and d) a cultural label to specific constellations of the first three elements.’ This definition is generally consistent with the overall literature regarding the components of an emotion, but it may be interpreted and qualified in a number of ways, following the debated issue of which of the psychobiological or social components is most salient.

The ‘organismic’ (Hochschild 1990: 119f.) or psychobiological (Scherer 1999) model of emotions, for instance, focuses upon the biological function of emotion and the display of feeling. From this perspective it can be argued that there are universal basic emotions – e.g. anger, fear, sadness, disgust and enjoyment – manifested in cross-cultural facial expressions (Ekman 1999; Scherer 1999; Thrift 2004). However, presumably basic emotions are also hard to define and delimit; the extent and depth of the socio-cultural shaping of emotions and emotional expressions make it difficult to provide evidence for any ‘universal’ set of discrete emotions (cf. Harré/Parrott 1996; Barbalet 1998).

The ‘interactional model’ advanced by Hochschild, and generally embraced by the body of social scientific literature on the topic, concentrates on emotions as social constructs. Moreover, the model integrates psychobiological aspects as socially shaped ‘ingredients’ (Hochschild 1990: 120). Consequently, on the one hand, Hochschild claims, counter to the organismic model, that emotions are not just
there to be triggered, but also become in social interaction (see also Reddy 2001). On the other hand, she invites psychobiological aspects when she speaks about ‘the signal function’ of emotions (Hochschild 1983; 1990: 119). Thus, if we return to her definition of emotion above, the four elements are experienced simultaneously, even if not necessarily consciously. Together with our other senses, emotion allows us to intuit the situations in which we find ourselves, guiding our selection of appropriate actions and expressions in the social terrain. Thus, for the purpose of the social science, what can be retrieved of the universal claims mentioned above is that the physical apparatus enabling human beings to experience emotions is universal (Reddy 2001; Damasio 2005). The prominent emotion sociologist Thomas Scheff (1990) further argues that shame is a universal social emotion, as it can be seen as a ‘master emotion’ that monitors compliance with culturally specific feeling rules. As a corollary to this, the quest for self-esteem through recognition – a sign of belonging and group inclusion – can also be assumed to be a universal human trait (cf. Honneth 2000).

A fruitful approach is to see emotions as processes rather than objects. Barbalet (1998) points out that as emotions inhere in social relations, they transform them and through experiencing emotions give rise to new ones, and so on. ‘Emotion is always situated’ and involves ‘the whole person’ instead of ‘an isolatable aspect or attribute of a person’s body or psychology’ (ibid: 79). When we name and speak of emotions, Barbalet contends, they become objects, but as such, they are merely ‘hypothetical constructs’ (ibid.: 180, 186).

The notion that emotion is a hypothetical construct follows from the fact that emotion cannot be reduced to its indicators. The various conceptualizations of emotion in life and in science derive from the frameworks in which the indicators of emotion are placed. These vary with the context and purpose of those involved. Thus the definitions of emotions are necessarily culturally diverse, both across societies and within them. (ibid.: 80)

A structuralist approach to emotions in social science focuses on the way emotion is embedded in social structures such as class (Barbalet 1996–97; 1998), the (stratified) structure of interaction rituals (Collins 1990; 2004), or generally the structural relationships of power and status (Gordon 1990; Burkitt 1997; Kemper 1990b; 2001). Collin’s approach, particularly, warrants attention in relation to the contents of this volume. Combining Goffman, Garfinkel and Durkheim, Collins
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(1990; 2004) states that social interaction involving two or more persons sharing the same focus of attention is a ritual, and that its outcome – collective effervescence – results in solidarity for the collective and emotional energy for the individual. The latter concept, emotional energy, refers to ‘a feeling of confidence, courage to take action or boldness in taking initiative. It is a morally suffused energy; it makes the individual feel not only good, but exalted, with the sense of doing what is most important and most valuable’ (Collins 2004: 39).

Emotional energy varies along a continuum. At the lower end, the individual experiences low self-feelings and low degree of inclusion and recognition, while the opposite is true at the other end of the spectrum. Further, emotional energy is unequally distributed. Power and status are the social mechanisms that determine the individual’s experience of emotional energy.

In summary, we approach and understand emotion in this volume as multidimensional. In this view, emotions are more than just inner (psychological or biological) states or processes. Rather, emotions are experienced in and shaped by interactions with others; they are framed and reproduced through language and social practice. Furthermore, the ways in which emotions are experienced and displayed are ‘coined’ by understandings, valuations and social structures that are themselves historically and socio-culturally grounded. In this sense, emotions are tied to and shape relations of power and interdependence. In particular, the study of the emotion-laden complexities of organizations and organizing calls for such a comprehensive view (cf. also Sturdy 2003). In order to enhance the understanding of emotions in organizational settings and to discuss the possibilities and limits of their manageability, research on emotion in organizations should strive to capture all these dimensions. Not every piece of research may focus on all dimensions, but different contributions on these aspects should be combined and contrasted. The purpose of this volume is to fulfil part of this task, as shown below.

3 Studying emotions in organizations

This volume’s aim is to further research on emotions in organizations by looking into specific processes and interactions in organizations that are not often highlighted in the main body of literature. For instance, by looking at ‘ordinary’ routines and everyday situations such as queuing for residence permits, medical advice calls, the selection of trainees, bullying and sexual harassment it expands insights into organizational
arenas where emotions are produced and where structural settings become tied to individual motives and actions through emotion.

To illustrate the relationship of this volume to the body of research into emotions in organizations we present the latter in a two-fold theoretical framework that has in turn been used to structure the contents of this volume. The first, a ‘compass’ to assist orientation in the field of research on emotions in organizations (Figure I1), refers to the research perspective taken. The second, a conceptual model of appearances of emotions in organizations (Figure I2), refers to the current focus of study. We will explain each part of the framework, and the way that it clarifies the contents of this volume, in proper order.

First, Figure I1 represents a ‘compass’ that helps orientation in the field of research on emotions in organizations (Sieben 2007a; b).¹ This compass differentiates common social scientific research perspectives – called here functionalist, interpretive, poststructuralist and (ideology) critical – with the goal of doing research on emotion in organizations. The horizontal dimension refers to the way of doing research, i.e. it captures where and how research concepts and problems originate. At the

![Figure I1](image-url)

**Figure I1** A compass to assist orientation in the field of research on emotions in organizations

*Source:* Adapted from Sieben (2007a: 138; Sieben 2007b: 567)
local/emergent end, studies are primarily explorative and/or hermeneutically oriented, emotion is regarded as emergent and studies seek to refine categories and to reformulate relationships found in situ. In contrast, at the a priori end we find the theory- and concept-driven research, e.g. based on categories like primary emotions, emotional labour and emotional intelligence, which often aims at testing hypotheses.

The vertical dimension refers to the goal of doing research with regard to social order. On the one hand, the goal may be politicizing. In this case, studies draw on discourses and/or practices linked to emotion that are understood as powerful, conflicting and a source of domination; they seek to question self-evident assumptions and to indicate points of resistance. On the other hand, the goal regarding social order may be to maintain it. Such studies tend to draw on emotions as forces to be discovered, enhanced and managed: they search for insights on features, links and effects of emotions and try to understand or explain the ways in which they affect organizational life.

All the contributions to this volume may primarily be characterized as local/emergent with respect to the origin of concepts and questions and hence their way of studying emotions in organizations – a whole range of contributions based on case studies or on ethnographic or conversation-analytic approaches. These approaches allow us to describe emotional facets in rich detail and to elaborate emotion concepts in view of organizational context (e.g. Fineman, Bornheim, Bloch, King, Leppänen, Martín Pérez and Imdorf). Others draw on emotion (management) discourses emerging from emotion research, historical documents, management literature and the like (e.g. Gabriel, Poder, Flam/Hearn/Parkin, Cossu, Terpe/Paierl and Baumeler). Some of these contributions may instead be characterized as interpretive in that they concentrate on sense-making processes in organizations or on understanding how emotions are constructed through organizational processes and practices, e.g. Bornheim’s analysis of the emergence of positive emotions, Imdorf’s conceptualization of the role of emotion for hiring processes or Terpe’s and Paierl’s analysis of feeling rules emerging from bureaucratic prescriptions. Other contributions may be characterized as politicizing in that they engage critically with emotion management discourses and/or organizational structures and processes, e.g. Fineman’s analysis of the side-effects of the ‘emotionologies’ in service organizations, Gabriel’s psychoanalytically driven critique of emotion management in care work, Poder’s critical elaboration of the empowerment concept, Flam, Hearn and Parkin’s analysis of the discursive mechanisms and power effects of hushing up rape and sexual
harassment, Martín Pérez’s analysis of how the emotions of queuing tend to (re)produce immigrants’ social condition and Baumeler’s analysis of emotional intelligence as an organizational regime of emotional conduct.

Second, the contributions can be characterized following their object of study, i.e. their thematic focus on emotions in organizations. Figure I2 represents a model of the appearances of emotions in organizations, i.e. a conceptualization of different forms in which emotion may be relevant to work in organizations. As such, this model is designed to outline the scope of the contents and will help to highlight the structure of the volume as well as the links between the contributions.

The model postulates differentiating analytically the levels of working, the organizing of work and the socio-cultural embeddings of organizations. If one focuses on these levels separately, emotion enters the picture in different manifestations. On the level of working, a job’s activities may require a person to work on and with emotion, to perform emotion work in the sense of Hochschild (1983). Following the three-way division introduced by Dunkel (1988), emotion may represent:

- the object of work, if employees have to influence others’ emotions, whether a service worker who lets clients feel well and attended or a team leader who seeks to establish an agreeable and cooperative atmosphere in the team;
• a *means* while working, if their own emotions and their expression are used to fulfil such tasks; and
• a *condition* of work, in the sense that one has to establish or redress a certain emotional state, to suppress or alter certain feelings – a vital task when dealing with others is at stake.

On the level of working, emotions may also appear as *antecedents* of work and as *consequences* resulting from work tasks. The antecedent-consequence array overlaps with the appearances of emotion as object, means and condition, but its range goes far beyond the work on and with emotion. Examples are joy with the work that motivate us, fear of a certain task or shame as result of a failure that hamper action and compassion or sympathetic feelings that cause a helping behaviour towards clients or colleagues. These examples clarify in addition, what the curved form symbolizes: antecedents and consequences are emotional processes that are not always easy to distinguish. At times, they may mutually cause each other or coincide: emotions that result from working will have consequences for further working behaviour.

On the level of *organizing*, numerous characteristics of the work setting influence, cause or modify the appearances of emotion. Emotion enters the picture on this level in the form of organization-specific *emotion rules and resources*. Rather than only shaping working behaviour, emotion rules and resources are produced and reproduced in this process. The same holds for the last level, *the socio-cultural embeddings* of work: social structures like gender, class or race may influence, cause or modify appearances of emotion. On this level, professional as well as broader socio-cultural emotion rules and resources enter the picture, again as appearances of emotion produced and reproduced in the process of social interaction at work.

With the appearance of emotion as *rules*, we understand the feeling rules (Hochschild 1979) and the display rules (cf. e.g. Rafaeli/Sutton 1989) embedded in the social norms that govern how emotion should be experienced and expressed. Such norms or emotional regimes may differ on the organizational, professional and societal level. On the organizational level, emotion rules may be explicitly stated, e.g. in mission statements or codes of conduct. But rules may also be implicitly demonstrated, experienced and reproduced, especially those emotion rules and emotional regimes tied to and arising from the broader socio-cultural embedding. With the appearance of emotion as a *resource*, we refer to Callahan’s (2004: 1433) structuration-theorist notion of emotion resources as the ‘source of control over the experience and expression
of emotion’. Callahan differentiates between emotion as authoritative, if it is externally controlled by the organization, and as allocative, if it is controlled individually. With regard to emotion as an authoritative resource we may also add the ‘emotions of control’ as analysed by Fineman and Sturdy (1999), referring to the ways in which emotion is embedded and becomes manifest in power relationships and mechanisms of organizational control. By emotion as an allocative resource, Callahan (2004) understands the job-related application of emotion, which may bypass organizational policies for the worker’s own social and economic needs. This notion of a deliberate emotion management beyond organizational control is also echoed by Bolton (2005) in her labour-process oriented analysis of emotional labour. These last two appearances of emotion, as rules and resources, thus complete the picture. Rather than representing additional components, they are present in the whole process of work. As structuring forces, they contribute to the emotional landscape of the organization.

The model of appearances of emotion in organizations depicts the range of emotional links to organizational work and serves as a blueprint for the structure of this volume. It also symbolizes the interplay of its two parts and of the individual contributions’ thematic foci. The first part, Emotionalizing Organizations, highlights the role of emotions in organizational processes and structures, showing that feelings are instrumental to organizations and in many ways interwoven with work processes, e.g. as an antecedent and a consequence of work in organizations. The second part, Organizing Emotions, details how organizational structures and processes contribute to the learning and the control of emotions. It gives insights into specific emotional regimes and the application of emotion rules and resources. The question here is of how organizational structures and processes take effect on customers and employees, how organizational members are urged into various emotional regimes and how desired feelings are instigated.

In Part I, Emotionalizing Organizations, Stephen Fineman suggests that the turn towards the feelings of the customer and the shift within public social work organizations from caring for clients to servicing customer leaves the individual social worker without safety net when clients decide to push complaints ad absurdum. Based on an empirical case study he exemplifies how the emotionologies and emotional sub-cultures of organizations give rise to feelings in the employee that manifestly influence her/his self-worth and trust in others and that these feelings may even cause illness and necessitate sick leave. Yiannis Gabriel adds a psychoanalytical edge to the traditional focus
on emotion management in care work. In a critical vein he argues that care work involves feelings and experiences from early childhood and is thus not as easily managed and scripted as has often been assumed. There is not just scripted emotion work in care work, but also sympathies and antipathies that are deep seated in each interactant and that shape the way the carers provide service to their clients and how the interactants perceive each other. Drawing on the example of professional elderly care, Nicole Bornheim analyses the emotional experiences of service providers. In terms of the model of appearances of emotions postulated here, she shows that positive emotions emerge on all levels – of working, of organizing and of the socio-cultural embeddings. As the most relevant triggers of positive emotions she identifies certain organizational conditions, namely working conditions and corporate philosophies. Based on a study of organizational procedures for personnel selection, Christian Imdorf examines affective decision-making in the hiring of trainees, showing the way that emotion and especially what is popularly called ‘gut feeling’ orientate the process of selecting appropriate candidates. They do so by coordinating and aligning the selection along criteria related to the different worlds of the firm and by reducing ambiguity in the face of insufficient information. Poul Poder elaborates an interactional approach to empowerment. As he argues, existing theories of empowerment focus either on the individual or the organization, treating empowerment either as a result of psychological aspects such as self-confidence or as an outcome of structural preconditions (e.g. in flat organizations), but they fail to take into account the importance of social interactions. Instead, he asserts that self-confidence and other positive emotions related to empowerment result primarily from interaction with colleagues and superiors, a process that not only grants recognition, but also the access to resources relevant to performing given tasks.

Combining Goffman’s theory of face-threatening acts, Scheff’s theory of emotions and social bonds and Clark’s theory of emotions and social place, Charlotte Bloch elaborates a framework for the categorization of negative acts and bullying in organizations. The results of her qualitative analysis of negative acts by the type of face-threatening acts with a focus on emotions and interactional processes allow us to better understand the range of consequences for the victims. Helena Flam, Jeff Hearn and Wendy Parkin examine the issue of violations in organizations at the macro, meso and micro levels with a focus on organization violations, gender relations and emotions. The theoretical framework developed assesses the nature of violations and the severity of their consequences,
and illuminates the way that nationalist and organizational discourses coincide in the effort to silence victims of rape and sexual harassment. The silence in turn reproduces the myths of the rational organization as well as the loving and secure family and nation. Alberto Martín Pérez presents an ethnographic study of the emotions in and around queuing for residence permits in Spain. As he shows, on the immigrants’ side anxiety, humiliation, anger, resignation and happiness link into one another and are acted upon individually and in groups. The way these feelings are expressed is deeply connected to the immigrants’ social status as they will suppress anger and reframe the situation in order not to endanger the permit they want to get. Emotions of anxiety and resignation are also identified on the civil servants’ side, along with emotions of frustration and a patronizing attitude towards the clients. The findings thus reveal how nation state structures position both public servants and immigrants as powerless subjects of ritualistic bureaucratic processes of inclusion/exclusion and gatekeeping, giving rise to the permanent emotional turbulence of ‘immigrant-hood’, as well as emotional strain and a ‘non-responsibility’ attitude among public servants.

In Part II, Organizing Emotions, Andrea Cossu highlights the ambiguous role and use of emotion in the bureaucratic organization of the Italian Communist Party, focusing on the role of rituals. On the one hand, the party repressed emotion to promote a ‘rationalist’ image where positive emotions were a side-effect of politics, while negative ones were ascribed exclusively to the ‘enemy’. On the other it provided detailed behavioural scripts that implied a thorough emotion management imposed on the communist in his and her daily individual life. Sylvia Terpe and Silvia Paierl draw on the reform of labour administration in Germany in order to examine the relationship between organizational processes, feeling rules and the ensuing emotions. They focus on the new processing rules for the ‘modern service providers’ – the case managers who attend to the unemployed. Based on a reinterpretation of the results of a qualitative study, they show in particular which feeling rules the case managers are subjected to and how they actively deal with them. The authors analyse the relationship of ‘voluntary’ emotion work and ‘forced’ emotional labour, and develop a typology that characterizes groups of employees by the feeling rules they feel obliged to obey and by their emotional reactions. In her qualitative analysis of the implementation of the ‘Learning by Listening’ concept, Debra King studies how techniques for the enhancement of the emotional intelligence of the staff and children in childcare institutions were developed and
implemented. Focusing on the ensuing change in childcare routines and the way that the care staff worked with the emotions concerning and around these changes, she offers insights into the sometimes far-reaching personal and private consequences of the organizational emotional regime and its production of preferred organizational identities. Vesa Leppänen presents a conversation analytic study of interactions between telephone advice nurses and people seeking medical help. The fine-grained analysis of their verbal exchanges reveals nurses’ microstrategies for controlling the callers’ potential anxiety about disease and guiding them within the framework of emotional neutrality, which is the preferred emotional regime of the bureaucratic setting. The results not only show that the nurses steer the interaction and the emotional expressions of the caller, but also that the structural contexts of the conservations put the caller in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the nurse. Finally, Carmen Baumeler discusses the concept of emotional intelligence as an organizational regime of emotional conduct conducive to flexible capitalism. Basing her work on Elias, Foucault, Hochschild and Reddy, she shows that the development towards increased interdependency and functional relationships, as well as modern bureaucratization, do not do away with emotions but indeed bring them back onto the agenda in order to create self-disciplining idealized subjects.

In view of these multifaceted topics and approaches, we may proudly state that this volume delivers a strong contribution to the broadening field of research on emotions in organizations. With its trans-disciplinary and multiparadigmatic character it conveys deep insights into the multi-dimensional ‘nature’ of emotion and its appearance in organizational structures and processes.

Last but not least, we wish to recognize that the realization of this volume is indebted to the existence of the European Sociological Association’s Research Network on the Sociology of Emotions (RN11). The network began in 2004 and is, in itself, a powerful sign of the growing interest in emotions in the social science. The network has quickly expanded since then, today encompassing both junior and senior researchers from Europe, Australia and the USA. In the volume Theorizing Emotions (Hopkins et al. 2009), members of the network engage in the theoretical expansion of emotion sociology. The cornerstones of that volume, as well as those of the current one, on emotions in organizations were laid in sessions of the RN11 at the 8th Conference of the European Sociological Association in September 2007. Additionally, we are proud to have attracted further junior, as well as prominent senior, researchers from outside the network such as Stephen Fineman and Yiannis Gabriel.
With all these contributions we are able to offer original pieces of work from the research front, and a further demonstration of the fruitful cooperation of sociologists and organization and management researchers in tackling the topic of emotions in organizations. We thank all the contributors for the fantastic cooperation and for staying with us till the glorious end!

Notes

1. The development of this compass is based on Deetz’ (1996) revision of the classic Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework of research perspectives in organizational research. The metaphor of a compass is to underscore the flexibility of different ways and goals of doing research, and the understanding of research perspectives as discursive orientations that are produced and reproduced in the very process of doing research. The framework’s construction and its adaptation to research on emotion in organizations are outlined in more detail in Sieben (2007a).

2. For details on the foundation and development of the network, along with the history of the sociology of emotions in Europe, see Jochen Kleres’ (2009) excellent preface to Theorizing Emotions.

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