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Part I
Introduction
Exploring Interstate Reconciliations

Puzzle

This book is about interstate reconciliations. Reconciliation has rarely been an attractive concept in international relations as forgiveness, apology, sacrifice, and harmony have not been prominent features in politics. From the realist perspective, nation-states have an inclination to compete rather than cooperate in pursuit of their national interests. Furthermore, competitive actions are reinforced in situations where the nations concerned have had a long history of hostility and conflict. This balance of power game has led hostile states to be reluctant to pursue long-term reconciliatory policies. However, the end of the Cold War and the revival of the United Nations played a significant role in transforming the pessimistic realpolitik vision of international relations toward a more ethical one. Pierre Hazan points out that ‘this shift in perspective provided the opportunity for reconciliation to play a more decisive role. [...] The UN General Assembly was so convinced of the need to promote such an integrated approach to the peace process that it declared 2009 to be the international year of reconciliation’ (Hazan 2009: 257–8).

If reconciliatory initiatives launched by former enemies have become relatively common nowadays, they are not working in the same way all over the world. The Franco-German reconciliation has been praised, both by academics and practitioners, to be the model of a successful interstate reconciliation. Many political elites have made historical analogies to this case in order to promote reconciliation with their own national enemies. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, presented the Franco-German case as the example to follow for the future of Polish–Ukraine relations during his visit to Lviv in Ukraine in 1998 while Helmut Kohl, German
Chancellor from 1982 to 1998, often expressed his wish to achieve with Poland the kind of historic reconciliation that Konrad Adenauer had achieved with France (Ash 1994; Iffly 2003). Ion Iliescu, former Romanian president, suggested in 1995 that ‘Romania and Hungary follow the model of Franco-German reconciliation’ (Szabo 1996: 46–50). The former president of South Korea Roh Moo-hyun also mentioned the Franco-German case whenever there was a recurrent dispute between Japan and Korea over history controversies. In addition, some academics make comparative analysis as well between European and Asian cases to see what ‘lessons’ Asian countries can get from Europe.1

If France and Germany seem to be ‘successfully’ reconciled today, other dyads such as Turkey and Greece, Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, or Israel and Arab countries, to name but few examples, have achieved less progress. The public has become dangerously insensitive to see ‘yet another’ political incident caused by a sharp dispute over Cyprus, history textbook issues, or a bombing terror threat since these events have repeated over decades. Even within the so-called reconciled cases where military conflicts are unthinkable today, a hostile public mood against each other is still vivid within societies, which forms a serious barrier to constructing stable bilateral relationship. The ambivalent situation raises some fundamental questions: Is this stalemate a normal situation? Is it impossible to break the vicious circle? Are certain countries simply more reluctant to reconcile than others? How do we explain the seemingly contradictory forces, a growing tendency toward international reconciliation and rising nationalism? What are the external and internal factors pushing or impeding nation-states, especially those with deep-seated hatred against historical enemies, to choose not to compete but to reconcile? What do we mean by a ‘successful’ reconciliation? How do reconciliatory factors at the state level interplay with determinants of international or intra-national level? In particular, do national initiatives to reconcile contribute to regional stability, or do they, on the contrary, threaten it by spurring resistance to reconcile? The main objective of this study is to address these central questions within an analytical framework of reconciliation that identifies key determinants to reconcile between historical enemies.

These questions are of particular importance and timely not only because they carries real world implications dealing with the problem of deep-rooted interstate enmity but also because our society faces today more than ever before the challenge of cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. Even though the probability for erstwhile enemies to fall back into military conflicts seems to have lessened in the present era of
globalization, unresolved history issues causing a reluctant mood to reconcile form serious obstacles to constructing solid bilateral relationship and, to a larger extent, a comprehensive regional cooperation framework. To achieve a lasting peace, a profound change in the interstate relations from enmity to amity is crucial. This study also contributes to scientific progress attempting to conceptualize reconciliation in international relations, which remains under-researched and under-theorized (Brown and Poremski 2005). If the term reconciliation is frequently used in political discourses or in the mass media, it is rarely mentioned in Political Science or International Relations Theory textbooks compared to other cooperative interstate behaviours such as rapprochement, coexistence, appeasement, détente, cooperation, interdependence, or integration. The major utility of interstate or international reconciliation studies is therefore its contribution as a conceptual, empirical, and methodological link between work on the future of the international system and the future of the nation-states whose interrelationships make up the system.

Why study reconciliation?

Political scientists or international relations theorists have not shown deep interest in reconciliation as a field of study about interstate behaviours. Seemingly, reconciliation phenomena are not sufficiently political or scientific to be analyzed since they regard reconciliation as concerning ‘personal relations or religious experiences for individuals and small face-to-face groups’ (Ross 2004: 197). In other words, reconciliation is rather a matter of inter-personal or inter-communal relations, often affected by ethnic, racial, or religious conflicts (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004). It is, therefore, not surprising to see that many studies on reconciliation have been conducted by sociologists, theologians, philosophers, psychologists, or anthropologists. Another plausible explanation is that political scientists intentionally ignored reconciliation because of its strong religious connotation (Favazza 2002; Cole 2007). Andrew Schaap in Reconciliation and Politics points out that ‘reconciliation is central to the Christian religion as it provides the narrative link between the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament’ (Schaap 2005: 18). Politics just cannot go along with reconciliation since the latter implies a voluntary act of sacrifice, forgiveness, or apology – all words with value-laden connotations – as opposed to the power political terms. Furthermore, some political scientists are wary of models and explanations that seem explicitly normative.
Conversely, one might argue that political scientists and practitioners do address reconciliation, but under the guise of more neutral terms such as rapprochement, appeasement, special relationship, détente, normalization, coexistence, and cooperation. The common sensical definition of reconciliation – the restoration of friendly relationships between states – means everything and nothing. A brief overview of existing literature tells us that each study takes its own interpretation depending on the selected cases since there is no clear analytical framework for the concept itself. Within the framework of conflict resolution, the conceptual overlapping with peace-keeping, peace-building, and peace-making makes it even more difficult to draw a distinct definitional boundary around the term.² In view of this, reconciliation seems nothing more than a new label applied to issues that international relations theorists have duly examined.

However, it is important to look at the term reconciliation through a new prism. Let’s take an example with other political terms: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, the motto of the French revolution in 1789. Applied onto the interstate level, it means that nation-states enjoy their ‘liberty’ by granting full sovereignty while interacting with other national authorities. They recognize complete ‘equality’ of all nations, de jure if not de facto, with mutual respect on any cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity. If these two values have relatively been put into reality, this is not the case of the third term, ‘fraternité’.³ Unlike liberty and equality, fraternité has lacked salience in the modern world:

In comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights but conveying instead certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights. (…) The ideal of fraternity is sometimes thought to involve ties of sentiment and feelings which it is unrealistic to expect between members of the wider society. And this is surely a further reason for its relative neglect in democratic theory. Many have felt that it has no proper place in political affairs (Rawls 1971: 105–6).

The change of international system from the demise of Empires to the proliferation of nation-states in the late eighteenth century gave priority to the search for liberty and equality among political entities. In addition, the Concert of Europe during the nineteenth century seemed to guarantee a durable peace to Europeans who had fought countless wars over decades. But, the outbreak of the First World War proved that
something was ‘missing’ to enjoy a stable peace among nations. It is thus worth exploring whether this ‘missing’ part has something to do with ‘liberté, égalité without fraternité’.

While liberty and equality are political rights that can be independently realized on their own account, fraternité requires interactions between human beings as well as nation-states. 형제애(*hyung-je-ae*), fraternité in Korean language, demonstrates well the relational paradigm of the term. At least, two distinctive subjects, 형(*hyung* means older brother) and 제(*je* means younger brother) are needed here. The characteristic of their relations is then represented as 애(*ae* means love). It is thus more difficult to apply fraternité in politics since it demands reciprocal willingness between two entities in putting the concept into reality contrary to liberty or equality. Nonetheless, it is to note that there is a trinity relation among these three concepts. Liberty and equality without fraternité leads to individualism whereas fraternité without liberty and equality is regarded as communism (Heo 2010b).

Fraternité is a nice catchy word omnipresent in the political propaganda and the mass media. As a matter of fact, the immediate reaction to this idealistic term would be ‘who are my brothers?’ In other words, ‘who belongs to my fraternal family?’ Are they limited to those who share same blood, same ethnic origin, same gender, same political affiliation, same religion, same language, same nation, or same culture? If one of these criteria is accepted, brotherhood becomes the cause for chauvinism, exclusion, factionalism, patriotism, racial discrimination, or religious conflict. However, brotherhood, by its origin, has a universal dimension. The United Nations takes a clear position in dealing with race, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. To cope with today’s challenge of diversity, UN proclaimed 2009 *International Year of Reconciliation* with the aim of ‘restoring humanity’s lost unity – particularly today, when human societies are fractured or deeply divided’. By putting high importance in ‘the recognition of the Other in their differences, interests and values’, UN urges us to think about what belongs to us and the others: ‘It is impossible to exist without others, and it is always possible to live in peace with others.’ It suggests new paradigms for human coexistence by promoting universal value such as ‘solidarity’ and ‘brotherhood’ (UN document A/61/PV.56).

애(*love*) in fraternité is not an altruistic act of charity, as often regarded, or a heartfelt sentiment of solidarity. It is rather an intense expression of mutual will to find a common good between ‘us’ and ‘the others’, even between erstwhile enemies, which requires concrete engagements (Lubich 2004a). Martin Luther King advocated a revolutionary view of fraternity in 1963,
dreaming that one day slaves and slave-owners, black men and white men, Catholics and Protestants, will be able to live together as brothers and sisters: ‘With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood’ (King 1986: 217–20). We are still far from observing its realization since it is hardly conceivable to see nation-states taking the lofty goal ‘Love the other’s country as your own’ into full consideration, which is the ultimate outcome of the term fraternité. Fraternité as a political paradigm is a complex but dynamic concept. It gives answers to challenges that our societies are facing today by reconnecting broken relations among states and people. Therefore, fraternité cannot be left as a secondary idea. It should come back to the centre of political discourses and finds its place as a principal concept in the academic disciplines such as the theory of democracy, international relations, and the theory of international politics (Baggio 2009). In politics, all is about relations: ‘Those who are eager to bring a new wave in politics should bring a new wave in relations. Fraternité contains this new relational paradigm (author’s translation)’ (Baggio 2009: 1).

In view of this, a similar approach can be taken to analyze the term ‘reconciliation’. For those who consider the absence of war as a sufficient condition for peaceful relations between states, reconciliation has nothing original to contribute to stable peace. However, this term will strongly resonate with those who believe that halting a war or signing a peace treaty is not enough to achieve sustainable peace. A simple coexistence between former enemies is indeed a form of peace, but it ignores the vital aspect of lasting peace (Bloomfield 2006). Without reconciliation, it is impossible to perennially cut off all sources of reviving conflicts and stabilize peaceful relations. Rebuilding a broken relationship by restoring mutual trust lies thus at the very heart of reconciliation studies. Because it demands fundamental changes in mutual perception based on deep-rooted beliefs or stereo-typed images, efforts coming from both political leaders and a larger public are crucial for a successful reconciliation. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that the ‘reconciliation is a crucial factor in stabilizing peace after the resolution of an international conflict and in transforming the relations between former enemies’ (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 4). It is in this context that this book is interested in exploring interstate reconciliations.6

Reconciliation studies in International Relations (IR)

As simple as the definition may be – becoming friends after a fight – there is no reconciliation theory in IR. This lack of theoretical framework is
mostly due to the interdisciplinary characteristics of the concept itself. However, the term’s breadth is not a road block but a stimulus for in depth research, as IR is inherently a discipline that covers diverse fields ranging from history, political science, economics, and law to anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. A basic database research on reconciliation shows that the term has been studied mostly in theology and philosophy. In these fields, reconciliation refers to ‘the communion between God and human being’, which demonstrates the strong religious connotation of the term (Favazza 2002: 52). Likewise, reconciliation, as a legal term, refers to the restoration of amicable relations between two individuals who were previously in conflict with one another and implies forgiveness for injuries on either or both sides. These definitions show that reconciliation has been considered more as a matter of interpersonal or inter-communal relations with emotional and normative aspects. Without ignoring previous works, this study takes a more specific focus in conceptualizing reconciliation. Taking nation-states as the unit of analysis, the main focus here is to explore whether this term can be defined as a national strategy of political behaviours between historical adversaries. For this purpose, it is of particular interest to explore how political scientists or historians view the phenomenon of reconciliation and to what extent their concepts overlap across fields.

**Reconciliation as a conceptual framework**

Most studies on reconciliation in political science have been conducted within conflict resolution theory. In *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, reconciliation is regarded as ‘the ultimate goal of conflict resolution’ (Ramsbotham *et al.* 2005: 231–48). Hizkias Assefa goes further by arguing that reconciliation is the highest level of conflict handling mechanism. The term is categorized both as a conflict resolving and conflict preventing strategy. He recognizes that ‘reconciliation is the most effective and durable way of resolving and preventing destructive conflicts’ (Assefa 2001: 342). Since reconciliation here is a strategy to stop the war or to resolve a conflicting problem, many studies have focused on how reconciliation should be pursued in a post conflict period and what conditions it needs to achieve the goal. Because the conflict resolution field is mainly interested in intra-national cases, the concept itself is analyzed at the interpersonal level, or at large, at the inter-group one. If the transformational aspect of relations from enmity to amity is generally accepted as the basic concept of reconciliation, different interpretations exist in what concrete form reconciliation most effectively transforms bilateral relations.
Because reconciliation is a ‘theologically-charged word with politically-charged implications’, certain value-driven terms are at the core of definitional debate (Favazza 2002: 52). The most frequently connected words with reconciliation are apology and forgiveness. Taking a biblical perspective, Gregory Baum and Harold Wells notes the need for forgiveness in reconciliation processes since human beings in relation with God are all sinners (Baum and Wells 1997). Applied to the political world, some argue that apology and forgiveness are indispensable elements in reconciliation. Nicholas Tavuchis, for instance, argues that apology is necessary in overcoming the past and thus realizing reconciliation (Tavuchis 1991). Michael Ignatieff sheds light on the impact of public apology that can be extraordinarily powerful in alleviating fears, avoiding violent conflict, and making reconciliation possible (Ignatieff 1996). When it comes to forgiveness, Schaap states that ‘the possibility of reconciliation depends further on a willingness to forgive, which sustains a space for politics between former enemies’ (Schaap 2005: 103). Brian Frost first admits that ‘to link politics and forgiveness is unusual’. But, after giving a broad empirical analysis on the Soviet Union and her neighbours, Japan and the West, Britain and Ireland, Germany's Role in Europe, he concludes that ‘without forgiveness, there can be no real peace and no lasting reconciliation’ (Frost 1991: 1). Ervin Staub even considers that ‘it is only forgiveness that makes reconciliation possible’ (Staub 2000: 376–84).

To a lesser extent, Trudy Govier argues that reconciliation and forgiveness usually go together although the former may exist without the latter in certain cases and vice versa (Govier 2002). In The Role of Forgiveness in Reconciliation, Yehudith Auerbach admits that ‘reaching true reconciliation through genuine forgiveness is difficult and consequently rare’ (Auerbach 2004: 157). But she points out that if we wish to go beyond formal peace or normalization between former enemies, reconciliation via collective forgiveness is needed. Mervin Love also takes forgiveness as the core element for reconciliation as it involves listening to the pain of others, and attempting to take it seriously together. She puts reconciliation at the heart of conflict resolution theory arguing that reconciliation is the ultimate goal of peace building (Love 1995).

Conversely, others evaluate that apology and forgiveness form a difficult obstacle to reconciling or are not necessary since it runs the risks of becoming too emotional (Dwyer 1999). Analyzing the Anglo-Irish reconciliation, David Bloomfield tells an anecdote of an Irish soldier who confessed that he can eventually work for the Anglo-Irish reconciliation but would never forgive (Bloomfield 2006). Charles Villa-Vicencio goes to the same direction arguing that reconciliation
needs to promote mutual understanding but it does not necessarily involve forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader 2005). In *Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations*, Raymond Cohen states that apology and reconciliation can never mean the same thing for states as for individuals. According to him, only a personal apology can express sincere regret for wrongdoing while a state as a legal abstraction does diplomatic apology (Cohen 2004). States might use ethical language but it is always motivated by *realpolitik*. Jennifer Lind in *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* mainly argues that apology certainly helped the Franco-German reconciliation process to go forward but then we should be very cautious of its exceeding negative impact since it runs the risk of triggering domestic backlash as South Korean–Japanese relations demonstrate. This normative implication opens an additional debate on whether reconciliation is morally imperative or not in restoring broken relations (Lind 2008).

Healing is another dominant element that constitutes reconciliation. From a sociological point of view, reconciliation means cognitive change between two affected people. John Lederach defines reconciliation as:

> A concept and a praxis endeavours to reframe the conflict so that the parties are no longer preoccupied with focusing on the issues in a direct, cognitive manner. Its primary goal and key contribution is to seek innovative ways to create a time and a place, within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate, and embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with the present (Lederach 2004: 35).

Therefore, healing the painful memory is the primary task in reconciliation. Johan Galtung also defines reconciliation as ‘the process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relations’ and suggests twelve different approaches to arrive at reconciliation (Galtung 2001: 1).

From a legal point of view, reconciliation means stopping the war and regulating past issues on judicial terms. Here, telling the truth and bringing justice are primary factors. Andrew Rigby’s *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence* gives detailed analysis on legal reconciliation (Rigby 2001). Desmond Tutu, the Nobel Peace Prize Winner in 1984, argued that reconciliation be considered as a synonym to restorative justice (Crocker 2002). And to restore justice, notes David Crocker in *Punishment and Reconciliation*, democratic deliberation is a crucial element.
For Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader, reconciliation regards justice as ‘an essential ingredient to any settlement, while recognizing that there are different ways of achieving and understanding justice’ (Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader 2005: 4). In this sense, reconciliation is closely linked to public justice and becomes the best way to avoid vengeance and amnesia:

Justice and reconciliation are inherently and inextricably linked. In societies emerging from violent conflict, political reconciliation is not a romantic or utopian ideal. It is often the only realistic alternative to enduring and escalating violence, and a vital means of building a society based on the rule of law and social reconstruction (Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader 2005: 3).

Many historians share this point of view since ‘overcoming the past’ is at the centre of their interest. For instance, Gi-wook Shin, Daqing Yang, and Soon-won Park state that the recent literature on reconciliation takes reconciliation as ‘an ultimate goal for many dealing with internal or external historical injustice’ (Shin et al. 2007: 2). In Roads to Reconciliation, Elin Skaar, Siri Gloppen and Astri Suhrke consider truth as the main element for reconciliation. They argue that restoring justice should be the main objective in reconciling by analyzing various cases ranging from African and European to Latin American countries. Therefore, political reconciliation at the national level refers to the ‘creation of conditions where former enemies may continue to disagree, but respect each other as citizens with equal rights’ (Skaar et al. 2005: 20).

As valuable as they are, these element-focused approaches in conceptualizing reconciliation do not address questions identified here; whether reconciliation can be perceived as an interstate cooperative behaviours and, if yes, how to measure it. They might give one or more aspects of how reconciliation should be pursued after a conflict. But they fail to offer a whole picture of what reconciliation is between nation-states. It is certainly not easy to distinguish the ‘how’ (what is needed) and the ‘what’ (what it is) of reconciliation. Is it by apologizing and forgiving (as a means) that we arrive at reconciliation? Or is apology and forgiveness (as a goal) equal to reconciliation? However, as Govier argues in explaining the concept of reconciliation ‘it is crucial not to confuse the various means that may be employed in the quest for reconciliation with reconciliation itself’ (Govier 2006: 21).

The limit of the extant reconciliation literature in dealing with questions identified here comes partially from the vague barrier between reconciliation and conflict resolution. Although they are not mutually
exclusive, as Bar-Siman-Tov argues in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, these two concepts are different:

Although conflict resolution leads to a formal termination of a conflict when a peace agreement has been reached and signed by the parties, it does not necessarily stabilize, normalize, or consolidate the new peace relations or even prevent the development of a new conflict in the future that may bring about renewed violence (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 61).

Conflict resolution is ‘an important but not sufficient condition for stable and harmonious peace between former enemies’ (Auerbach 2004: 152). Reconciliation should be considered as ‘a crucial factor in stabilizing peace after resolution of an international conflict and in transforming the relations between former enemies’ (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 4). In view of this, reconciliation goes beyond conflict resolution. By including the notion of stable peace as the ultimate goal, ‘reconciling with enemies’ is not content any more with a periodic event such as showing an apologetic gesture or agreeing on a peace treaty to end a war. What is needed here is thus to compare various interstate cooperative behaviours in order to identify the similarities as well as the particularities of reconciliation; then to find out quantifiable indicators of measurement viewing it both from diachronic and synchronic dimensions.

**Reconciliation as a political phenomenon**

A study of a concept is valuable itself, but it becomes much more if mapped onto the world it sets out to explain. Because reconciliation is commonly regarded as a conflict resolution mechanism at the inter-communal level, many case studies have been conducted about countries that experienced civil war, genocide, or mass violence stemming from racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination. Therefore, the existing literature on reconciliation phenomenon mostly deals with the social reconstruction or reintegration process within a nation. The South African reconciliation is the most frequently selected case owing to the success of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Cambodia, Chile, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Mozambique, and Rwanda, to name but a very few examples, are some other cases of which the intra-national reconciliation process has been studied in depth. By contrast, interstate cases, which are the main interest of this study, have rarely been analyzed from a political scientific approach. A vast history literature exists tempting to explain how former enemy dyads go forth and back in improving
their bilateral relations. However, they are rarely treated within the framework of reconciliation. Moreover, most of researches on interstate reconciliations often take a narrative approach by examining one or two cases, and this without any attempt to conduct a comparative analysis.

For interstate reconciliation studies, prevailing historical cases are the by-product of the end of the Second World War, mainly Germany and Japan’s relations with their neighbouring states (Buruma 1994). The Franco-German reconciliation is a ‘crucial case’ because of its exemplary status as a successful reconciliation process between two nation-states with a longstanding antagonism. Abundant literature exists in the field of International History exploring the crucial role of a political leadership, people to people reconciliation processes, the impact of the European regional integration on the bilateral reconciliation, and the interaction between international and domestic politics. Likewise, the German relations with the Eastern European countries, the Polish case in particular, has a considerable literature that falls into the interstate reconciliation framework.

Unlike the German relations with neighbouring states, the Northeast Asian cases have only recently attracted attention to the reconciliatory aspect of bilateral relations. According to Shin, Park, and Yang, some significant changes of international context such as democratization, globalization, regional integration, and the rising nationalism are crucial elements in raising renewed interest in reconciliation among the Northeast Asian countries (Shin et al. 2007). The Sino-Japanese reconciliation and the South Korean–Japanese reconciliation processes are two prevailing cases focusing on historical issues such as unresolved territorial disputes and history textbook controversies. Similarly, the Turkish–Greek reconciliation study mainly deals with the territorial issues, the Cyprus or the Aegean Sea problem in particular. When it comes to the Armenian–Turkish relations, scholars are more reluctant to use the term reconciliation mostly because there have not shown many positive signs owing to their radically different interpretations of the past.

The Indo-Pakistani relationship, the Israeli relations with Arab countries, and the Anglo-Irish reconciliation are cases with two influencing variables, ethnic-religious differences and territorial disputes. The relation between Israel and Egypt is the most advanced among Israeli–Arab reconciliation processes although it still remains cold today. The Northern Ireland reconciliation is a complicated case since it both entangles intra-national and inter-national reconciliation processes: Protestants versus Roman Catholics, or Unionists against Nationalists within Ireland in addition to the Irish–British relations. The Hungarian relations with neighbouring states, Rumania and Slovakia in particular, fit
here as well since minority issue still hampers any further reconciliatory processes between them. The relations between a colonial aggressor and victimized countries are sometimes considered as the subject of reconciliation. Germany and Namibia, France and Algeria, Indonesia and Timor, and Italy and Libya are some telling examples. However, there is an ongoing controversy over whether it is possible or even necessary to conduct reconciliatory politics for the past colonial experiences (The Economist 2008a).

The literature on the history of bilateral relations is certainly abundant. However, the narrative approach over one or two cases has its own limit in identifying crucial variables that affect interstate reconciliation processes. If mono-case studies help figure out external and internal conditions influencing the reconciliation process in the case selected, they fail to provide with a comprehensive understanding of the interstate reconciliation process. It is not easy to figure out whether a cause (strong political leadership or external pressure for example) in the case A (Franco-German relations) has a causal relationship with the outcome (reconciliation or non-reconciliation) without looking into other cases. It is also difficult to understand to what extent a reconciliation process is ‘successful’ and whether it is possible to distinguish different degrees of reconciliation.

A number of works however do examine interstate reconciliations in a comparative perspective. Lily Gardner Feldman offers an excellent comparative study by analyzing German foreign policy toward Poland, the Czech Republic, Israel, and France (Feldman 1999a). To a lesser extent, Catherine Iffly also compares Franco-German reconciliation with Polish–German and Polish–Ukraine relations (Iffly 2003). Both suggest convincing variables to explain the outcome of reconciliation: international context, leadership, and institutionalization. However, since the cases selected are all more or less reconciled today, it is difficult to evaluate the adequacy of the same variables within un-reconciled cases.

Stephen Rock explored four historical cases in which great powers make a gradual transition in their mutual relations from enmity to amity: Great Britain and the United States, Great Britain and Germany, France and England, and the United States and Germany. He compared the first two cases with the latter in order to explore what external and internal factors influenced the dyad to reconcile (Rock 1989). In ‘War and Reconciliation’, Peter Brecke and William J. Long use quantitative methods in analyzing the correlation between war and reconciliation event. Defining reconciliation event as the first step to stop the war, they selected numerous cases which experienced major interstate wars from 1888 to 1991 (Long and Brecke 2003).
Nonetheless, the use of the term ‘reconciliation’ and its unit of analysis vary from one to another. For Rock, reconciliation is merely a synonym of rapprochement. In consequence, he focuses on the relationship between great powers, dyads in competing rivalry and not in historical enmity. For Long and Brecke, the central interest of the study is the transformation of relations between dyads that had experienced war or are still in a military conflict. Hence, reconciliation is rather perceived as a periodic event. This vast interpretation of the term and its scope leads us to reflect on the nature of dyadic relationship and the necessity to draw a clear boundary of ‘whom’ to reconcile.

Methodology

Since the topic itself has an interdisciplinary nature, I selected a methodology that combines both a historical and a political scientific approach. According to Stephen Walt, ‘reliance on historical anecdotes or a large statistical sample is equally troublesome’ (Walt 1987: 11–12). Narrative evidence cannot tell which causes are most powerful whereas a quantitative approach cannot provide direct evidence about the perceptions and motivations that inspired a particular political decision. In order to overcome these limitations, I employ a methodology that crosses the line between a focused comparison and a statistical analysis. Given the aim of the study, this compromise between generality and specificity seems necessary and appropriate.

For some, the research methodology that historians and political scientists use may appear irreconcilable. Jack S. Levy explains that ‘historians describe, explain, and interpret individual events or a temporally bounded series of events, whereas political scientists generalize about the relationship between variables and construct lawlike statements about social behaviour’ (Levy 1997: 22). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita also states that the differences between them are clear enough that history departments seldom hire people trained as political scientists and vice versa (Bueno de Mesquita 1996). Bluntly put, there is a general assumption that historians are interested in constructing a narrative history based on the explanations of particular events whereas political scientists are more inclined to build general theories and test them (Levy 1997). However, as Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman argue, this seemingly distinctive gap is somewhat overstated. Contemporary historians should ‘establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our own time’
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(Elman and Elman 1997: 9, 41). Paul Pierson also argues that ‘theoretical explorations of historical causation remain important even for scholars who are dubious about the prospects for generalization or uninterested in its pursuit’. Therefore, this study tends to achieve greater clarity about ‘how the past affects the present’ by employing both historical and political scientific approach as it will help ‘historically-oriented scholars more effectively communicate the import of their research to often sceptical colleagues, and open up possibilities for more constructive intellectual exchange’ (Pierson 2000: 73–4).

To meet my research objective – constructing a theoretical framework for a political concept – deductive reasoning is the best suited. The deductive ideal-type method provides practical predictions and aids in systemizing empirical generalizations. As Raymond Aron argues:

A theory is a hypothetical, deductive system consisting of a group of hypotheses whose terms are strictly defined and whose relationships between terms or variables are most often given a mathematical form. The elaboration of this system starts with a conceptualization of perceived or observed reality; axioms or highly abstract relationships govern the system and allow the scientist to rediscover by deduction either appearances that are thereby fully explained, or facts that are perceptible through devices, if not through the sense, and that temporarily either confirm the theory or invalidate it (Aron 1967: 2).

Since deduction is a process that enables us to use an analytical framework to explain real-world events, it provides a causal link between a theory and empirical observations (Manheim et al. 2002: 18).

Three specific methods are used here. I first employ the method of difference. I compare similar concepts of interstate behaviours interchangeably used with the term reconciliation in order to figure out the commonality as well as the particularity of reconciliation. Then, I develop an ideal-type of interstate reconciliations. Since my topic covers both the field of international politics and history, it is useful to construct a schematic framework based on the different socio-cultural and politico-historical settings. ‘Ideal type’ (Idealtypus in the German language), a methodological concept developed by Max Weber, refers to ‘heuristic mental constructs that, though simplifications, purport to capture in some way general features of reality and so stimulate thought, discussion, and social comparison’ (Ritter 1986: 201). Even though the term model or paradigm are interchangeably used with ideal type, I selected the term ideal type since it ‘has nothing to do with any type
of perfection other than a purely logical one’ whereas *model* has rather a value-driven connotation (Weber 1949).\textsuperscript{14}

Some might argue that an ideal type is a purely artificial construct based on the intellectual imagination. Certainly, a scientific characterization of a social phenomenon is somewhat simplified and even exaggerated. But, in a stricter sense, all political ideas such as democracy, liberty, or freedom rather suggest an idealistic picture since the reality does not correspond perfectly with these lofty goals. Therefore, the utopia–reality gap should not undermine the attempt to build a schematic framework: ‘the fabrication of intellectual tools is unavoidable because human affairs are so complex’ (Ritter 1986: 202). In a nutshell, an abstract ideal-type construction not only contributes to providing a theoretical lens through which various empirical cases can be observed, compared, and tested. It also brings about scientific progress by which humanity can make slow but significant evolution. A political concept or phenomena, reconciliation in this study, can be thus understood as ‘a process that moves toward a goal that will never fully be achieved, but a goal that serves as a model of perfect harmony’ (Ladisch 2006: 115).

As the result of a deductive reasoning from the theoretical framework of reconciliation, this study finally proposes a tentative typology of reconciliations. The typological approach was mostly used in the economic field. Nonetheless, social scientists have also shown deep interest in this method. Simply put, typology means structuring or perceiving the world by means of categorical types (Tiryakian 1968). A type is not a theory but is only deduced from a theory, which means that there is ‘potential relationship between the theory in use and the observations of empirical data just made’ (McKinney 1950: 237). The primary contribution of this method is that it serves as a basis for comparison and measurement of concrete occurrences. It also serves as a point of reference for the analysis of social reality.

Constructive Typology, as an aspect of scientific methodology, refers to ‘a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases’. As John C. McKinney points out, type constructions is a methodological approach that requires both historical and political scientific approaches as a ‘generalizing constructed type is drawn from a theory that has already received substantial empirical verification, or constructed directly from the particulars of an historical situation’. Although there are still some controversies, constructing typology remains ‘an ever-present feature of empirical investigations’ (McKinney 1966: 203).
Relatively few and scattered as they are, there is a strong need for a systematic study of interstate reconciliation cases. Such a classification is valuable for two main reasons. First, it helps carry out a comparative analysis across various processes. The extant literature mostly takes a historical approach by focusing on one or two cases. However, if one wishes to draw a close comparison in order to make predictions, it is important to go beyond in-depth case studies and to formulate an overall outline of analysis applicable to empirical cases. This can be done by making a categorization of socio-political phenomenon. Secondly, it leads to a better evaluation of the impacts that bilateral reconciliations have on regional or international security. Based on the interaction among three levels of analysis – systemic, regional, and domestic (inter-governmental and intra-societal) reconciliations – the aim here is to establish a typology that allows assessing the incentives of as well as the obstacles to reconciliation across various categories: ‘The more explicitly stated the typology, including the relationships between types, the more the typology functions as a theoretical model’ (Tiryakian 1968: 179). In sum, the scientific study of reconciliation builds upon but go beyond the particularistic knowledge of specific cases, on the one hand, and avoid lumping together all instances of reconciliation, on the other hand. The primary characteristics of the typology suggested in this research are thus descriptive and to a certain extent classificatory but not explanatory.15

Focus and scope

Since reconciliation studies cover a wide range of actors, areas, and fields, it is important to clearly delimit its focus as well as its scope.

Interstate relationship

The main focus of this book is the reconciliation processes ‘between’ nation-states. Most of researchers in reconciliation studies so far have focused on the reconciliatory efforts among ethnic groups or religious communities ‘within’ a nation or a state. Although they are important phenomena to be analyzed, a melting pot of inter-state and intra-state cases is dangerous since different approaches lead to different outcomes. Joel H. Rosenthal points out in ‘Making Peace: Dilemmas of Reconciliation’ that ‘actions across national lines will necessarily differ from those within a single nation’ (Rosenthal 2001).16 Depending on the units chosen, the process implies different elements. The reconciliation between France and Germany has certainly different way to go through from the one between a dictatorial ruling party and a rebellion group
within a country where the power symmetry between the units involved is radically different from interstate cases. As a matter of fact, Craig Etcheson categorizes the reconciliation processes between nation-states as the most difficult unit of analysis. He contends that reconciliation between nations and people are the most complex level of analysis and thus needs different implications for how to conceptualize reconciliation (Etcheson 2004). For this reason, this book does not deal directly with intrastate reconciliation cases. It is nonetheless important to stress that the source of explanations goes beyond the state level since the external factors as well as internal ones affecting the reconciliatory policies range from individual to systemic levels. As Barry Buzan claims, ‘central confusion in understanding what “levels” refers to arises from a widespread failure to distinguish between sources of explanation and objects of analysis’ (Buzan1997: 198). Therefore, I understand here the unit of analysis as the subject to reconciliation, nation-state, and the level of analysis as ‘the types of variables that explain a particular unit’s behaviours,’ which includes regional factor as well as international one (Moul 1973: 495).

**Nation-state**

Without entering the terminological debate of what forms a state, a nation, or a nation-state, I take nation-state as the unit of analysis, referring to ‘a legal territorial entity composed of a stable population and a government’ since the central interest of this book is the government-to-government and people-to-people reconciliation processes as well as the interaction between states and peoples (Baylis and Smith 2005: 780). According to André Liebich, nation and state are like ‘two sides of the same coin’:

> A state is the formal, organizational side of the coin; a nation is its human side. States are institutions; nations are collectivities. The former have an objective character; the latter have a subjective one (Liebich 2003: 454).

Donald Puchala rightfully explains as well that the history of International Relations is essentially ‘the history of relations among states and peoples, which appropriately defines the subject as the history of interacting cultures’ (Puchala 1995: 2). Nevertheless, drawing a clear-cut line between the governmental unit and people is somewhat artificial since, in a stricter term, public officials are also part of the population. The simple reason I make the distinction between the governmental and societal
levels is that, unlike ordinary citizens, those representing a country at the governmental level possess power to implement political decisions, which in turn affects the reconciliatory policies with former enemies. By ‘those representing a country at the governmental level,’ I refer here to domestic political actors such as president, prime minister, foreign minister, diplomats, public officials, civil servants, and politicians.18

I also confine the nature of relationship between nation-states. In contrast to natural science, it is difficult to control ‘unit homogeneity’ or even its weaker version, the ‘constant effect’ assumption when it comes to the academic field dealing with human behaviours (King et al. 1994: 91–4). It is certainly impossible to find two cases that are identical in every respect. Socio-cultural backgrounds are different, and they all have their own historical particularities. Nevertheless, this diversity does not set up an insurmountable obstacle to conduct a cross cultural analysis on reconciliation politics. The origin of conflicts and the cause of division are certainly diverse. But, the ultimate goal remains the same for former enemies willing to transform their mutual hostility to affinity: establishing a lasting peace relation. For this purpose, this book focuses on dyads with decades or centuries old antagonism, which I name here hereditary enemy states. It thus excludes political adversaries or economic rivalries as it constitutes a relatively common or even natural phenomenon in international relations.19

The concept of a nation-state and that of hereditary enmity may appear, at first glance, as contradictory in that the former is a modern invention whereas the latter embraces historical baggage even before the birth of a nation-state. As a matter of fact, the history of conflicts between Imperial families, Empires, ancient civilizations, city-states, and ethnic groups does not always correspond with the one between nation-states today. Some of them have changed their geopolitical belongings while others simply disappeared. In this sense, mutual hatred nurtured during ancient and medieval times does not necessarily have a direct impact on interstate enmity construction in modern times. Yet the creation of a political unit in the modern era does not mean a total rupture from the past or a new construction of a nation or a state. The pasts of Empires, religious communities, or ethno-nations continue to condition modern processes of interstate relationships. Even though the nation-state ‘where cultural and political coincidence might be considered to exist’ is a recent artificial construct, it is still based on ‘echoes of the past, both ethnic and civic, that are not easy to ignore’ (Pecora 2001: 3). It is thus worth taking into account the historical legacy of dyads, enmity construction in this book, even before the birth of a nation-state.
Introduction

Nationalism and reconciliation

Although every human being is unique and irreplaceable, it is difficult to deny that people belonging to the same country share, to some extent, similar characteristics. Americans and the British have long enjoyed the so-called special relationship just like ‘birds of a feather’. What makes them flock together? Is it the fact that they speak a common language, English? Or is it so as they share the Anglo-Saxon culture? If this is the case, do Japan and Korea share a similar affinity with China in that both had been over centuries under the Sino-centric influence? In view of this, collective identity, national identity in particular, is a difficult variable to deal with. It is subjective, multiple, and complex:

Peoples’ identities are not necessarily monolithic because self conception is a unique combination of many identities such as religions, nationalism or ethnicity, gender, class, community, family, and so on (Haynes 2007: 165).

What constitutes a national identity thus varies from one country to another. Given the scope of this book, I focus on the collective aspect of identity formation. Individuals create and develop their own image about ‘who they are’ based on what they learned, what they hear, and what they see. Nonetheless, the search for identity is strongly affected by the society they belong to. Somewhat simplified, I consider amicable or antagonist sentiment towards former enemies as ‘collective’ thus ‘national’ and not ‘personal’. Anthony D. Smith points out the communal nature of national identity: ‘A sense of shared continuity on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population, shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit, and the collective belief in a common destiny of that unit and its culture’ (Smith 1992: 58).

The socio-political identity of a people passes down from generations to generations through family folklore, education, and mass media. It deeply affects people’s mindset and further creates a shared sense of national pride or national humiliation, which I define here as nationalism. This collective expression of a people, either perceptual or physical, is relational since one tries to fortify oneself vis-à-vis the others: ‘Until the other is identified can the self be realized’ (Tamaki 2010: 23). The debates on nationalism are old yet still ongoing. The term has been classified and defined as a political ideology, a national sentiment, or a social movement; the origins or types of nationalism are multiple; there is a never-ending discussion on whether nationalism is inherent thus...
natural or ‘imagined’ thus invented. This book does not intend to contribute to the conceptual clarity of the term ‘nationalism’. Instead, the attention is narrowed down to the extent it affects the interstate reconciliation processes: ‘Nationalism would make little sense in a world where good relationship between cultures was possible, where powerful states felt no temptation to absorb small ones’ (Guibernau 1996: 64). Nationalism plays a crucial role in reconciliatory politics since it has a considerable impact upon transforming popular perception on oneself as well as on the others. Smith convincingly argues that the joint efforts of France and Germany to change earlier perceptions towards each other, through the use of symbols, youth exchange programmes, and by subsidizing academic studies of common history, brought significant change in shifting their enmity relations toward amity relations (Smith 1992).

**Case selection**

This research is primarily an exercise in international relations theory building, and not in a narrative history. I have thus not tried to provide a chronological history of reconciliation processes nor did I try to cover all existing empirical cases. Instead, I used them fragmentally to build a descriptive typology by employing a deductive method. The selected cases here thus need to be tested in the future.

I explored dyads mostly from Asia and Europe for several reasons. First, European history has the best example of international reconciliations. The principal historical evidences I used are namely the Franco-German, the Anglo-French and the Polish–German reconciliations. Because most achievements on reconciliation have been derived from the history of European countries, it is especially appropriate to examine their utility in predicting the behaviour of states that are neither European nor Great Powers. Critics can be made arguing that Europe is considered as a common civilization that makes nation-states easier to work together. Yet, if we were interested in the degree to which this homogeneity predicted violent behaviour toward one another, we would find that wars were common occurrences among European states. Since I have a specific goal of evaluating reconciliatory factors between historical enemy states rather than simply comparing similar cases, my research is expected to produce a certain degree of valid causal inference.

Secondly, I chose the Northeast Asian reconciliation processes. It may seem strange, at first glance, to talk about Japanese relations with China and Korea as they normalized their diplomatic relations more than thirty years ago and interplay intensively in various fields today.
Nevertheless, both are significant cases because, unlike the European cases, historical memories, embedded with strong animosity, are still powerful symbols for a host of problems that stymie efforts at reconciliation at the national level and put major obstacles to improving political relations. These two cases pose itself an additional interesting feature since both South Korea and China are faced with a double burden of reconciliation; at the intra-national level with North Korea and Taiwan and at the inter-national level with Japan. Some other cases such as Turkish relations with Greece and Armenia, Pakistani–Indian relations, Hungarian–Slovak relations, and certain colonial reconciliation processes are also analyzed to the extent they help clarify the concept of reconciliation and its various processes.

A serious problem that a researcher faces while relying on intentional selection of observations is selection bias. However, with the above-mentioned observations, the problem of bias will be avoided, since they all vary across a range of values of the dependent variable. In other words, I pay special attention to the fact whether the change in independent variables resulted in the comparable changes in the dependent variable. It would have been difficult to find out whether the key explanatory variable is genuinely associated with the dependent variable if I had not manipulated my dependent variable (success or failure to reconcile between historical enemy states and its measurement upon the degree of reconciliation). In so doing, I will be able to identify ‘something’ in successful cases that allowed political leaders and the public to change their perceptions toward each other and cooperate in the process of regional integration while this ‘something’ might have been missing in un-reconciled cases. Since the typology construction contains both synchronic and diachronic dimensions, it is also possible to control other domestic and international political circumstances specific to each decade by varying periods from the 1950s to the 2000s.

The structure of the book

This book has three parts. It first suggests a definitional framework of interstate reconciliation in international relations. It is important to note that the definitional tool I build here is not the one, but a proposition which will be used to develop various types of interstate reconciliations. In so doing, I start with defining two major concepts, hereditary enmity and reconciliation. With the aim of narrowing the subject of reconciliation, I first develop some particular characteristics of historical enemy states. This clarification is indispensable since the
term enemy is ubiquitous in the media and the academic circle with so many different meanings. By demonstrating how and why interstate antagonisms were nurtured, the comparative analysis of historical enmity will contribute to better understand the nature of reconciliation and its variety in political sense. Secondly, I explore a similar conceptual family of interstate cooperative behaviours in order to build a distinctive intellectual category for the term reconciliation. An in-depth reflection on two terms, a state of war and a state of peace, will be made here.

Within the suggested definitional framework, I then develop an ideal type for interstate reconciliation processes by taking a differentiated level approach: systemic, regional, and domestic levels. By systemic level, I mean external factors that play a facilitating or impeding role, sometimes decisive, in bilateral reconciliation processes. By regional factors, I refer to regional cooperative and institutional frameworks, integration process in particular, which are mutually beneficial with bilateral reconciliation. Domestic level covers both inter-governmental and inter-societal approaches in achieving bilateral reconciliation. Empirical observations are provided to illustrate how to measure the degree of state-to-state and people-to-people reconciliation processes in various fields ranging from politico-diplomatic, economic, socio-cultural to historical and institutional one. It demonstrates the potentials as well as the limits of each area in relation to the others.

This study finally proposes various types of reconciliations which, hopefully, may find wider applicability. The existence of political willingness at different levels and sectors engaged across time provides the first dimension in classifying various forms of reconciliation. This periodic classification within a case demonstrates the dynamics of change and continuity of processes and explains the reversibility as well as the sustainability of one case. The second and the third ones are based on the nature of historical enmity construction and of the dyadic relationship projected to the future. The multidimensional typology contributes to providing a theoretical framework across cases. It also intends to identify significant variables affecting reconciliation processes. This scientific, rather artificial, categorization does not mean that each category is historically proven and worthwhile to be equally analyzed in detail. By using empirical and pragmatic compression methods, I only develop types that are academically useful and empirically present. Future implications are suggested in the concluding remarks focusing on one of the biggest challenges we are confronted with today: ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity.
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