# Contents

*Foreword by Michael Cox*  
*Acknowledgments*  

**Introduction**  
The Argument in Brief 1  
The Plan of the Book 13  

1. **Owning Violence: A History of the Modern Nation State**  
   A Brief History of the Nation State 19  
The Feudal State 23  
The Polity of Estates 28  
From the Absolutist State to the Modern State 30  
Conclusion 39  

2. **The Modern State**  
   Violence and the Modern State 43  
   Liberalism and the Neutral State 50  
   Elite Theory 54  
   Marxist Views of the State 56  
   A Realist Institutional Theory of the State 59  
   Conclusion 67  

3. **Political Dissent**  
   Situating Contemporary Protest 71  
   A Brief History of Civil Disobedience 77  
   A Theory of Civil Disobedience 80  
   Legal Protest 91  
   Revolutionary Protest 92  
   Conclusion 93
# Contents

4. Political Violence: Situating Terrorism 95
   Forms of Political Violence 106
   Terrorism Involves the Deliberate Targeting of Non-state Actors and Institutions by Non-state Actors 118
   Terrorism is a Form of Violent (or Threatened) Political Communication 120
   The Victims Are Not the Intended Recipients of the Political Message 120
   Terrorism Is Always Illegitimate Violence 121
   Conclusion 121

5. State Terrorism 123

6. Terrorism; Justifications and Explanations 148
   Justifications for Terrorism: Putting the Definition to Work 149
   Explaining Terrorism 162
   Conclusion 171

7. Terrorism: Types, Effects and Organization 172
   Types of Terrorism 173
   The Political and Social Effects of Terrorism 179
   The Structure and Organization of Groups that Use Terrorism 185
   Conclusion 191

8. Contemporary Terrorism and the War on Terror 193
   Contemporary Terrorism 194
   The War on Terror 207
   Conclusion 220

Conclusion: Rethinking Terrorism 221
   The Islamic State 225
   The Killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby 227
   The Sydney hostage siege, December 2014 228
   9/11 230

Bibliography 233
Index 253
Introduction

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

Events that produce significant changes in the international political system are rare, and difficult to discern (Buzan and Lawson, 2014). Westphalia, the two world wars and the end of the Cold War are possible candidates, but history makes fools of those prone to premature declarations of ‘new world orders’. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (henceforth 9/11) are another widely accepted candidate for an event that is said to have changed the conduct of international politics. Here was a supposed epoch-changing event played out in real time on TV screens and broadcast on radios across the globe. Apart from the musings of some conspiracy theorists, the meaning of 9/11 is relatively clear. Once the second plane, United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center, the events of 9/11 became unmistakably understandable as ‘terrorist attacks’ (Thompson, 2004; Wright, 2006a). This horrific event, supposedly singular in its form, thrust the issue of international terrorism on to the agenda of global politics in previously unimagined ways.

9/11 is often claimed to be a catalyst for a series of system-defining changes that we are currently undergoing. The overthrowing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002; the war on terror; the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war; the Iraq war; the concerted attempt to export democracy to the Middle East;
2 Rethinking Terrorism

and the emergence of non-state actors as significant agents on
the global stage, all represent but a few of the supposed major
developments directly related to 9/11 (Chandrasekaran, 2007).
In addition, the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in
Iraq in 2014 provides further evidence that the forces unleashed
post-9/11 could yet be system-redefining in ways that are not
yet fully clear. Yet a heavy sense of paradox pervades the global
unanimity surrounding the meaning of 9/11. For despite the
fact that the majority of the global populace understood the
events of 9/11 as ‘terrorist attacks’ and are happy to continue
to talk in these terms, there is no consensus on what terror-
ism is. There is no global political consensus, nor any academic
consensus. We all seem to know what we mean when ‘we’ use
the term terrorism but there is no collective agreement on what
it means.

Academics are well versed in the problematics of ‘essentially
contested’ concepts (Gallie, 1964: 157–91). And doubtless Walter
Bryce Gallie’s analysis can be usefully applied to the definition
of terrorism. Yet in terms of political practice, the issues go well
beyond any semantic contestation. It is not simply the case that
we are unable to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism,
but that we are unwilling to do so. We are collectively unwilling to
define terrorism because it suits our political purposes to deploy
the label in circumstances of our choosing. As such, the use of the
term terrorism is as much a political weapon as are acts of terror-
ism. In addition, both the practice of terrorism and the political
deployment of the term are forms of political communication.
When groups, or individuals, seek to use terrorism as a tactic the
aim is to convey a political message. Likewise, when groups or
individuals label an act as terrorism, they also seek to communi-
cate something specific about the act.

Importantly, in addition to its communicative aspect, terrorism
is also a form of political violence. Indeed, for many people it is
the most heinous form of violence. This explains why the deploy-
ment of the term carries so much rhetorical force. To accuse
someone of terrorism serves to label not only that specific act
as beyond the pale, but also constitutes an attempt to delegiti-
mize the cause that led to it. Terrorism cannot be accommodated,
understood or explained; it can simply be confronted. The only
rational response to terrorism is the use of terror against it. Yet,
as a form of political violence, terrorism is also motivated by
political circumstances; hence, those who engage in it must believe that acts of terrorism serve those political ends.

Some commentators have doubted that 9/11 falls under this rubric, describing the events of 9/11 as a form of ‘apocalyptic nihilism’ residing outside politics and any expectation of attaining political objectives. 9/11 was not about the communication of any political message, but about destruction. According to Michael Ignatieff, 9/11 literally represents a longing for ‘nothing’; at least nothing understandable in political terms (Ignatieff, 2001). There has always been a tendency to treat terrorism in this way. For some, terrorism is an evil beyond understanding, a sui generis act beyond the realms of political calculation. Such a view makes apologists of those who would seek to understand it, since terrorism is not something that can be understood.

Much of the literature on terrorism, albeit with some notable exceptions, follows this trend, with a focus primarily on description as opposed to explanation. This book travels a different path and attempts to think theoretically about contemporary forms of terrorism. Some in the field doubt that terrorism can be theorized in this way. Louise Richardson, for example, claims that terrorism is a microphenomenon and hence not susceptible to explanation (Richardson, 2006a: 2). Likewise, Andrew Silke suggests that since ‘good science … is all about prediction’, terrorism cannot be subject to scientific investigation, and hence explanation (Silke, 2004: 11). This way of thinking confuses terrorism as phenomenon with terrorism as event. To paraphrase Kenneth Waltz, a theory of terrorism will explain why it recurs and will indicate some of the conditions that make terrorism more or less likely, but will not predict the occurrence of particular terrorist acts (Waltz, 1979: 69). What a theory of terrorism hopes to explain is why there is such a phenomenon, not why individual acts of terrorism are committed.

Thinking theoretically about terrorism, however, is no easy task. How can one draw generalities or tendencies out of something that cannot even be defined? How can something so particular and sui generis be given a theoretical form? The answer is context. Terrorism can only be understood in a theoretical context that brings together the modern state, political violence and alternative forms of non-violent protest against the state. Terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the state. As a form of political communication, terrorism is always effectively a violent (or threat of) critique of existing political arrangements.
The institution at the heart of contemporary political arrangements is the state. Or as political theorist Carl Schmitt put it, ‘the concept of the political already presupposes the concept of the state’ (Schmitt, 1996: 19). As such, all forms of political protest take place within the context of the modern nation state and can only be understood in relation to this context. What this means for our understanding of contemporary terrorism is nicely captured by Philip Bobbitt, who argues that ‘[e]very constitutional order invokes a unique form of terrorism’ (Bobbitt, 2002: 548). Thus, as the state undergoes change so too does the form of terrorism.

Political protest against the state can take non-violent forms. Civil disobedience, for example, constitutes a form of protest against the state that explicitly, at least at the theoretical level, rejects the use of violence. What, however, explains the resort to violence as against the adoption of non-violent forms of protest? One answer given in the literature lies in the psychologies and pathologies of individuals (Post, 2007; Reich, 1990). Such an approach may help explain individual cases, but it cannot explain all cases, still less the support that terrorists must necessarily enjoy among the wider populace. The number of individuals prepared to engage in direct terrorist acts is comparatively small when compared to the numbers prepared to offer a wide range of varied support. Given the large numbers giving tacit or explicit support to groups using terrorism, it seems clear that psychological explanations of terrorism based on individuals require supplementing with more structural accounts.

Contra these individualist explanations, this book attempts to develop a structural explanation that provides a context within which acts of terrorism might be understood. At the heart of this explanation is the self-perpetuating, yet contradictory, nexus of terrorism, violence and the state. Violence and the state are inextricably linked. The modern state was born out of violence and, according to Max Weber’s influential definition, is defined in terms of it being the sole source of the legitimate use of violence in society. Although Weber’s definition of the state is well known and often cited, it is worth quoting at length to examine exactly what it entails for the understanding of terrorism:

‘Every state is founded on force,’ said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of ‘state’ would be
eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as ‘anarchy,’ in the specific sense of this word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state—nobody says that—but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib [kin or blood relations]—have known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. Hence, ‘politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state … Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. (Weber, 1965: 1)

One implication of this is that states that fail to control the use of political violence are essentially not functional states. Indeed, for Weber, the use of violence by non-state actors challenges the very existence of the state. Another implication is that although states may use alternative forms of control other than violence, the right to use force is unique to the state. No other social institution can legitimately use violence. Finally, in order to remain functional states, states must suppress forms of violence that threaten to disrupt them. It follows from this that insofar as terrorists use violence as a form of political communication they necessarily present themselves as a threat to any given state. Or, in the case of contemporary international terrorism, it is a direct challenge to the contemporary global political order that has been constructed on the basis of this particular model of the state.

It is also important to see how this particular notion of the state is firmly embedded within a European context, which then spread, through the use of violence, to the rest of the world.
Empires, imperialism and colonization all played a role here, using violence to carve up territories and force indigenous populations to adopt this model of the state. Certainly, the particular form of states across the globe varies from democratic to authoritarian modes of governance, but what unites them is the fact that all forms of modern political organization accept the state’s claim on the legitimate use of violence. This highlights something important about the contemporary political situation and the place of contemporary terrorism within it. For what is at stake here is not a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996), but the altogether more problematic issue of competing visions of what shape politics, and thus the state, should take. This struggle has taken many forms, but the emergence of radical political Islam, and the terrorism that has accompanied it, presents itself as a challenge to the notion of politics embedded with the modern state. The emergence of the Islamic State is simply the most visible demonstration of this phenomenon, and we can expect to see more such examples as our cherished definitions of politics, and thus the state, come under attack (Bobbitt, 2002: 521–46).

Almost all books on terrorism begin with a torturous discussion of the problems of definition. This is not an issue that can be sidestepped, and any book with terrorism in the title must tackle this issue head-on. Because terrorism necessarily involves a political standpoint, and engenders such extreme emotions, the search for a definition precise enough to provide meaningful analytical purchase, yet general enough to obtain agreement from all participants, is extremely difficult. Many analysts simply retreat into the rather trite and oft-repeated phrase, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. This is an unacceptable position to hold; for moral, political and analytical reasons.

Analytically, to adopt this position and still continue to talk of terrorism can only produce the worst kind of scholarship. For under this approach, the assumptions underpinning the deployment of the term are always hidden. Without at least a very basic definition of terrorism, however flawed, the reader can only be left floundering as the meaning changes from sentence to sentence. Politically and morally, it suggests that decisions about the rightness of an act are simply subjective matters decided by each individual in terms of nothing other than their own political preferences. The causes we support are fighting for freedom; those we do not are terrorism.
Yet, the very idea that terrorism and freedom fighting can be counterposed in this way is a serious error. Freedom fighting describes an ‘end’ that groups, or individuals, strive to achieve. Terrorism is a practice, or means, to an end. It is entirely possible that one can support the political aspirations of a group attempting to free themselves from oppression, yet not support the means (terrorism) that they use to achieve it. In fact, what underpins most contemporary uses of the term terrorism is the belief that some forms of non-state actor political violence can be justified (freedom fighting) and some not (terrorism). Political violence, however, is not all of a kind, and we need to explore the nature of terrorism as a particular form of that violence. Moreover, the relationship between an academic definition of terrorism and one deployed by publics, politicians and practitioners is a particularly problematic area. Here some position on the philosophy of social science can be of help.

All research begins with ontology, and ontology is at the heart of problem of defining terrorism. The cliché that terrorism it is a bit like pornography and you will know it when you see it has a grain of truth to it. A Realist philosophy of social science can help here (Manicas, 2006; Sayer, 2000). Terrorism is no mere empirical fact, or thing, that simply requires appropriate observation and cataloguing of its process and modes of operation. As a social fact terrorism is constituted, in part, by the beliefs of the actors engaged in the complex web of that practice. However, although the concepts and beliefs of actors engaged in any given social practice are integral to any understanding of that practice, they do not exhaust it. Far less can social scientists assume that the actors have a comprehensive understanding of their situations. Everyday understandings of terrorism are essential to any social-scientific account of terrorism, but they cannot set the limits of that understanding. If this were the case then social science would be otiose. Moreover, to attempt to ground academic accounts of terrorism solely in the definitions employed by actors involved in the practice is to privilege just those actors’ accounts at the expense of a more considered scientific investigation of the term. It also deprives the academic of critical purchase on those accounts; how is it possible to criticize the deployment of the term if the very definition of that term is drawn from those that that deploy it?

This means that those definitions that attempt to draw exclusively on official accounts are doomed to fail. Nothing illustrates
Rethinking Terrorism

this better than the outright refusal of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Taipei Times, 2002) to countenance any definition of terrorism that portrayed Palestinian groups as terrorists. The reasons for this were clear. According to the delegates, the political violence that did emerge from groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas and Hezbollah was driven by deep and long-standing frustration at Israeli occupation and policies. I suspect most people would agree with this assessment of the plight of the Palestinians, but it confuses the belief in the justice of the cause with the means of addressing it. One can support a particular cause without supporting the means employed to redress it. Some violent acts emerging from Palestinian groups can be classified as terrorism, whilst some are not. Nonetheless, although academic accounts of terrorism do not need to be bound by public uses of the term, they must, since those beliefs are (in part) constitutive of it, at least be able to provide an account of why the beliefs are incorrect. As such, there is little point in academic definitions of terrorism that have no public purchase, no matter how sophisticated they may be. Academic accounts must be able to take those public beliefs and place them in a broader context in order to make sense of the error underpinning those beliefs. The broader context for terrorism is the state and its relationship to violence.

Most studies of terrorism miss the fundamental point that the concept of terrorism already implies the concept of the state. Terrorism cannot be defined in the absence of some or other account of the state. And the state can only be understood in terms of its history. The history of the development of the modern state can be understood as a long process of appropriation and accumulation (of territory, peoples and resources) achieved through the use of violence; a process that had winners and losers (Poggi, 1990). The success of the modern state in this process blinds us to this history; we accept states as the dominant and legitimate form of political organization. Noting the place of violence in the development of the modern state, however, allows us to situate that violence as an integral aspect of the state. Understood this way, terrorism and other forms of non-state violence can be interpreted as reactions to this process, and rejections of the claim to state legitimacy. Terrorism and state reactions to it can only be adequately understood if this point is grasped, and although groups deploying terrorism have specific political objectives, the
underlying structural battle is over nothing less than the ownership of violence. Of course, the battle over control of the ownership of violence is clear when insurgency and revolution are involved. But in terrorism it takes a distinctive form because the violence is intentionally directed against non-state actors.

This book rethinks terrorism by linking it to the state. It explores the relationship between the state and protest against the state, in violent and non-violent forms. In placing the state at the centre of the analysis I aim to arrive at a deflationary account of terrorism that places severe restrictions on the use of the term. The book is primarily interested in the impact terrorism has on the international political system, which involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities transcend national boundaries. Under conditions of globalization, most forms of terrorism now have international consequences, even if the sources of it derive from domestic conditions. The book also explores the nature of the state, and other forms of resistance against the state, but it does so primarily as a means of placing terrorism in context.

It has often been thought that the state represents a sharp dividing line between the academic division of labour between international relations (IR) and political science (broadly conceived). Thus, for example, political science concerns itself with what goes on inside the state and IR with what goes on outside the state (Walker, 1993). Of course, well before globalization became the leitmotif of the contemporary age, some analysts have challenged this hard and fast distinction. International terrorism is itself a performative act that challenges the artificial boundary between politics and IR. But more than this, a comprehensive understanding of terrorism requires the integration of politics, culture, identity, the economy and sociology.

The modern nation state is a particular form of political configuration, and in order to understand this form, we must treat the state historically. States did not just emerge into the world, fully formed. Indeed, for most of human history societies functioned without even a very primitive form of state. The modern state can only be understood in its historical context. An important aspect of any treatment of the state is to consider it in terms of its relationships to other forces and actors, and in particular, an analysis of the role of violence in its development and maintenance.

Of course, violence is not the only form of political control used by states, and indeed many modern Western states have developed
Rethinking Terrorism

sophisticated forms of control over their populations such that the role of violence in the maintenance of the state remains all but hidden. An analysis of the history of the state, however, allows us to relocate this violence as an integral aspect of the state itself. And it should come as no surprise that that which was founded on violence should itself be subject to violent challenges.

The Argument in Brief

Rethinking terrorism requires us to place it into three contexts. First, the development, shape and form of the modern state. Second, terrorism is a form of political protest that stands in a relation to other forms of political protest. Third, terrorism is a form of political violence, and we should be careful to distinguish between differing types of political violence. All violence inevitably induces terror, but the production of terror is not always terrorism. Of these three contexts, the history, function and form of the state is most important in terms of understanding terrorism.

If the book hangs on one point it is this; terrorism can only be understood in the context of the state. The state emerges and has developed through the use of violence. The violent aspects of the state are not incidental to it but are structurally a necessary part of the state. The state is the political apparatus of modern societies that claims the sole right to use violence legitimately. Violent reactions to the state are not simply protests against certain policies, but at the same time they are existential challenges to the idea of the state itself. This helps to explain why the state reacts so violently to the use of violence by non-state actors against it. But it also helps explain why non-state actors resort to violence against the state. Violence begets violence. Of course we abhor this situation, but given the structural role of violence in the state, it should come as no surprise when some critics of the state use violence against it. Such uses of violence represent direct challenges to the claim of the state to monopolize the ownership of violence.

This is important, because placing the state at the centre of analysis in terms of terrorism allows me to introduce the concept of ‘state actors’ as an alternative to the more common term of innocents, or non-combatants. The term innocent is morally loaded and difficult to delineate in complex contemporary societies.
Index


Afghanistan, 1, 110, 157, 201, 204, 208–9, 212, 213, 216, 218, 220
al-Qaeda, 16, 164–5, 171, 178, 185–6, 198, 199, 203, 204–6, 216, 217–18, 225, 230
Arab Spring, 72, 80, 220

behaviourism, 132
bin Laden, Osama, 99–100, 158, 159, 160–1, 165, 170, 196, 204, 217–18, 231
Britain, see United Kingdom
capitalism, 36, 47–9, 57–9, 62, 169, 175
Chomsky, Noam, 125, 131
Christianity, 77, 195
civil disobedience, 11, 14, 50, 69–71, 77–94
civil liberties, 12, 89, 184, 211–12
civil society, 47–9, 58, 63, 119
‘conjunctural concept’, 126
constitutionalism, 4, 37, 66, 72, 86–7, 140
critical realism, 43, 133, 163, 224
de La Boétie, Étienne, 80–3
‘doctrine of necessity’, 152, 154, 157, 167
domestic law, 11, 14, 30, 37, 50, 70–2, 77–80, 83–92, 97–8, 101, 106–8, 114, 128, 130, 137, 140–1, 221, 222
drones, 107, 121, 141

Egypt, 2013 overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, 43
‘essentially contested concepts’, 2, 221
ethics
consequentialist, 149–50
deontological, 149–50
ethnic cleansing, 108, 132

freedom fighting, 6–7, 18, 100–1, 110
Gandhi, Mahatma, 14, 77–8, 84, 86, 89, 93
genocide, 132, 157
globalization, 9, 80, 123, 168, 186, 205, 206, 219, 220, 222
Guantánamo Bay, 136, 212

Hamas, 8, 177
Hezbollah, 8
Hobbes, Thomas, 30, 33, 39
human rights, 104, 118, 128, 137, 139, 140–3, 146, 155, 158, 211
insurgency, 62, 103, 105, 109–12, 144, 152, 225, 226
international law, 66, 118, 128, 139–40, 143, 155
intervention, 20, 38, 43, 112, 209
Iran
1979 hostage crisis, 216
green movement, 75, 80
nuclear programme, 202
revolution in January 1979, 213
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 174, 184, 189, 231
IS (Islamic State), 2, 6, 158, 195, 198, 206, 225–7, 229
Islam, 158, 170, 178, 183, 195–9, 205–6, 213–16, 219, 220, 227, 229
islamophobia, 212
Israel, 8, 68, 100, 154, 159, 177–8, 184, 196, 209

jus in bello (just war), 150

Kant, Immanuel, 101
King, Martin Luther, 14, 77, 84, 87, 89–90

Leviathan (Thomas Hobbes), 30
Index

Marx, Karl, 40, 57, 63, 82
media
mass, 73, 79, 92, 182–3
role of, 46, 69, 73, 126–7, 152, 179, 181–3, 205, 212
social, 72–7, 181
Moldova, Communist Party defeat 2009, 75

nation, 4, 9, 19–22, 31–2, 36, 67, 40
National Security Agency, 140, 211
Natural Law, 81
‘New World Order’, 1
non-intervention, 33–4
Norway, 230

ontology, 7, 61, 120, 127, 132, 169, 179
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 8

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 8, 174, 181, 190–1
philosophy of social science, 7, 101, 126, 132, 162
positivism, 59–60, 133, 135
poverty, 146, 157, 168, 169, 180, 207
protest
conscientious objection, 85, 88
and domestic law, 83–9
‘legal’, 14, 69, 90–2
legitimate, 41, 43, 44
membership, 74
moral, 42, 84–91, 92
non-violent, 4, 14, 78, 92–3, 100, 120
revolutionary, 70–1, 92–3, 109–10
violent, 12, 14, 19, 69–70, 112–13, 121, 185
see also civil disobedience

presentism, 96

Quṭb, Sayyid, 199

Rawls, John, 14, 71, 77, 84, 86–91
religion, 34, 79, 157–8, 169, 177–8, 195–8, 200, 220, 226
repression, 57, 68, 132, 134
rendition, 104, 136, 137–8, 212

Schmitt, Carl, 4, 21,140, 165
self-determination, 174–5
slacktivism, 76

Somalia, 196, 217–18
South Africa, anti-apartheid movement, 79

sovereign(ty)
absolute, 30, 32–3, 35, 37, 39
authority, 19, 20–1, 30
contemporary, 23, 25, 37, 29, 52, 66, 113, 185, 219
Islamic, 178, 198–9
legal, 35
popular, 39, 44, 51, 54
territorial, 20

Spain, 2004 attacks in Madrid, 74–5, 99, 129, 196
state(s)
absolutist, 21–2, 30–37, 51
authoritarian, 6, 18, 59, 68, 132, 159, 220
definition, 4–5, 17, 19, 114, 119, 126, 203
democratic, 2, 11, 18–19, 21, 38–9, 43, 44, 46, 48–59, 61, 68, 69, 80, 81, 86–7, 90, 94, 100, 104, 116–17, 158–60, 175, 182, 211–12, 218–20
development, 8, 10, 13, 17–68, 101, 106, 117, 121, 122, 169
dictatorship, 59, 104, 140, 142
disaggregated, 140
failed, 202–3
feudal, 23–8
‘institutional ensemble’, 44, 63, 206
legitimacy of, 8, 19, 36, 40, 43, 64, 223, 226
as ‘polity of estates’, 28–30
security, 44, 46, 60, 81, 113, 114, 136, 140, 154, 168, 184, 190, 211–13, 222, 231
and statehood, 21, 206, 226–27
totalitarian, 119, 142
violence, 33, 41, 44–5, 43–50, 75, 103, 106–8, 118, 127–39, 143, 149, 154–5, 162, 222–4, 227 see also violence
state-sponsored terrorism, 16, 144–6, 190, 202

state terrorism
1979 Tehran, 145, 216
definition, 15, 128, 123–47
fear, 128–9, 134, 139, 136–8, 142
Index 255

moral dimension, 130–1, 137, 139, 141–4
terror, use of, 10, 102–4
surveillance, 35, 77, 81, 211
Sydney, 2014 hostage siege, 180, 228–30
system
 international political, 9, 104
 self-organizing, 16, 203–4

technology
 communications, 74
 intellectual, 56
 internet, 72, 76, 181 see also media
 military, 30, 35
terror, use of, 102, 15–16, 112–13, 115, 135, 142–3
terrorism
 context, 3–4, 8
definition, 5–8, 12, 14, 95–128, 131, 151–2, 179, 192, 221, 223, 225
deflationary approach, 9, 14, 119, 125, 128–30, 146, 146, 174, 193–4
discourse, public, 118, 127, 174, 195
domestic, 180, 200, 201, 220, 222
fear, 97, 102–5, 120, 176, 179, 180–1, 184, 192, 212
finances, 28, 114, 144, 166, 187–8, 190–1, 191, 209–10
franchise, 205–6, 228
history, 193
ideological, 97, 113, 144, 177, 186–7, 189, 200, 228
international, 1, 5, 9, 16, 21, 33, 104–5, 200–1, 214, 220, 222
inflationary account, 13, 103, 105, 122, 128, 146–7, 224
Islamic, 6, 21, 113, 148, 157–8, 177, 195–6, 198, 200–20, 225, 229
moral dimension, 15, 92, 101, 103, 112, 114–17, 119, 148–71
nationalist, 174–5
‘new’, 113, 148, 194–5, 198, 200, 220
as political practice, 15, 125–35
psychology, 162–3
religious, 16, 157–8, 174–8, 195–201, 220
revolutionary, 175–6
single-issue, 176
state, see state terrorism

structural organization, 185–91, 203
suicide, 105, 156, 216
typology, 166–7, 173–8
Thoreau, David Henry, 14, 77–8, 84, 86
twin towers, see United States

United Kingdom
1984 Brighton attacks against Margaret Thatcher, 125
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 79
killing of Fusilier Lee Rigby, 227–8
suffrage (women’s), 78
United Nations, 95
United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, 128
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 98–9, 139

United States
Civil Rights Act 1964, 79
Montgomery Bus Boycott 1955, 78, 79
Oklahoma bombing 1995, 176
Pentagon, 121, 160–1, 231
Selma to Montgomery marches 1965, 79
Voting Rights Act 1965, 79
World Trade Center, 1, 121, 160–1, 231

Velvet Revolution, 80, 93, 109
Vietnam War, 79, 88, 216, 218
violence
 illegitimate, 17–18, 101, 106, 118, 121, 172, 223
 legitimate, 4–6, 18–19, 44, 105–7, 121, 124, 151, 193, 223
monopolised, 17, 18, 22
non-state, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 100, 116–17, 118–19, 127, 129, 134, 152–3, 159, 176, 223
ownership of, 9, 10, 17–19, 20, 22–3, 106, 207, 223–4
political, 3, 10, 12–15, 19, 24, 69–70, 95–124, 128, 131, 133–4, 148–9, 154, 172
state, see state terrorism
tactical (search strategic, context of indiscriminate), 85, 114, 142–3, 175, 189, 195, 220
Index

‘War on Terror’, 16, 104, 146–8, 167, 183, 186, 191, 193, 205–20

warfare
  pre-emptive, 1
  proxy, 144
  total (mobilization), 38, 82

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 202–3, 219

Weber, Max, 4–5, 17, 40, 44, 47, 49, 55

Westphalia, 23–4, 27, 34

World Trade Center, 2001 attacks on,
  see 9/11 attacks

Zapatero, José Luis Rodríguez, 129