CONTENTS

Series Editors’ Preface  ix

Acknowledgements  xi

Chronology of European Decolonization  xii

List of Abbreviations  xiv

Maps of Africa, Asia and the British and French Empires  xviii

1 Introduction: Definitions and Explanations  1

The Meaning of Decolonization  2
Explanations of Decolonization  4
(1) Nationalist Explanations  5
(2) International Explanations  9
(3) Metropolitan (Domestic) Explanations  13
Endnote  17
## Contents

### 2 Empire and its Rejection: Before 1945

- *European Empires* 19
- *Pre-1945 Anti-Colonial Revolts* 25
- *Conclusions* 29

### 3 South East Asia: The Struggle for European ‘Recolonization’

- *The British in Java and Sumatra* 33
- *The Dutch Attempt to Recolonize* 36
- *Indochina from 1940 to 1945* 38
- *The British in Saigon* 40
- *The Vietminh in Hanoi* 43
- *The French War in Indochina* 45
- *Malaya: Return of British Rule* 49
- *The Malayan Emergency* 53
- *Singapore and Federation* 60
- *Conclusions* 62

### 4 South Asia, The Middle East and the Mediterranean: British Retreat from Empire

- *British India: The Case for Departure* 66
- *The Partition of India* 71
- *The Princely States: Kashmir* 74
- *Burma: Collapse of British Rule* 75
- *Ceylon: Progress to Dominion Status* 79
- *Palestine: Britain’s Mandate* 81
- *Palestine: Britain Ends its Mandate* 85
- *Egypt: The British Foothold* 87
- *Aden and the Gulf States* 91
- *Cyprus* 95
- *Malta* 101
- *Gibraltar* 102
- *Conclusions* 104
Contents

5 Africa and the Caribbean: Winds of Change Blow 106

The Economics of African Decolonization 108
The Gold Coast: Under British Rule 112
Nkrumah’s Populist Nationalism 114
French West and Equatorial Africa 116
Nigeria: Under British Rule 122
Nigeria: The Federal Solution 125
The Central African Federation 128
Central Africa: The Emergence of Nationalism 131
The Congo: Independence and Civil War 135
British West Indies 140
French and Dutch West Indies 142
Conclusions 143

6 White-Settler Africa: Reluctance to Concede Majority Rule 146

Algeria: Under French Rule 147
Algeria: Armed Insurrection 149
The Struggle for Algiers 152
The Surrender of French Algeria 154
Kenya: Under British Rule 157
Kenya: State of Emergency 160
Southern Rhodesia: Towards UDI 166
White Rhodesia: Black Resistance 170
Portuguese Angola, Mozambique and Guinea 174
Armed Struggle in the 1960s 176
The Effects of the Portuguese Revolution 179
South Africa: From White to Majority Rule 183
Conclusions 184

7 Overseas Territories and DOM-TOMs: Remnants of Empire 186

Britain’s Overseas Territories 187
The Falkland Islands 189
Contents

Hong Kong 191
France’s DOM-TOMs 193
Vanuatu (New Hebrides) 195
New Caledonia 198
Conclusions 201

8 Conclusions: Explanations Reassessed 203

(1) Nationalist Explanations 204
(2) International Explanations 208
(3) Metropolitan (Domestic) Explanations 211
The Role of Collaborative Elites 213
Closing Remarks 217

Bibliography 220

Index 228
One of the most momentous changes to take place in the post-1945 world has been the dismemberment and almost complete removal of the European colonial or maritime empires set up in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. When the Second World War broke out in 1939, roughly a third of the world’s entire population lived under imperial or colonial rule; today less than 0.1 per cent of the global population lives in dependent territories. The idea that a developed nation should physically occupy and colonize another territory overseas simply because it had the power and resources to do so gradually became unacceptable to international opinion – even before the advent of total war against Germany, its European allies and, subsequently, Japan.

On the other hand, the removal of colonial occupation did not gather pace until after 1945, representing a drawn-out historical process rather than a sudden event. This book sets out to explain why and how the European empires that were so prominent before the Second World War had all but disappeared only 30 years after that war ended in victory for the major Western colonial powers.
European Decolonization

Particular attention will be given to the various mechanisms of European departure around the world, with each major colony receiving separate, extensive and consecutive treatment, rather than being subject to chronological or thematic subdivision.

The primary aim of what follows is to enable readers to understand the seismic adjustment whereby vast tracts of the world achieved freedom from European occupation or colonial rule. The central theme of most chapters will be the consensual view that imperial disengagement can only be understood within the international political context of the postwar world, the legitimization of nationalist movements as against imperial ascendancy, and the colonial policies of the metropolitan powers. No one strand alone can portray the experience of decolonization – it is the linkages between them which provide the crucial element.

The author also hopes to convey some of the sheer excitement of this sprawling topic: the pressure of events on harassed colonial officials; the problematic interventions of the two superpowers; and the harsh choices facing nationalist leaders often unable to defeat far superior European armies. This introductory chapter starts by looking at definitions of ‘decolonization’, then summarizes various explanations for European withdrawal from empire that have been put forward by historians over recent years, broadly speaking: (1) nationalist or colonial; (2) international or global; (3) metropolitan or domestic.

The Meaning of Decolonization

‘Decolonization’ signifies here the surrender of external political sovereignty, largely Western European, over colonized non-European peoples, plus the emergence of independent territories where once the West had ruled, or the transfer of power from empire to nation-state. The historical process that this overarching term draws our attention
to has not yet acquired an agreed definition among historians, but ‘decolonization’ usually means the taking of measures by indigenous peoples and/or their white overlords intended eventually to end external control over overseas colonial territories and the attempt to replace formal political rule by some new kind of relationship. The ‘decolonizing’ of Soviet Russia’s post-1945 continental empire in east central Europe and the Balkans from 1985–90 will hence be excluded from the chapters that follow, although others have recently considered it part of the same general historical experience (Pearson, 1998; Chamberlain, 1999).

Citizens of the new nation-states, and their admirers, often prefer to speak of ‘national liberation’ rather than use the term ‘decolonization’ generally favoured by Western scholars. In itself, this reflects different views (‘push out’ versus ‘pull out’) of what actually took place. ‘Decolonialism’ would, perhaps, be a more neutral academic term. The rather forbidding term ‘decolonization’, used here because of its overall convenience and familiarity, appears to have been coined in 1932 by an expatriate German scholar, Moritz Julius Bonn, for his section on ‘Imperialism’ in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. It took 20 years to pass into more general currency and first featured in a book title when Henri Labouret, a liberal French administrator, interpreted it in Colonisation, Colonialisme, Décolonisation (1952) as a natural climax of imperial rule whose arrival was being unwisely hastened by contemporary pressures (Hargreaves, 1976, 1988).

‘Decolonization’ will be used here both in the general sense, as a historical movement which tended to encourage the removal of non-indigenous rule, and in relation to an ongoing historical process in particular colonial situations. Chapters will focus on how European powers after 1945 attempted to disengage from or were driven out of formal political occupation of their overseas possessions and also how, in some cases, they tried to reassert colonial supremacy. For those colonial rulers who lost or conceded
sovereignty, decolonization invariably meant the attempt to replace imperialist control by some new kind of commercial or strategic relationship. On the surface, post-1945 decolonization effectively demolished the old international system – economic, geographic, and cultural – by which the developed or urban-industrial Western nations had once dominated the rest of the world.

If these nations continued to dominate, it was no longer through various forms of political incorporation into their colonial empires but (in the absence of the coercive powers of the colonial state) by exercising commercial and financial hegemony over their former possessions, a relationship sometimes known as neocolonialism. The fragmentation of economic area that decolonized West Africa underwent, for example, has been interpreted as creating an irresistible pressure for the maintenance of colonial structures and ‘development’ policies which in turn, no less overwhelmingly, produced foreign domination and underdevelopment (Amin, 1973).

**Explanations of Decolonization**

One of the problems in writing about decolonization is that we know the end of the story. Whether self-government is seen as either the result of deliberate preparation/abrupt withdrawal by a colonial state (‘decolonization’) or as a triumph wrested from the colonizers by nationalist movements (‘liberation struggle’), the story allows itself to be read backwards in order to privilege the process of ending colonial rule over anything else that was happening in the postwar years. Firstly, those favouring a nationalist or – to use Eurocentric terminology – ‘peripheral’ explanation (Easton, 1964; Grimal, 1978; Low, 1993), emphasize that indigenous upheavals invariably set the pace for decolonization, while the disappearance of collaborative elites also made continued European colonial rule unworkable (see Chapter 8).
Secondly, those historians who favour the *international* explanation of imperial disengagement (McIntyre, 1977; Lapping, 1985) point out that, in the new bipolar world after 1945, both the United States and the Soviet Union were hostile to old-style imperialism, although for different ideological reasons. Newly independent Third World states like India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka since 1972) also exerted international pressure through the United Nations (UN) to accelerate the process of decolonization. Thirdly, a focus on the domestic consequences of international relations, the *metropolitan* or domestic constraints approach (Kahler, 1984; Holland, 1985), illuminates how empire was fast becoming too burdensome and served no strategic or economic purpose for the mother country. From this perspective, loss of the ‘will to rule’ led to a belief that it was not worth expending men and money to preserve what were perceived as colonial liabilities by the middle-class taxpayer.

*(1) Nationalist Explanations*

It ‘now seems scarcely tenable’, argues an eminent historian who stresses indigenous resistance, ‘that international pressures and domestic constraints were at least as important as colonial [nationalist] pressures in propelling the west’s former imperial powers to decolonise’ (Low, 1993: 262). The explanation that anti-colonial nationalism was the *primary* factor in inducing an imperial power to disengage from formal control of a colonial territory is linked to the ‘peripheral’ or colony-based explanation of decolonization. ‘The winning of independence by the former colonies has therefore been in very large measure the work of the nationalists in the colonies themselves’, concluded the American author of an ambitious early synthesis on the rise and fall of Western colonialism, writing at the height of African decolonization:
European Decolonization

Their ‘positive action’ and agitation, including in some instances armed insurrection, have gradually made it clear to the colonial powers that, in the existing state of world opinion, it was not worth their while to attempt to hold the colony by force and that it was better to retreat with the best face possible, salvaging what they could and trying to retain as much good will as possible for the post-independence era. (Easton, 1964: 370)

Decades later, there are grounds for doubting whether nationalism, however powerful and decisive it may have been in certain cases, really was the crucial determining factor in accelerating imperial retreat generally. Some historians attribute equal importance to loss of the allegiance of collaborative elites – in part an outcome of the spread of nationalism – on whom the European colonial rulers so heavily depended.

The advocates of nationalism as a deciding element argue that decolonization in nearly all cases required first the growth of anti-colonial nationalist sentiments and nationalist forces within a colonial territory itself. But this growth alone was never the whole story. Assuming that international pressures were not always of great significance, ‘what was then of prime importance were the particularities of the imperial [or metropolitan] response, which to a major degree determined the nature of the confrontation which then ensued – though hardly ever the eventual outcome’ (Low, 1993: xii). Whether the occupying power responded by force or negotiation to nationalist demands was obviously crucial in determining the outcome of decolonization. Those historians emphasizing nationalism none the less argue that international persuasion or economic self-interest did not provoke Europe’s accelerated decolonization in Africa after 1959, more nationalist pressures forcing countries like Britain and France to confront and resolve contradictions in their colonial position.
Introduction: Definitions and Explanations

Nationalist leaders themselves combined cloudy anti-colonial rhetoric with the search for grass-roots support – such as Jomo Kenyatta discovered in the land-hungry Kikuyu squatters kept out of the British white-settler ‘Highlands’ in Kenya and Indonesian nationalist Ahmed Sukarno in Javanese peasant fear of the return of prewar Dutch taxes and compulsory demand for export crops. Kwame Nkrumah built a popular base in West Africa’s Gold Coast after 1949 by mobilizing trade unions, farmers, traders, ‘verandah boys’ and various other interest groups. What charismatic, Western-educated nationalist leaders offered such relatively deprived sections of the community was the future possibility of a mass political movement capable of representing remote districts in a provincial or colonial capital far more effectively than purely local, tribal or sectional pressure groups. Nationalist politicians accumulated power and influence only by representing a political machine that spoke for cocoa farmers, coffee growers, chiefs, cultivators, urban traders and lorry owners. ‘Where they lacked such a machine, the colonial state crushed them like flies’ (Darwin, 1991: 89).

Anti-colonial risings incited by nationalist politicians could exert a terrible price and result in more immediate death and destruction to the nationalists’ own countrymen, sometimes instituted by the guerilla fighters themselves, than to their well-armed European rulers. Over the period 1954–56 the Muslim FLN leadership in Algeria raised political passions by calculated acts of violence, directed as often against those who refused to cooperate with them as against Frenchmen. For every European murdered by the FLN it is estimated that they killed eight of their own people. Indigenous peoples who found employment as police or military under European colonial rule, such as the Arab auxiliaries in Algeria known as harkis, could expect no quarter if those rulers were compelled to depart by armed force. Equally, while fighting the British in Malaya after 1948, the communists used violence to eliminate their
European Decolonization

Chinese Kuomintang guerilla opponents, to disrupt economic life, to dissuade peasants from aiding the British and to persuade Malaysians to provide them with food, money and supplies. Vietminh intimidation of non-communist peasants during the struggle against the French in Indochina, and their removal of VNQDD supporters in the north, is also often disregarded (see Chapter 3). Events between 1952 and 1956 in British Kenya, during which time Mau Mau resistance was broken, saw African security force casualties of around 500. On the other hand, African civilian victims of the Mau Mau numbered 1817 – adding weight to the argument that the Emergency was a civil war between militants on the one hand and loyalist Kikuyu on the other, as well as a Mau Mau campaign against white settlement (see Chapter 6).

If we dismiss exaggerated contemporary fears that communist or Soviet conspiracies were behind various nationalist movements beyond South East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, then a more persuasive explanation for the increase in nationalist resistance to imperialism concerns the mutually reinforcing ‘contagion effects’ of British and French decolonizations, in Africa in particular, acting as both stimulus and model to nationalists in their own colonies and elsewhere. For example, after Britain’s Gold Coast achieved independence as Ghana in 1957, the demands for autonomy from French West and Equatorial Africa became difficult to resist (see Chapter 5). The contagion explanation does not really address, on the other hand, the basic question as to why the colonial populations were susceptible to ‘contagion’ in the first place. One long-term explanation for nationalist potency is that, in the post-1945 period, by increasing the productive capacity of their colonies, the European powers created the very conditions which encouraged the colonized peoples to challenge imperial rule: rapid urbanization, plus social and political mobilization behind the ideology of anti-colonial nationalism. Economic development of the colonies and the postwar
acceleration in world economic growth created the structural conditions throughout the colonial world in which indigenous nationalism could flourish. Political and economic pressures on European decision-makers hence combined to reinforce existing international pressures for retreat or withdrawal (Sanders, 1990).

Nationalist explanations provide a powerful and attractive theory of colonial ‘liberation’ and the end of empire. They lend significance to the political movements whose ability to mobilize mass support was so striking a feature of the last decades of colonial rule, especially in Asia and Africa. Nationalist political disturbances clearly had the capacity to promote colonial self-government to the top of the political agenda in various European capitals. Yet are they sufficient to explain the whole complex phenomenon of the breakup of European colonial authority or ‘decolonization’ without taking into account international and metropolitan pressures to transfer power?

(2) *International Explanations*

To what extent was the breakup of the European colonial empires merely an inevitable outcome of the great transformation in international politics that followed the Second World War? Despite some necessary qualifications, the ensuing postwar decades may easily be characterized as the ‘age of the superpowers’. The prewar European Great Powers – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – appear feeble, from this perspective, besides the enormous post-1945 strength and apparent power of the United States and the Soviet Union. In a world of Cold War ideologies and nuclear deterrents, ‘colonial empires appeared as quaint survivors of a prewar age, to be quickly dismantled lest they be knocked to pieces in the turbulent wake of the superpowers’ (Darwin, 1991: 56). Both the new superpowers were avowedly anti-colonial in outlook, while the ideological struggle against German fascism and Japanese
militarism had made the assertion of prewar racist and imperialist attitudes much less in vogue among the victorious Western allies. Furthermore, the 1941 ‘Atlantic Charter’, agreed between Britain and America on common wartime objectives, and the 1945 United Nations Charter enshrined freedom from colonial rule as an ideal.

The emergence of the two superpowers as the arbiters of world affairs and the humiliating defeat of European colonial rulers in South East Asia by the Japanese from 1941–42 seemed to signify the passing of European world primacy and of the ‘rickety’ colonial structures that formed part of it. In 1945, the Cold War had not yet become the chief influence on the shaping of Western policies and the Soviet Union was not then the most formidable opponent of British, French and Dutch colonialism; at most, she gave ideological support to nationalist movements. It was the United States which most prominently opposed European colonialism. Why, after all, should a dynamic American political economy, bearing the staggering military burden from the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) onwards of defending postwar Western Europe against a supposedly encroaching Soviet Union, be willing to tolerate obsolete spheres of influence or late-nineteenth-century colonial boundaries that reserved markets, oil fields and raw materials to declining European states that were now so dependent upon American economic aid?

Until his death in April 1945, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s dislike of the European colonial empires (the French one in particular), as the leader of a federated and democratic nation forcibly liberated from British colonial rule in the late-eighteenth-century, chimed with Soviet communist denunciations of capitalist imperialism. Both superpowers tried to discourage middle-ranking European powers, like the Netherlands, from clinging on to Empire to salvage their self-esteem. Bankrupt postwar Britain and a helpless France were also obvious targets of an intermittent attempt by the emerging superpowers to build a non-
colonial world order. The formal creation of the United Nations at San Francisco in October 1945 with its stiffer terms for trusteeship, compared with the old League mandates, also reflected a stronger bias in favour of advancing colonial territories to independence. International pressures increased with the admission of newly independent nations such as India, Ceylon and Indonesia to the UN, who skilfully used it as a platform or means of isolating and embarrassing the old colonial powers. In 1960, alongside the entry of many new African states, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which typified colonial rule as a denial of fundamental human rights contrary to the UN Charter.

Conversely, a striking paradox, ‘the imperialism of decolonization’, has been used to argue that in the immediate postwar period British imperial power was only allowed to recover with American support. ‘At metropolitan and international levels British imperial power was substantially an Anglo-American revival’ (Louis and Robinson, 1994: 469). In March 1946, Prime Minister Attlee speculated that Britain was fast becoming an easterly extension of a strategic arc, the centre of which was the American continent, rather than looking eastwards through the Mediterranean to India and the Far East. By the end of 1947 the Americans were doing a great deal to prop up the British Empire, especially in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Over the same period, the British government withdrew troops fighting the communists in Greece, had left India, were about to depart from Burma and Ceylon, and not long after to abdicate their mandate in Palestine (see Chapter 4).

Only as the Cold War intensified between 1947 and 1951 did the United States hasten to strengthen Britain and France in defence of Western Europe. Washington relied on the British and French empires to block Sino-Soviet expansion into territories on the rim of southern and
western Asia. Hence, with joint policies in Europe and mutual support in Malaya and the Middle East, the British could rely on ‘the American shield’ against communist intervention. Similarly, after Suez in 1956 ended British aspirations to imperial dominance in the Middle East (see Chapter 4), the British Empire was internationalized then dismantled as part of an Anglo-American coalition. But this was a coalition in which Britain was clearly the junior partner and in which Washington insisted that Britain prioritize the Cold War over its colonial possessions. ‘After 1956 the British fell in with the American design for Western alliances [with the ex-colonial powers] with freer trade and free institutions. Such was the imperialism of decolonization’ (Louis and Robinson, 1994: 495).

In any event, given such dramatic post-1945 changes in international relations, the contraction of imperial power and the liberation of so many countries from colonial rule can appear, in retrospect, natural and inevitable. This was not how Europe’s politicians, diplomats and civil service mandarins necessarily saw their colonial empires developing at the time. British politicians, in looking back, presented the unravelling of empire as an orderly, rational, honourable and deliberate process but the messy reality was much less consistent and unavoidable:

In short, far from there being a planned withdrawal, a considered transformation from empire to commonwealth, what actually occurred from 1945 until the late 1960s was the unpredictable erosion of position after position, foothold after foothold, followed on each occasion by further efforts to hold together the remnants of world power and influence, by one means or another. (Darwin, 1984: 206)

The orthodox view of British decolonization was that Britain freely abandoned its global imperial status in the 1940s and 1950s, whereas revisionist interpretation suggests a determination to recoup Britain’s pre-Second World War
role as a world leader, despite living in a new and more hostile postwar environment (Kent, 1993).

(3) Metropolitan (Domestic) Explanations

The home government in the mother country or ‘metropole’ had to take the ultimate decision about whether or not to transfer power and so an alternative way of explaining imperial retreat has been to see it as a political choice taken by postwar European governments under the pressure of domestic (often economic) constraints and calculations of national interest. In this sense, Europe simply drifted away from her old imperial role; the ‘will to rule’ gradually slackened and public indifference reinforced the effects of economic decline. The idea that during the 1940s and 1950s there was a sharp change of attitude in Britain towards empire and the burdens of an imperial role, and that this change played a key part in disengagement from colonial responsibilities, has been a recurrent theme in several accounts of the end of the British Empire. Not that the British felt any shame about owning a maritime empire, or had qualms about exploiting it. Rather, it was the case that public opinion at home took little interest in colonial possessions and was, consequently, unwilling to see scarce resources spent on preserving them. It followed that once empire became too much of a nuisance financially, militarily and in international relations, British opinion at home would tolerate getting rid of it as quickly and painlessly as possible (Darwin, 1991).

On the face of it, domestic constraints such as the vicissitudes of the British economy closely paralleled the progressive abandonment of colonial rule with the Commonwealth being used to conceal the realities of declining world power. The economic crisis of the immediate post-Second World War years, when Britain was saved from bankruptcy by American Lend-Lease borrowings and later the Marshall Plan, saw decisions taken to withdraw from India, Burma
and Ceylon, and to abandon the Palestine mandate. On the other hand, fears about the prospects for Britain’s economic recovery moved politicians in the opposite direction at the same time – for example, towards the greater economic exploitation of colonial East Africa (see Chapter 6) plus tin-and rubber-rich Malaya (see Chapter 3). Structural economic weakness also exposed Britain to pressure from America whose leaders, while not actively hostile to the survival of the British Empire, required conformity with American policy, notably in Palestine. A shift in domestic economic policy under Harold Macmillan’s premiership in the late 1950s coincided with accelerating Britain’s departure from the dozens of African, Pacific and Caribbean colonial dependencies that still remained (see Chapter 5).

European colonialism, it has been argued, ‘became dysfunctional to the operational necessities of the metropole’ (Holland, 1985: 205). In other words, an economic shift away from imperial tariffs and trade, as well as the postwar expansion of the welfare state and middle-class devotion to it, helped to pave the way for gradual imperial disengagement. After the Suez watershed, a strategic shift in Britain towards ‘interdependence’ with the United States and the partnership in nuclear weaponry that followed the 1957 Defence Review, highlighted the contradiction between upholding sterling and funding the counter-insurgency operations needed at times to defend Britain’s world role. De Gaulle’s shift away from French colonial Africa a few years later can also be explained by the alternative prospect of nuclear greatness. Recognition of the commercial benefits and also job opportunities of the British Empire, ‘a gigantic system of out-door relief for the aristocracy of Great Britain’ in Victorian radical John Bright’s hostile phrase, were also replaced in domestic politics by a sense of its redundancy and burden on the taxpayer.

Economic developments within the European Coal and Steel Community (France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) from 1952 also made
previous concerns with unrewarding colonial development policies seem an increasing burden. When de Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958, he had the confidence gained from the setting up a year previously of the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) by the Treaty of Rome to scale down French colonial commitments, whereas Britain fell increasingly behind its continental competitors. ‘The British Treasury was gripped by a panic-vision of the UK economy not only being bypassed by west European prosperity, but meanwhile being milked by parasitic dependents in Africa and the Caribbean’ (Holland, 1985: 207). The British were also preoccupied with the preservation of sterling’s role in financing international trade and investment, and with it the earning power of the City of London. By the late 1950s, the restoration of convertibility meant that the City’s invisible earnings had more to gain from emerging global opportunities than from remaining confined to the sterling area. ‘As the value of the imperial component of the Sterling Area diminished, so did the economic obstacles to decolonisation. Indeed, by moving with the nationalist tide, Britain hoped to benefit from informal ties with the Commonwealth while simultaneously promoting sterling’s wider, cosmopolitan role’ (Cain and Hopkins, 1993: 266).

Another plausible metropolitan explanation of why colonies were hustled towards independence, with the emergence of a new middle class back home, was to release West European resources for domestic welfare spending. The state was expected to subsidize house purchases, hospital treatment and higher education through tax reliefs and student grants, and any diversion of resources for colonial purposes – such as to defeat Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya or the FLN in French Algeria – became increasingly resented by new and expanding middle-class electorates that benefited disproportionately from increased welfare spending. The survival of British imperial power also appeared to be a matter of electoral apathy in the 1950s
European Decolonization

and 1960s, quite unlikely to disturb the domestic political scene. Even the emotional appeal to ‘kith and kin’ at the time of UDI in 1965 by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia attracted only a small backbench group of right-wing Tory MPs (see Chapter 6). The possibility of a decline in public support for the military coercion of terrorist movements, such as those the British encountered after 1945 in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden, could hence be seen as a further domestic constraint. There was a limit to metropolitan financial resources which could be devoted to colonial repression without public hostility from ordinary middle-class taxpayers.

Even if domestic politics did not play a decisive role in the removal of British imperial power, they were neither marginal nor of little consequence elsewhere in Europe and contained the power to obstruct or even destroy the efforts of policy makers to respond to external change. The example of the French Fourth Republic (1946–58) is a reminder that instability at home could paralyse colonial policy and that colonial issues, such as Indochina and Algeria, could wreck governments and constitutions. It was, after all, the threat of a military coup to shore up French rule in Algeria that cleared the way in 1958 for General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. Britain, on the other hand, displayed striking political stability throughout the years of imperial withdrawal, minimizing the domestic effects of decolonization by externalizing the costs of failure. Various areas of troublesome conflict in the 1970s and 1980s – the Middle East, Cyprus, southern Africa, Kashmir, Sri Lanka – were legacies of British decolonization. ‘Britain was spared, but the world still lives with the consequences, which are not borne by British society’ (Kahler, 1984: 386).

Altogether, these various interpretations of the role of domestic policies, in the case of Britain at least, add up to suggest quite strongly the indifference at best, hostility at worst, of public opinion at home to any over-eager attempts to prevent the dissolution of colonial empire. They suggest
that we should see the impulse to decolonize getting stronger as the material concerns of the mass electorate dominated party political calculations in the metropole, as the urgency of domestic social reform increased, and as the electorate came to perceive empire as a drain on scarce resources otherwise available for welfare spending at home. At the same time, international and colonial-nationalist pressures to retreat from empire also became more intense in the 1950s and 1960s and those politicians who favoured a deliberate acceleration of imperial withdrawal enjoyed public tolerance if not enthusiastic support (Darwin, 1991).

Endnote

This book deals both with the eventual dismantling of that British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish and Netherlands sense of belonging to an imperial nation which ruled large tracts of the world and also with the achievement of a sense of nationhood by newly independent countries that took over the reins of power from the Europeans. That colonial issues remain current, despite the disappearance of empires, is suggested by attention given to the recent decolonizations of Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999), plus occasional media coverage of Britain’s remaining overseas territories like the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar – claimed respectively by Argentina and Spain – as well as of violent anti-settler outbreaks in the 1980s on New Caledonia, a large island in the South Pacific still under French supervision (see Chapter 7). After consideration of the actual historical processes of disengagement in specific colonies (Chapters 3–6) and a survey of those dependencies remaining (Chapter 7), the various explanatory hypotheses put forward above for decolonization will each be reassessed (Chapter 8). Attention will also be given to the important role of collaborative elites in the context of a ‘peripheral’ or colony-based interpretation of the end of empire (see Chapter 8).
INDEX

Abbas, Ferhat 26, 149, 150
Abd el Krim 26
Abdul Rahman, Tunku 59, 60, 216
Aden 16, 65, 91–4, 104, 105
Adoula, Cyvrielle 138
Africa 106–8, 143–5, 146–7, 184–5
economics of decolonization
in 108–11
neocolonialism in 4
see also individual countries
African National Congress
(Central African Federation) 130, 132, 135
African National Council
(ANC – South Africa) 184
African National Council
(ANC – Zimbabwe) 170–1
African Party for the
Independence of Guinea and
Cabo Verde (PAIGC) 176, 179
Aldrich, Robert 118, 120, 143, 187, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 216
Algeria 16, 25, 106, 110, 215
civil unrest and
insurrections 122, 146, 149–56, 184–5, 206;
atrocities 7, 150, 151, 152, 156; battle for
Algiers 152–4; costs to
France 15, 111; ending of 111, 154–6;
pre-1945 26
French rule 147–9
independence 156, 212
All-African Peoples’
Conference 136
Allen, Louis 77, 79
Alliance des Bakongo
(ABAKO) 136
Alliance Révolutionnaire Caraïbe
(ARC) 142
Amery, Leo 68
Amin, Samir 4
Anderson, David 96
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936) 88
Anglo-Nigerian Defence
Pact 127
Angola 147, 175, 176–9, 181–3, 207, 218–19
Angolan National Liberation
Front (FNLA) 176, 178, 181
Anguilla 141, 188
Antarctica
British Antarctic Territory 189
Terre Adélie 193
Anti-Fascist Organisation
(AFO – Burma) 76
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom
League (AFPFL – Burma) 76, 77, 78, 79
Antigua and Barbuda 141
Apithy, Sourou Migan 118
Arden-Clarke, Charles 115
Argenliue, Thierry d’ 42, 45
Argentina 190–1
Armée de Libération Nationale
(ALN – Algeria) 150, 154, 156, 206

228
Index

Armitage, Robert 97, 132
Aruba 143
Ascension Island 188
Atlantic Charter (1941) 10, 63
Atmore, Anthony 175, 176
Attlee, Clement 11, 50, 69, 73, 77, 78
Aung San 76–7, 78
Aung San Suu Kyi 79
Australia 28
Dutch East Indies and 33, 36
Awolowo, Obafemi 122, 124
Azikiwe, Nnamdi 124, 127
Azores 187
Balfour Declaration 82
Balfour-Paul, Glen 89
Baling peace talks (1955) 59
Banda, Hastings 132, 133, 134, 135
Bangladesh 74
Bao Dai 39
Barbados 141
Baring, Evelyn 161, 162, 163
Basutoland 183
Baudouin II, King of the Belgians 136
Bechuanaland 183
Beinart, William 183
Belgium, Congo see Congo (Belgian, later Zaire)
Belize 141–2
Ben Bella, Mohammed 156
Ben Gurion, David 86
Bennett, George 158, 160
Berlin Conference (1884) 19–20
Bermuda 188
Betts, Raymond 155
Bevan, Aneurin 69
Bevin, Ernest 34, 82, 83, 84
Biafra 127–8
Bidault, Georges 45
Binh Xuyen gang 40
Birmingham, David 120, 136
Bismarck, Otto von 19
Blundell, Michael 163
Bogarde, Dirk 162
Bonaparte, Napoleon 188
Bonn, Moritz Julius 3
Bose, Subhas Chandra 53
Botha, P. W. 183
Botswana 183
Boucheur, C. H. 54
Boumédiéene, Houari 156
Boyce, D. George 169, 173
Brazzaville Conference (1944) 117
Briggs, Harold 56, 57
Bright, John 14
British Antarctic Territory 189
British Guiana 141
British Honduras 141–2
British Indian Ocean Territory 189
British Virgin Islands 188
Brown, Colin 206
Brown, George 94
Brown, Judith 67, 68, 73, 215
Brunei 62
Buchan, John 18
Burma National Army 76
Burma/Myanmar 11, 13
British withdrawal 65–6, 75–9
civil unrest and insurrections 27, 50
Burns, Alan 112
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu 183–4
Cabrál, Amilcar 176, 180
Cabrál, Luiz 180
Caetano, Marcello 174, 179
Cain, P. J. 15
Calcutta Youth Conference 53
Campbell-Johnson, Alan 70, 73
Canada 28, 66
Canary Islands 187
Cao Dai 40
Carrington, Lord 173
Carruthers, Susan L. 55, 162
Carter, Jimmy 172
Castle, Barbara 169
Catling, Richard 163
Caute, David 128, 172
Cayman Islands 187–8
Cédile, Jean 40, 41
Index

Ceuta 187
Ceylon see Sri Lanka/Ceylon
Chad 22
Challe, Maurice 154, 155, 206
Chamberlain, Muriel E. 3, 23, 206
Charles, Prince 192
Chew, Ernest C. T. 29, 61
Chiang Kai-shek 38, 43, 191
Chilembwe, John 26
Chin Peng 51, 59, 60
China
  communist victory 56
  Indochina and 40, 43–5, 46, 48
  Korea and 56
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 53
Chipman, John 25
Chirac, Jacques 143, 199, 200
Chissano, Joaquim 181
Christison, Philip 33
Churchill, Winston 57, 67, 76, 84
civil unrest and insurrections
  Algeria 122, 146, 149–56, 184–5, 206; atrocities 7, 150, 151, 152, 156; battle for Algiers 152–4; costs to France 15, 111; ending of 111, 154–6; pre-1945 26
  Angola 176–7, 178–9
  Belgian Congo/Zaïre 27, 136, 137–9, 208, 218
  Biafra 127–8
  Burma 27, 50
  Côte d’Ivoire 118
  Cyprus 97–8, 99
  French Antilles 142
  Ghana/Gold Coast 113
  India 28, 68
  Indochina 8, 27, 38–9, 41–2, 45–9
  Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies) 27–8
  Ireland 24
  Kenya 15, 16, 27, 109, 146, 158, 160–6, 206
  Madagascar 110
  Malaya 7–8, 16, 18, 53–60
  Morocco 26
  Mozambique 177–8, 179
  New Caledonia 17, 195, 198–201, 202, 205
  Nyasaland 26, 132
  Palestine 16, 28, 84, 85
  Portuguese Guinea 176, 179
  pre-1945 anti-colonial revolts 25–9
  Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia) 170–4
Clayton, Anthony 46, 117, 150, 154, 163, 206
Cloake, John 58
Coates, John 54, 57
Cohen, Andrew 114, 129
Cold War 9, 11–12, 138, 182, 211
  Indochina and 46, 47, 210
  collaboration 6, 203, 213–17
Collins, Michael 24
colonial/imperial territories 1, 18–19
development of European empires 19–25
  pre-1945 anti-colonial revolts 25–9
  see also decolonization and individual territories
Cominform 53
Commonwealth (former British Empire) 13, 15, 25
  Burma and 78, 79
  see also individual countries
Commonwealth (Empire) Day (24 May) 18
Comoros Islands 196
Congo (Belgian, later Zaïre) 110, 135–40
  administration 23, 136
civil unrest and insurrections 27, 136, 137–9, 208, 218
  independence 108, 136, 207–8

230
Index

Connell, John 143, 187, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202
contagion effects 8
Convention People’s Party (CPP – Ghana) 107, 114–16
Cooper, Frederick 109, 126
Coral Sea Islands Territory 187
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 118
Coussey, Henley 113–14
Creasy, Gerald 112, 113
Creech Jones, Arthur 82, 113, 115, 129
Cribb, Robert 206
Cripps, Stafford 67, 69
Cuba 20
Cyprus 16, 18, 65, 95–101, 105
Danquah, J. B. 112
Darwin, John 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 77, 81, 85, 86, 97, 102, 104, 110, 112, 122, 123, 160, 168, 205, 208, 212, 214, 217
Dato Onn Bin Ja’afar 52
Davidson, Basil 179
de Gaulle, Charles see Gaulle, Charles de
de Valera, Eamon 24
decolonization explanations 4–17, 203–19; international 5, 9–13, 208–11; metropolitan (domestic) 5, 13–17, 211–13; nationalist 3, 4, 5–9, 204–8
meaning 2–4
Decoux, J. 39
Deer Mission 39
Defferre, Gaston 119, 144
Devlin, Patrick 133
Dewey, Peter 42
Dhlakama, Afonso 181
Diamond, Jared 21
Dianou, Alphonse 200
Diego Garcia 189
Dien Bien Phu, battle of 47–8, 148, 206
Djibouti 196
Dominica 141
Dominion Party (DP – Southern Rhodesia) 167
Dong Minh Hoi (Nationalist Party – Indochina) 44
Dorman-Smith, Reginald 77
Douglas-Hume, Sir Alec 168, 170
Dulles, John Foster 47
Duncanson, Dennis J. 40
Dunn, Peter M. 42
Dutch East Indies see Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies)

East Africa Association 27
East Timor 59, 180
Easter Island 187
Eastern Europe 3
Easton, Stewart C. 4, 6
economic colonialism 4
economic development, demands for independence and 8–9
economics of decolonization in Africa 108–11
Eden, Anthony 90, 97
Edgerton, Robert B. 164
Egbe Omo Odudua society (Nigeria) 124, 125
Egypt 26, 65
British presence 87–91
Palestine and 87
Yemen and 93
Eisenhower, Dwight 47, 90, 91, 98, 209
elites, collaborative 6, 203, 213–17
Empire (Commonwealth) Day (24 May) 18
Erskine, George 163
European Community/Union 14–15, 111
Fabius, Laurent 199
Faeroes 187
Fairn Committee 165
Falkland Islands 17, 169, 186, 189–91, 202, 212
Fanon, Frantz 147, 178
Farouk, King of Egypt 88–9

231
Index

Feisal, King of Iraq 91
Field, Winston 167, 168
Fieldhouse, D. K. 110, 111
First, Ruth 218
First World War, treaties after 23
Foot, Hugh 98, 100, 124
France
empire 10, 19;
administration 22–3;
assimilation concept 25;
economics of 110–11;
metropolitan explanation for decolonization and
14–15, 16; overseas
departments and
territories 186, 193–201,
202; post 1919–20 League
mandates 23; US support
for French imperialism
11–12; see also individual
countries
end of French Fourth
Republic 16, 120
nuclear weapons 14, 195
Suez crisis and 90
Franco, Francisco 26, 103
Fraser, T. G. 82
French, Patrick 68, 72, 73
French Antilles 142–3
French Communist Party
(FCP) 118
French Guiana 194
French Polynesia 194, 195
French West and Equatorial
Africa 116–22, 143, 144–5,
216
Front de Libération Nationale
(FLN – Algeria) 7, 15,
150–3, 154, 156
Front de Libération Nationale
Kanake et Socialiste
(FLNKS – New Caledonia)
198, 199, 200, 201
Front for the Liberation of South
Yemen (FLOSY) 93
Fuad, King of Egypt 88
Furedi, Frank 161
Futuna 194, 195
Gadhafi, Muammar 106
Galtieri, Leopoldo 190
Gandhi, M. K. (Mahatma) 28,
67, 68, 69, 70
Gardiner, Nile 22
Gaulle, Charles de
Algeria and 16, 111, 153–4,
155, 206, 212
European Community
and 15, 111
French Africa and 14, 111,
117, 120, 121, 216
Indochina and 43
Gent, Edward 54
Germany
empire 19, 23
in Second World War 28, 88
Ghana (former Gold Coast) 218,
219
British rule in 112–16
independence of 8, 107, 116,
119, 144
nationalism in 7, 114–16
Giap, Vo Nguyen 39, 46
Gibraltar 17, 65, 102–4, 105,
187, 202
Gimson, Franklin 191
Girardet, Raoul 149
Gizenga, Antoine 138
Goa 174
Gold Coast see Ghana (former
Gold Coast)
Gough, B. 190
Government of India Act
(1935) 66
Gracey, Douglas 40, 41, 42
Gray, W. N. 55, 57
Greece 11, 54
proposed union of Cyprus
with 95, 96, 97, 98, 99
Greene, Hugh Carleton 55
Greenland 187
Grenada 140, 141
Griffiths, James 56
Grimal, Henri 4
Grivas, George 97, 98, 99, 100
Guadeloupe 142–3, 194, 195
Guam 20, 187
Index

Guatemala 142
Guiana
  British 141
  French 194
Guinea-Bissau (former Portuguese Guinea) 176, 179, 180, 206
Gulf States 65, 91–5, 104–5
Gurney, Henry 54, 57

Hadj, Messali 150
Haggard, H. Rider 18
Hammarskjöld, Dag 138, 139
Harcourt, Cecil 192
Harding, John 97, 98
Hargreaves, J. D. 3, 26, 108, 114, 127, 139, 162, 167
Harper, T. N. 64, 127
Hatta, Mohammed 33, 37, 206
Healey, Denis 169
Heath, Edward 170
Henissart, Paul 155
Hewitt, Vernon 75
Hitchens, Christopher 99
Ho Chi Minh 38, 39, 44–5
Hoa Hao 40
Holland, Robert 5, 14, 15, 96, 97, 98, 133, 149, 152, 213
Hong Kong 17, 186, 191–3
Hopkins, A. G. 15, 21
Hopkinson, Henry 96
Horne, Alistair 151
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix 118–19
Huggins, Godfrey 128, 129, 131
Hunt, Rex 190
Hutchinson, Martha
  Cranshaw 151
Hyam, Ronald 129

India 5, 11, 13, 215
  British withdrawal 65, 104, 207, 211; case for 66–70;
  partition 70, 71–4, 104;
  princely states 74–5
  civil unrest and
  insurrections 28, 68
  Goa 174
  Indian National Army 53
  Indian National Congress 28, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 104
  Indochina 16, 29, 59
  attempt to reimpose French rule (1946–54) 32, 38–49,
  62, 63, 148, 206; British involvement 40–3, 211;
  French war in Indochina 45–9; Vietminh in Hanoi
  civil unrest and
  insurrections 8, 27, 38–9, 41–2, 45–9
  Indochina Communist Party (ICP) 38, 39, 44
  Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies) 11
  attempted reassertion of Dutch rule (1946–9) 31–2, 33–8,
  62, 63, 206, 209, 215–16;
  British involvement 33–6, 211
  civil unrest and
  insurrections 27–8
  Malaysia and 62, 95
  nationalism in 7
  in Second World War 29
  Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 37
  Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) 33, 37
  Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP – South Africa) 183–4
  insurrections see civil unrest and
  insurrections
  international explanations of
decolonization 5, 9–13,
  208–11
  Iraq 23, 91, 92
  Ireland 24–5, 28
  Irgun Žvai Leumi (IZL – Palestine) 85
  Irish Republican Army 24
  Ismay, Lord Hastings 70
  Israel 86–7, 90
  Italy 24, 88
  Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) 118

233
Jackson, Robert 57
Jagan, Cheddi 141
Jamaica 140, 141
Japan in Second World War 10, 28–9, 76, 191
Indochina and 38, 39
Jeffrey, Robin 32
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 104
Johns, W. E. 18
Jordan 87
Jospin, Lionel 201
Jouhaud, General 155
Kabila, Laurent 218
Kahler, Miles 5, 16
Karnow, Stanley 39, 41, 45
Kasavubu, Joseph 136, 137, 138, 139
Kashmir 75
Kasem, 'Abd al-Karim 91, 92
Katanga 134, 137, 138–9
Kaunda, Kenneth 132, 135, 171
Keay, John 62
Kelly, George M. 148
Kendrew, Joseph 98
Kennedy, J. F. 210
Kent, John 13, 211
Kenya 18, 214–15, 218
British rule 157–66
civil unrest and
insurrections 15, 16, 27, 109, 146, 158, 160–6, 206
nationalism in 7
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) 166
Kenya African National Union (KANU) 165–6
Kenya African Union (KAU) 159, 161
Kenyatta, Jomo 7, 146, 160, 161, 165, 166
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA – Kenya) 27, 159
Killearn, Lord 35
Kimbangu, Simon 27
Kipling, Rudyard 21–2
Kissinger, Henry 172
Klerk, F. W. de 183, 184, 209
Korean War 56, 59, 115
Kungu, Waruhiu wa 160
Kuomintang 8, 50, 53
Kuwait 91, 92
Kyle, Keith 90, 139, 166
Labouret, Henri 3
Lacoste, Robert 151, 152
Lafleur, Jacques 200
Lai Tek 52, 53
Lampson, Miles 35
Lapping, Brian 5, 161
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean 46
League of Nations, post-1919–20
mandated territories 23–4
Lebanon 82
Lederc, Jacques Philippe 42
Lee, Edwin 29, 61
Lee Kuan Yew 62
Lend-Lease 13
Lennox-Boyd, Alan 58, 59, 98, 126, 127, 165
Lesotho 183
Libya 106
Linggadjati Agreement (1946) 35, 36
Lini, Walter 196, 197
Lloyd, Lord 92
Louis, William Roger 11, 12, 84, 90
Low, D. A. 4, 5, 6, 144, 214
Lu Han 43–4
Lugard, Frederick 22
Lumumba, Patrice 136–7, 138
Lyttelton, Oliver 57, 129–30
Macao 17, 187, 193
MacDonald, Malcolm 54
Macdonald, Peter 47
Machel, Samora 172, 177, 181
McIntyre, W. David 5
MacKenzie, John M. 18, 212
Macleod, Iain 102, 134, 135, 144, 165
McMahon, Robert J. 29, 36
MacMichael, Harold 52

234
Macmillan, Harold 14, 210
African decolonization
and 107, 108–9, 110, 144,
213; Central African
Federation 133, 135;
Nigeria 127
Cyprus and 98, 99
Suez crisis and 90
West Indies and 141
‘winds of change’ speech 107
Macpherson, John 124
Macquarie Island 187
MacQueen, Norrie 179, 207
Madagascar 110, 205
Madeira 187
Makarios III, Archbishop 97, 98,
99, 100
Malawi (former Nyasaland) 26,
129, 130, 132, 133–4, 135,
168
Malay Nationalist Party
(MNP) 51
Malaya
administration 49–50
exploitation of resources 14,
32, 50
Indonesia and 62, 95
restoration of British rule 32,
49–62, 63–4, 76, 205, 216;
Emergency (1948–60) 7–8,
16, 18, 53–60; Singapore
and 60–1
Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA) 59
Malayan Communist Party
(MCP) 50, 51, 52, 53, 56,
58, 60
Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC) 59
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese
Army (MPAJA) 50–1
Malino group 37
Mallaby, A. W. S. 34
Malta 65, 101–2, 105
Malta Labour Party (MLP) 101
Mamdani, Mahmood 108
Mandela, Nelson 184
Manley, Norman 141
Margai, Milton 108
Marshall Plan 13, 37, 209
Martin, Ged 25
Martinique 142, 194
Massu, Jacques 152, 153
Mathu, Eliud 159
Matignon Accord (1988) 200–1
Maxwell, Kenneth 182
Mayall, James 218
Mayotte 194–5
Melilla 187
Mendès-France, Pierre 48
Menem, Carlos 191
metropolitan (domestic)
explanations of
decolonization 5, 13–17,
211–13
Mintoff, Dominic 101, 102
Mitchell, Philip 158, 160
Mitterrand, François 142, 199,
200
Mobutu, Joseph 139, 181, 218
Moi, Daniel arap 218
Mollet, Guy 151, 153
Mommsen, Wolfgang 203
Monckton, Lord 133, 134
Mondlane, Eduardo 177
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms
(1919) 66
Montgomery, Bernard 57
Montserrat 188–9
Mook, Hubertus J. van 34
Morocco 26, 106, 146, 149, 213
Mountbatten, Edwina 71, 72
Mountbatten, Louis as allied
commander SEAsia
(1945–6) 66
in Burma 76, 77
in Dutch East Indies 33, 34, 35
in Indochina 40
in Malaya 51
as Viceroy/Governor General of
India 69–70, 71–3, 75, 207
Mouvement National Congolais
(MNC) 136
Moyne, Lord 85, 140
Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) 181
Index

Mozambique 147, 175, 177–8, 179, 180–1, 219
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) 171, 177–8, 179, 180–1
Mugabe, Robert 171–2, 173
Muhammad Idris, King of Libya 106
Murray, Donette 210
Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) 89
Muslim League (India) 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 104
Muzorewa, Abel 171, 172, 173
Myanmar see Burma/Myanmar
Myochit Party (Burma) 77
Nahas Pasha 88
Namibia 182
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 152, 205
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) 124, 125, 126, 127
National Democratic Party (Southern Rhodesia) 131
National League for Democracy (NLD – Burma) 79
National Liberation Front (NLF – Yemen) 93, 94
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 97, 98, 99, 100
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 178, 181–2, 207
nationalist explanations of decolonization 3, 4, 5–9, 204–8
Nationality Act (1981) 202
Navarre, Henri 47
Ne Win 79
Néguib, Mohammed 89
Nehru, Jawaharhalal 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 104
neocolonialism 4
Netherlands 10
Netherlands Antilles 143, 187
Netherlands East Indies see Indonesia (former Dutch East Indies)
Neto, Agostinho 178–9
New Caledonia 142, 186, 194
civil unrest and insurrections 17, 195, 198–201, 202, 205
New Guinea 59
New Hebrides (Vanuatu) 186, 195–7
New Zealand 28
Ngo Dinh Diem 41
Nigeria 18, 218, 219
British rule 22, 23, 122–8
divisions in 122–3, 124
federalism in 125–8
independence 108, 123
Niue 187
Nkomo, Joshua 131, 167, 170, 171, 173
Nkrumah, Kwame 7, 107, 114–16, 119, 144, 205
Nkumbula, Harry 129, 132, 135
Norfolk Island 187
North Atlantic Treaty (1949) 10, 210
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Cyprus and 98, 99
Northern Marianas 187
Northern Peoples’ Congress (Nigeria) 125, 126, 127
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 27, 128–35, 168
Nu, U 79
nuclear weapons
France 14, 195
UK 14, 210
Nuri as-Said 91
Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) 132
Nyasaland (Malawi) 26, 129, 130, 132, 133–4, 135, 168
Nyerere, Julius 143, 177
O’Brien, Conor Cruise 138, 139
Oliver, Roland 175, 176

236
Index

Olivier, Borg 102
Olympio, Sylvanus 118, 119
Organisation de l’Armée Secrète
(OAS – Algeria) 155–6
Osterhammel, Jürgen 203
Ottoman Empire 23
Ovendale, Ritchie 107, 110, 133, 213
Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese
Army (OCAJA – Malaya) 50
Overseas Independents’ Group
(IOM – French Africa) 118
Pakistan 67, 70, 71, 73, 74,
75, 207
Palestine
British Mandate 81–5; ending
of 11, 14, 65, 85–7, 104
civil unrest and
insurrections 16, 28, 84, 85
partition 86–7
Pandey, B. N. 71
Parti du Peuple Algérien
(PPA) 150
Patel, S. V. 73
paternalism 21
Patriotic Front
(PF – Zimbabwe) 171, 172
Patten, Chris 192
Payne, Anthony 218
Pearce, Lord 170
Pearson, Raymond 3
Philippines 20, 31
Pinochet, Augusto 191
Pitcairn Island 189
Pleven, René J. 117
Pons, Bernard 199
Pontecorvo, Gillo 152
Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) 178, 179, 181,
182, 207
Porter, A. N. 97
Portugal
dom empire 19, 147, 174–83,
206–7, 209
dom revolution in 174, 179–83,
207
Preston, Paul 26
Puerto Rico 20, 187
Radcliffe, Cyril 70, 71, 73, 98
Rance, Hubert 77
Rassemblement Démocratique
Africain (RDA) 118, 119
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie
dans la République
(RPCR – New
Caledonia) 198, 199, 201
religious movements 26–7
Renison, Patrick 165
Renville truce (1948) 37
Réunion 194, 195
Rhodesia
Northern (Zambia) 27,
128–35, 168
Southern see Zimbabwe (former
Southern Rhodesia)
Rhodesian Front (RF) 167, 168
Ricklefs, M. C. 216
Rivera, Primo de 26
Roberto, Holden 176
Roberts, Andrew 69, 72
Robinson, Ronald 11, 12, 90
Robson, Mark 153
Rocard, Michel 200, 201
Rodrigues 187
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 10, 36,
209
Rosie, George 41
Roxas, Manuel 31
Rum-Van Roijen Agreement
(1949) 37–8
Rusk, Dean 94–5
Saddam Hussein 92
St Barthélémy 194
St Helena 188
St Kitts-Nevis 141, 188
St Lucia and St Vincent 141
St Martin 143
St Pierre et Miquelon 194
Salan, Raoul 153, 154, 155, 156
Salazar, António de Oliveira 165,
174, 179, 209
Salisbury, Lord 98
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samoa, American 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanders, David 9, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanger, Clyde 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savimbi, Jonas 181–2, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw, U 77, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saya San 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second World War 1, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany and 28, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan and 10, 28–9, 38, 39, 76, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segal, Ronald 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sékou Touré, Ahmed 118, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senanayake, Don Stephen 80, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senghor, Léopold Sedar 118, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharpeville massacre 107–8, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, Anthony 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, Clare 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone 108, 218, 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sillitoe, Percy 162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Commission (1927–9) 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence 61–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restoration of British rule 60–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Second World War 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore Federation of Trade Unions 60–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sithole, Ndabanzainghi 170, 171, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Alison 158, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Ian 168–70, 171, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, R. B. 50, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soames, Christopher 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soulbury, Lord 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soustelle, Jacques 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa 26, 107–8, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>progress to majority rule in 183–4, 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Georgia 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Orkney Islands 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sandwich Islands 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Shetland Islands 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Rhodesia see Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola and 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cominform 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina and 45, 46, 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-war power 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support for decolonization 5, 9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defeat by US (1898) 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empire 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar and 102–4, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinola, António de 179, 180, 181, 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springhall, J. O. 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka/Ceylon 5, 11, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British withdrawal 65, 79–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stamps 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statute of Westminster (1931) 28, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterling Area 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stern Gang 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens, Jimmy 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens, Roger 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stilwell, Joe 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockwell, A. J. 50, 52, 77, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stookey, Robert W. 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strachey, John 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stubbs, Richard 54, 55, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 22, 27, 79, 88–9, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez Canal 87, 88, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez crisis (1956) 12, 14, 90, 91, 100, 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto, General 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukarno, Ahmed 7, 27–9, 33, 37, 38, 62, 205, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surabaya, bombardment of 33–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Ba’ath Socialist Party 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanganyika 160, 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarling, Nicholas 35, 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Templer, Gerald 57–8, 59, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre Adélie 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatcher, Margaret 172–3, 190, 192, 212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

238
Index

Throup, David 159, 161, 162, 215
Thuku, Harry 27
Tjibaou, Jean-Marie 198, 200, 201
Todd, Garfield 166
Togo 119
Tokelau 187
Tran Van Giau 43
Trevaskis, Kennedy 93
Trevelyan, Humphrey 94
Trinidad 140, 141
Tristan da Cunha 188
Truman, Harry S. 36, 83, 85, 209, 210
Tshombe, Moise 134, 137, 139
Tunisia 106, 146, 149, 213
Turkey, invasion of Cyprus (1974) 100–1
Turks and Caicos Islands 188
Turnbull, Richard 93
Um Nyobé, Ruben 118, 119
Union Calédonienne (UC) 198
Union Populaire pour la Libération de Guadeloupe (UPLG) 142
United Federal Party (UFP – Southern Rhodesia) 166, 167
United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) 112–13, 115
United Kingdom 10 empire 18–19; administration 22, 23; economics of 108–10; metropolitan explanation for decolonization and 13–16; post 1919–20 League mandates 23–4; remnants of 186, 187–91, 201–2; US support for post-1945 British imperialism 11–12, 14; see also individual countries
Indochina and 40–3, 46, 47 involvement in Dutch East Indies 33–6 nuclear weapons 14, 210
United Malays Nationalist Organization (UMNO) 51–2, 59, 205
United National Independence Party (Northern Rhodesia) 135
United National Party (UNP – Ceylon) 81
United Nations
Algeria and 155
Angola and 182–3
Belgian Congo and 108, 138–9
Charter (1945) 10, 63
Cyprus and 100
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) 11
Dutch East Indies and 36, 37, 209
formation 11
Gibraltar and 103
Gulf States and 93–4
Kashmir and 75
New Caledonia and 199
new nations in 108
Palestine and 85–7
support for decolonization by 5, 11
trusteeships 11
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and 170
United States of America
Angola and 181
Cyprus and 98
Dutch East Indies and 36, 37
Gulf States and 91, 92
imperialism after 1898 20
Indochina and 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48
Marshall Plan 13, 37, 209
Palestine and 83, 84, 85, 86–7
post-war power 9
Suez crisis and 90
support for British/French imperialism 11–12, 209–10
support for decolonization 5, 9, 10

239
Index

Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 102
Vanua’aku Party (New Hebrides) 196
Vanuatu (New Hebrides) 186, 195–7
Victoria, Queen 15
Vietminh (Vietnam Independence League) 8, 38–9, 40, 41, 43–5, 46, 48
Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNA) 8, 27, 44, 45
Vorster, B. J. 171, 172
Wafid party (Egypt) 26, 88, 89
Wallis 194, 195
Watt, Harry 18
Wavell, Lord 67, 68, 69, 73
Welensky, Roy 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134
Welsh, Frank 192
West Indies
British 140–2
Dutch 143
French 142–3, 194
Westerling, Raymond ‘Turk’ 36
Whitehead, Edgar 131, 132, 166, 167
Williams, Ann 94
Williams, Charles 154, 155
Wilson, H. S. 23, 117, 124, 174, 185
Wilson, Harold 168, 169, 170, 212
Yemen 92, 93
Yoruba Action Group (Nigeria) 125, 127
Youlou, Fulbert 118
Young Kikuyu Association (Kenya) 27
Zaghlul, Saad 26, 88
Zaïre see Congo (Belgian, later Zaïre)
Zambia (former Northern Rhodesia) 27, 128–35, 168
Zeller, General 155
Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia) 16, 128–31, 180, 206

civil unrest and insurrections 170–4
illegal white regime in 147, 166–70
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 170, 171, 173
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) 167, 170, 171, 173

240