

# Contents

<i>List of Tables, Figures and Maps</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xiii
<b>Prelude</b>	1
<b>1 The Colonial Drug Trade</b>	11
Bengal Opium Traffic 1773–1856	12
Pro-revenue Actions	25
<b>2 Anti-opium Pressures</b>	36
US Concerns on Opium Traffic	36
Struggle in South Asia	49
The Battle in British Democracy	60
<b>3 British Narco-diplomacy, 1909–46</b>	69
The Shanghai Opium Conference	70
The Hague Opium Conference	77
The Geneva Opium Summit	93
<b>4 Indian Resurgence, 1947–97</b>	106
Multiple Drug Policies	107
‘Sandwiched’ between Opium Regions	119
The Indo-Australia Opium Trade War	130
Anti-drug Legislation	150
<b>5 Pakistani Dilemmas, 1947–97</b>	163
Colonial Legacies	164
Islamic Prohibition, 1977–85	177
Geo-strategic Changes in Southwest Asia	184
The Growth of Narco-democracy, 1985–97	205

<b>6</b>	<b>The Bangladeshi Panorama, 1972–97</b>	226
	Colonial Excise Policy	227
	A Crossroads for Drugs	233
	The Market for Indian Phensedyl	237
	The Weak Crusade against Drugs	246
	<b>Epilogue</b>	257
	<i>Notes</i>	265
	<i>Glossary</i>	305
	<i>Index</i>	310

# 1

## The Colonial Drug Trade

Through the dealings of the British East India Company, opium, traditionally used medicinally, became a non-medicinal business commodity during the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth centuries. At the time of growth and development of the opium monopoly in Bengal from 1773 to 1856, the economic condition of the poppy farmers (*ryots*) had deteriorated and tension had erupted between the local *zamindars* (landlords) and the colonial authorities. This conflict aided in the eventual uprising of 1857, also known as the Indian ‘Sepoy Mutiny’. In an attempt to further control the private cultivation of opium poppies and the free trade in opium, the government adopted the Opium Act of 1857 and the Opium Act of 1878.

The colonial drug laws applied a double standard, as they allowed the imperial authorities to appropriate revenue from the state-run opium monopoly, while pushing the private traders to become involved in the contraband trade. The Indian opium trade flourished until the late nineteenth century, when China emerged as a major market for the supply of opium from India. By the end of the century, the colonial rulers progressively increased local consumption of intoxicating drugs in South Asia through the establishment of an official distribution system. Thus, the history of the drug trade in South Asia has a complex political background with numerous cross-regional connections.

## **Bengal opium traffic 1773–1856**

The growth and development of an opium trade in South Asia between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has a sensational political history. The Arab physicians, who had learnt the medicinal application of opium (*Papaver Somniferum*) from the Greeks,<sup>1</sup> came in contact with India from the eighth century AD. The knowledge of medicine that they brought with them had a profound impact in later history. Eventually, in collaboration with Dutch, Portuguese and then the English trading companies, a group of private traders evolved in sporadic poppy cultivation in some parts of India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With the establishment of political rule, the British East India Company eventually expelled all other parties from the opium trade and came in conflict with the local zamindars that attempted to resist the large-scale conversion of fertile land into poppy cultivation. This rift eventually contributed to the great uprising of 1857 in the poppy growing areas.

### **The war on opium trade**

In 1986, in an interview with Lt. Col. James B. Gritz (Ret.), an official envoy of the White House, the Burmese drug lord Khun Sa' maintained:

We must remember the opium trade is originally a creation of the west. The British fought major wars with Asian nations to ensure their monopoly on, and freedom to trade in opium.<sup>2</sup>

This bitter claim by an infamous drug dealer was made probably in regard to the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars in the late 1830s and 1850s. However, an academic inquiry into the origin of major wars in Bengal and other parts of South Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and their relevance to the opium trade has never been conducted. The following discussion illustrates the commercial policies of the western maritime powers, especially those of the British East India Company, that eventually inspired them to seize political power in Bengal, largely for the benefit of opium trafficking.

The Arabs first traded opium in India as a medicinal commodity. They studied and practised Greek medicine, and opium became well

known to them as *afyun*, a word that is quite close to the Greek *opion* (οπιον) meaning opium. Abu-l-ali-ibn-Sina or Avicenna, a renowned Arab physician, recommended it especially for pain relief and as a cure for eye diseases.<sup>3</sup> The Arab traders, who came to know of the drug during the Roman Empire, introduced it to Persia. They brought medicinal opium into India, China and elsewhere around the eighth century AD.<sup>4</sup> E.H. Walsh wrote:

The use of opium spread eastwards from Arabia, through Persia, and into India with the Arab invaders who conquered Sindh from the sea in the eighth century, and was extended through the country by successive waves of Mahomedan [Mohammedan] conquest, each of which extended further than the last.<sup>5</sup>

In 1927, Richard M. Dane argued that the Arabs controlled the trade from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to Malaya and carried opium from Turkey, India and Iran.<sup>6</sup> It was through Arab traders and travelling physicians<sup>7</sup> that the medicinal use of opium was introduced into India, and then became known under various Sanskrit and vernacular names: *afim*, *afyun*, *afyuni*, *afimi*, *afimchi*, *afun*, *aphin*, and *apeem*, in various parts of South Asia. In the Punjab, opium was known as *khash-khash*, *khis-khash*, which had derived presumably from the Persian *cash-cash*. In Nepal, opium was introduced as *aphim*, while the Chinese adopted *af-yun* or *a-fu-yong*, which are very close to the Arabic form. Opium was initially incorporated in the *Bharaprakasha*, a Sanskrit text, and other *Ayur-Vedic* works during the eleventh century.<sup>8</sup> The use of opium continued in traditional India in secret (*tantric*) rituals and herbal (*hakimi*) treatments, as a remedy for diarrhoea, dysentery, incontinence, and fever. With the promotion of quasi-medicinal opium, western trading companies eventually became involved with the commercial opium trade in South Asia.

During the sixteenth century a growing trade in opium in India exhilarated many western travellers and business-minded people. The Portuguese traveller Duarte Barbosa, who accompanied Vasco da Gama as his secretary in 1500, made early reference to the Indian opium trade at Calicut and Cannanore until 1515. In the memorandum submitted before the Opium Commission, Dane provided evidence that opium was listed in the articles sent

from India to Lisbon with Cabral's fleet in 1501.<sup>9</sup> Writing of the flourishing demand for medicinal opium in India, D'Albuquerque in a letter to King Manuel of Portugal in December 1515 requested that opium poppies 'be sown in all the fields of Portugal' to make money from India.<sup>10</sup> Europeans like Garcia D'Orta and John Huyghen van Linschoten, who visited India in the sixteenth century, noticed a sprouting trade in opium in many parts. Caesar Fredrick, a Venetian, wrote in 1518 that he made profits in opium supplies from Cambay and the port of Chawl on the West Coast of India to Burma. Thus, a trade in medicinal opium flourished in different parts of pre-Mughal India without much regulation.

Alongside the flourishing opium trade, the recreational and semi-medicinal use of opium was evident amongst the Mughal nobility and Rajputs in medieval India. It is known from the *Babur-Nama* that Qasim-i-Ali, one of the associates of Emperor Babar, was an opium eater.<sup>11</sup> Abu'l Fazl, a learned adviser of the Emperor Akbar, mentioned the use of *kuknar* (a mixture of opium and hemp) by some Mughal dignitaries including Akbar.<sup>12</sup> The *kuknar* in *A'in-I-Akbari* appears to be closely associated with another Persian name *kouknar*. Bernier, who traveled in the Mughal Empire in the mid-seventeenth century, noted that the warrior Rajputs were greatly 'accustomed to the use of opium'.<sup>13</sup> With the rise in demand for non-medicinal opium within and outside India, the cultivation of opium poppy gradually increased. (See below for a discussion about the controversy on Mughal opium monopoly.) During the eclipse of the Mughals some Patna traders, in collaboration with western trading companies, became involved in the organized opium trade. In partnership with Dutch, Portuguese and then English trading companies, a group of Patna free traders became involved in the production of opium poppies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Portuguese merchants embraced the trade in the early sixteenth century. As a result of their dealings, opium became an exportable product of India, poppies being grown in parts of modern Uttar Pradesh (UP), Rajasthan, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.<sup>14</sup> Their greater involvement also made Cambay an important centre in the South Asian opium trade.<sup>15</sup> At Goa, the Portuguese seized the major share of that trade from the Arabs,<sup>16</sup> and exported Indian opium to

China.<sup>17</sup> Following the Portuguese, the Dutch, Spanish and British traders became involved in 'a tug of war', as they competed for the Indian opium trade and other commodities. With the formation of the Dutch East India Company in 1602, Dutch factories were established at Hooghly, in Bengal. Dane noted that the Dutch East India Company sent about 100 kilos of Malwa opium annually from 1613 to Malaya (Malacca) and then sold it in Thailand (Siam), Burma (Pegu) and China for a profit.<sup>18</sup> After occupying Malaya in 1649, and wresting control over the Indian Ocean from the Portuguese, the Dutch carried Indian opium to Batavia. The Dutch began to trade Bengal opium from 1659.<sup>19</sup> Tavernier, who was in India during this period, mentioned that Dutch traders traded in opium in 'exchange for their pepper'.<sup>20</sup> The islands of the East Indies were the chief markets for the Dutch opium trade.

To expand their trade interests in opium, the British East India Company competed with the existing local and foreign opium traders in Patna throughout the seventeenth century. Between 1583 and 1591 Ralph Fische, an Englishman, visited Bengal and described the culture of opium present in Patna.<sup>21</sup> In 1600, the British merchants founded the British East India Company to facilitate taking part in the flourishing opium trade. In his recent work, Om Prakash maintains that by the middle of the seventeenth century the British East India Company carried opium from Bengal to Sumatra in Indonesia for sale.<sup>22</sup> Dane maintained that the British traders competed with the Dutch East India Company, which received permission from the Mughal Emperor in 1676 for licitly trading in opium by 'paying a tax'.<sup>23</sup> In 1683, the management of the British East India Company, 'to make opium a part of the Company's investment', issued orders.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the Patna opium dealers and petty traders (*paykars*), who due to their connections with the Dutch traders had attained a dominant position in the trade, confronted the British merchants.

With the eclipse of the Mughal Empire by the mid-eighteenth century, the British East India Company forcefully established a substantial influence in the Indian opium trade. In March 1757, in a letter to the President and Council of Fort William in Bengal, P. Godfrey and his associates indicated that the East India Company had achieved exclusive control over the opium trade on the West Coast by October 1754, and had 'prohibited' all other parties 'from

trading therein'.<sup>25</sup> The strategic importance of the east coast due to its geographical proximity to the Asia-Pacific region, a major market for opium trade, also influenced British merchants to expand their military influence in the region. In an attempt to expand their commercial facilities, the British East India Company increased military power along the coastline in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century. The adoption of defence strategies, in violation of the Mughal trade rules (*dastak*), generated an armed conflict between Nawab Seraj-ud Daula of Bengal<sup>26</sup> and the East India Company authorities. In an 1891 document George Watt maintained that the attack of Nawab Seraj-ud Daula over the Kashimbazar military base (*Kuti*) in 1756, and the disruption in the supply of opium from the Patna Opium dealers'<sup>27</sup> to the British East India Company, led to the Battle of Plassey in the following year. In 1894, providing similar evidence, James F. Finlay noted:

The destruction of the English settlements by Sura-jud-Daula in 1756 drove the English merchants out of the market; and in default [defiant] of competitors, the native dealers were compelled to dispose of their opium to the Dutch at Rs70 a maund. This low rate led to the cultivation being greatly restricted.<sup>28</sup>

To break this circumscription, the leaders of the East India Company went into a secret deal with some of the rival ministers of Nawab Seraj-ud Daula. The *Fort William-India House Correspondence* indicated that under a 'trade agreement' Omichund, an influential merchant within the Nawab's government, helped in ousting the youthful Nawab from power.<sup>29</sup> The victory of Plassey in 1757 provided the British East India Company with a stronger political hold over the opium trade in Patna and the surrounding poppy-growing areas.

After establishing its political control in Bengal, the British East India Company founded the government opium monopoly that eventually ousted the Patna opium dealers and the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese companies from the trade. In a letter addressed from the Court of Directors to the Council in Bengal, it was admitted that the initial experiments over the establishment of the opium monopoly were responsible for 'all the bloodshed, massacres, and confusions' in Patna in 1763.<sup>30</sup> The situation deteriorated further



after conflicts between the agents of the newly installed ruler Mir Kashim and the merchants of the British East India Company. In order to establish its total control, the East India Company authorities finally seized political power in the Boxer War in 1765. Following this, the colonial rulers swiftly established their exclusive power in the opium trade.<sup>31</sup> The beginnings of political control in the late 1750s allowed the colonial authorities to set up a despotic type of state-run opium monopoly that expelled all competitors from the existing free trade.

### **Mughal opium**

In an attempt to justify the establishment of an opium monopoly in Bengal, colonial historians maintained that the monopoly had existed in India for centuries and they inherited it from the Mughal rulers. In 1890–1, Watt argued that the poppy cultivators paid Rs4 per *bigha*<sup>32</sup> in Agra and Rs1 and 4 *anna* in Malwa<sup>33</sup> as highest and lowest rent rates to the Mughal authorities during the sixteenth century. Watt did not mention whether a similar tax was applicable for other agricultural products in India.

Dane, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, asserted that the Mughal Emperor in 1676 granted 'a monopoly' of the trade to the Dutch, who in turn paid a tax to the government.<sup>34</sup> He further debated that the opium monopoly was conducted for many years by Fakhr al Tujar, a local merchant, who enjoyed absolute freedom for supplying it to the European companies, in exchange for an annual payment to the government. Dane's assertions were contradictory and do not testify to the running of an opium monopoly by the Mughal rulers. It is more plausible that the British East India Company was inspired by the Dutch opium monopoly that had been established in Ceylon in 1675.<sup>35</sup> Through this measure the Dutch colonial rulers prohibited local people and all other private traders from taking part in the commercial activities in opium.

The claim about the existence of a Mughal opium monopoly was written during the late nineteenth century when the official policy was attacked by the anti-opium crusaders as morally indefensible. Being engaged in the propaganda battle, some of the imperialist writers attempted to justify the colonial drug trade in South Asia from an historical point of view. In a parliamentary monograph, Watt maintained that the poppy-growing areas of Fatehpur,

Allahabad, Ghazipur and Ahmedabad came under Mughal administration during the time of Emperor Akbar.<sup>36</sup> In defence of the government policy George H. Batten, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service, argued that the Mughal rulers started manufacturing and selling the drug as the 'most convenient and successful' example of opium monopoly.<sup>37</sup> To stimulate the pro-opium sentiment, Batten's paper was read before the Society of Arts in London in March 1891 and then presented to the British Royal Commission in 1893.

The colonialist writers held that in some towns the right to sell opium was taxable, in the same way that certain other luxury articles were taxed. Referring to Abu'L Fazl, the celebrated historian of Akbar's time and the writer of the *Akbarnamah*, Robert Needham Cust in 1893 claimed that poppy was 'one of the most valuable crops' and 'an important source of revenue' during the time of Emperor Akbar.<sup>38</sup> Consulting *A'in-I Akbari*, *Alamgirnama* and Bernier's *Travels in Mughul India*, I have found no evidence of the existence of an opium monopoly in medieval India. However, from the *A'in-I Akbari* it is apparent that Akbar's governor in Kandahar, Shahbaj Khan, was known as *char bughra khur* for his dependence on four drugs: opium, cannabis, wine and *khuknar*.<sup>39</sup> In his book on *Storia Do Mogor*, Niccolao Manucci, an Italian traveller who visited India between 1653 and 1708, mentioned opium as one of the exportable commodities of the Mughal Kingdom.<sup>40</sup> Scattered information from contemporary sources does not certify the claims made by colonial writers about the Mughal control on opium revenue.

The sporadic cultivation of opium poppies in different parts of medieval India was outside the general revenue system of the state authorities. The *Final Report of the Opium Commission* maintained that under the Mughal and other dynasties which had successively held power in various parts of India, there does not seem to have been any system of excise on opium.<sup>41</sup> In 1853, Nathan Allen argued that to mislead the public opinion both in England, India and elsewhere, the Imperial authorities had fabricated stories about the peerless growth of the opium trade under the Mughal rulers.<sup>42</sup> Given the varied information, it is a bit difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the Mughals had any monopoly in the trade. As a rule, therefore, there was no control on the cultivation of opium poppies

and opium revenue in medieval India. The policy adopted by the Dutch in Ceylon appears to have been duplicated by the British in Bengal from 1773.

### **British opium monopoly**

The establishment of the government opium monopoly in Bengal evolved through a process of autocratic administrative experiments between the early 1770s and 1800s. In a 1957 study, G.N. Chandra provided a chronological account of the growth and development of the opium monopoly in Bengal.<sup>43</sup> In 1983, *The Cambridge Economic History of India* maintained that poppy cultivation was profitable to farmers and they enthusiastically took part in production.<sup>44</sup> These works failed to demonstrate the nature of the political struggle between the colonial authorities and the dominant social groups, or the hostility amongst the European trading companies that resulted from the enforcement of the monopoly. The following discussion illustrates the social dimensions of the political battle that occurred during the consolidation of the opium monopoly in Bengal, and its eventual outcome as a mass uprising in the poppy-growing areas.

To organize the opium enterprise, the government of the East India Company in 1763 established the so-called 'Gentlemen's monopoly' run by the Patna Council. It consisted of Company officials, who entered the business directly and distributed money through Indian agents (*gumastas*) amongst farmers to grow opium poppies. The employees received their salaries from the profits they made individually in the opium monopoly.<sup>45</sup> However, the tendency to maximize personal benefits from the trade often led to conflict and misunderstanding between the rival Indian agents. The Gentlemen's monopoly also experienced competition from the French and Dutch merchants, who received opium supplies from the Patna traders.

In an attempt to establish a business consortium in opium, the East India authorities in 1765 allowed other European companies to participate in a joint venture under one general agent. Malpractice and corruption of officials affected this system,<sup>46</sup> when the respective companies started to 'trade clandestinely on their own account in the drug'.<sup>47</sup> Under the joint venture, the land under poppy cultivation was increased from 283,000 hectares in 1765-6,

to 303,500 hectares in the following year.<sup>48</sup> This large-scale conversion of paddy fields into poppy cultivation contributed to a famine in Bengal in 1770. This famine caused the death of 10 million people<sup>49</sup> in an area that had been traditionally known as the 'Golden Bengal' due to its natural resources.<sup>50</sup> As a result of official malpractice and famine caused by the joint venture, the legal and moral control in the maintenance of the opium monopoly fell into a deep crisis.

To manage the outcomes of the fragile monopoly, governor-general Warren Hastings in 1772 withdrew the opium monopoly from the Patna Council, and leased the whole business for a fixed amount, to two local businessmen who had previous experience in the management of an opium factory at Patna. This attempt was followed by the creation of a separate Board that helped create the government monopoly of opium in Bengal in 1773.<sup>51</sup> Explaining the attempt, Hastings wrote:

We have prohibited all other persons under our protection from interfering with it and we have determined to sell it by public auction for the benefit of the Company.<sup>52</sup>

As a result of this policy, the Dutch and French Companies lost their authority in the Patna opium trade, and the production management came under the control of the British East India Company.<sup>53</sup> To stop the diversion of monopoly opium into private channels, Cornwallis expelled the agents of French and Dutch companies from their possessions in India and Sri Lanka by 1795. In July 1799, the management of the opium industry was left in the hands of two senior bureaucrats, one with headquarters in Patna (Bihar Agency), and the other in Ghazipur (Benares Agency). This system eventually helped the colonial authorities to consolidate the opium administration, and achieve greater benefits from the opium industry.

During the early years of the opium monopoly, contractors were involved in the forceful engagement of poppy farmers to produce the maximum amount of opium. In 1777, the *Bengal Revenue Consultations* reported 'forcible destruction' of crops in Bihar to make land available for poppy cultivation.<sup>54</sup> In 1789, the *Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings* maintained that after paying a high price to the Company authorities, contractors forced the farmers 'to increase their poppy cultivation

beyond their means and convenience'.<sup>55</sup> The *Bengal Board of Revenue Proceedings* of 1790 maintained that the 'rapacity' of the contractors also led to conflict with zamindars or headmen (*chaudhuries*), who with interests in alternative crops, opposed poppy cultivation in their areas.<sup>56</sup> To prevent local zamindars from interference in the poppy cultivation, the contractors used the influence of the state power, the Patna Council.

The tension between the contractors and the zamindars was a major impediment to the growth of poppy cultivation and the revenue income derived from opium. The royalty paid by the contractors under the monopoly system was unconvincing to Lord Cornwallis, who arrived in Bengal as governor-general in 1786.<sup>57</sup> On his arrival, Cornwallis established a government opium monopoly in Benares, and urged zamindars to refrain from encouraging farmers in alternative crops, or to offer them better incentives. Thus, frequent mention occurs in the records of the period that under the opium monopoly, injury and oppression were inflicted upon poppy-growing farmers, and tension erupted between zamindars and contractors. To secure the confidence of the poppy cultivators, Cornwallis introduced an official purchasing system in 1789, and fixed a rate of remuneration in Bihar. Despite the measure, the government failed to increase opium production or to secure a good price from foreign markets.<sup>58</sup> To upgrade the opium monopoly as an important branch of the public revenue, the government in 1799 abandoned the contract system and adopted the agency system instead.

Under the new system the government imposed repressive regulations on poppy cultivation and urged poppy farmers to 'refund threefold' the advances for any land, which they did not cultivate according to their undertaking.<sup>59</sup> The leading contemporary economist Adam Smith criticized the intimidation of the farmers by the official authorities:


A rich field of rice or other grain has been ploughed up; in order to make room for a plantation of poppies; when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium.<sup>60</sup>

Smith also indicated that Company officials, in certain cases, forced unwilling farmers to accept advance money to grow poppies instead of other crops in their paddy fields. Assessment by Indian officials while converting agricultural land into poppy

cultivation often provoked disagreement by farmers. Once a farmer started poppy cultivation, invariably he had to continue production year after year. Considering the crop unprofitable, the farmers were less than enthusiastic about growing poppies and neglected to water them.

Despite the unwillingness of the farmers, poppy cultivation continued with greater control by the colonial bureaucracy. The hierarchy of the opium administration was constituted in five categories: (1) the Collector, a senior British administrator; (2) the *gumastas*, a group of local commercial agents directly attached to the administration; (3) the *sudder mattus*, members of the landed aristocracy; (4) the village *mattus* or *khatadars*, agents of the villagers; and (5) the poppy farmers. Negotiations between the management and the poppy growers were conducted through village intermediaries, who received a commission for their services in the implementation of opium policies in rural areas. The arbitrary role of the middlemen and coercion of the field officers often caused frustration and suffering among the poppy farmers. Every cultivator was bound to sell the whole of his produce to the Opium Departments, at a rate fixed by the government.

As a result of state patronization, the opium monopoly emerged as one of the largest economic activities in colonial India. To maintain and promote the trade in opium, the government increased the cultivation of poppy to those areas where the quality was superior. Under the Regulation of 1816, the police and the excise officers were authorized to take action against the zamindars and other landed aristocrats if there was any indication found that they had encouraged clandestine cultivation of poppy and illicit sale of opium.<sup>61</sup> To encourage maximum production by the poppy farmers, the governor-general increased the incentives for the poppy growers once in 1822, and again in 1830.<sup>62</sup> This measure helped expand poppy cultivation in 49 sub-divisions of the Benares agency and 11 districts in the Bihar agency<sup>63</sup> (see Map 1). By the mid-1850s, the total area engaged under the Bengal opium monopoly was about 31 million hectares (120,000 square miles), where under the licensed system 1.25 million cultivators were engaged in poppy cultivation.<sup>64</sup> In 1857, a British parliamentary paper documented that the production of opium under the Bengal monopoly rose from 1,600 metric tons in 1845–6 to 3,200 metric tons in 1854–5.<sup>65</sup> Out of this total production, the Bihar agency contributed the two-thirds of the amount.



Map 1 India: traditional poppy growing areas (1997 boundary)

During the 1820s and 1830s the British government either conquered or physically blocked the strategically important poppy-growing areas to help expand the opium enterprise in Bengal. It annexed areas along the eastern side of Punjab in 1801 and some parts of UP in 1803, and subsequently expanded the Bengal opium monopoly system in northern India. Opium poppies had been grown sporadically without official control in Punjab under Sikh rule, and in Oudh under the Nawab's rule. Following the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British government extended the opium monopoly to certain districts there and poppy was then grown under the licence system. A similar system was also adopted in Jammu and Kashmir after these areas were annexed from the Sikh rulers. In Kashmir, the average area under this crop was roughly 760 hectares in the mid-1850s.<sup>66</sup> The total area under the government opium monopoly system in northern India including the UP was about 26 million hectares (100,000 square miles).<sup>67</sup> Poppy cultivation was extended to these areas under the Benares Opium Agency. With the creation of this agency, Ghazipur emerged as the second largest opium producing centre after Patna. The total area engaged in poppy cultivation in northern India gradually increased to match the Bihar agency.

Following the British invasion, the government adopted mechanisms to forcibly involve farmers in poppy cultivation, and to prevent local zamindars from intervening in the opium monopoly. There was a growing body of public opinion in India that to bring about a change in the policy the government should abolish the system of opium monopoly. Aggregating the opinions of the poppy cultivators, the British Indian Association, in a petition to the House of Commons in 1853, urged:

Justice requires that the interference of the government with the cultivation should cease, and that revenue derived from the drug should be in the shape of fixed duties on manufacture and exportation. ... By the adoption of this principle, the cultivators will possess that freedom of action which all men possess under governments.<sup>68</sup>

This appeal for the emancipation of poppy farmers from forced cultivation of opium was unsuccessful.<sup>69</sup> Ignoring the appeal, the colonial authorities increased indirect control over the cultivation of the opium poppy in central India. In 1856–7, the government



regulated about 117,000 hectares engaged in poppy cultivation in that region.<sup>70</sup> Despite the resentment and suffering of the poppy growers, the opium monopoly in Bengal and private poppy cultivation in central India flourished. Under the opium monopoly, the economic conditions of the poppy farmers deteriorated and the strength of the zamindars was undermined.

The culmination of a long-term conflict between the local zamindars and the promoters of poppy cultivation helped to provoke rural people to join hands against the colonial authorities. In his work *Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny 1857–59* William Forbes-Mitchell, a sergeant who took part in the suppression of the uprising in UP, argued that the introduction of forced poppy cultivation sparked mass rebellion in the region.<sup>71</sup> Mitchell contended that the mass uprising was more serious in the poppy-growing areas of northern India. People in the south, on the other hand, generally aided the colonial government. The most vulnerable areas were Oudh, Rohilkhand, Doab, Meerut, Bengal, Bihar, Benares, Gujarat, Bombay and Allahabad, where the rural population extensively took part with urban people in the uprising. The war was deadly in Oudh, where over 100,000 civilian-armed men joined in the rebellion.<sup>72</sup> The annexation of Oudh in August 1856 was described by Ralph Moore as ‘the blackest crime’ that England ever committed, and was the ‘immediate cause’ of the so-called Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.<sup>73</sup> The revolt of 1857 can largely be ascribed to the discontents of local zamindars and poppy cultivators who persistently opposed the colonial opium monopoly system.

The events of the uprising in India in many ways were comparable to the Chinese Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. (I shall discuss the Anglo-Chinese opium wars later). While in India, the unwilling farmers were compelled to cultivate the opium poppy, in China the ruling authorities were forced to open their ports to accept opium from India. In both cases, the pro-revenue claims of the colonial power were triumphant.

### **Pro-revenue actions**

Throughout the nineteenth century the colonial authorities pursued double-standard narcotics laws to eliminate the private traders from the opium trade and help the Bengal opium monopoly system

flourish. Under Regulation 3 of 1816, clauses agreeable to the monopoly system were incorporated.<sup>74</sup> In his contemporary work, Donald Matheson argued that, practising the ‘worst form of Machiavellian policy’,<sup>75</sup> the colonial authorities appropriated revenue from opium exports and the domestic consumption of intoxicating drugs. After the uprising of 1857, the government adopted further legislation banning poppy cultivators from growing opium poppies for private profit. Under the Opium Act of 1878, the government imposed penalties for smuggling contraband opium. The following discussion considers the extent of the political control that assisted colonial authorities to draw multiple revenues from harmful drugs.

### **‘Blood money’**

For capital formation, as well as to run the administration, the colonial government in India continued the supply of opium to China throughout the nineteenth century. As early as 1800, the Chinese Emperor issued an edict prohibiting the import and abuse of the Indian drug altogether.<sup>76</sup> Although the Chinese rulers treated opium as a vice, it was officially treated by the Indian customs as a ‘medicinal drug’.<sup>77</sup> Its use in England was regulated by the Poisonous Drugs Act of 1819. Despite the fact, the continued supply of opium from India was creating socio-economic and political concerns for the Chinese authorities.

Pursuing an unrelenting policy, British opium trade to China and the Asia-Pacific region expanded at the turn of the eighteenth century. The Annual Reports for the *Proceedings of the Board of Trade (Opium)* during 1794–1805 maintained that the net amount of revenue from opium exports increased from Rs414,869 in 1794–5 to Rs983,514 in 1797–8 and it shot up to Rs2,370,706 in 1798–9.<sup>78</sup> Compared to the Portuguese and the Dutch, who never had exported over ‘200 chests [13 metric tons] in any year’ to China, the sending of opium by the East India Company broke all previous records.<sup>79</sup> Manufactured under the supervision of qualified staff, Indian opium was dearest to Chinese addicts, who were prepared to pay a premium for the drug.<sup>80</sup> In violation of the Chinese ban but in line with the government’s pro-revenue policies, the export of opium from India consecutively increased until the late nineteenth century.

In an attempt to technically continue the export of so-called ‘provision opium’ by individual companies, the British government

prevented its marines from participating in the Indo-China opium trade, but set up a public auction system in Calcutta. The British owners ran most of the private companies, who took part in the prospering opium trade, while Americans and local Parsees operated some.<sup>81</sup> Dane argued that British merchants and free traders, 'many of whom were lawless men', smuggled opium to China in open violation of Chinese regulations.<sup>82</sup> To give this contraband trade a legal status, the British Parliament in 1833 unilaterally extended the Charter of the Indo-China opium trade for twenty years. The Chinese authorities attempted to stop the contraband supply of opium from India, but through the Opium Wars of the early 1840s and late 1850s China was forced by the maritime powers to legalize the opium trade. In these Wars, China lost about 20,000 soldiers and paid a huge penalty for the forceful resistance to Indian opium.

As a result of the First Opium War of 1839–42, opium exports from India to China increased tremendously by the mid-nineteenth century. In 1857, Donald Matheson indicated that opium exports rose from 127 metric tons in 1800, to 2,485 metric tons in 1837, but following the First Opium War it rose to 6,372 metric tons in 1857.<sup>83</sup> Table 1.1 shows that the export of opium under the Bengal government opium monopoly during 1845–55 increased by 51 per cent, while the total receipts from the Bengal opium monopoly increased by 30 per cent during 1845–53. However, as a result of the price reduction in the Chinese market during the mid-1850s, the receipts from that market dropped by 5 per cent. The British Parliamentary Paper *East India (Opium)* in 1857 maintained that the government of India earned a total land revenue of £15.07 million in 1854–5 followed by opium revenue of £4.42 million.<sup>84</sup> These statistics did not include the export of Malwa opium supplied from the non-British territories in central India. While throughout India land revenue was the number one revenue item, the opium revenue in Bengal exceeded it. Official statistics indicate that in 1854–5 the land revenue in Bengal was £3.33 million, whereas opium revenue was £3.37 million.<sup>85</sup> In 1854–5, the Bengal monopoly alone contributed 76.24 per cent of the total opium revenue earned in the country. Including the revenue from the hemp (*ganja*) monopoly in north Bengal, the total drug revenue in Bengal was far greater than any other revenues in colonial India.

Table 1.1 *Bengal government opium monopoly, 1844–55*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total exports (in metric tons)</i>	<i>Total receipts (in million Rs)</i>
1845–6	1572	26.68
1846–7	1577	27.80
1847–8	2230	27.26
1848–9	2612	35.47
1849–50	2500	35.72
1850–1	2334	32.62
1851–2	2213	37.74
1852–3	2557	38.73
1853–4	3144	37.22
1854–5	3241	37.11

*Source:* 'Returns Relating to the Growth, &c; of Opium', British Parliamentary Papers, *East India (Opium)*, 1857, Session 1 (60), volume 11, p. 124.

During the late nineteenth century, the British government adopted two important pieces of legislation that helped consolidate its control on opium trade. Under the Opium Act of 1857, the cultivation of poppy and manufacture of opium went under the direct control of the Bengal administration and the Board of Revenue at Calcutta. The Act repealed existing regulations on narcotics of 1793, 1795, 1816 and 1824,<sup>86</sup> and prohibited private traders, including local zamindars, from engaging in the opium trade.<sup>87</sup> The law forbade unauthorized poppy cultivation, and made it a punishable offence. Opposing the government policies on 'moral' grounds, some official members demanded the cessation of poppy cultivation under a monopoly.<sup>88</sup> However, for economic reasons their proposal was opposed by the Bengal government, and by the Bengal Board of Revenue. The colonial rulers denied a similar submission, for the withdrawal of authoritative control on poppy cultivation, in 1864, in 1868–9, and in 1881. In response, the government only adjusted the real value of rupees by increasing incentives to the poppy growers from Rs3 per *seer*<sup>89</sup> in 1850–1, to Rs5 in 1881–2 and Rs6 in 1894–5, for the promotion of the trade. This policy helped assist the colonial government to boost opium exports that had fallen almost 50 per cent in 1858, by about 90 per cent by the early 1870s.

The government enacted further legislation to deal with smugglers who undermined the opium laws and encouraged cultivators to divert extra quantities of opium at a handsome price. In May 1870, a river trader, Ram Dass, was caught in possession of about 508 kilos of illicit opium on the Hooghly River.<sup>90</sup> To control smuggling, the private possession and trade in opium became punishable under the Opium Act of 1878.<sup>91</sup> Under this Act, a maximum imprisonment of one year or a fine for Rs1,000 or both was imposed for illegal cultivation and trade of opium poppy.<sup>92</sup> The objectives of the above policies were to keep control over poppy cultivation both in British and non-British territories, and to ensure that the cultivators delivered to the state the whole of the produce without diverting it into illicit channels.

As a result of British Imperial policies, the annual revenue from opium exports rose dramatically. Referring to the Revenue Minister, the *Medical Times and Gazette* in 1873 indicated that the government of India at the beginning of the 1870s earned about £7.75 million from the Indian opium trade annually.<sup>93</sup> After a verification of the facts and surplus receipts from the estimated budget, the journal further contended that the actual receipts from the opium trade were £8.66 million. While the official reports celebrated this revenue increase, opponents condemned the policy, both at home and abroad, as 'a revenue of blood!' Nevertheless, the opium export continued, mostly to Hong Kong, China (Treaty Ports), the Straits Settlements, the Philippines, Singapore, Java (Indonesia), Cochin China, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Mauritius, Mozambique and Zanzibar.<sup>94</sup> Amongst these areas, Hong Kong was the biggest centre for the colonial opium trade from where opium was smuggled into Mainland China, and also sent elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. The trade in opium, that also included opium from central India (Malwa), was continued by the British government until 1935.

### **Malwa toll**

Through a series of wars, the British government forced the central Indian rulers and traders to hand over a substantial transit fee for their opium exports. In order to earn an extra revenue and protect the export market of the Bengal opium monopoly, the import of

Malwa opium<sup>95</sup> into or transport through British territory was prohibited except on payment of the bypass duty. A similar transit duty had been in force in the 1780s on opium produced in the Gorakhpur district of Oudh under the Nawab's dominion.<sup>96</sup> In line with Oudh, the British government in 1830 adopted a transit duty on Malwa opium (opium produced in the non-British territories in central India) passing through British territories on the way to foreign markets.<sup>97</sup> The following discussion outlines the geostrategic objectives that inspired the British government to control opium exports from central India.

The opium grown in Malwa had emerged as a rival to the Bengal opium monopoly by the late eighteenth century. Malwa opium was traditionally exported to China via Baroda and Cambay from the ports of Diu and Daman, which were Portuguese possessions. By the end of the century the colonial authorities came to realize that the increase of opium supplies from central Indian states was compelling the Bengal government to sell monopoly opium to China at very low prices. In 1796, the *Fort William-India House Correspondence* maintained that to sell the Company's opium at a competitive price, merchants of the East India Company gave Rs1.2 million 'remittance to China'.<sup>98</sup> Four years later, the *Fort William-India House Correspondence* again indicated that due to greater demand for opium from Bombay and Madras, Bengal opium was facing a 'large deficit'.<sup>99</sup> To respond to this trade competition, the British government pursued both military and diplomatic solutions.

In an attempt to block the central Indian states, the British government invaded some of the strategically important areas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the colonial authorities annexed South Gujarat and obtained greater control over the West Coast. Following this invasion, the colonial authorities between 1824 and 1826 achieved the purchasing rights of opium from Baroda, Holkar, and a number of small States. However, the poppy cultivators refused to sell their produce to the British Opium Agent at an arbitrarily fixed price. This measure also failed to stop the indigenous rulers from engaging in opium exports to China. In defiance of British policies, cultivators in central India passed a large amount of opium to the Portuguese ports of Diu, Daman and Goa, or used transit facilities in Karachi. In a memorandum to the Royal Commission James F. Finlay,

Secretary of the Department of Finance and Commerce in India, maintained that 'Scindia, Jeypore, and other important Chiefs refused from the beginning to join in the arrangement', and used Karachi port for exporting opium into the China market.<sup>100</sup> In order to compel the central Indian farmers and authorities to submit to British policies, and to expand trade facilities in the Indus valley, the British government annexed Sind in 1843.<sup>101</sup> The annexation of Sind provided them with the ability to control exportable opium grown in the small central Indian states of Rajputana, Baroda, and other areas.

The conquest of Sind, amongst other strategic gains, gave the British government an opportunity to collect an increasing amount of revenue from central Indian opium exports. The headquarters for the Malwa transit duty was Indore, with sub-agencies in Bhopal, Udaipur, Jaora, Ratlam, Chittore and Mandsaur. In 1883–4, the amount of opium passing through the Indore agency was 2,566 metric tons.<sup>102</sup> The opium from these places was sent directly to Bombay for export. Transit duty on Malwa opium was levied at points on the border between the central Indian States and the Bombay Presidency, which were invaded during the previous century. In 1876, D.W.K.B. indicated that the average revenue from Malwa opium in 1875–6 was about £2.25 million, while the sales of Bengal opium were £4 million during this period.<sup>103</sup> In a contemporary paper, Batten maintained that the value of average exports of Malwa opium for the five years ending 1890–1 was Rs4 million.<sup>104</sup> Thus, without having any direct control over the cultivation or manufacture of Malwa opium, the British government derived a huge amount of revenue through the Malwa transit system. Alongside its revenue from the opium export, the colonial authorities increased the amount of revenue obtained from the domestic consumption of intoxicating drugs.

### **Excise revenue**

In line with the promotion of export trade in opium, the pursuit of 'maximum revenue' was the core principle of the Excise (*Abkari*) policy of the government of British India. Rajeshwari Prasad, in his book entitled *Some Aspects of British Revenue Policy in India: 1773–1833*, provides a detailed account of the British government's major drives

in three vital areas: for example, salt, opium and customs. In 1858, *Meliora* maintained that amongst all these sources, the trade in opium was 'particularly lucrative'. In 1922, G.S. Bajpai argued that as part of their 'civilized' culture,<sup>105</sup> the colonial authorities in Bengal established a branch of excise revenue for the retail sale of opium, cannabis and liquor in the early 1790s.

During the early years of their rule, the Imperial rulers in Bengal adopted policies that expanded excise revenue from deleterious drugs. As early as 1793, the government adopted excise duty on licensed vendors and on the transit of cannabis from north Bengal to Dhaka (formerly Dacca), and other urban areas.<sup>106</sup> In an attempt to earn revenue from liquor trade, the colonial authorities in 1789 introduced an auction system for selling the 'right to distil liquor' in Dhaka, and as a result of this policy the liquor revenue in Dhaka district by 1837 had reached Rs41,000.<sup>107</sup> A similar trend in the sale of country liquor was evident in all other big cities and district headquarters in Bengal. Following these initial measures, licensed shops were introduced in different city centres for the distribution of excise opium and cannabis to local customers. Under Regulation 6 of 1800, an excise duty was introduced on the consumption of cannabis, while excise duty had been imposed on opium and liquor by 1797.<sup>108</sup> The excise opium was manufactured in, and supplied from, Bihar and Benares government factories to licensed vendors for local consumption. Depending on local demands, the availability of illicit supplies, and the effectiveness of the administrative machinery, the retail price was set by the revenue department. The number and the location of licensed opium shops was determined by the local authorities under the control of the Board of Revenue, and the license fee for each shop was fixed annually by public auction.

The colonial authorities, in the early stages of their rule, also attempted to appropriate excise revenue from the production and consumption of cannabis in some parts of East Bengal (now Bangladesh). In line with the contemporary opium monopoly in Patna, the British government by the early 1790s tried to regulate the cultivation and distribution of cannabis (*ganja*) by private traders. Farmers in Jessore district produced excisable cannabis, and for its taste consumers throughout the region praised the '*Jessori ganja*'. An official wrote in 1809:



Ganja was largely cultivated within the district, principally about [in] Keshubpore, in pergunnahs Ramchunderpore and Taragonia, but also to a small extent in the north-western corner. The duty was collected upon it at the time of its purchase or export from the producing districts, of which Jessore was then a principal one.<sup>109</sup>

The same report indicated that the annual production of cannabis in Jessore ranged between 1,900 and 2,200 metric tons. Due to underhand connections between the cannabis producers and the private traders (*byaparies*), the taxation on cannabis did not provide sufficient revenue for the colonial authorities. To break this nexus, the colonial authorities in the mid-1850s introduced the *Ganja Mahal* system (monopoly under licensed traders) in Naogaon in Rajshahi district, and in some parts of Bogra and Dinajpur districts, and banned hemp cultivation in Jessore in 1875. A London publication in 1891, however, claimed that cannabis production was continued in Jessore and Pabna districts during the 1880s.<sup>110</sup> By the early 1890s, the total area under official cannabis cultivation reached over 24,000 hectares, Naogaon being the headquarters of the administration.<sup>111</sup> Given the administrative arrangements, the government maintained a monopoly system in cannabis production in north Bengal, and most of the yield was exported to other parts of the region.

Nevertheless, in support of the export revenue from opium the colonial authorities pursued contradictory measures during the early nineteenth century. In an attempt to receive foreign currency, especially from China, the colonial authorities discouraged local consumption of opium and encouraged opium exports. In 1813, Collectors were warned about the sale and consumption of opium, 'except for medicinal purposes'.<sup>112</sup> Under Regulation 13 of 1816, the government declared a 'maximum revenue with minimum consumption' policy that contradicted the facilitation of opium distribution through licensed vendors.<sup>113</sup> The availability of excise opium (for example, poppy heads, *madak* and *chandu*) through licensed vendors made the government's regulatory measures doubtful. In India, where public opinion was generally reluctant to endorse the medicinal and recreational use of opium, licensed vendors were encouraged to distribute increasing amounts of opium through licensed shops.

As a result of the government's pro-revenue drug policy, the distribution and consumption of excise opium increased significantly. The sale of excise opium through the licensed vendors in Bengal in 1873–4 raised an amount of Rs1.75 million<sup>114</sup> that rose to Rs2.75 million in 1892–3.<sup>115</sup> It is likely that these figures also include excise revenue from other forms of intoxicating drugs. In 1892–3, Bengal licensed vendors distributed about 210 metric tons of excise opium among the local population. In Assam, the excise revenue rose from Rs1.17 million in 1873–4 to Rs1.87 in 1892–3.<sup>116</sup> In 1873–4, the licensed vendors in Assam sold about 70 metric tons of excise opium to local consumers. In Chattishgarh Division of the Central Provinces, the net revenue after deducting the cost price from excise opium in 1874–5 was over Rs100,000.<sup>117</sup> The number of opium shops for retail sale in the Central Provinces was 1,133 in 1892–3, and the quantity of opium issued to these shops was about 30 metric tons. A similar trend in the distribution of intoxicating drugs continued in other parts of South Asia. (I shall discuss the distribution of excise opium in Sri Lanka and Burma in Chapter 2.) Figure 1.1 shows that during 1880–94, the revenue from excise opium cautiously increased while the revenue from export opium and Malwa transit duty gradually fell from Rs7.68 million to Rs5.46 and from Rs2.53 million to Rs1.65 million respectively. This decline occurred largely as a result of the growing of opium in China to counteract supplies from India. The above statistics also show that due to political pressure created by the anti-opium lobbies in England and in South Asia, the sale of excise opium declined during 1892–4. As a result of the government's revenue 'maximization' policies, the consumption of opium, cannabis and liquor increased implicitly. While the British government had essentially controlled its own drug problem through the Pharmacy Act of 1868, a large amount of opium abuse continued among the South Asian population with little regulation.

None the less, the drug policies pursued by the government were increasingly attacked by the anti-opiumists and temperance workers in England, in China, and in South Asia as both reckless and immoral. In an attempt to overcome anti-narcotics public opinion, the British government in 1893 set up a Royal Commission on Opium that lauded the opium monopoly and recognized moderate use of opium as good for health. But the medical evidence provided




Figure 1.1 Gradual increase in excise revenue and decrease in opium exports in India, 1880-94

Source: Based on data provided by the *British Royal Commission on Opium*, 1894, vol. 61, p. 348

in defence of the Indo-China opium trade was attacked by pressure groups in the US, and refuted by subsequent Opium Committees in accordance with their observations in the Asia-Pacific region, in Sri Lanka and in India. Despite the resistance, the official distribution of excise opium and other intoxicating drugs proceeded when the principle of ‘maximum revenue with minimum consumption’ was still in force during the post-Royal Commission period.

# Index

- ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 107, 123, 142, 144, 146–50, 259, 262, 305; Fence 122–3, 144; Jaisalmer 147, 149; Jammu 24, 147, 149, 174
- ADDICTS 155, 160–1, 164, 167–8, 204, 231, 240, 255; Chinese addicts 26, 239; ‘human rats’ 180; Quincey, De 245; Rajputs 14, 46; Singh, Rabindra 129
- AFGHAN CRISIS 5, 163, 185–91, 196, 203, 260–1; drug trade 187–9; Dubs, Adolph 184; Kabul 173, 186, 189, 219; *mujahedin* 163, 185–9, 188, 191, 193–4, 219, 307; Taraki, Nur Mohammad 184–6
- AIRLINES 220; Indian embarkation 121; PIA 220–1; US aviation 221
- ‘AMERICAN DISEASE’ 167; Afro-Americans 37–8; Grazia, Jessica de 40; ‘army disease’ 39; Chinatown 37–8, 305; Civil War 2, 39, 40, 190; San Francisco 37
- AMERICAN TRADE 27; Beveridge, Senator 44; New Jersey 145, 151; New York 38, 41, 44, 121, 201; Sino-American Treaty 44, 69, 71; Tientsin treaty 37; Vermont 38
- ANTI-DRUG LAWS 4, 5, 8, 10, 46–7, 69, 70, 102, 150–62, 165, 167, 183–4, 198, 207, 210–11, 215, 217–18, 220, 225–6, 249–55, 258, 263–4
- ANTI-OPIUM PRESSURE 2, 34, 36, 43, 46, 48–9, 52, 55–7, 60, 62–5, 67–9, 78, 258; anti-drug campaigners 86–9, 182; Brodie, Sir Benjamin 51; Canada 50, 202; Ellis, John 65; public health campaigners 54
- ARAB 13; Avicenna 13; physicians 12–13; traders 12–4
- ASIA-PACIFIC 2–4, 16, 26, 29, 35, 37, 43–4, 48, 97, 146, 238, 257; Java 29; Malaya 13, 15; Philippines 29, 43, 45, 47, 60, 68, 244, 258; Sumatra 15
- ASSAM 34, 74, 84, 86–8, 90–3, 103, 125; Brahmaputra valley 126; Butler, Captain 91; Liquor Prohibition Act, 1953 110; Opium Prohibition Act, 1947 110, 151
- ASSAM OPIUM ENQUIRY 3, 8, 88, 90–3, 95, 100
- AUSTRALIA 7, 46, 97–8, 151, 263; Glaxo Australia 131; Green, Julian Ormond 132; Guinane, David 7, 287; Smith, Wayne 132; Tasmanian opium 130–7
- AYUB REGIME 4, 165–6, 175
- BALUCHISTAN 147, 164–5, 168, 174, 184–6, 198, 205, 211, 215, 217, 220, 261; Dera Gazi Khan 174; Marri, Sher Mohammad 186; Pakhtunistan 185; Rabat 189, 198, 222; Rind, Mohammad Ali 215
- BANGALORE 144, 146
- BARISAL 228, 229–30, 232, 242, 244
- BAY OF BENGAL 233, 255; Chittagong 34, 228–9, 234; Coastguard 254; Cox’s Bazar 234–5; Naff River 233; Technaff 233–5

- BENARES 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 98, 116
- BENGAL LEGISLATION 53, 74, 228–9, 300; Board of Revenue 28, 32; Excise Act, 1914 231; Excise Act, 1909 102, 227, 229, 231; Excise Regulations 1813 58, 74; Opium Smoking Act, 1932 102, 166, 230, 249; Regulation 1800 32; Regulation 1816 22, 26, 33
- BHUTTO, BENAZIR 163, 210–17, 212–16, 219–20, 222, 224–5; aerial spraying 208, 211; Afridi, Malik Waris Khan 214–5, 220; Babar, Nasirullah Khan 122, 196–7, 216; Leghari, Farooq Ahmed 217; Narcotics Control Ordinance, 1995 216; Zardari, Assef Ali 217
- BHUTTO, ZULFIKAR ALI 4, 163, 166–7, 169, 177–81, 205, 207, 210; BPC Report 178; Mahmud, Maulana Mufti 178; ulema 4, 177–9, 214, 216, 309
- BIHAR 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 53, 76, 88, 101, 104, 128–9; Patna 1, 14–16, 19–21, 24, 76, 85, 168, 228, 248
- BOMBAY 25, 30–1, 50–1, 78, 84, 88, 90, 98, 101, 103, 121, 125, 142–3, 155, 157–9, 161, 238, 244; Bombay Prohibition, 1949 109–10
- BRITISH OPIUM MONOPOLY 1, 11, 16–17, 19–25, 27–9, 61, 64, 66, 70, 91, 116, 137, 173, 248, 257–8; Cornwallis 20–1, 247; gentlemen's monopoly 19, 21; Hastings, Warren 20; agency system 21, 30; collector 22, 33; *gumasta* 19, 22, 137, 306
- BRITISH OPIUM TRADE 3, 15, 17, 25, 29, 42–4, 46–9, 50, 53, 60–1, 65, 68–71, 76–7, 82, 95–6, 99–00, 162, 257–8; Alexander, Major General 172; Brunyate 71; East India Company 11–12, 15–17, 19, 20, 26, 30, 54, 63, 247–8; Godfrey, P. 15
- BURMA 54–6, 60; Akyab 55, 78, 228, 234; Arakan 54–5, 234–5; Buddhism 54, 56, 89; Excise Act, 1917 74; King Thibaw 54; Maungdaw 234; non-Burmese 55; Opium Law, 1909 74
- CALCUTTA 27–8, 76, 128, 150, 152, 227–8, 236; public auction 20, 27, 32
- CANNABIS 57, 63, 79, 109–10, 112, 117–18, 120, 129, 152–5, 227, 231–2, 241, 245; cultivation 32–3, 153, 237, 247, 250; Simla Conference 117; Tamil Nadu 152, 154
- CENTRAL ASIA 122, 188–9; Balkan drug route 120, 122, 199, 200; Italy 151, 199; Karakorum Highway 189; Silk Road 172, 188, 262
- CEYLON OPIUM COMMITTEE 8, 57–60, 68, 90, 93
- CHINA REVENUE 4, 5, 17, 29, 36, 50, 52, 54, 57–8, 63–4, 72, 81, 86, 89, 97, 107, 128, 164, 210, 227, 263; Anglo-Chinese treaty 42–3, 61; 'blood money' 18, 26–9, 34, 36, 53, 57, 61, 66–7, 71, 73, 89, 91, 96–7, 99; opium burning 81; provision opium 26, 308
- CHINESE EMPIRE 26–7, 42; Canton 44, 172; Hong Kong 8, 29, 36–7, 61–2, 172; Sinkiang 172–3; Macao 37, 172; Whampoa 172
- CHRISTIANITY 61–2; Anglican Bishop 50; Brent, Bishop Charles H. 45, 48, 70; ex-China missionaries 36, 41–3, 47, 49–1, 60–2, 64; Methodist Churches 42; Rev. Wilber F. Crafts 43; Somerville, Dr 50

- CIA 7, 10, 121, 184, 189–92, 194, 203–4, 219; Kwinty, Jonathan 192
- CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES 5, 124, 145, 176, 184, 188–9, 198–9, 218, 223, 262–3; Achari 142; Bhardwaj, Ashwini 142; Lucknow University 142; Pratapgarh 142; Quetta 198–9
- COCAINE 52, 77–80
- COLD WAR 5, 7, 163, 185, 190–8, 220, 257, 261; Amin, Hafizullah 185–6; Brezinski 185; Bush, George 191–4, 212; Carter administration 185, 187; Cliford, Clark 191; McCoy, Alfred W. 8, 9, 186, 203; Reagan administration 187, 191, 193
- COLD WAR SYNDROME 197; Dukakis, Michael 193; Malik, Zahoor 219
- CONGRESS GOVERNMENT 105–6, 109; Ambedkar, Dr R.B. 108; Constituent Assembly 107–8, 165, 178; Karimuddin, Kazi Syed 107
- CONGRESSIONAL CERTIFICATE 134, 194, 211; AID 207; Eagleburger, Lawrence S. 193
- CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS Gokhale, G.K. 52–3, 72, 86; Irwin 99; Lord Ashley 65; Montford 81, 83, 85; Morley-Minto 46, 65, 71–4; non-official members 72–4, 86, 89; Reading 96; Salisbury 49
- COURTS 156–60, 167, 179, 201, 210, 213, 224, 251; Islamic Court 182, 198; *Qazi* courts 182–3; Special Courts for Speedy Trial Act, 1992 218
- DANE, RICHARD M. 13, 17, 27, 248
- DANGEROUS DRUGS 9, 26, 32, 56, 69, 87, 100, 106, 117, 162, 166; Act, 1930 100, 115, 118, 151, 165, 183–4, 215, 249; Act, 1940 117; Act, 1985 210; (Amendment) Bill, 1988 248; (Amendment) Act, 1993 215; Convention, 1925 100; Rules, 1957 117; Rules, 1967 166
- DEATH PENALTY 264; Bangladesh 249, 251–2; Burma 54; India 128, 158–9; Iran 198; Oman Sultanate 222; Pakistan 5, 206, 217; Saudi Arabia 202, 221–2
- DE-CRIMINALIZATION 9, 263
- DELHI 111, 121, 155, 182; New Delhi 186, 191
- DE-TOXIFICATION 161 197, 255; Lok Vikas Kendra 155; Mayo Hospital 181; methadone 199, 263; neltrexone 161
- DHAKA 32, 227–32, 234–5, 240–2, 246; tokais 244
- DRUG ADDICTION 2, 39–40, 50–4, 78, 83, 86–90, 92–5, 100, 103, 105, 107, 127, 165, 180–1, 183, 196–9, 205, 226, 238, 243, 255, 264, 266, 305; heroin 41, 80, 128–9, 154–6, 196–9, 200, 210, 237, 261–2, 306; menace 1, 9, 41, 45, 199, 256; nervous system 39; Tompkins, William F. 40
- DRUG MONEY 5, 7, 10, 120–1, 123, 145, 160, 163, 177, 185, 187, 190–1, 194, 205–6, 214–15, 218–20, 223–5, 257, 259, 260–1, 263; contraband drugs 26, 223
- DRUG TRAFFICKING 12, 68, 81–2, 92, 98–9, 101, 132, 154–5, 174, 185, 189, 191, 193, 252, 199, 200–1, 216, 220; international market 146, 154, 258–9; Landi Kotal 176; McCord, Eliadah 252; Nigerian drug syndicate 252; syndicates 188, 198, 200, 203, 210, 213

- DURAND LINE 9, 173–4, 185–6, 188, 260; Afghan Amir 172–3; Daoud regime 185; Elliot, Major-Gen. J.G. 172; Kandahar 18, 149, 173–4
- DUTCH 12, 16–20, 26, 56, 257; Batavia 15; East India Company 14–5, 17; Tavernier 15
- EAST COAST 16, 125; Madras 30, 78, 84, 104–5, 144–5; Madras Prohibition Act, 1947 110
- ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 153, 154–5, 157, 181–2, 192, 202, 204–5, 208–12, 218, 220–1, 234, 236, 250–1, 253–4, 259–60; BDR 240, 251, 253; BSF 123, 129, 154, 240; Israeli customs 145; Police 155, 157–8, 202–3, 205, 209, 220, 236, 251–5; police regulations, 1895 38
- ERSHAD REGIME 6, 226, 247, 250–1; Drug Ordinance, 1982 238; Narcotics Control Act, 1990 249–55; Narcotics Control Ordinance, 1989 249; Opium Ordinance, 1984 248
- EXCISE POLICIES 3, 5, 31, 70, 74, 82–5, 88–9, 93, 104, 106, 164, 166, 227–32, 258; revenue 31–5, 70, 72, 74–5, 81–5, 103–5, 108, 110–13, 116, 118, 165–8, 174, 178, 227, 230
- EXTRADITION 212, 216–17, 219, 247, 251; Baig, Mirza Iqbal 6, 212, 215
- FAMINE 20, 53, 62; Beadon, Sir Cecil 53; Golden Bengal 20
- FAZLE HAQ, GENERAL 6, 185, 187, 201, 213; Duncan, Emma 6, 182; Manuel A. Noreiga, General 193, 201; 'Poppy General' 6, 201
- FOREIGN MAIL 98, 155, 220
- FRANCE 130, 151; French merchants 19–20; Paris Protocol, 1948 107
- GANDHI, MAHATMA 13, 86–90, 93, 95, 107–9, 113, 230; Gandhi, Feroze 112–13; Gandhi, Indira 112
- GENEVA SUMMIT 3, 69, 90, 93–8, 101–3, 107, 117, 166, 191, 230
- GERMANY 7, 78, 151
- GHAZIPUR 18, 20, 99, 134–6, 143, 154–5, 168, 239
- GRADUAL REDUCTION 60, 96, 113, 164, 209; Bombay 105–6; Morley, John 49, 65–8
- GUJARAT 14, 25, 30, 143, 145, 149, 152, 157
- HAGUE SUMMIT 3, 69, 77–81, 85, 91, 94
- HARTAL 254, 306; Hasina regime 226, 235
- HASHISH xi, 120, 145, 155, 161, 174, 212; *charas* 63, 109, 120, 128, 145, 153, 166, 168, 174–5, 196–7, 216, 232, 305
- HEALTH AUTHORITIES 127, 161; Lyari Clinic 197
- HEKMATAYAR, GULBUDDIN 188–9; Burhanuddin, Dr 189; *Hesb-i-Islami* 188–9; Koh-i-Sultan 189
- HEMP MONOPOLY 27, 32–3, 168; Naogaon 33, 232; Hemp Commission 63
- HEROIN TRAFFIC 121, 124–6, 128, 142–3, 200–1, 211, 218, 261; brown sugar 146, 155, 226, 235, 241, 249, 305; heroin no. 4 127, 192, 306
- HIMALAYAN REGION 4, 129, 172, 237; Himachal Pradesh 111, 116, 152; Tibet 237
- HOUSE OF COMMONS 2, 24, 27, 50, 53, 57, 62, 65–7, 80; Conservative Party 65, 66, 72;

- HOUSE OF COMMONS (*cont'd*)  
 Gladstone, W.E. 62, 65;  
 Kimberley 66; Liberal Party 48,  
 57, 64–6, 80; Taylor, T. 66, 68;  
 Thomson, Meysey 50
- HYDERABAD 108, 111, 148
- ILLICIT DIVERSION 29, 132–3,  
 136–42, 146–50; Chittorgarh  
 138–9; Gidwani, D. 139;  
 Sharma, Karan 140
- INDIAN AUTHORITIES 106, 112;  
 Customs 26; Five-year plans  
 113–14; Home Ministry 113;  
 Lok Sabha 109, 112–13, 19–20,  
 156; Planning Commission  
 112–14; Welfare Ministry 156,  
 161
- INDIAN LEGISLATION 150–62;  
 Essential Commodities Act,  
 1985 148; Medicinal and Toilet  
 Preparation Act, 1955 112;  
 NDPSA, 1985 151–9; NDPS  
 (Amendment) Act, 1988  
 158–62; PITNDPS Act, 1988  
 156–8, 160
- INDIAN OPIUM INDUSTRY 1,  
 20, 24, 70–1, 76, 98, 131,  
 136–9, 248, 259; 'black gold'  
 130, 135; Export Promotion  
 Committee 117;  
 Indo-Australia competition  
 106, 130–6; Indo-China trade  
 8, 11, 27, 35, 44, 67, 71; opium  
 exports 26–8, 45, 81–2, 96–8,  
 134
- INDIAN STOCKPILES 98–9, 131–6,  
 141–2, 200, 239
- INSURGENCY 4, 5, 7, 119–24, 126,  
 128, 187, 194, 204; Chinese  
 guerilla 190; RAW 122; north-  
 eastern India 123–4; Rohingya  
 234–5; Shan Liberation Army  
 124, 126; Sikh militants 121–2
- INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS  
 Fornebu 201; Heathrow 221;  
 Manchester 221; Zia 236, 252
- INTERNATIONAL CONTROL 36–7,  
 41, 43, 45, 48, 69,  
 81–2, 85, 92, 95–9, 101,  
 103, 105, 164, 191, 261,  
 264; collective security 41;  
 Interpol 158, 160, 193, 202,  
 206, 233–4; President Roosevelt  
 48, 68
- INTOXICATING DRUGS 10–1, 26,  
 31–2, 34–5, 40, 43, 52, 55–6, 74,  
 83–4, 86, 100, 106, 103–6,  
 108–14, 128–9, 164, 166,  
 177–82, 227–30, 245, 306;  
*bhang* 51, 57, 63, 110, 117, 152,  
 155–6, 168, 182, 197, 232, 305;  
*chandu* 37, 51, 102, 164, 305;  
*madak* 51, 103, 307; *mahua*  
 109, 156; *pustu* 173, 308
- IRAN (Persia) 13, 222–3, 238,  
 247–8; Great Wall 223; Iranian  
 revolution 120, 163, 185, 188,  
 191, 198–200; Khomeini, Imam  
 Ayatullah 195, 198–9; Pahlavi,  
 Mohammad Reza Shah 191,  
 198–9; Sistan-Baluchistan 200,  
 223
- ISI 121–3, 184–6, 188–90, 194,  
 203–4, 219, 262; Hamid Gul,  
 Lt. General 213; Imtiaz,  
 Brigadier 213
- ISLAMABAD 182, 188, 194, 205,  
 218, 220
- JAPAN 54, 59, 67, 77–8, 275;  
 Formosa (Taiwan) 45, 59;  
 Maruyama, Hisayoshi 212;  
 Tokyo summit 191
- 'JESSORI GANJA' 32–3, 250, 306
- KASHMIR 20, 108, 119–23, 152–3,  
 168, 173; Azad Kashmir 122;  
 Hizb-ul-Mujahedin 122
- KHALEDA REGIME 6, 226, 245,  
 247, 251, 254–5
- KHAN, Arbab Jehangir 207;  
 Ghulam Ishak 215, 219, 223;  
 Khan Abdul Ghaffar 174, 208;



- Khan Abdul Wali 208–9, 223;  
Yakoob 208
- KHUN SA 12, 126, 235; Kachin  
124, 126
- LAHORE 6, 148, 164, 168, 170,  
178–9, 181, 197; Singh, Ranjit  
173
- LAMB, CHRISTINA 6, 182, 185, 188
- LEAGUE OF NATIONS 85, 93, 95,  
98, 100, 103, 166, 174
- LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 52, 56,  
73, 79, 83, 89, 90; Blackett, Sir  
Basil 96, 99
- LICENSED SHOPS 24, 32–4, 55–8,  
74, 87–8, 104, 113, 164–8, 171,  
174–5, 229–32; Aitchison, Sir  
Charles 54–5; toddy shops 86,  
109
- LIQUOR INDUSTRY 50, 87, 227–8,  
252–3; Bogra 227–8; Gaibanda  
252; Narshingdi 253
- LONDON 62–3, 158, 249
- MADHYA PRADESH 14, 110–11,  
115–16, 137, 140–3, 152, 155–7,  
161; Madhya Bharat Act, 1955  
115; Mandasaur 140, 142–3,  
155; Neemuch 134, 143, 155;  
Singh, Digvijay 141
- MAJLIS-I-SHURA 205, 207, 307;  
Afridi, Malik Moin Khan 215;  
Gadoon-Amazai 176, 206–9,  
211; Junejo, Khan Mohammad  
206, 208–10; Khalid, Mirja  
213; National Assembly 178,  
180, 183, 196, 209, 213–15,  
219
- MALWA OPIUM 1, 15, 17, 27,  
29–31, 34, 66, 82, 98, 143, 305;  
central India 24, 27, 29, 31,  
51–2, 71, 98–9, 100, 143; Indore  
31, 155
- MEDICAL OPINION 49, 50–1, 54,  
60, 92, 117, 127, 258; Brown,  
James H. 39; opiate abuse 37,  
40–1, 46–7, 49, 51–2, 54, 58, 60,  
71, 91, 115, 243; Merchant,  
Dr Yusouf 155
- MEDICINAL OPIUM 12–4, 26,  
72, 82, 96, 99, 106, 114, 116,  
118, 130–6, 172, 198, 238–9,  
247, 259, 264, 287; CPS 130,  
135, 287; D’Albecorque 14;  
non-medicinal opium 14, 50,  
100, 111, 187, 238, 243, 257;  
opium alkaloid 116, 134–6,  
143, 243
- MILITARY 126, 200–5, 213–14, 224,  
249; Asad Durrani,  
General 224; Aslam Beg,  
General 224; Farooq Ahmed,  
Sq. Leader 203; Harrison,  
Selig S. 186, 193, 202; Kharur  
Rehman, Flight Lieut. 202; NLC  
203; Zahooruddin, Major 202
- MONEY LAUNDERING 160, 204;  
BCCI 204; havala system 160
- MORPHEUS 39; morphine 38–40,  
77–80, 82, 116, 136, 180, 259,  
263
- MUGHAL OPIUM 14–18, 181, 257;  
Akbar, Emperor 18; Babur-  
Nama 14; Batten, George H.  
18, 31; Fazl, Abu’l 14, 18
- NARCO-DEMOCRACY 205, 210,  
214, 217, 220, 224–5; Girki,  
Amanullah 215; ‘drug mafia’  
139, 215, 217, 221, 224, 226;  
IDA 214, 219; Saifullah, Seth  
219
- NARCOTICS ADMINISTRATION 22,  
251, 307; DNC 242, 254;  
Frontier Constabulary 176;  
Narcotics Board 166; NCB  
133–4, 139, 142, 154, 159, 251;  
NCD 7, 211, 250, 255, 262;  
PNCB 166–7, 169, 211, 213,  
216, 218
- NEPAL 13, 237; Ecstasy 129;  
Nepalese supply 128–9; Freak  
Street 129; Siliguri corridor  
125, 237

- NON-CO-OPERATION 69, 86–9, 92–3, 108, 258; Aman Sabhas 89; Swadeshi movement 87, 227–8; Tagore, Rabindranath 95
- NORTH BENGAL TRAFFIC 242, 247–8, 250; Benapole border 236; Bogra 228; Dinajpur 250; Faridpur 228–30; Gudagari 236; Pabna 250; Rajshahi 232, 240, 248, 250; Shatkira-Jessore 236, 240, 242–3, 250
- NORTHEASTERN INDIA 119–28, 150, 235; AIDS 127–8, 136, 245; Imphal-Moreh 124–6, 153, 155; intravenous drugs 127; Manipur 123, 125, 127–8, 153, 235; McDonald, Hamish 124–6; Mizoram 124; Nagaland 123, 125, 127
- NWFP 5, 147, 164–5, 167–9, 171–6, 178, 184–5, 188–9, 191, 196, 198–9, 201, 203, 206, 208–9, 212, 218, 260–1, 307; Amb 174; Dera Adam Khel 189; Khyber valley 176, 184, 214, 216, 218–19; Mardan 169, 174, 176
- OPIUM DIPLOMACY 45, 130–6; advisory committee 96; Anglo-American trade 37, 44; Elgin 57–8; Grey, Sir Edward 48–9; opium conference 115; Reid 49
- OPIUM HABIT 38–9, 51, 74–5, 78–9, 81, 83, 85, 88, 92, 95, 167, 175, 228; chocolates 238; dens 38, 45, 50, 56, 60, 67, 71; Smith, Dr George 51, 53; smoking 37–8, 41, 45, 51–2, 54, 71, 100–3, 165–6, 199, 230–1
- OPIUM LAWS 55, 104; Act, 1857 11, 28, 115, 151, 168, 170; Act, 1878 11, 26, 29, 101, 115, 118, 151, 165–6, 249; Act, 1957 118; Ordinance, 1984 248; Revenue Act, 1950 115–16; Smoking Act, 1934 103
- OPIUM REGIONS 119, 266; Golden Crescent 9, 119–23, 148, 150, 184, 233, 306; Golden Triangle 119, 124–6, 148, 150, 187, 191, 233–5, 306; Golden Wedge 119, 128–9, 233, 237, 306; white sugar 234
- ORISSA 88, 101, 110, 116, 156, 227
- PAKISTANI OPIUM INDUSTRY 168–71, 260; ‘mineral’, 191–2, 195, 201, 214, 221; Montgomery 168; Swat 169, 176, 207
- PATHAN 5, 163, 171–7, 184, 186–90, 206, 208–9, 212, 218, 260, 307; Afridi 176, 305; Malik 175, 184, 216, 218, 307; Nehag valley 171, 218; *zirga* 216
- PESHAWAR 176, 189, 203, 218–20; Dera Ismail Khan 220
- PHARMACEUTICAL 39, 114, 131, 135–6, 145–6, 150, 180, 235, 238, 240, 259, 263; Johnson and Johnson 131; Pharmacy Act, 1868 100; Poisonous Drugs Act, 1819 26; Shetty, Dr Harsh 239, 245
- PHENSEDYL 146, 226, 237–46, 259, 307; Codeine-phosphate 41, 116, 244–5, 303
- PHILIPPINES OPIUM COMMISSION 2, 8, 37, 45–8, 57–60, 66; Elgin 57–8
- POLITICAL PARTIES 54, 95, 126, 200, 208–9, 214, 223–4, 259, BJP 140; BNP 235; Indian National Congress 52, 86, 89–0, 93, 108, 140; Muslim League 107–8, 206; NDP 208; PNA 178; PPP 208, 210–12, 214–15
- POPPY CULTIVATION 5, 12, 17, 19–25, 28, 52–4, 62, 70, 76, 80, 82, 89, 95, 98–9, 105, 115, 117,

- 133, 135–6, 138, 140, 152, 168–70, 172–6, 183, 187, 195, 199, 206–9, 218, 223, 237, 247–9, 260–2, 308; Chittagong Hill Tract 249; Herat valley 173; MQY 140–1
- POPPY FARMERS 7, 11, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 53, 131, 134, 136–41, 152, 162, 175, 184, 207, 211–12, 214, 259, 260–1; Smith, Adam 21
- POPPY SUBSTITUTION 21, 99, 171, 207–8, 212, 261; Gadoon ‘poppy war’ 206–9
- PORTUGUESE 12–14, 16, 26, 30, 257; Gama, Vasco da 13
- POST-COLD WAR 211, 216, 219–20, 257, 261–2
- PROHIBITION 3–5, 9, 26, 44, 46–7, 49–0, 55, 59, 78, 86, 89, 101, 103–4, 106–14, 148, 163, 177–9, 181, 183, 259, 264; *haram* 179, 306; Prohibition Enquiry Committee 107, 112–14; Travancore-Cochin Prohibition Act, 1950 111; tripartite prohibition 109–11
- PRO-OPIUM 25, 63–4, 88–9, 104, 114, 140, 206–7, 209, 214, 227, 258; Batten, George H. 18; Brassey, Lord 63; Campbell, John 94; Hardinge 75, 78
- PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURES 72, 74, 83, 85–6, 104, 219, 225
- PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES 127, 144–7, 151, 154, 158, 161, 167, 239; mandrax 145–6, 155, 196, 239, 259; stimulants 129; ‘tiger’ Memon 158; tranquillizer 39, 58–9
- PUBLIC OPINION 34, 36, 42, 46, 54–7, 60–1, 64, 68, 86, 89–0, 92, 206, 208; pressure groups 43, 46, 50–1; Renard, Ronald D. 54
- PUNJAB (India) 24, 51, 84, 100, 103, 111, 118–23, 149, 161; Amritsar 123, 174; Excise Act, 1914 164; Sikh rule 24, 46, 173
- PUNJAB (Pakistan) 165, 167–9, 171, 173–4, 213, 217; Prohibition and Restriction of Liquor Rules, 1949 165, 179
- QUAKER 61–3; Alexander, Joseph G. 63; Burdon, Dr 61–2; Pease, Sir Joseph 61–2, 65; SSOT 55, 60–1, 63–5; Turner, F. Stross 61
- QUASI-MEDICINAL 13, 169, 231, 257; *Ayur-Vedic* 13, 305; cholera 92; Greek 12–3, 151; *hakim* 13, 165, 168, 306; malaria 92, 227; *unani* 167, 291
- QURESHI, MOEEN 215, 223–4
- RAJASTHAN 111, 120, 123, 137–8, 142–3, 149, 152, 156; Opium Rules, 1958 115, 143; Singh, Joginder 143; Thar desert 120–1
- RANGPUR OPIUM 247
- REBELLIONS ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ 11–12, 25–6; Oudh 24–5, 30; *zamindars* 11–12, 20, 22, 24–5, 28, 309; Boxer rebellion 42–4; Boxer war 17
- REPORTS INCB 133, 135; INCSR 132, 139, 156, 194–5; UNI 242
- ROYAL OPIUM COMMISSION xi, 1, 8, 9, 13, 18, 30, 34, 36, 45–7, 50–2, 58–9, 62–6, 70, 75, 78, 90–2, 94, 258; Berridge, Virginia 59; Wilson, Henry J. 46, 63, 230
- SAARC Convention, 1990 247
- SHANGHAI CONFERENCE 2, 68–9, 70–8, 81, 97, 116–17, 229; Kusevic, Vladimir 72
- SHARIAH 5, 177–83, 222, 260, 308; Aurangzeb, Emperor 181–2;

- SHARIAH (*cont'd*)  
 Bernier 182; Prophet  
 Mohammad (*PBUH*) 179–80,  
 183; *see also* Qur'anic laws  
 179–80
- SHARIF, MIAN M. NAWAZ 163,  
 215, 217–25; Afridi, Ayub Khan  
 212, 216, 219; Jamhuri Ittehad  
 Party 219; Matti, Lal  
 Mohammad 202; Tihar valley  
 218
- SIND 13, 31, 165, 167–8, 205,  
 217; Karachi 30–1, 143,  
 147, 181, 192, 197, 199, 202–4,  
 217, 220; Sind Abkari Act, 1973  
 166
- SOUTHWEST ASIA 163, 190–2, 194,  
 196, 205, 262
- SOVIET RUSSIA 120, 122, 163, 172,  
 184–7, 189–91, 193, 195–7;  
 Gromyko, Andrei 186;  
 Kalashnikov 176, 306;  
 President Gorbachev 191; Red  
 Army 120, 219
- SPANISH 16, 45, 130;  
 Spanish-American War 45
- SRI LANKA 17, 20, 29, 58, 236;  
 Colombo 56; Singhalese and  
 Tamils 56, 59
- STRICT LAWS 10; forfeiture 5, 158,  
 160–1, 206–7, 209–10, 216, 251;  
 life imprisonment 177; Swiss  
 Bank 160
- SUPERPOWER POSTURE 186, 194,  
 196, 252, 260
- TALEBAN 190, 262; Jamiatul  
 Ulema-i-Islami 190, 208;  
 Rehman, *Maulana* Fazlur 190;  
 Tajikstan 189–0
- TASK FORCE 211, 251; ANTF  
 215–6
- TEMPERANCE 34, 43, 49–0, 56,  
 86–8, 258; Alexander, H.G. 87,  
 95, 98; Brahma Samaj 50
- THAI HEROIN 15, 252; Bangkok  
 129; double lions 234
- THIRD WORLD 145–6, 239, 259
- TURKEY 13, 79, 130, 134, 136, 169,  
 199, 200, 203, 222, 238;  
 Kurdish 200
- UN CONVENTION 1961 137, 147,  
 151, 160, 171, 175, 246, 250,  
 260; Convention of 1972 137,  
 151; Convention of 1988 6,  
 158, 217, 219, 247;  
 Psychotropic Substances of  
 1971 151, 160, 171, 260
- UN INSTITUTIONS CND 132, 147,  
 156, 239; ECOSOC 132; INCB  
 131, 133, 135, 140, 147,  
 149–50, 195; UNDCP 159, 190,  
 195, 218, 244, 255; WHO 161,  
 167–8, 181
- UN PROTOCOL 1946 165; Protocol  
 1948 115; Protocol 1953 117,  
 130, 165; Protocol 1972 171,  
 246
- UP 14, 24–5, 76, 95, 98, 105,  
 115, 136–7, 139–40, 142–3,  
 145, 152, 173, 228; Bara Banki  
 138–9, 141; Excise Act, 1910  
 74; Opium Prohibition Rules,  
 1947 116; Opium Rules,  
 1931 116; Opium Smoking Act,  
 1934 103; Opium Rules, 1955  
 116
- US DRUG WAR 36, 38, 41, 43,  
 190–3, 198, 210, 216, 261;  
 Foreign Affairs 119–20, 148,  
 152, 192; DEA 134, 193, 203,  
 217, 221; Pressler Amendment  
 215–17, 254; State Department  
 8, 42–3, 45, 47–8, 141, 193–5,  
 198, 212, 218; Subcommittee  
 on crime 120–1, 129, 146, 159
- WARS 12; Anglo-Afghan War 172;  
 Anglo-Burmese War 54; Battle  
 of Plassey 16; First World War  
 3, 80–2, 85, 98; Gulf War 195;  
 Indo-Pak 119; Opium Wars 8,  
 12, 25, 27, 37, 42, 63, 65, 173;

- WEST BENGAL (INDIA) 111, 236;  
Bongaon 236; Burdwan 152;  
Hoogly 15, 29; Murshidabad  
236; Nadia 153, 236; North 24  
Parganas 153, 236, 240
- WEST COAST 14-5, 30, 37, 129,  
143, 258; Baroda 30-1, 143;  
Calicut 13; Cambay 14, 30,  
143; Chawl 14; Daman 30,  
143; Diu 30; Goa 14, 30, 129;  
Kutch 143
- WEST PAKISTAN (1947-71) 4;  
Opium Rules, 1956 165;
- Dangerous Drugs Rules, 1958  
165; Smoking Ordinance, 1960  
166
- ZIA-UL HAQ, GENERAL 5,  
163, 177, 179-85, 187-8,  
192, 200-2, 204-7, 209-11,  
213, 215, 225, 260; *Hadd*  
Ordinance 1979 177, 179-81,  
183, 306; Hasnain, Hamid 201;  
public floggings 181; Shamim  
Anwar, Air Vice-Marshall 202;  
Zia, Shafiq 201