# Contents

_Preface_ ix

_About this Volume_ xii

_Acknowledgements_ xiii

**Critical Keywords** 3
- Abjection 3
- Aesthetics 8
- Alterity 14
- Aporia 19
- Carnival/Carnivalesque 25
- Class 31
- Culture 37
- Deconstruction 43
- Desire 51
- Difference/Différance 58
- Discourse 65
- Event 70
- Gender 74
- Hegemony 81
- Hyperreality 89
- Hypertext 92
- I/dentity 95
- Ideology 100
- Imaginary–Symbolic–Real 108
- Interpellation 114
- Intertextuality 119
- Iterability/Iteration 121
- *Jouissance* 125
- *Khôra/Chora* 130
- Literature 134
- Materialism/Materiality 143
- Modernism 151
- Myth/o/logy 158
Narrative/Narration 162
Other 169
Overdetermination 176
Performativity 182
Postmodernity/Postmodernism 190
Power 197
Queer 201
Race 204
Reader/Reading 212
Sexuality/Sexual Difference 220
Simulacrum/Simulation 226
Subject/ivity 232
Uncanny 239
Unconscious 246
Writing 252

**Afterword** 257

Literary and Cultural Theory: The Contested Ground of Critical Language or, Terms, Concepts and Motifs 259

**Works Cited** 271

**Index of Terms** 292

**Index of Authors** 294
CRITICAL KEYWORDS
Abjection is employed by Julia Kristeva in an effort to destabilize the binary logic of much psychoanalytic thought, where the notions of (desiring) subject and object (of desire) often represent a co-dependent oppositional pairing. In order to understand Kristeva’s point it is necessary that we recognize ‘subject’ and ‘object’ not only as opposed locations or two halves of a logical model, but also as supposedly discrete and complete identities in and of themselves. Each figure in the pair is accorded its own self-sufficient meaning with definable boundaries. Such boundaries are the psychic limits by which the self separates itself from its other within the psychoanalytic framework of Kristeva’s text. Indeed, another way of positing the subject/object dyad would be to comprehend it, as already implied, in terms of ‘self/other’. The abject, says Kristeva, is ‘neither subject nor object’; instead it opposes the ego by ‘draw[ing] me to the place where meaning collapses’. While the subject/object structure makes logical meaning possible, the abject produces, or is otherwise comprehensible as, an uncanny effect of horror, threatening the logical certainty of either the subject/object or self/not-self binarism. Abjection is thus the process or psychic experience of a slippage across the boundaries of the self, and with that a partial erasure of the borders of the psyche which define the ego. The abject is, amongst other things, the fluid locus of forbidden desires and ideas whose radical exclusion is the basis of the subject’s cultural determination; in comprehending the process of abjection thus, we come to see, as Kristeva makes apparent, that that which threatens the self is not simply, necessarily locatable outside the self but rather emerges or erupts within subjectivity.

Beginning, then, with abjection, it is clear from this term that there is, in one sense, an intimate relationship between the psychic construction of the human body and that which both revolts and yet in some manner belongs to that body. In literary or filmic forms, such revulsion and rejection need not be figured literally. While it can be the case that the image of a corpse, a character vomiting or the metaphor of vomit may be employed, it is often the case that the abject is symbolized, given a determinate form outside the self and other than the self and yet causing a visceral, often violent response.
Seeing the monstrous and the repulsive in any narrative representation is, in effect, to witness an exteriorized manifestation of that which is already incorporated in my psyche and yet which is irrecuperable as belonging to my ‘self’. As the discussion of the break-down of binary oppositions and the concomitant evacuation of stable semantic value makes plain, there is therefore a mobile structural relationship to be understood here, whether that which makes me abject is actually external to me or is incorporated with me, whether within my body or in my psyche. The relationship is structural because I am reacting to something which, though not me, none the less brings about a response, described in the following manner by Julia Kristeva, in her definition of the term abjection:

repelling, rejecting; repelling itself, rejecting itself. Ab-jecting.
Julia Kristeva (1982: 13)

As Kristeva’s brief comment and, in particular, her hyphenated gerund, ab-jecting, should make clear, I am speaking here not simply of a subject–object relationship, nor yet a static structural model but, instead, a process or movement that defines the structurality of the structure. This is expressed through both the particular gerund and also the function of the gerund throughout the citation. For abjection to be felt it has to get underway. It is thus less important, perhaps, that we understand the concept as a moment, than as a motion, if we are to register the fundamentally destabilizing aspect of abjection. This will help to explain how what makes one person feel abject will not do the same for others.

The abject threatens life . . . Although the subject must exclude the abject, the abject must, nevertheless be tolerated for that which threatens to destroy life also helps to define life . . . The abject can be experienced in various ways – one which relates to biological bodily functions, the other of which has been inscribed in a symbolic (religious) economy.
Barbara Creed (1993: 9)

That the abject threatens and creates a violent sensation of disorientation is very clear. Moreover, as Barbara Creed explains, the abject is irreducible to any particular type of experience. Abjection can take place anywhere, in any context, and its nature is such that, while it is so intimately connected to our own sense of identity, whether individual or communal, social or private, personal or national, its unnerving force comes from the fact that, however much a part of us the abject might be, it is radically, irreducibly other than any element of our identities which we take to be normal or healthy. What we therefore reject, or whatever it is we are repulsed by, belongs to being.
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated... Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside himself.

Julia Kristeva (1982: 1)

The abject is unequivocally excessive; psychic in its condition, it is a response either to something material or to something psychic, and it can produce physical or material effects. Such is its excessiveness, following from previous comments, we might wish to suggest that the abject cannot be defined except through its effects. We see this problem here, when Julia Kristeva describes her response to the skin on milk. You or I may have no such response to this particular phenomenon, and yet, through the physiological and psychic response described by Kristeva, we comprehend the feeling of abjection. What is also significant here is the fact that Kristeva makes explicit the relation between abjection and the self, signalled in her passage through the suspension of the first person pronoun in quotation marks. It is not so much the fact that she is recounting a particular experience, though this is the point from which she begins, but rather that the ‘I’, the subject, is disturbed in the assumed security of its identity by the involuntary response to the milk.

Loathing an item of food, a piece of filth, waste or dung. The spasms and vomiting that protect me. The repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck... Food loathing is perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection. When the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of milk... I experience a gagging sensation and, still farther down, spasms in the stomach, the belly... Along with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream... ‘I’ want none of that element... ‘I’ do not assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it. But since food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me’... I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself.

Julia Kristeva (1982: 2–3)

However, what has to be acknowledged and repeatedly stressed, between Kristeva’s and McAfee’s comments, is that the object is neither the milk, nor indeed any particular object as such. The subject rids itself of something that is other than itself and yet part of itself, thereby seeking in the process of ‘ab-jecting’ to re-establish the boundaries of the self.
Abjection is the state in which one’s foothold in the world of self and other disintegrates. The abject is the symptom of being on the border, pushing toward psychosis where the I blurs and is not yet . . . In anxiety or abjection – through this overwhelming ill-ease – there can be no differentiating between beings.

Noëlle McAfee (1993: 120)

So, to reiterate: abjection or, as Kristeva has it above, ab-jecting names the work of a psychic traversal resulting in a corporeal, physiological and psychological response which, due to the extremity and violence of subjective experience, breaks up the subject’s sense of identity in the very process by which 'I’ strive to maintain myself, my identity, my life. Abjection effects a violent revelation to me about my selfhood: that identity, comprehended as a fixed meaning, is only an illusion promoted by the psyche; rather, the self is nothing but a fiction, a series of narratives precariously assembled and always susceptible to the erasure of its boundaries and the dissolution of its assumed sovereignty or autonomy.

The abject is that which, although intimately a part of early experience, must be rejected so that the self can establish the borders of its unified subjectivity: the familiar foreign(er) who is suddenly recognized as a threat to (national) identity. This rejection (abjection) of certain aspects of physical immediacy, whether of the personal body or the body politic, is the act which establishes subjective identity, but this act also establishes that identity as a prohibition, and as lacking an earlier bodily continuity. The subjective self, therefore, is always haunted by the possible return of the abject that was part of the presubjective experience . . . Abjection contradicts the self’s (national or individual) claim to unity and knowledge, but this contradiction is so profound precisely because it emerges from the gestures with which the self attempts to assert such a claim . . . Abjection blurs the usually clearly marked space between the self and the other . . . the abject is that which seems to confound the possibility of meaning . . . The self abjects that which is most necessarily inescapable and rejected: the bodily reminders of physical dependence and necessity.

Norma Claire Moruzzi (1993: 144–5)

Questions for further consideration

1. In what ways might the abject be thought of in relation to the uncanny?
2. Is the abject purely a negative determination or negation of self, or can it be read as a configuration, a provisional difference or non-identity within identity, of otherness or alterity?
3. In light of the emphasis on corporeality in discussions of the abject, is there discernible an articulation of abjection in relation to the carnivalesque body?

Explanatory and bibliographical notes


2. Throughout, the reader will find the occasional reference to binaries, binarisms, binary oppositions. While binary oppositions operate in the history of Western thought at least since the Aristotelian text, the phrase *binary opposition* is given significant emphasis in the work of a Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (b.1857–d.1913): *Course in General Linguistics*, rev. edn, Introduction by Jonathan Culler, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Reidinger, trans. Wade Baskin (London: Fontana/Collins, 1981). Saussure’s work in linguistics (which became the principal influence on structuralist critics) stressed the structural nature of signs. The sign consists of two components, the signifier (the word) and the signified (the object, thing or idea represented or signified). Signifiers are not representative of the things they indicate; language is arbitrary, and we arrive at meaning through common agreement rather than by creating words which in some manner resemble that which we wish to signify. Therefore, no word bears meaning intrinsically: we know ‘cat’, not because the word has any similarity to the creature it names, but rather, because it is neither a ‘bat’ nor a ‘hat’, much less a ‘cut’. Moreover, signifiers only have a particular meaning or range of meanings relationally; that is to say, we only know the meaning of a word by the structural-semantic context in which we find it. Significantly, then, many meanings are comprehended through comparison with what they are not: we know what day means because it is not night, absence and presence are not absolute values or concepts but are only determined and determinable by being comprehended in relation to one another; we know what good is, because it is not bad, and so on. Such pairs are referred to as binary oppositions, which structural pairing not simply operates at a semantic level but also governs much human conceptualization (see, for example, entries under alterity, culture, deconstruction, difference/différance, gender, materialism/materiality, other, race, sexuality, subjectivity, uncanny).

Further reading


AESTHETICS

Aesthetics is derived from the Greek aistetikos, meaning perceptible to the senses; aesthetic approaches to literature are ones which concern themselves primarily with the work’s beauty and form, rather than with extra-textual issues such as politics or context. Aesthetics, which involves the exploration of beauty and nature in literature and the fine arts, involves two theoretical approaches: (a) the philosophical study of the nature and definition of beauty; and (b) the psychological examination of the perceptions, origins, and subjective effects of beauty. In the wake of much politically oriented criticism, the critical interest in identity politics, and the assumption that aesthetic discourse is necessarily formalist or hermeneutic and therefore depoliticized, the very notion of the aesthetic has, in some areas, acquired a somewhat pejorative value, while in others, the aesthetic has assumed a much more contested value.

However, one should not assume that the question of aesthetics is free from a history, that its theoretical interests are unchanging, or that the development of aesthetics is separate from other forms of thought, even though in numerous instances art is treated as though it were autonomous. On the historical transformation and the contexts of aesthetic discourse, Helga Geyer-Ryan remarks:

it is no accident that the emergence of a discourse about art takes place during the Enlightenment, the era of rationality and science. The aesthetic attitude and the discourse associated with it are consequences of the rational–scientific emancipation of man from nature and thus of the emergence of the capacity for distancing ourselves from given particular contexts . . . The transition from poetics to aesthetics . . . testifies to the historical break with the immediate relationship to the world accomplished through art . . . By virtue of this abstraction from the immediate, subjective and idiosyncratic relationship to the world . . . the subject is able to experience the dimension of universality which belongs . . . to the field of sense perception.


So, we might say, the historical and cultural context of the emergence of aesthetics as a determinable discourse arises as a result of an epistemological rupturing of context. Or, to put this another way, the context of aesthetic discourse’s arrival and that which marks it as modern is registered in and as its sundering from, and occlusion of, the forms of thought that have made it possible. The other aspect of aesthetics to be taken account of here is its being rooted in ‘sense perception’ or, as Michèle Barrett has it, a ‘mode of perception’ from which pleasure arises.
The questions raised by the term ‘aesthetic’ may be summarized as follows: (1) Can we say that there is a distinctive faculty or mode of perception called ‘aesthetic’ and what would be the nature of the pleasure afforded? (2) Can we identify objects or works to which universal aesthetic value adheres? These questions are difficult to formulate in a non-circular way and the history of attempts to get to grips with them is, perhaps surprisingly, very sparse. Aesthetics constitutes a minor subfield of philosophy in which the questions are considered in the abstract (what is beauty? and so on) rather than in respect to the claims of particular instances.

Michèle Barrett (1992: 34)

The problematic of the aesthetic and of inquiry into aesthetics to which Barrett alerts us is evaded by a circularity of argument, a certain self-closing of the language concerning the subject, which tends towards the autonomy premised in the rupture already spoken of, above. The following remark acknowledges the autonomous condition of the discourse:

aesthetics, the category of the aesthetic, is a rigorous philosophical discourse’s way of attempting to ground its own discourse on principles internal to its system and thereby to close it off as a system: that is, as a logic.

Andrzej Warminski (1996: 21)

So, aesthetics determines its own logic. This has two implications at least. On the one hand, aesthetic discourse, in situating its own parameters, appears to police what is appropriate to its range of interests, modes of inquiry, methods of proceeding. On the other hand, it appears to attempt to make itself impervious to any mode of questioning which does not conform to the rules, the rhetoric or grammar, by which aesthetics addresses its subjects and mediates its conclusions. It is perhaps for these, as well as other reasons, that aesthetics is available as an assumed universal language. Such is the power of aesthetic categorization that its uses and foci have historically encroached on other philosophical areas of inquiry:

traditionally the aesthetic mode of being had been conceived of as a particular and secondary one, which was firstly relevant only for objects of human origin and secondly to be subordinated to the foundational mode of being of the real. In modern conditions, however, a principalization and universalization of the aesthetic occurs. The notion that aesthetic categories could be suited to the understanding of even the elementary and general constitution of reality is suggesting itself more and more forcefully. The place of the classical ontological categories of
being, reality, constancy, actuality, and so on, is now being taken by aesthetic categories of state such as appearance, mobility, baselessness and suspension. In previous centuries a second set of categories had been developed in the shadow, so to speak, of the primary categories of reality (and only with regard to the secondary realities of human fabrication) which then suddenly, once reality itself had idealistically, romantically, historically, and so on, revealed itself to be a fabrication generally proved itself to be suitable for the understanding of the primary and universal reality too.

Wolfgang Welsch (1997: 37)

Such pervasive interrogation and the expansion of analytical inquiry suggested by Welsch is allied closely to the understanding of the role of subjective reflection and interpretation.

Initially, as regards the question of the conditions of knowledge in general, ‘aesthetic’ means to grasp the givens of sensible intuition in the a priori forms of space and time. In the third Critique, the term designates reflective judgment, only insofar as it excites the interest of the ‘faculty of the soul’ that is the feeling of pleasure and of displeasure.

Jean-François Lyotard (1994: 9)

As Lyotard has us understand, human analytical ability, where intellectual perception considers the values of objects in the real world in relation to matters of emotional response, is closely tied to the determination of aesthetic qualities. However, this is at odds with the notion of universal aesthetic values, precisely because the processes of judgement and reflection are always subjective. This returns us to the problematic of aesthetics once again, a problematic which might be read as historically governed, as Terry Eagleton argues.

The aesthetic is at once . . . the very secret prototype of human subjectivity in early capitalist society, and a vision of human energies as radical ends in themselves which is the implacable enemy of all domineering or instrumentalist thought. It signifies a creative turn to the sensuous body, as well as an inscribing of that body with a subtly oppressive law; it represents on the one hand a liberatory concern with concrete particularity, and on the other hand a specious form of universalism.

Terry Eagleton (1990: 9)

Eagleton’s commentary ties the subjective analytic to broader historical transformations. In grounding the development of aesthetic discourse in this way, he makes it possible for us to begin to comprehend the ways in
which the paradoxes of aesthetics and its autonomous severing from other forms of inquiry can serve particular interests in society. If the aesthetic is an autonomous discourse, it need not have to consider, according to its own rules, the economic contexts or material bases from which the objects of its inquiry are produced. Furthermore, if aesthetic discourse aspires to a universalism, it can automatically rule out any social or historical inquiry as irrelevant to its interests. In addition to this, in granting primacy to subjective perception, it can also make implicit claims about humanity and about matters of taste and pleasure as though these also are universal or intrinsic and not matters of education, privilege, leisure, and so on. Karol Berger argues the principal aspects of such assumptions.

We may take the aesthetic pleasure in a real object or an imaginary representation. What demarcates this sort of pleasure from other kinds of delight is that it is independent of the dictates of our appetites or reasons and thus remains unconnected with our desires (‘disinterested’ and ‘free’). The delight in the agreeable or good necessarily generates a desire that the object of our delight be real and be ours, and it, potentially at least, also generates an action designed to satisfy desire. The aesthetic pleasure ends in itself, not in a desire or an action.

Karol Berger (2000: 100–1)

Yet, such aesthetic pleasure is not innate. It is learnt, it does change, and it does have a history, a history tied closely to the advent of modernity:

The aesthetic, then, does not cover the whole scope of truth; rationality is also indispensable. But the aesthetic is concerned with the base level, whereas rationality is first concerned with the subsequent structures. It is precisely this primary character of the aesthetic that one traditionally hasn’t grasped or wanted to admit to. The modern development, however, has allowed us to recognize it enduringly.

And this was decreed not by some aesthetician or other, but was a recognition forced upon us by science, the guiding authority of modernity. It prescribed an epistemological aestheticization – an on-principle aestheticization of knowledge, truth and reality by which no issue remains unaffected. This epistemological aestheticization is the legacy of modernity.

Wolfgang Welsch (1997: 47)

So, far from being neutral, universal, and autonomous, aesthetics is, we might argue, irredeemably political in its functions, if not directly in its modes of interpretation. The work of what is termed literary theory, in numerous guises, has been to unveil the occluded politics of aesthetic discourse, summarized here by Marc Redfield; Redfield’s argument explicitly
draws out the location of aesthetic judgement in a materially and linguistically constituted human subjectivity. In doing so his text enacts an irreversible shift from the supposed autonomy of aesthetics to the always historical and material conditions of ideology.

Aesthetics is . . . the model of all ideology, since aesthetics builds its system out of linguistic functions that it treats as attributes of consciousness or spirit. In theory's aesthetic allegory, the disruptive free play of Kant’s *pulchritude vaga* becomes the figure for a potential randomness of the signifier, a randomness which can never appear without undergoing a ‘subreptive’ ascription of meaning but which remains incoherently necessary if language is to occur. The subject of language, ‘man’, becomes the subject of judgment and the ‘ideal of beauty’, thanks to a play of the signifier which remains lodged at the heart of ‘man’s’ possibility – the kernel of trauma, rendered in Kant as the threatening, basilisk gaze of a pure judgment of taste. And since ‘man’, in this narrative, reads his possibility – or has it read for him – in the signifier, the catachresis that establishes the signifier’s legibility thereby also establishes the subject’s interpellation by language, and insertion into the symbolic order. The catachresis is prosopopoeiea: a ‘giving face’, as Cynthia Chase says, to something that may or may not be a sign, but which is taken as one in being perceived. This illegible, radically external insistence making up the possibility of the sign’s production is what theory calls materiality. We may recall that the term ‘ideology’ originally signalled the attempt to derive ideas from the senses, and that in the wake of Marx and Engels’s displacement of Destutt de Tracy’s term, the critique of ideology became a troubled inquiry into the materiality of phenomenal form. If the notion of ‘ideology’ preserves in its history an aesthetic ascent from the sensuous to the ideal, the critique of ideology becomes a critique of aesthetics in seeking to explain the effectivity of fiction, or, conversely, the fictionality of the real, since any materiality at the origin of ideology must be able to generate ideological illusion. In a rigorous Marxism, materiality resists itself, and thereby generates history. Theory pursues this thought to its limit in locating the materiality and interpellative force of ideology in language’s self-resistance.

Marc Redfield (1996: 33–4)

Questions for further consideration

1. Why should it be the case that the questions asked of aesthetic value are generally posed in the abstract, rather than with regard to singular objects, instances or works of art?
2. Is the aesthetic a category free of or distinct from ideological considerations?
3. In what ways is aesthetic pleasure distinct from other forms of pleasure? How might such distinctions be articulated?

Explanatory and bibliographical notes

1. **Hermeneutics**: the science of interpretation.
3. **Epistemology**: branch of philosophy dealing with the grounds of knowledge.
4. **Ontology**: branch of philosophy, especially metaphysics, concerned with the study of being as an abstract concept, or the being or essence of things.
5. **A priori**: deductive logic or reasoning, proceeding from causes to effects.
7. **Pulchritude vaga**: random, shifting or inconsistent beauty.
8. **Subreptive**: obtaining something by misrepresentation or suppression of the truth, or otherwise a deceptive argument or misrepresentation.
9. **Catachresis**: an incorrect use, or misapplication, of words.
10. **Prosopopoeia**: representation in human form; a figure of speech in which either (a) an imaginary or absent person is represented as speaking, or (b) an abstract or inanimate figure is personified or anthropomorphized.


Further reading


**ALTERITY**

*Alterity* names a condition of absolute, radical otherness in critical and philosophical discourse. While the notions of otherness and alterity are, to some extent, interchangeable in critical discourse, in *Time and the Other* and other texts Emmanuel Levinas addresses the absolute exteriority of alterity, as opposed to the binary, dialectic or reciprocal structure implied in the idea of the other. For Levinas, the face of the other is the concrete figure for alterity. My sense of self is interrupted in my encounter with the face of the other, and thus the self, the I as Levinas puts it, knows itself no longer in its self-sameness but in its own alterity, in coming face to face with the face of the other. It is important to register the fact that the other is not simply a ‘location’ or ‘identity’ distinct and separate, outside one’s own, but...
INDEX OF TERMS

abjection, 3–6
aesthetics, 8–12, 134, 135, 137, 144, 146, 151, 153, 190, 192, 213
agency, 116, 147, 236
alterity, 14–18, 169, 171, 174, 247
aporia, 19–25
Being, 64, 90, 170, 239, 244, 249
binary oppositions, 3, 15, 56, 240, 243, 263
carnival, carnivalesque, 25–30
chaos, 130–3
class, 31–37
culture, 37–42, 208
deconstruction, 43–51, 85
desire, 3, 51–8, 60, 129, 216, 246, 261
différance, 18, 58–64
difference, 16, 18, 58–64, 121, 123, 135, 148, 171, 201, 204, 209, 210, 220–5, 263, 264
discourse, 65–9
discourse, 65–9
ego, 3
event, 70–4, 214
fetish, 89
gender, 74–80, 98, 127, 172, 174, 201, 221
hegemony, 81–7, 135
homophobia, 201
hypertext, 92–4, 95
ideology, 12, 28, 29, 35, 41, 48, 61, 66, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 84, 86, 95, 100–6, 115, 117, 120, 135, 145, 153, 154, 159, 163, 179, 180, 188, 194, 208, 209, 213, 234, 235
imaginary, 108–13
interpellation, 114–18, 161, 236
intertextuality, 119–21
iterability, iteration, 71, 73, 121–5, 182, 184, 218, 228, 229, 230, 253, 262, 264, 267
jouissance, 112, 113, 125–9
khôra see chora
laughter, 27
literature, 134–41
materialism, materiality, 143–9
myth, mythology, 158–62
narrative, narration, 162–8, 204, 209
object, 3
ontology, 8, 16, 48, 55, 58, 64, 70, 71, 73, 131, 133, 137, 138, 141, 156, 169, 170, 198, 233, 247, 248, 249
other, otherness, 3, 14, 15, 17, 60, 61, 71, 112, 169–74, 207, 214, 267, 268
overdetermination, 176–8
performativity, 71, 75, 182–8, 267
power, 188, 197–200
postmodernity, postmodernism, 190–5
psyche, 3, 6, 95, 98, 104, 108, 126, 128, 176, 177, 221, 224, 243, 244
queer, 201–4
race, 204–11
reading, 92, 93, 123, 212–19, 246, 260
real, reality, 89, 108–13, 226, 228
representation, 75, 89, 173, 195, 213, 226, 234, 250, 253, 262, 268
self, 5, 14, 74, 96, 122, 124, 169, 170, 172, 173, 234, 235, 237, 238
seriality, 73
sex, sexuality, 74, 75, 76, 79, 98, 113, 128, 201, 220–5
simulacra, 226–31
singularity, 71, 97, 213, 214, 220–5
symbolic, 108–13, 177, 225, 250
tele-technology, 90, 103
Thatcherism, 209
trauma, 112
uncanny, 239–51, 265
unconscious, 246–51, 265
writing, 73, 92, 218, 252–5
INDEX OF AUTHORS

Althusser, Louis, 68, 102, 115, 169, 176, 177, 179
Aristotle, 21, 22, 59
Attridge, Derek, 71, 72, 267
Austin, J. L., 182, 183, 184
Bachelard, Gaston, 80
Badiou, Alain, 15, 16
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 25, 26, 27, 29
Balibar, Étienne, 39
Barrett, Michèle, 8, 9, 39, 40
Barthes, Roland, 160, 161
Baudrillard, Jean, 39, 89, 90, 226, 227
Beardsworth, Richard, 22
Benjamin, Andrew, 18
Bennington, Geoffrey, 45
Berger, John, 102
Berger, Karol, 11
Blair, Tony, 87
Brandt, Joan, 18
Browning, Robert, 254
Bourdieu, Pierre, 40, 41, 187, 188
Bush, George W., 87
Butler, Judith, 75, 78, 79, 187, 188
Celan, Paul, 18
Cohen, Tom, 259, 260
Cornell, Drucilla, 23
Creed, Barbara, 4
Crichley, Simon, 15–17
Deleuze, Giles, 51, 58, 73, 238
de Man, Paul, 100, 265, 266
Derrida, Jacques, 17–23, 43, 45, 47–9, 59, 61–4, 182–4, 186
Dyer, Richard, 210, 211
Eagleton, Terry, 10, 27, 28, 36, 100
Ebert, Teresa, 190
Foucault, Michel, 65–8, 188, 199, 200, 224
Freud, Sigmund, 53, 54, 120, 176, 177, 239, 240–2, 244, 246, 247
Gates, Henry Louis, 205, 208
Gramsci, Antonio, 38, 81–3, 85, 103
Geyer-Ryan, Helga, 8
Guattari, Félix, 51
Hall, Stuart, 206
Hartman, Geoffrey, 41, 42
Hegel, G.W. F., 178
Heidegger, Martin, 47, 64, 239, 244
Hyppolite, Jean, 260, 262, 263
Irigaray, Luce, 169
Jameson, Fredric, 36, 190
Kafka, Franz, 117
Kamuf, Peggy, 44, 45, 266
Kant, Immanuel, 58, 62, 234
Kristeva, Julia, 3, 4, 5, 6, 29, 119, 120
Landow, George, 92
Leclau, Ernesto, 83, 85, 86
Lenin, V. I., 179
Levinas, Emmanuel, 14–16, 169, 174, 177
Lukács, Georg, 231
Lyotard, Jean-François, 10, 190, 10
Mcafee, Noelle, 5
Marx, Karl, 19, 31, 100
Milliband, Ralph, 36
Miller, J. Hillis, 44, 45, 47
Morris, Pam, 26
Mouffe, Chantal, 83, 85, 86
Nash, Christopher, 92
Nelson, Ted, 92
O’Driscoll, Sally, 201
Patton, Paul, 72
Plato, 119, 226, 254
Ponge, Francis, 186
Rabaté, Jean-Michel, 108
Rabelais, Jean-François, 25
Redfield, Mark, 11
Regan, Ronald, 87
Royle, Nicholas, 48
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 110

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 23, 172
Stallybrass, Peter, 26
Thatcher, Margaret, 87
Thompson, E. P., 33, 34
Weber, Samuel, 16
Welsch, Wolfgang, 10
White, Allon, 26
Williams, Raymond, 37, 38, 39, 100, 102
Wood, Ellen Meiksins, 33
Zedong, Mao, 178, 179
Žižek, Slavoj, 104, 105, 112, 117, 180