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Introduction

While I was writing this book a number of events unfolded that reflect the significance of diversity and how we – as democratic societies – live and manage it. More than half a million refugees and migrants appeared at European Union (EU) borders in the first eight months of 2015, in addition many thousands lost their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Africa. Haunting images of dead men, women and children circulated in the media and discussions about transnational migration, Europe and the fate of refugees/migrants already in Europe and at its borders evolved over long months. With the growing number of refugees and migrants making their way from the southern edge of the borderless Schengen Europe across the Balkans and on towards the most desired destinations of Germany and Scandinavian countries, the divisions among EU countries became increasingly visible. In September 2015 plans for the relocation of 120,000 refugees were discussed by leaders of EU member states, with the German chancellor Angela Merkel leading the calls for a quota system that would make the distribution of the latest wave of refugees and migrants in Europe fair. The United Kingdom (UK) opted out of an EU refugee sharing system and instead pledged to take in 20,000 Syrian refugees. Some of the ‘newly democratic’ EU member states – namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia – argued that they were badly prepared for a forced allocation of refugees, and that their incapacity was not only due to the state of their economies but also to their lack of cultural and religious ties with Muslims. They were, however, outvoted and consequently Slovakia and Hungary filed a court challenge against the EU refugee relocation plan.

The argument that Muslim refugees and migrants represent a threat to Europe’s Christian identity and values has found its supporters across a variety of countries. While Angela Merkel has insisted that Germany can accept and integrate as many as one million Syrian refugees, Nigel Farage – the leader of UKIP (UK Independence Party), a right-wing populist political party – warned of an African exodus of biblical proportions which should be prevented by restrictive measures. There was, however, one significant exception that Farage was

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willing to make in his strict opposition to more refugees and migrants entering Britain – Christians should be allowed to come. ‘I have said all the way though I particularly feel the plight of Christians because they have nowhere to go in that region, I would happily take some Christian refugees ... Because they have nowhere to go as a direct result of what we’ve done [that is, the UK’s role in removing Muammar Gaddafi in Libya]’ (Mason, 2015). The Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico pointed out that ‘refugees have different cultural habits and religion. There is a grave security risk that we must talk about’ (Hospodárske noviny, 2015, author’s translation). In a comment piece for the German daily newspaper *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung* the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán wrote that ‘those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity’ (Mackey, 2015). In the summer of 2015 Hungary embarked on the building of a 175-km long and 4-m high razor fence (which will be turned into a concrete wall at a later stage) along its southern border to stop refugees entering via the so-called Balkan route, and in mid-September it closed its border and introduced a new set of laws that made it a criminal offence – punishable by prison or deportation – to damage the fence. In October Austria and Slovenia announced that they too might have to turn to building fences unless a Europe-wide solution to the refugee crisis was agreed upon.

These events link closely to topics and issues discussed in this book. First of all, Europe has faced a new type of migration – it no longer involves mainly migrants from the (former) colonies to the imperial centres, migrants who had some affinity with the ‘host’ country. Rather, the refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to the southern borders of Europe are essentially willing to live in any country that is ready to take them. They also connect with other migrants through complex transnational networks and do not necessarily aim to settle in the ‘host’ country in the long run. Second, as always, the transnational movement of people involves questions of inclusion and exclusion. Farage’s preference for Christian refugees indirectly suggests his reservations about Britain accepting Muslims while some East/Central European leaders are much more vocal in their refusal of Muslim refugees. Hence the 2015 refugee crisis raised not only questions about who ‘they’ (Muslims, refugees, migrants, Syrians) are but equally importantly about who ‘we’ (Christian, European) are, and about what exactly ‘our’ way of life is that ‘they’ supposedly threaten.

The book is thus also concerned with ways that societies develop to manage diversity – through policies and strategies – which have been transforming in European democratic countries since the 1990s when there was a shift from policies of multiculturalism to integration. These policies do not relate only to how many or which refugees are allowed into a country while their asylum claims are processed. They are also linked to how those newly arrived people integrate into their ‘host’ country and, importantly, they relate to how countries understand or interpret the principles of democratic citizenship. The final observation that I would like to make relates to the role of media in democratic societies. Analyses of the media coverage of the refugee crisis (see for example European Journalism Observatory, 2015) raise important questions about normative ideals linked to the media (that is, how media should perform in democratic societies). In democratic societies the media function as a public sphere in which diverse opinions and views on matters of public importance – and the example of Syrian refugees is one such matter – are given space. Criticisms about the range of opinions and the quality of debate in the media have been wide ranging in relation to the refugee crisis. It is, however, not my aim in this book to make empirically informed judgements about the balance or quality of media representations on any particular issues or in relation to any particular groups; rather, what I offer is the consideration of why and how media policies tackle the broader normative issues and what their limitations are.

Yet, it is not only refugees and migrants – although public discourses tend to focus on them – who are affected by how we manage the co-existence of culturally and ethnically diverse populations. Indigenous minorities and marginalized groups have also fought for democratic citizen rights and cultural rights have been part of this struggle. Media play crucial democratic roles and they are also important for the maintenance of cultures and languages – not having access to channels of communication is disenfranchising. Media systems do not exist in a vacuum, they are the result of government policies and among these are ones intended to promote diversity. There are at least three dimensions of diversity that are relevant for media policy makers, and they are central to the arguments developed in this book – representation of various voices in society; access to a range of communication channels; and a wide range of choice. These different understandings of diversity are reflected in rationales that underpin media regulation, namely effective communication, political diversity and cultural diversity.

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It has been widely acknowledged that political as well as analytical discourses are characterized by a lack of clarity when it comes to the concepts of media diversity and media pluralism because the two terms tend to be used interchangeably.

[M]edia diversity is generally used in a more empirical or tangible meaning, whereas pluralism refers to a more diffuse societal value or an underlying orientation. In the broadest sense, the concept of media diversity refers to the heterogeneity on the level of contents, outlets, ownership or any other aspect of the media deemed relevant.

(Karpinen, 2007, pp. 9–10; cf. Raeijmaekers and Maesele, 2015)

I use the term ‘diversity’ throughout the book (apart from references to policy documents using the term ‘media pluralism’), both in relation to the broader normative framework of media and democracy and multiculturalism discussed in the first half of the book and in later explorations of diversity at the level of audiences, media workforce and outlets and media contents. This, however, does not mean that the second half of the book is divorced from the normative ideals discussed mainly in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Indeed, in the 1990s the normative ideals that influence media policy underwent ‘a marked pluralistic or anti-essentialist turn ... Instead of a singular notion of the public sphere, national culture or the common good, theorists today prefer stressing the plurality of public spheres, politics of difference, and the complexity of ways in which the media can contribute to democracy’ (ibid., p. 11). We should also keep in mind that media policies incorporate contradictory normative ideals; for example, the diversity of representations in the public sphere as well as the maintenance of a national culture into which the various groups in society are integrated (for more on this see Chapter 2 in particular).

In Western European countries public service broadcasting foregrounded the public interest in communication from its inception, while the United States supported competition in a marketplace of ideas that was independent from the intervention of the state. European media systems underwent significant changes when commercial broadcasting was introduced and the regulation of media markets was driven by economic rationales relating to the economic benefits of competitive markets which can involve interventions that intend to remove barriers of entry to markets or tackle concentration. The fact that media are profit-driven industries and important economic

players does not come as a surprise. After all, journalists and bloggers report on the box office takings of Hollywood movies on a daily basis, and some of these (although they should not be confused with profits) are staggering. For example, the 2014 Warner Bros re-make of *Godzilla* was heralded as a Box Office King, cashing in over \$100 million in its opening week solely on the US market (Box Office Mojo, 2015), while it cost an estimated \$160 million to make. Hollywood film studios, however, are not the only content makers that are on investors' radars. The revenues of the Finnish company Rovio – the makers of *Angry Birds* – grew more than 20 fold between 2010 and 2012 (from €6.5 million to €152.2 million) so the company's 2013 annual report (Rovio, 2014) was much anticipated and widely discussed. However, it is important to foreground that competition between media organizations has proved to be insufficient in achieving democratic and social goals because it does not ensure political or cultural diversity, so interventions such as lowering barriers to entry in broadcasting will not ensure optimal outcomes in those areas. Media operate on a dual market, they offer/sell a product to audiences and they sell the audience to advertisers, and we need to bear in mind that they are prone to market failure. This occurs when supply and demand in a market are unequal, as demonstrated by the detrimental impact of ownership concentration on free market competition. Reliance on income from advertising – a crucial funding mechanism for commercial media – reduces the supply of minority programmes because media content will not be made available to an audience that is not sizeable enough nor attractive enough (for example, a low income group) to appeal to advertisers. This is particularly pertinent in the case of ethnic minorities which are often small in size and frequently among low income groups. (In the US, for example, 'the wealth of white households was 13 times the median wealth of black households in 2013'; Kochhar and Fry, 2014.)

Media industries are also on the radar of politicians. They are important businesses with large numbers of employees and – as part of the creative economy – they have been the focus of strategies for job creation and economic growth. Moreover, industries that form part of the creative economy have been identified as providing possible new pathways for economic growth in developing countries (see for example UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). According to UK government data, in 2012 the creative economy accounted for one in twelve jobs or 5.2 per cent of the overall UK economy (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2014). Media outputs are bought and sold on international markets and – as US President Barack Obama noted in a 2013 fundraising

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speech at DreamWorks Studios (the creators of *Shrek* and *Madagascar* among many others) – Hollywood exports are important economically but also ‘believe it or not, entertainment is part of our American diplomacy’. The President went on to suggest that Hollywood transmitted US tolerance and diversity to a global audience through its stories:

They might not know the Gettysburg address, but if they’re watching an old movie – *Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner*, *The Mary Tyler Moore Show*, or *Will and Grace* and *Modern Family* – they’ve had a front row seat to our march towards progress. Even if their own nations haven’t made that progress yet.

(Carroll, 2013)

Media contents, the ways in which they are produced and the representations that they carry are also of interest to this book although – as already mentioned – my concern here is not predominantly with empirically-based content analyses. It might be presumed that a diverse media workforce will produce diverse contents, but this issue is not so straightforward, as highlighted in a UK-based campaign by the award winning actor Lenny Henry. His campaign for greater ethnic diversity in the British media industry focussed on the public service broadcaster BBC (Conlan, 2014), which indeed earmarked £2.1 million per year for a diversity creative talent fund (BBC, 2014). Although it is without any doubt important to increase the diversity of staff working in media industries (as multiculturalism policies intended to do), focusing solely on public service broadcasters may not be radical enough to achieve change.

It is, however, not only the number of media professionals of minority backgrounds that is of importance here. It has long been documented that women and minority groups face a glass ceiling in the media industries, so it is difficult for them to progress further in the hierarchy than middle management positions. Gender and ethnicity are socially constructed in media organizations – employees may not even be conscious of some entrenched practices that lead to the differential treatment of women or minorities. Also, there may be professional practices and values – for example in the case of journalism those of objectivity and impartiality – that make it difficult to introduce more inclusive ways of representing minorities. Entertainment programmes are not readily associated with democratic roles and policy makers have paid more attention to ensuring political diversity (through interventions in contents, for example) than to

representations in entertainment programmes. However, entertainment contents are important for a number of reasons, one of them being the creation of a space in which social values and identities are discussed. This is illustrated by the US sitcom *The Cosby Show* that received critical acclaim and was at the same time criticized for painting an unrealistic picture of an African American family and providing the majority population with an excuse for institutional discrimination.

As already mentioned, democratic governments have been reluctant to introduce policies that could be seen as intervening in media contents – after all freedom of speech is highly valued in these countries – and there have been only a very few signs that this approach may change. One such indication occurred in 2007 when the European Parliament invited the European Commission to propose measures for media pluralism at the European level. In the process the EU commissioned an *Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach* that will ‘develop a monitoring tool for assessing risks for media pluralism in the EU Member States and identifying threats to such pluralism based on a set of indicators, covering pertinent legal, economic and socio-cultural considerations’ (Europa, 2015a, p. viii). The inclusion of indicators of cultural diversity has been a major development because the EU normally works with a narrow understanding of media diversity as a competition objective and leaves issues of cultural identity and national culture as constructed and managed by public service broadcasters in the hands of the member states. The pilot project resulted in the so-called Media Pluralism Monitor tool that underwent pilot implementation in 2013 (Europa, 2015b). It is, however, questionable whether it will be implemented by member states. The Media Pluralism Monitor draws attention to the importance of international regulatory bodies when considering how diversity relates to media. Institutions such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have been developing policies related to cultural diversity and, of course, international organizations that deal with trade and competition are also relevant. It is evident that media policy making occurs at the national as well as transnational level and it is embedded in the relevant social and political frameworks. Policy making has evolved historically and reflects shifts in power relations among the various stakeholders. It is not my aim here to provide a comprehensive overview of media policy making within various national and transnational contexts. Instead, I provide examples from countries of the EU (including some of the ‘new democracies’) and the United States to illustrate

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the underlying policy rationales and regulatory mechanisms that relate to media diversity in terms of reflecting differences in society, access to channels of communication and finally contents. Whenever possible I attempt to provide at least a brief account of the historical background. As already explained Chapters 1, 2 and 3 focus on the larger normative frameworks, and the subsequent chapters provide more tangible accounts of diversity as reflected in media policy relating to diversity of audiences, media outlets, media producers and contents.

New media technologies have been explored for their potential of empowering marginalized groups in society and also for creating alternative public spheres – spaces in which minority groups can come together and discuss matters that are of importance to them. While the internet has not provided an easily available ready-made solution for dealing with inequalities in democratic societies, there are indications that some online spaces for debate actually provide meaningful alternatives to the national mediated public sphere. Yet, one should be cautious about the extent to which new media technologies increase the diversity of access to channels of communication because some of the most marginalized groups in society still face a digital divide which runs along gender, race and income lines, with the well-off and well-educated making better use of them. In addition, concerns have been raised about new media technologies fragmenting audiences and enabling a cosy retreat into echo chambers where one's circles include only those with the same views. The internet has also made the headlines for another reason – the so-called battle for net neutrality. The campaign that aimed to prevent the potential creation of a two-tier internet (a fast lane for the well-off and a slow one for others) highlighted its importance for democratic life and also the fact that, unlike broadcasting, regulation of the internet in the public interest has been largely absent.

The transnational movement of people to which I referred in the opening to the Introduction has been accompanied by the consumption of transnational media contents. This may seem to be a recent phenomenon but it dates back to the 19th century and the spread of telegraph which led to the establishment of the first corporations with an international scope and the first international media markets and news industries. The domination of US media products (summarized in phrases such as 'Americanization' or 'Dallasification', referring to the US television series *Dallas*) was opposed particularly vocally in the 1970s and 1980s with discussions about the one-way flow of media products at UNESCO. The concept of cultural imperialism dates back to the late 1960s and was based on the premise that US dominance

in media content production led to homogenization and threatened indigenous cultures. Although the concept of cultural imperialism has been largely replaced with that of globalization, scholarly interest in news flows and their unevenness persists. The emergence of alternative news agencies from outside 'the West' (such as Al Jazeera, a Qatari-owned television station which also broadcasts in English) has been linked to the creation of a contra-flow of news. The response of governments to the competitive threat of US media companies has been visible also at the pan-European level with the EU introducing media policies aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the European media industries. The 'Television without Frontiers' Directive of 3 October 1989 created a European common market in television broadcasts and introduced a protective measure – quotas on European works and works produced by independent companies. The EU has also attempted to create a pan-European broadcaster that would promote a European culture and identity, but without much success. Critics of the project point out that it worked with the same assumptions as national broadcasting, and these were inadequate within a transnational context.

Transnational media consumption has also been on the rise particularly since the 1980s when satellite television spread. This is partly due to technological developments that make it easy to access media from a variety of countries, including – in the case of migrants – their countries of origin. Research suggests that migrants enjoy a varied media diet and that transnational contents form only one part of it. In some cases migrants do not find enough contents that are pertinent to them in the mainstream media in their 'host' countries and hence they turn to alternatives, including minority or community media. However, concerns have been raised that this leads to ghettoization or the creation of parallel mediated public spheres and some see this as a sign of migrants' unwillingness to integrate into their new communities. Research into transnational media consumption poses significant issues, which mainly relate to finding conceptualizations that avoid the national frame. New media technologies also enable the creation of major global businesses. For example, three search engines dominate the global market – Google, Yahoo and Microsoft – indeed, in 2015 the European Commission launched an investigation into Google's possible abuse of its dominant position (European Commission, 2015). There are a number of online content providers that represent major business interests, including iTunes, Apple's music streaming service which in 2015 had 800 million accounts globally, and the content streaming service Netflix which reached 75 million users globally.

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The writing of this book was also framed by events that put the spotlight on ongoing racial inequalities and (institutional) racism in the United States. The killings and maltreatment of black Americans by law enforcement officers and the subsequent unrest in Chicago, Minneapolis, St Louis and other cities made headlines worldwide. A data journalism project by the UK-based newspaper *The Guardian* worked with statistical data for the first five months of 2015 and found that '29% of those killed by police, or 135 people, were black. Sixty-seven, or 14%, were Hispanic/Latino, and 234, or 50%, were white. ... The figures illustrate how disproportionately black Americans, who make up just 13% of the country's total population according to census data, are killed by police' (Swaine et al., 2015). Moreover, the data analysis showed that unarmed black Americans were twice as likely to be killed by the police as other unarmed people. In June 2015 the pastor and eight parishioners of the Mother Emanuel African American church were killed in a racially motivated attack in Charleston. In his eulogy for Reverend Clementa Pinckney US President Barack Obama spoke about the gap between the discourses of post-race and the actual lived experiences of African Americans in the United States (see Squires, 2014).

Much scholarly work has been devoted to exploring this gap and this book is intended as a contribution to debates about the inequalities that persist in democratic societies. However, the exploration of the (mediated) post-race discourse as such is not central to the arguments discussed in this book. Rather, the central question that the book addresses is the role of media diversity in sustaining a democratic public sphere/s and achieving that within the framework of policy approaches. The book thus builds on approaches and research usually associated with media economics, political economy, political communication and critical media industry studies. Partly due to the focus on policy and the ways in which media policies frame issues of diversity, the book may allude to approaches associated more closely with cultural studies but they are not central to its concerns.

Chapter outline

1 Living and managing diversity

This chapter takes a broader look at the concepts and developments that are crucial for understanding how we – as democratic societies – live diversity and how we manage the co-existence of various ethnic

and cultural groups in (super)diverse societies. It provides some statistical data to support the notion that migration has not only increased but its nature has also changed. The chapter traces the shift from policies of multiculturalism to integration that has been ongoing since the 1990s in a number of European countries, and it stresses that managing diversity must be linked to democratic citizenship in order to be inclusive. National culture plays a key role in any discussions about social inclusion, and the chapter argues that the shift away from multiculturalism signals both support for homogenizing understandings of national culture and a faulty understanding of identity as a zero-sum game in which migrants are expected to ‘shed’ their ‘original’ identity in order to be included. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the normative framework – how media should operate in order to attain certain social, democratic and other goals. The normative framework, the policies and regulations that guide the operation of media, are decided in the political and judicial arena, and policy responses can be influenced by the politicization of the issues under consideration (migration certainly represents one such issue). The chapter outlines three dimensions of diversity that are relevant for media policy makers – diversity as reflection of differences in society, diversity of access to channels of communication and finally diversity of contents.

2 Media diversity and the public service tradition

Broadcasting was from its early days understood as a public good in Western European democracies and that in the economic sense as well as in a more general philosophical sense as an activity that was to enhance the quality of communal life and contribute to the development of democratic culture. Public service broadcasting is underpinned by a need to provide diverse information to citizens and society at large, and is less concerned with the freedom of communicators. (In this respect it differs significantly from an understanding of the media as a market with competing information.) Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is relevant for explorations of public service broadcasting in three aspects at least: it stresses that the institutions and practices of mass communication are closely linked to the institutions and practices of democratic societies; a public sphere needs to be independent from the market as well as the state; and it requires a material basis. With the increasing diversification of European societies, public service broadcasting – a quintessentially national cultural institution – faces the challenge of greater inclusivity. The chapter argues that

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multiculturalism policies – despite their limitations linked to support for particular ethnic groups – aid a more inclusive type of broadcasting. The crisis of public service broadcasting has been linked to marketization (occurring in Europe since the 1980s), and a crisis of legitimacy as well as technological change. The chapter also considers whether the emergence of new media technologies has improved diversity of access to channels of communication, particularly in the light of evidence that the digital divide continues to exist along gender, race and income lines.

3 Media diversity and the marketplace of ideas

This chapter explores a competition-based approach to media and discusses whether such an approach is beneficial for social and cultural goals that are associated with the media. In the United States public service broadcasting did not develop as in Europe; from the beginning it was assumed that competition in the marketplace of ideas was the best approach to ensuring that the truth would emerge. However, concerns about the efficiency of this arrangement were raised early on, and in the 1940s the Fairness Doctrine was introduced to ensure that controversial issues were covered by the media and that contradictory opinions were represented in the marketplace of ideas. The chapter explores the economic characteristics of the media in order to develop the argument that competition-based approaches are not sufficient if we want to ensure that the media fulfil their democratic and social roles. Some of the shortcomings of a competition-based approach arise from the nature of media markets – media operate on a dual market and they are particularly prone to market failure. Interventions in the media market can, for example, aim to secure unhindered competition and deal with barriers to entry to markets but they are not sufficient guarantors of the social and democratic roles of the media. Clearly, media are also important businesses. Economic justifications for regulation play a significant role in this respect and result in benefits for consumers, although arguably these do not necessarily equate to benefits for citizens. The chapter also discusses advertising – a funding model that is crucial for media industries – and demonstrates its shortcomings in respect of the inclusion of minorities.

4 Transnationalization of media and audiences

Media contents travel across national borders and the internationalization of media and their dispersed audiences raises a number of

challenges for policy makers as well as scholars. The chapter discusses the development of the transnational media system which is characterized by international media spaces and flows that are no longer the sole preserve of Western-based conglomerates (for example, news organizations like Al Jazeera are seen as providing a contra-flow of news). The chapter considers imbalances in the global news flow and some of the historical developments in this respect. The emergence of a number of transnational media organizations has been driven by profit considerations, although in some cases – such as the pan-European broadcaster – the driving forces have also been linked to cultural identity. Policy makers have responded to the ‘Americanization’ or ‘Dallasification’ of European media by introducing measures aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the European media industries and at protecting them from the dominance of US contents. The chapter also considers the relevance of new media technologies within the framework of the transnationalization of media and audiences. The transnational consumption of media is closely linked to migrants’ (or minority populations’) construction of cultural identity and maintenance of a sense of belonging, but it has been interpreted as being detrimental to their integration into the ‘host’ society. The study of transnational media consumption poses particular methodological and conceptual challenges, some of which are related to the limitations of a ‘national container’ viewpoint that sees the national unit as the primary unit of analysis and makes transnational approaches highly problematic.

5 Diversity and media producers

The chapter explores the premise that a diversity of content producers translates seamlessly into a diversity of contents, or in other words, if there are significant numbers of media content producers who belong to/represent marginalized groups, their voices will be heard. This premise is explored in relation to professional journalism and two marginalized groups in particular – women and ethnic minorities. The marginalization of these groups within the journalistic profession and its consequences have been discussed for a number of years (not least in the 1960s in connection with race riots in the US). Women and ethnic minorities are numerically under-represented within the profession and they also face a glass ceiling which limits the positions to which they are promoted. (Women and representatives of ethnic minorities rarely take up positions in the top management of media companies, they often ‘get stuck’ in middle management.) The chapter argues that there

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is no simple quantifiable solution because gender and ethnic identities are also constructed within media organizations (organizations are not neutral in their treatment of gender and ethnic differences) and these professional values and practices (independently of who exercises them) can significantly limit the possibilities for improving the representation of women or ethnic minorities. The chapter also considers the ‘typecasting’ of ethnic minority journalists and the special expectations that they face, not only in representing the groups to which they belong but also in conducting their profession in a way that serves as a bridge between the minority and the majority populations.

6 Diverse societies, diverse contents

The final chapter explores diversity of contents and ways in which democratic societies manage it. Governments of democratic countries have been reluctant to introduce restrictions on contents, after all such measures are associated with totalitarian regimes. However, we find policies that either encourage the production of ‘good’ contents or suppress ‘bad’ ones. The chapter considers political diversity measures that relate to news and current affairs and argues that public service broadcasters are more closely regulated and scrutinized in this respect than their commercial counterparts. The focus of the chapter is broadcasting because it has been subjected to statutory regulation more readily than the press, which has traditionally been self-regulated in the United States and Western Europe, although the chapter briefly considers the principles of self-regulation. When exploring entertainment contents and their diversity, the chapter highlights examples of recent television series that are widely understood as examples of complex representations of diversity, including the Canadian series *The Little Mosque on the Prairie* (produced by a public service broadcaster) and the series *Orange is the New Black* (produced by Netflix). Netflix is an example of a commercial online streaming company that has become a competitor in the television content market. Arguably, this increase in the number of market players has contributed to greater diversity of choice and has also prompted traditional cable companies to compete (for example, ABC has commissioned a series about an Asian American family). The final section of the chapter considers the diversity of online contents, restricting the discussion to news and the supposed democratization of journalism which is the result of the greater involvement of ‘ordinary’ readers, listeners and viewers in decisions over contents and editorial choices.

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