# Contents

*List of Figures*  
vii  
*Acknowledgements*  
viii  
*Notes on Contributors*  
ix  

**Introduction**  
Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo  
1  

## Part I  Liberalism and International Relations Theory

1  Liberalism – In Theory and History  
   *Beate Jahn*  
   15  

2  Liberalism, Democracy, and International Law – An English School Approach  
   *Cornelia Navari*  
   33  

3  Realism Tamed or Liberalism Betrayed? Dystopic Liberalism and the International Order  
   *Nicholas Rengger*  
   51  

4  Rising Powers: A Realist Analysis  
   *Brian C. Schmidt and Nabarun Roy*  
   67  

## Part II  Liberalism and American Hegemony

5  The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents  
   *G. John Ikenberry*  
   91  

6  Power and the Liberal Order  
   *Michael Cox*  
   103  

7  American Statecraft in an Era of Domestic Polarisation  
   *Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz*  
   117  

8  Neoconservatism, Neoclassical Realism, and the Narcissism of Small Differences  
   *Jonathan D. Caverley*  
   145
Contents

9 The Liberal International Order Reconsidered

Christian Reus-Smit

167

Part III The Diffusion of Liberalism

10 The Paradox of Liberalism in a Globalising World

Philip G. Cerny

189

11 Debating China’s Rise in China

Ren Xiao

215

12 The Export of Liberalism to Russia

Margot Light

236

13 Liberal Theory and European Integration

Frank Schimmelfennig

253

14 Beyond Liberalism? Reflections from the Middle East

Louise Fawcett

270

Conclusion

Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo

288

Index

298
Introduction

Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian, and Ramon Pacheco Pardo

Liberalism – defined, in its broadest sense, as the Western paradigm of thought that posits the individual as the normative standard of political and economic activity – has long had a strange courtship with the discipline of International Relations (IR). Indeed, it could be argued that liberalism has come in and out of intellectual fashion, largely as a response to world events. After two world wars and the Great Depression, the founding fathers of the discipline of IR sought to distance themselves from the unfulfilled promises of Wilsonian liberalism by taking a hard and “scientific” look at power politics. A few decades later, its perceived “triumph over communism” in 1989 seemed to have provided it with a degree of ideological legitimacy uncommon in the history of political thought: both its twentieth-century totalitarian challengers lay at its feet, defeated. A “New World Order”, based on the now-unquestioned precepts of liberal democracy and neoliberal economics, would propel the world into an era of peace and prosperity where Marx’s historical dialectic would reach a premature end point (Fukuyama, 1993). If anything, this brave new world would be a boring place, bereft of ideological conflict and discussion, with technocratic governments “kept in line” through a combination of market forces and a US-led international society.

Twenty years later, hindsight – the critic’s perennial friend – allows us to marvel at the hubris displayed in the intensity of the moment. Liberalism’s detractors charge that the enlightenment’s foundational ideology failed to deliver its promise of individual freedom and knowledge through its reliance on and reification of the state; that it has provided the few with prosperity at the cost of environmental degradation and poverty for the many (Heynen et al., 2007); that it has left the world with an economic system that is forever teetering on the brink (Gill, 2012); that it has fundamentally remained a Euro-centric imposition on a culturally and ideologically still-diverse world (Hobson, 2012); and that it has threatened the fundamental right to life of the many – mostly in the global South – who have fallen victim to liberal forms of warfare (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001; Mbembé and Meintjes, 2003).
Gaps between theory and practice have widened as national and domestic norms and institutions are confronted with the War on Terror (Desch, 2007). Those who presented the International Economic Order as the road to global prosperity face one of the worst financial meltdowns in living memory. Cosmopolitan-inspired interventionism is juxtaposed with the failure to prevent and react to humanitarian crises, and top-down democratising projects around the world have either stagnated or reversed (Jahn, 2007a, 2007b). Critics charge that the world is more “in flux”, with less agreed-upon rules than ever before, with the (re-)emergence of distinctly illiberal great powers pointing to new divides between autocracies and liberal democracies in the post-Cold War world (Gat, 2007). To its detractors, Liberalism seems to be an ideology with universal pretensions, but without universal answers – as the hapless fates of its totalitarian predecessors have shown, not a desirable position over the longer term.

This book was born at the start of the greatest crisis of Liberalism since the Interbellum. Marking the twentieth anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the October 2009 Millennium Conference – entitled “After Liberalism?” – presented a unique opportunity to put recent developments in IR into theoretical perspective. As turning points in IR offer novel opportunities to take stock of dominant discourse and thought, drawing inspiration from previous reflective works on historical change in the discipline, notably G. John Ikenberry’s After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Rules after Major Wars (2001) and Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), the objective of the 2009 Millennium Conference and Special Issue was to raise questions about the direction of liberalism in this new century of uncertainties. It evaluated the significance of recent events, in particular the financial crisis, the rise of regional powers, the humanitarian fallout, and the international response thereto, as well as the ability of IR theory to make sense of the liberal order today.

The 2009 Conference and Special Issue inspired our subsequent proposal for this edited volume. After reflecting on the discussions generated by the conference and the chapters presented in the Special Issue, we identified important subthemes and implications for future consideration. Prominent among these was the remarkable staying power of liberalism: its ability to reinvent itself to fit the current order, albeit in different guises. Whether, as G. John Ikenberry argues, liberal structures will retain a benign form even as US authority wanes, or whether, as posited by other contributors in this volume, liberalism will react to systemic change through greater hegemonic control, liberal ideology has found a way to adapt in both theory and practice. That liberalism’s robustness lies precisely in its malleability, in its consistent ability to metamorphosise in a world perennially in flux, struck us as an important implication for future reflection.
This edited volume will address precisely this theme. If liberalism’s strength lies in its ability to reinvent itself, this raises important theoretical, empirical, and normative questions for the student of IR. Part I deals with liberalism as theory – What is the continued relevance of liberalism as an explanatory theory of IR? Are critiques of liberalism sufficiently effective in their current form? Part II looks at liberalism and American hegemony – To what extent is American hegemony expressed in the form of a liberal international order? Does domestic polarisation spell the end of support for this order? To what extent will it be able to survive in this new century? Part III examines the diffusion of liberalism – What is liberalism’s role in the international political economy? How does it feed into the policies and world views of established and rising great powers – China, Russia, and the European Union – as well as recent political upheavals in the Middle East? The concluding chapter sums up and reflects on the larger themes of the volume.

In Chapter 1, Beate Jahn questions the narrative of a “rise and fall” of liberalism in IR theory. The rise and fall of liberalism reflects the experience of liberalism in IR theory, rather than its fate as a political project. The penchant of liberal theory for dichotomies and oppositions – between the domestic and the international, theory and practice, and between liberalism’s political, economic, and normative dimensions – fails to grasp liberalism’s core premises. Jahn develops a Lockean understanding of liberalism, which highlights continuities of the liberal political project from the Cold War period into the present. Liberalism is dynamic and varied. While democracy is today widely seen as a core characteristic of liberalism, liberals were historically cautious about democracy promotion. Jahn subsequently discusses the intimate link between liberalism and colonialism. Current IR theory fails to recognise power politics as a constitutive element of liberalism. Jahn concludes that we are likely to see more liberalism, yet in a different guise. She identifies the “successful democratisation of liberalism”, which forces governments to pursue economic growth to “provide the population with the economic benefits that maintain their stake in the system”, as the major historical change in liberalism. The intimate linking of liberalism and democracy, however, has not resolved a core tension – centred on the fact that the maintenance of liberal policies in some parts of the world has been built on the illiberal expropriation of others. Today, this expropriation takes place in the international sphere, where the “political fallout of these economic policies has to be borne by other states”. Liberalism is best recognised as a political project, carried out through the differential treatment of liberal and non-liberal actors in the domestic and the international spheres.

In Chapter 2, Cornelia Navari argues that while liberalism may be declining, democracy is on the rise. While many have pinpointed Wilsonian liberalism as the origin of a democracy norm, Navari argues that democratic
governance only emerged as an international norm with the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1989. She states that this mischaracterisation has to do with the influence of constructivist theory on IR, which focuses scholarship on norm construction and norm entrepreneurs. Navari draws on the English School as a helpful tradition with which to identify settled and emerging norms. She argues that an emerging democracy norm has significant implications for international society, rendering for example the possibility that democratic states no longer recognise the outcomes of elections in non-democratic states, and justifying military intervention into such states. While the implications of a democracy norm remain up for question, Navari argues that democracy is gaining determinate meaning in international society by setting a standard of regular elections between at least two competing political parties, which are fairly monitored. While human rights advocates call for a deeper norm of full political rights, Navari identifies most of the activity surrounding the creation of a democracy norm as one of setting standards. With the exception of the European context, Navari claims that the international standard is not being enlarged to allow external interference into domestic political processes. While the existing democracy norm has gained a wide institutional backing among international and regional organisations, thus far, there has been more reference to democracy promotion rather than protection, and more emphasis on humanitarian rather than democratic intervention.

In Chapter 3, Nicholas Rengger examines what he calls “dystopic liberalism”. He distinguishes dystopic liberals from liberals who believe in one superior way of life and focus on justice, rights, and obligations, such as John Rawls. Dystopic liberalism, in contrast, is pluralistic in its recognition and endorsement of multiple modes of life. Rengger draws on Judith Shklar’s “liberalism of fear” to develop an understanding of dystopic liberalism as guided by scepticism and suspicion of utopianism. Dystopic liberals seek as their end the protection of personal freedom. They take a prudent approach to IR, which often overlaps with their realist counterparts. Rengger questions the ability of dystopic liberalism to “deliver what it promises”. There is an ambiguity running through dystopic liberalism, where scepticism and liberalism push in contradictory directions. For Rengger, scholars must ultimately take a stance. While scepticism and liberalism run hand in hand and feed each other in the work of Shklar, Rengger argues that for other dystopic liberals, scepticism trumps liberalism. For Shklar, in particular, liberalism is rare and fragile – the conditions able to support liberalism are far and in between – linking realists and liberals in their view of the human condition as essentially “tragic”. Rengger questions this core assumption: “...human life is not ‘tragic’, it is just life; and equally, one should see political life not as a ‘Dystopia’ but just as political life in all of its variety and messiness”. He concludes that political philosophy should be sceptical first and liberal second. Drawing on Santayana,
skepticism is the “ chastity of the intellect and should not be relinquished too readily”.

In Chapter 4, Brian Schmidt and Nabarun Roy analyse liberalism as a theory of IR by dissecting its approach to the rise and fall of great powers, while providing an extensive comparison with the manner in which realism describes this reality of world politics. Schmidt and Roy show that liberalism and realism concur in important ways. Both theories emphasise engagement with rising powers and avoidance of unnecessary confrontation. However, Schmidt and Roy explain, liberalism and realism have significant differences in the analysis of the impact of rising powers in the international system. Liberals acknowledge that the rise of new powers such as China and India today challenges the existing liberal international order, but they are not especially worried about this because they do not believe any major disruption to the order to be likely. In contrast, realists, whether classical, structural, or neoclassical, are acutely concerned about possible disruptions to the international order caused by the rise of new great powers. This has led to a debate within realism that is missing among liberals, with realists agreeing on a prognosis of instability in the international system, but not on the policy prescriptions for today’s hegemon, the United States. For realists, the existing liberal international order will not necessarily integrate a rising great power; thus, appeasement, balance of power, containment, negotiated settlement, peaceful change, preventive war, and retrenchment are all available policy choices for the hegemon in response to the rise of new powers.

In Chapter 5, G. John Ikenberry – following his keynote speech at the 2009 Millennium Conference – responds to a growing literature arguing that the liberal order is under challenge. This literature foresees a return to multipolarity and new forms of conflict, especially between autocratic and liberal-democratic states. It emphasises historical grievances, with powers such as China and Russia reclaiming their international role. Ikenberry posits that the current crisis is one of American dominance, rather than being one of the liberal order itself. Power and authority will shift, yet there is no ideological alternative to liberalism. Building on his earlier work, he argues that the current American-led international liberal order is defined by its transparent rules-based character. States today have more in common both in the threats they face and in their interests. A gradual normative reorientation in favour of a universal conception of human rights and the “responsibility to protect”, greater “security interdependence” based on more diffuse and complex transnational threats, and common interests – especially in health and environment – will likely increase demands for cooperation and institutionalisation. Where, for more than half a century, the United States has governed the liberal international order, today, rising states seek a greater position within this order. “The challenge of the liberal international order today is to manage this transition in its ownership and governance”. The crisis of liberalism is a result of its success, rather than its failure. Instead
of an E.H. Carr crisis, where realist critiques of the liberal project bear fruit, for Ikenberry, the current crisis is a Karl Polanyi crisis, where “liberal governance is troubled because dilemmas and long-term shifts in the order can only be solved by rethinking, rebuilding, and extending that liberal order”. Ikenberry argues that this crisis of liberalism is ultimately likely to produce more liberalism.

In Chapter 6, Michael Cox examines the future of the liberal international order in view of the multiple challenges it has faced in recent years: the post-9/11 conflicts, the financial crisis, and the rise of China. Rejecting the notion that the 1990s marked a high water mark of a Liberalism now in decline, Cox adopts the “unfashionable” position that it is, in fact, not in crisis, given the persistence of democracy, global capitalism, globalisation, and the fact that “the American people actually decided to reject many of the policies associated with the Bush administration by electing the most liberal (and the first black) President in the history of the republic”. Cox considers not only material but also “soft” power, including Research and Development spending and the concentration of leading educational institutions in the United States. Despite rising China’s economic prowess and increasingly active role in the Global South, for Cox, the Chinese lack a conscious international strategy; moreover, while China may command respect, it has shown itself less strong in the sphere of soft power, with few imitators. In sum, the system of power underpinning the liberal order may be battered and less confident than at the end of the Cold War, but it retains enormous staying power.

In Chapter 7, Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz document the decline of support for liberal internationalism in the country that created it – the United States. Kupchan and Trubowitz argue that this decline has consequences not only for American foreign policy, but also for the international system as a whole. They trace this decline not to the policies implemented by the George W. Bush administration, as commonly believed, but to the end of a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy emanating from the threat posed by illiberal states, be it Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union. Absent the geopolitical and domestic conditions that sustained liberal internationalism – above all engagement in multilateral institutions – this approach to foreign policy has been eroded. The absence of bipartisanship at the domestic level hampers those seeking the restoration of liberal internationalism as the default foreign policy of the United States, as proved by the difficulties of the Barack Obama administration in doing so. Kupchan and Trubowitz explain that, given the distinct possibility that liberal internationalism will not enjoy broad domestic support for the foreseeable future, the United States has to design and implement a new grand strategy. This grand strategy should be more modest in terms of its goals and means, more pragmatic from an American point of view, so as to avoid creating more divisions at the domestic level. In its liberal internationalist form,
liberalism has been weakened as a foreign policy option in the United States and is unlikely to return any time soon.

In Chapter 8, Jonathan D. Caverley also focuses on liberalism as a theory of IR by examining other theories with which it has some prima facie similarities and differences. To this end, Caverley looks at neoconservatism and neoclassical realism in the context of US politics. The former is yet to be universally accepted as a valid theoretical approach for the analysis of IR, but, as Caverley shows, there are a number of central tenets to neoconservatism that allow it to be considered as a distinct and codified theory as well. Above all, neoconservatives believe in the spread of democracy to enhance stability in the international system. This would put them in line with traditional liberal thinking, were it not for one crucial difference: their belief on the use of force in achieving this goal. As Caverley argues, this specific feature brings it closer to realism’s latest incarnation – its neoclassical variant. For while neoclassical realism does not specifically advocate spreading democracy through military means, it does share with neoconservatism a starting assumption about the nature of the international system being defined by (potentially violent) competition among states in an anarchic world. Neoconservatism is thus best described as a theory advocating a liberal goal – the spread of democracy – within a realist world view. The debate between neoconservatism and neoclassical realism that emerged as a result of the policies of the George W. Bush administration – especially the launch of the Iraq War – thus camouflages a shared world view that does not coincide with liberalism’s.

In Chapter 9, Christian Reus-Smit critiques Ikenberry’s conception of international order as a common set of rules and practices as incomplete: for Reus-Smit, institutionalised power and authority and a framework for constitutional social norms are additional characteristics. While Ikenberry puts less emphasis on the “purposive” dimension of international order, Reus-Smit argues that great powers construct orders to preserve their own security and peace. There is a contradiction in Ikenberry’s conception of order as stability versus order as institutionalised governance between states. Smit argues that Ikenberry takes a sovereign state system as given, neglecting the extent to which the rise of the liberal order occurred “hand in hand with a reordering of how the international system’s political units stood in relation to one another”. Where Ikenberry casts the United States as the “sole architect and builder”, Reus-Smit emphasises the agency of post-colonial states in driving the post-1945 normative revolution of self-determination, noting the United States’ opposition to self-determination alongside European colonial powers. Drawing on Ruggie’s embedded liberalism, the development of the liberal international order reflects broadly shared legitimate goals. Instead, what is novel in today’s liberal order is the notion of universal sovereignty as the sole legitimate type of political organisation. Like Jahn, Reus-Smit identifies tensions between the sovereign state system and cosmopolitanism. Reus-Smit
highlights the “Millian” quality of the liberal order and the perpetuation of a distinction between “civilised” and “barbarous” nations. “One of the great accomplishments of post-1945 anti-colonialism was to delegitimise not only the institution of empire, but also this explicitly racist division of the world’s peoples into civilised and barbarian”. Constitutional norms of ethical cosmopolitan universalism and “hierarchy without empire” push in different directions. While empire now has a stigma, hierarchy has not disappeared, but must be informal and negotiated.

In Chapter 10, Philip G. Cerny examines liberalism by focusing on a phenomenon that many consider to be one of its clearest manifestations: globalisation. Cerny argues that globalisation both enhances and weakens liberalism. On the one hand, globalisation creates new pathways closely related to the traditions of Enlightenment liberalism and the pluralisation of social orders. On the other hand, globalisation strengthens cross-border manifestations of collective action, thus undermining the states that IR considers to be the birthplace of liberalism. Cerny explains that five trends are the most prominent result of globalisation: a reduction of war and violence, economic interdependence, social inclusion and multiculturalism, new ideologies, and institutional pluralisation. These trends can be described as simultaneously neoliberal and neomedieval. They are neoliberal insofar as a new international political economy built upon cross-cutting institutional and market relations is developing. This renders obsolete important political and economic functions of the state, which therefore might cease to be the foundational point of contemporary international politics. These trends are concurrently neomedieval in that competing multi-nodal political processes creating an overlap of boundaries and jurisdictions are becoming entrenched. Therefore, the state is once again undermined, further weakening liberalism. But globalisation, Cerny argues, need not spell the end of the state and liberalism with it. States can become part of multi-level systems of governance, bringing together sub-state, state, and supra-state actors. Meanwhile, liberalism in its Enlightened and plural forms is being reinforced in the form of the just-mentioned neoliberalism.

In Chapter 11, Ren Xiao analyses the liberal and realist aspects of the rise of China through the prism of the “peaceful rise”, and later the “peaceful development” conceptualisations. Ren argues that the origin and articulation of “peaceful rise” and its eventual transformation into “peaceful development” demonstrate that China is not an entirely realist power. Indeed, Ren maintains, China has increasingly displayed foreign policy actions that are distinctly liberal. In particular, China is involved in a growing number of multilateral diplomatic initiatives, unafraid to engage with other countries and even to take on a leading role. This reflects domestic steps towards democracy, the free market, and an open society. In this context, there was some internal debate about whether China’s more prominent role in international politics should be labelled “peaceful rise” or “peaceful
development”. The latter was finally preferred, mainly because it served not only to soothe critics of China’s rise, but also to show that China does not wish to seek hegemony or challenge the existing international order. Ren thus argues that the rise of China is, above all, the rise of a liberal China. Contrary to realist assertions, this rise is unlikely to lead to a confrontation between great powers, militarily or otherwise. Even China’s military build-up, which many see as a means to prepare for war, has led to deeper engagement in multilateral security issues. China’s self-interest is based on a liberal, not realist, understanding of international politics.

In Chapter 12, Margot Light examines why liberalism has failed to take root in Russia. While past historical epochs and events have indeed shaped Russian political culture, more effective elucidations for Liberalism’s still-born status can be found in the country’s recent past: firstly, in the nature of the reforms undertaken in the 1990s and the consequences of those reforms for the majority of the Russian people and, secondly, in the mistakes that were made in the democracy promotion programmes launched by the United States and the European Union in those years. The failure of liberalism to take root can be explained through an unbalanced preoccupation with neoliberal economic reforms, a determination to prevent – through undemocratic means if necessary – the return to power of the Communists and the more general failure to promote robust liberal-democratic institutions. There was, consequently, nothing inevitable about the failure of liberalism in Russia. The chapter begins with a brief account of the rise and decline of liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s; a second section describes the neoliberal economic reforms implemented in Russia in the early 1990s and examines their economic and social consequences. The argument then turns to the problems that arose in promoting democracy in Russia and the rise and demise of liberalism in Russian foreign policy, before studying the retreat from liberalism and neoliberalism under President Vladimir Putin, and concluding with a brief evaluation of the liberalising potential of the 2011 post-election demonstrations.

In Chapter 13, Frank Schimmelfennig criticises the truncated nature of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) as an explanatory approach to European Integration. Emanating from neoliberal institutionalism and including domestic politics in its accounts of European integration – in typically liberal fashion – it nevertheless builds on only one single variant of liberal theory: commercial liberalism. As a consequence, LI neglects the many facets of European integration that derive from the nature of the European Union as an ideational liberal community, where fundamental developments cannot be adequately theorised and explained in isolation from liberal values, norms, and identities. The author proposes a move beyond the limitations of commercial LI, formulating building blocks and hypotheses for an alternative, ideational liberal variant of the theory. A liberal international community is then defined as a community of states governed by
liberal norms, including peace, multilateralism, and democracy, and based on a post-national, civic identity: ideational liberalism argues that these norms, rather than economic interests or material bargaining power, shape the constitutional developments in such a community. The chapter provides three brief case studies on Eastern enlargement to substantiate its argument, representing three different dimensions of integration (enlargement, institutional deepening, and policy integration) that have remained unexplained by “orthodox” LI. Thus, the role of democratic values is seen as crucial in driving Eastern enlargement; similarly, the parliamentarisation of EU decision-making processes is tied to the varying democratic national identities of the member states; these same variations in national identity are posited as underlying the differentiated levels of integration between member states.

In Chapter 14, Louise Fawcett starts out by probing the historical record for a better understanding of the Middle East’s experience of liberalism: challenging ahistorical and simplifying assumptions about the region’s “illiberal” past, she seeks to construct an alternative narrative based around key liberal or liberalising episodes from the late Ottoman period to the present. Liberalism’s history in the Middle East was by no means continuous, its progress marked by crisis, retrenchment, reform, and renewal. Against this background – one of stunted or interrupted liberalism – the chapter goes on to examine the relevance and appropriateness of some of the dominant “universal” pretensions of liberalism, those advocated and practised by Western liberal democracies, in light of the regional experience. Here, it suggests that while Arab, Iranian, and Turkish liberals – both Muslim and non-Muslim – have undoubtedly embraced the language of liberalism and pluralism, it is also likely that any modern Middle Eastern reading of liberalism will look different in some important aspects. These differences, it is argued, relate to timing – the region’s first embrace of liberalism came relatively late; culture – there was and is a tension between certain universal logics of liberalism and local cultures and practices; and, finally, external factors, which have had contradictory push-pull effects. In this regard, the Middle East is seen as by no means unique – other states and regions have embraced liberalism at different times and in different ways – though it has perhaps been unusual in the longevity of authoritarianism and persistence of illiberal practices.

References

# Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM treaty</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyssinian crisis</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounting standards</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Democracy Act</td>
<td>46–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>76, 113, 129, 131–2, 137–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>113–14, 270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>45, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Liberalism</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda for Democratisation</td>
<td>39, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aggression</td>
<td>43, 99, 123, 183, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadinejad</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP, see Islamist Justice and Development Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, Ben</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>154, 160, 278, 293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambiguity</td>
<td>4, 56, 60, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American, Inc</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Voter</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America, see United States</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchical Society</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anarchic world</td>
<td>7, 146–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Brooke</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-American sentiment</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiballistic Missile Treaty</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-colonialism, movements of</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-colonial struggles</td>
<td>174, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-Communist revolutions</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-globalisation movement</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-trust regulation</td>
<td>197, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-utopianism</td>
<td>54–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-utopian liberalism</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appeasement</td>
<td>5, 68, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Awakening</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Human Development Reports</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab–Israel conflict</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Spring</td>
<td>33, 193, 270–1, 273, 278, 280–2, 284–5, 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab version of liberalism</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arbitration procedure</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>archipelago form of liberalism</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aron, Raymond</td>
<td>53, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aspirational law</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also positive law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asymmetric information</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataturk, Kemal</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenian power</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenian version of democracy</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Alliance</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Charter</td>
<td>54, 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>25–6, 111, 180, 218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher education</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land rights</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property distribution</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarianism</td>
<td>191, 276, 278, 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian liberalism</td>
<td>198, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian states</td>
<td>16, 277, 288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>277–8, 280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentary elections</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bail-out scheme</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance of power politics</td>
<td>72–3, 75, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balance of power theory</td>
<td>76, 83, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bandwagon</td>
<td>75–6, 80, 156, 224, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank for International Settlements</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bankruptcy</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bargaining power</td>
<td>256–7, 263, 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>10, 253, 263, 267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing Consensus</td>
<td>198, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berezovsky, Boris</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin blockade</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Wall</td>
<td>2, 134, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beslan, hostage crisis</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bill of rights</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bipartisan</td>
<td>117–19, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consensus</td>
<td>6, 118, 121, 124, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>120–1, 123, 130, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internationalism</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
bipartisanship, 6, 117–31, 136–7, 139
liberal internationalism, 121–2
trends, 120
black box, 80–1
Black Mass, 63
Boao Forum, 222–3
body bag syndrome, 203
Bolton, John, 129
bond rating agencies, 201
Brazil, 48, 95, 100, 107–8, 111–12, 194, 201, 219, 221
democracy, 48
higher education, 111
per capita income, 107
spending on defence, 112
Bretton Woods, 20, 93, 119, 122–3, 175
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), 107, 194, 216, 221
Britain, see United Kingdom
budgetary competition, 257
Bush, George W, 128–9, 277, 279
Bush administration, 6, 105, 129, 131, 139, 146

C. A. W. Manning, 36
see also English school
Canada, 25, 111, 180
higher education, 111
land rights, 25
capitalism, 16, 104, 191, 194, 197, 292
capitalist states, 16, 209
Carinthian plebiscite, 34
Cartagena Protocol, 42
Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs), 257
Central Party school, 222
Central Treaty Organisation, 124
The Century of Total War, 59
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 35
Charter of Paris, 35, 40
Chechnya war, 246
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 244
China
allies, 114
and ASEAN trade, 220
assertive, 224
authoritarian, 105
autocratic revival, 91
bilateral FTAs, 218
China threat thesis, 224
citizen’s life, 107
civil–military relations, 230
clash between liberalism and autocracy, 92
communist-led, 104, 113
confrontational policies towards, 84
confrontation with US, 78
contribution to the UN, 221
conversion of, 294
developmental path, 224
domestic policy, 223
economic prowess, 6, 69, 225
economic rise, 113
expansionism, 122
foreign currency reserves, 218
foreign policy, 221–2
free market, 217–18
GATT membership negotiations, 230
GDP, 106
global division of labour, 219
globalisation process, 227
great-power, 291
growing economic engagement, 291
higher education, 111
hukou system, 219
hyper growth, 216
influential voices, 114
international trade, 81
largest exporter, 218
liberal, 9, 215–16, 232
liberal-democratic development, 216–17
military modernisation, 228–31
multilateral diplomacy, 220–1
national power, growth of, 227
overseas interests, 229
peaceful development thesis, 224–5
peaceful rise thesis, 221–5
peacekeeping cost, 221
per capita income, 107, 227
poverty, 226
reform, 217
regional hegemony, 291
rise of, 6, 8–9, 68–9, 215–16, 232, 290
rising state, 77, 104
self-identity, 225–8
self-interest, 9
service trade sectors, 217
single-party rule, 291
socialist market economy system, 217
Index

China – continued
soft-balance against US, 76
spending on defence, 112
strategic goal, 227
super-rich class, 108
trade, 110, 231
transition phase, 226
UN Security Council member, 221
WTO membership, 217–18, 230
China model, 216
China Reform Forum, 222
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 217
civil and political rights
covenant on, 180
optional protocol, 177
civil rights movement, 127
cognitive liberalism, 19
colonialism, 3, 17, 25–6, 291–2
colonial policies, 26
colour revolutions, 247
commercial liberalism, 9, 253–4, 256–9, 262, 266–7
differentiated integration, 258–9
enlargement, 257–8
parliamentarisation, 258
Commission of Human Rights, 39–40
communism, 96, 118, 122, 124, 237, 242, 294
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 237
comparative advantage, 193, 245
compensating losers, 200, 210
competition state, 199–200, 208
complex interdependence, 195, 289
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 128, 130, 138
conflict prevention, mechanism for, 43
conflict resolution, nonviolent, 19
Confucious Institutes, 113
congressional delegation, 133–4
conservative coalition, 125
Conservative Democrats, 125, 133, 135
Constitutional Democratic Party (KADETS), 236
constitutionalism, 129, 270, 274, 277, 280
constitutional revolution, 274
costitutive elements, 21, 27, 29, 170
containment, 5, 68, 84
conventional liberalisms, 56
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 34
corporate governance, 201
corruption perceptions index, 242
cosmopolitanism, 7, 168, 181, 183–4
embedded, 181–4
inspired interventionism, 2
institutionalised, 177
Council of Europe, 35, 40–1
Council on Foreign Relations, 135
CRF, see China Reform Forum
CTBT, see Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
cultural bonds, 202
cultural framework, 20
Davos report, 107
debt crisis, 296
Declaration of Human Rights, 34
Declaration of Lisbon, 48
defence modernisation, 229
democracy
aspiring, 48
associated, 41
Athenian version, 159
characteristics, 46–7
consolidated, 47, 243, 264
cosmopolitan, 207
crisis of, 114
culture of, 43
democratic intervention, 45–6
economic, 242
emerging norms, 39
features of, 40
genuine, 40
humanitarian intervention, 45–6
ideal of, 42
international law, 47–9
liberal market, 16
promotion, 3–4, 16, 18, 20, 28–9, 41–4, 46, 284, 292
protection, 41–3
representative, 41–2, 265, 278
role of UN, 44
Russia, 242–4
sanctions in aid of, 43–5
social, 153, 239
United States, and, 46–7
democratic consolidation, 263
democratic credentials, 274
democratic domino theory, 156
democratic freedoms, 248
democratic governance, 34, 41, 45, 274, 283
democratic intervention, 4, 45–6
democratic law, 46
democratic liberal, 27
democratic mechanisms, 159
democratic peace thesis, 17, 51, 70
democratic regimes, 16
democratic Russia, 239–40
democratic states, 4, 33, 39, 49, 69, 151, 153, 155, 244
democratic transformation, 272
democratic transitions, 191, 267
democratic vote, 34
democratic weakness, 151–2
democratisation, 17, 24, 39, 42, 48, 97, 145, 152, 156, 160, 189, 202–3, 277, 293
advance, 48
defined, 42
lack of enthusiasm for, 160
demographic crisis, 242
Denmark, 34, 259, 265–6, 268
convergence criteria, 259
deregulation, 16, 199, 255
desecuritisation, 203
developed world, 192
differentials theory, 83–4
differentiated integration, 258–9, 265–6
disaster relief operations, 230–1
dispute settlement, 28
divided liberalism, 16–21
elitist liberalism, 18
imperialism, 19
institutional liberalism, 19
internationalism, 19
pacifism, 19
partial conceptions, 20
radical liberalism, 18
Dodd-Frank Act, 206
Doha Round, 228
domestic law, 37–8
domestic liberalism, 24, 27
domestic polarisation, 117–41
bipartisanship, 119–26
liberal internationalism, 121–2
dominant state ideology, 39
Duties Beyond Borders, 60
dynamic differentials theory, 83–4
dystopic liberalism, 4, 51–65, 293–4
advocates of, 56
dystopic character, 65
faces of, 52–7
fate of, 62
international order, and, 57–61
liberalism without order, 61–5
political moralism, 53
E.H. Carr crisis, 6, 101, 293
Earl of Shaftesbury, 25
Eastern enlargement, 10, 253–4, 257–8, 263–4
East Timor, 33
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 43, 45
economic crisis, 92, 109, 111, 289
economic freedom, 239
economic indicators, 107
economic interdependence, 8, 17, 19, 150, 195–9, 204
economic policies, 3, 16, 18, 20, 27, 29, 255, 292
economic reforms, 9, 237, 240–3
efficient market, 196–7
egalitarian liberals, 52
Egypt, 249, 270–1, 273–6, 280–1, 284
constitutional court, 277
multiparty politics, 276
Muslim Brotherhood, 280
political pluralism, 271
elections
free and fair, 47–8
presidential, 129, 136, 244, 249–50
electoral processes, 43, 45, 47–8, 277
elitist liberalism, 18
embedded cosmopolitanism, 168, 181–4
embedded financial orthodoxy, 200
embedded liberalism, 7, 175
embedded nation-states system, 206
engagement model, 81–2
English school, 36–8
international law, 37–8
settled norm, 36
enlightenment liberalism, 8, 204
Eurobarometer, 265
euro crisis, 267–8
European colonial powers, 7
European Community (EC), 257
European conception of democracy, 41
European Court of Justice, 261
European integration, 9, 253–9, 261–3, 265–6, 268, 288
European Parliament (EP), 254
Europe’s colonial powers, 177
Europe’s imperial powers, 179
Euro-sceptic countries, 266
Euro-sceptic electorates veto power, 263
Euro-scepticism, 265
Eurozone, 254, 259, 267, 296
existential threats, 203
expropriation, 3, 24, 26–7
extensive development, 198

Faces of Injustice, 56, 63
fair elections, 40–1, 45
fascism, 118, 124, 154, 158–9
totallyitarian extremes of, 195
February 1917 Revolution, 236
financial crisis, 2, 6, 29, 92, 110, 138, 189, 198, 200–1, 211, 220
financial orthodoxy, embedded, 200
Financial Stability Board, 199
fiscal crisis, 139
fiscal pacts, 267–8
foreign direct investment (FDI), 106, 110, 219
foreign policy, 6, 27–8, 80, 117–18, 120–1, 123, 127, 130, 137, 147, 152, 245
liberal, 20, 27–8
moral, 148, 151
theory of, 160, 255
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 221
Forum on East Asia–Latin America Cooperation, 221
France, 111, 119, 131–2, 180, 215, 274, 295
Franco-German antagonism, 94
free markets, 8, 16, 19, 27, 150, 191, 195–6, 217–18, 221, 232, 239–40
free rider, 225–6
free society, 104
see also capitalism
free trade agreements, 136, 218
French revolutions, 191
funding priorities, 136

G20, 95, 221, 296
Gaidar, Yegor, 239–40
GATT, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gemeinschaft, 190, 202
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 27, 121
Geneva Convention, 104
Germany
culturally homogenous, 180
engagement model, 81
foreign policy, 6
hegemony, 72
higher education, 111
international politics, 34
Iraq War, opposition of, 131
liberal internationalism, 118
macroeconomic preferences, 267
modernisation revolution, 198
post-war, 94
rise in power, 72–3
Glasnost, 238
global civil society, 201, 204, 207
global economic crisis, 249
global governance, 140, 199–200, 204–5
Global Trends 2025, 91
global village, 193
global warming, 98
global war on terror, 159, 290, 293
glocalisation, 193, 204
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 237–8
Gray, John, 52, 63
Great Depression, 1, 92, 115, 118, 198
great power concert, 94
great-power rivalry, 78
great-power war, 67, 72, 82–3, 95–6, 171, 289
Green Movement, 281
Grey, John, 270, 280
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 140, 218
Gulf of Aden, 231
Gulf War, 277
gun belt, 134
Gusinsky, Vladimir, 246

Hague Conferences, 175
hard-line policies, 79, 84
Hatschek, Julius, 36–7
H-bomb, 74
health pandemics, 98
hegemonic theory of war, 83
hierarchy without empire, 8, 168, 181, 183–4
Hong Kong, 108, 111
House of Commons, 25
hukou system, 219
humanitarian intervention, 16, 28–9, 45–6, 291–3
human rights
bodies, 180
covenants on, 180
forums, 179
fundamental, 180, 183
fundamental freedom and, 41
gradual shift, 97
individual freedom and, 16
international law, 180
international regime, 176–7, 183
in Iraq, 104
liberal, 260
negotiations, 181
new principles, 180–1
proactive protection, 16
promotion of, 172, 174
protection, 262, 296
and responsibility to protect, 5
revolution, 176
violations, 20, 43, 45
Human Rights Commission, 180
Hussein, Saddam, 160
hyperinflation, 240–1
ideational commitments, 174
ideational liberal community, 9
ideational liberalism, 10, 253, 256, 259, 262, 266–8
ideological conflict, 1, 127
Ikenberry’s order, 170–7
illiberal environments, 17
illiberal expropriation, 3
illiberal implications, 159
illiberal right-wing populism, 294
IMF, see International Monetary Fund
imperialism, 19, 60, 192–3, 291
India, 5, 48, 70, 76, 80, 95, 100, 107–8, 111, 194, 221
bandwagoning with US, 76
Bill Clinton’s visit, 78
democracy, 48
higher education, 111
international trade, 81
non-proliferation, 81
nuclear treaty with US, 82
per capita income, 107
rise in power, 68
rising state, 77
super-rich class, 108
indigenous American societies, 22
individual freedom, 16, 22–6, 29, 40, 216, 276
industrialisation
regional alignments, shift in, 123
uneven growth, 83
industrial welfare state, 210
informal governance groupings, 93
information and communications technology, 193–4, 202
infrastructural sectors, 197
insecurity, sources of, 98
integration
differentiated, 254, 258–9, 263, 265, 268
regional, 259, 261–2, 265–6, 288
supranational, 264–5
integration theory, 253–4, 256
intellectual property rights, 26, 218
intensive development, 198
inter-national approach, 206
International Atomic Energy Agency, 76
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 47
International Criminal Court, 128–9
international law, 47–9
International Monetary Fund, 26–7, 107, 296
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 199
international performance, 18
international politics, democracy in, 34–5
international relations (IR), 1, 15, 103, 145, 194, 254, 288
analysis of, 7, 60
conflict-ridden aspects, 70
liberal theory of, 254
theory, 2–3, 5, 7, 254, 266, 295
interstate bargaining, 255
interstate commerce, 150
interstate commitments, 255
interstate cooperation, 183
interstate relations, 57, 145
interstate war, 131
intervention, 16, 39, 44–6, 49, 157, 181, 191, 198, 279–80, 293
command-style state, 198
democratising, 247
direct, 199
humanitarian, 16, 28–9, 45, 291–3
pro-democracy, 280
intraliberal relations, 20
Iran, 76, 80, 82, 124, 131, 137–8, 154, 160, 273–7, 279–81, 283
arms control, 124
constitutional revolution, 274
election, 277
negotiations with US, 131
nuclear programme, 140
Operation Enduring Freedom, 76
political trends, 281
post-revolutionary, 283
pro-democracy movements, 281
TRIP survey, 160
Iranian Revolution, 276
colonial tutelage, 274
exemptional freedom, 275
gap between rich and poor, 139
human rights, 104
Obama's foreign policy, 138
pro-democracy intervention, 280
regime change, 280
societal divisions, 160
violence, 132
Iraq War, 7, 104, 130–1, 136, 145, 160, 270, 273, 280–1
Ireland, 266
Islam (Islamic), 278, 280–3, 285
culture, 283
danger of fixing, 283
dehumanised, 278
democratic temper of, 283
expansionist, 276
extremism, 131–2, 279
extremist groups, 278
fundamentalism, 154
illiberalism, 278, 280
militant, 154
modernisation of, 285
movements, 281
political, 294
political traditions, 280
terrorism, 278
threat, perceptions of, 280
traditional, 283
Islam and the Arab Awakening, 283
Islamic al-Nahda Party, 278
Islamic Republic in Iran, 276
Islamic Salvation Front, 277
Islamist Justice and Development Party, 281
Islamist revivalism, 283
Israel, 78, 132, 275, 277
Japan, post-war, 94
Jiabao, Wen, 222
jihadism, 280
jihadist terrorism, 98
Jordan, 275, 277–8
Kadet party, 236
Kantian problems, 58
Kateb, George, 54
Keynesian policies, 20
Khatami, Muhammad, 277
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 246
Korean denuclearisation, 220
Korean War, 121
Kosovo, 45, 128, 247
Kyoto Protocol, 128–9
Latin American states, 177
League of Nations, 34, 94, 119, 140, 274, 292
Lebanon, 48, 274, 277, 281
legitimate violence, 203
liberal barrier, 20
liberal capitalism, 92, 196
liberal community, 260–2
  economic co-binding, 260
liberal human rights, 260
liberal credentials, 244
liberal critic, 63
liberal decadence, 151
liberal-democratic development, 216
liberal-democratic states, 5, 41, 91
liberal-democratic transition, 267
liberal economic policies, 27, 291
liberal elements, 232, 272
liberal ethos, 69
liberal expansionism, 97
liberal governance, 6, 101, 293
liberal hegemonic protector, 150
liberal hegemonic state, 172
liberal heresies, 290
liberal ideology, 2, 161, 290, 295–6
liberal imagination, 57, 60, 93
liberal imperialism, 19
liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), 9, 253–6
  identity-based preferences, 256
  institutional choice, 256
  interstate bargaining, 255–6
  preference formation, 255
liberal-international consensus, 290
liberal internationalism, 6, 91, 93, 117–24, 127–8, 130, 132–5, 137–40, 149, 204, 216, 249
  course correction, 139–41
demise of, 127–30
domestic sources, 123–6
domestic sources of decline, 133–8
geopolitical sources of decline, 130–3
globalisation, 132–3
institutions of, 93
international cooperation, 132–3
moderates, dwindling breed, 135–7
North–South alliance, 122–3
Obama presidency, 137–8
polarised public, 138
principles of, 117
regional divides, 133–5
rise of the moderates, 124–5
terrorism, 131–2
United States role, 123
absolutist international order, 170
American, 93–4
definition of, 171
durability, 95–6
features of, 167
forms of, 171
fundamental institutional practices, 169
go golden age of, 174
great transformations and, 96–9
ideational underpinning, 174
Ikenberry’s order, 170–7
systemic configurations, 169
trends, 99–101
liberalism of rights, 53, 55
liberal opposition, 17
liberal paradox
  economic interdependence, 195–9
  future scenario, 206–11
  nation-state, 192–5
  neoliberalism, evolution of, 199–201
  political dimensions, 202–6
  social dimensions, 202–6
  in theory, 190–2
liberal peacebuilding, 16
liberal policies, 3, 20, 29
liberal political theory, 51, 53
liberal politics, 52, 58, 61, 64, 201, 276, 295
liberal polities, 23–4, 178
liberal proceduralism, 168, 181–2, 184
liberal republicans, 125, 135
liberal revolution, 92, 295
liberal rules, 96
liberal states, 28, 260
liberal theory, 3, 18–19, 24, 52, 146, 249, 253, 255–6, 259, 267, 288, 293, 296
classical, 288
established, 266
and European Integration, 253
fate of, 15, 30
single variant of, 9, 253
truncated, 253
liberal thought, 19, 21, 51–4, 62, 64, 238, 283
Index

liberal toleration, 53
liberal tradition, 21, 195, 272, 294
liberal universalist, 58
liberal welfare state, 153
liberal Westernisers, 245
liberal zone of peace, 69, 279
Libya, 45, 140, 270
humanitarian intervention, 45
Lieberman, Joseph, 46
like-minded states, 132
Lincoln, Abraham, 203
Lisbon, declaration of, 48
Lisbon Treaty, 35
loans for shares scheme, 241
Locke's theory, 15, 27
Locke's theory, 25, 27

Machiavellian problems, 58
managed democracy, 248–50
Manila, 42
market fundamentalism, 216
market-promoting regulation, 198
Marshall plan, 28, 121–2
martial metropolises, 123
Marx, Karl, 209
mass privatisation scheme, 241
material power, 154, 171, 173, 232
McCain, John, 46
mediation, 44, 201
Medvedev, Dmitry, 248
mercantilism, 92
metamorphosis, 293–7
Middle East
Arab authoritarianism, 270
constitutional revolution, 274
democratisation, 282
Iranian revolution, 276
liberal past, 273–9
mushrutiyat, 274
reform movements, 271
Western liberal values, 284
militarism, 276
military intervention, 28, 44, 153, 247, 293
military modernisation, 215, 228–9
military spending, 74, 79, 124, 134, 203
Mill, John Stuart, 181, 291
Millian sovereignty, 168, 181–4
moderates, 126
rise of, 124–5

modernisation revolution, 198
modernity
antinomies of, 191
ethos of, 54
multiple, 92
monetary union, 254, 259, 265–6
mono-multiculturalism, 202
Moore, Barrington, 198
morality, 53, 56, 59, 72
Morocco, 48, 278, 280
constitutional monarchy, 48
parliamentary elections, 280
multilateral diplomacy, 127, 131–2, 216, 220–1, 232
multilateral trading, 228
multilateral treaties, 178
multinational force (MNF), 43
multiparty system, 239, 277
multiple modernities, 92
multipolarity, 5, 84, 91–2, 99–100
Munich Agreement, 72
Munich Conference, 247
mushrutiyat, 274
Muslim Brotherhood, 280, 282
mutually assured destruction (MAD), 192

National Democracy Institute, 48
National Intelligence Council, 91
nationalism, 202, 275
national self-determination, 98
nation-state, 192–5, 209
NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
naval blockade, 44
Nazism, 195
negotiated settlement, 5, 68, 73–4
neoclassical realism, 7, 80, 145–6, 157–61
neoconservatism, 7, 145–60
democratic weakness, 151–2
social scientific theory, 146–7
state-centrism, 154
Wilsonianism, 149–51
neoconservative theory, 145
neofunctionalism, 254
neoliberal, 8–9, 16, 18, 20, 29, 190, 199, 209, 237, 242, 294
economic reform, 9, 237, 240, 242
economics, 1
free-market, 240
Index

globalisation, 294
ideology, 208
institutionalism, 9, 161, 253–4
package, 200
policies, 201
neoliberalism, 9, 159, 199–201, 210, 216, 237, 245, 248, 294
embryonic transnational, 201
evolution of, 199–201
social, 201
neomedievalism, 209
neorealism, 156–7, 160–1
newly restored democracies, 42
New Zealand, 25–6, 218
Nigeria, 43, 48
9–11 attacks, 283–4, 293
non-aligned movement, 289
non-democracies, 48, 69, 151, 156
non-democratic predecessor, 27
non-democratic states, 4, 39, 69, 153
non-liberal principles, 148
non-liberal spheres, 27
non-liberal states, 17, 29, 262
non-metaphysical liberalism, 60
non-proliferation, 81, 182, 220, 226
Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, 82
non-tariff barriers, 217
nonviolent conflict resolution, 19
non-Western power, 48
normative understandings, 36–7
norm evaluation, 35–6
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 76, 93, 121, 128, 245
North Korea, nuclear programme, 131
nuclear armed states, 84
nuclear proliferation, 98

Ordinary Vices, 55, 63
Organisation for Security and Cooperation, 48
Organisation of American States, 42
Orthodox Church, Russian, 237, 249–50
Oslo accords, 277
Ottoman Empire, 273–4
Ottoman-modelled constitution, 274
Ottoman period, 10, 271, 274
Ottoman reform, 273–4
Outline of International Law, 36
outsourcing, 133–4, 199
overseas direct investment, 218
Owen, John M., 69

pacific union, 69
pacifism, 19, 159
pacifist liberalism, 19
Palestine, 48, 274
parliamentarisation, 10, 253, 257–8, 263–5, 267
partisan conflict, 121, 128
partisan polarisation, 140
party polarization, 126
party politics, polarisation of, 136
Pasha, Urabi, 273
Peace and War, 58, 60
peaceful change, 5, 68, 72
peacekeeping, 29, 44, 203, 226
People's Liberation Army (PLA), 229
Perestroika, 238
Persian Gulf War, 128
PHARE programme, 242
Philippines, 48
PLA, see People's Liberation Army
pluralism, 10, 104, 203, 260, 271, 275–6, 282
Polanyian double movement, 208
polarisation, 136, 139–40
policulturalism, 202
political forms, 33, 64
political liberation, 27, 29
political moralism, 53, 56
political pragmatism, 118
political realism, 61
political reforms, 239, 250, 279, 284
political rejuvenation, 277
political rights, 4, 23–4, 34, 46–8, 177, 180
political stability, 16
political theory, 21, 51–2, 55, 61, 65
polyculturalism, 202, 205
populist-nationalist politics, 275
positional advantages, 107
positive law, 38–9, 178
post-Cold War, 2, 20, 27, 39, 76, 92, 273, 278, 290
post-colonial states, 7, 180–1, 292
post-imperial states, 34
poverty, 1, 29, 54, 94, 226
power asymmetries, 82
power calculations, 71
power capabilities, 171
power differentials, 68–9, 79–80
power disparity, 78
power maximisation, 71, 77
power politics, 1, 3, 16, 26–7, 29–30, 42, 70, 72, 75, 101, 150
power strategy, 77
power transition theory, 82–3
preventive war, 5, 68, 71, 73, 79–80, 82, 84
prikhvatizatziya, 241
private finance initiative, 200
private mediation, 201
private property, 19, 21–6, 217, 260
economic institution of, 22
protection of, 22, 25, 216
privatisation, 16, 24–7, 207, 241, 243, 248
procedural justice, 170, 177–8, 181, 184, 260
pro-competitive regulation, 197–8
pro-democracy movements, 281
Prokhorov, Mikhail, 250
pro-market regulation, 198
property rights, 25, 192, 197, 217
protoliberal principles, 15
protoliberal thought, 22
provincial autonomy, 273
The Public Interest, 153
public/private partnerships, 200
publicly organised production sectors, 200
Putin, Vladimir, 9, 237, 244–50
qualified majority voting (QMV), 264–5
quasi-autocracy, 33
radical Islamists, 283, 295
radical liberalism, 18
RAND study, 108
democratic, 290
neoclassical, 7, 80–2, 145–6, 157–61
political, 61
post-war, 72–4
structural, 74–80, 84, 160
realist theory, 67–8, 70, 82, 146, 171
regime change, 29, 69, 161, 247, 276, 279–80
regional integration, 262–3
regional powers, 2, 78, 226–7
regulatory state, 199
religious conservatism, 294–5
religious freedom, 273
republican liberalism, 19, 256
responsibility to protect, 20, 28, 35, 46, 97
retrenchment, 10, 68, 79, 271
revisionism, 80
revisionist states, 71–2, 80
revolution in military affairs, 155
rising powers
appeasement, 68
balance of power, 68, 71
bi-polar distribution, 73
containment, 68
dynamic differentials, 82–4
liberalism and, 68–70
militarily spending, 74
military capabilities, 71
negotiated settlement, 68
neoclassical realism, 80–2
peaceful change, 68
post-war realism, 72–4
power politics, 70–2
power transitions, 82–4
preventive war, 68, 82–4
realism, 70–2
retrenchment, 68
structural realism, 74–80
RMA, see revolution in military affairs
Rockefeller Republicans, 133
rogue states, 28
Ruggie, John, 173, 288
Rumsfeld, Donald, 129
Russia

anti-Communist revolutions, 239
anti-corruption campaigns, 242
autocratic revival, 91
clash between liberalism and autocracy, 92
colour revolutions, 247
democracy, 242–4
Democratic Russia, 239–40
democratising, 156
demographic crisis, 242
economic crash, 247
economic developments, 248
economic reform, 243–4
failure of liberalism, 237
foreign policy, 244–5
free elections, 239
geopolitical interests, 97
global economic crisis, 249
Gorbachev reforms, 236
higher education, 111
international debts, 241
liberalism, 237, 245–8
loans for shares scheme, 241
mass privatisation scheme, 241
multiparty system, 239
neoliberal economic reforms, 240–2
neoliberalism, 245–8
Orthodox Church, 237, 249–50
parliamentary elections, 249
privatised state-owned enterprises, 241
quasi-autocracy, 33
re-emergence of liberalism, 238–40
reform programme, 238
soft-balance against US, 76
spending on defence, 112
unemployment, 240
Russo-Japanese War, 236

SACU, see South African Customs Union
Sadat, Anwar, 276
Saudi Arabia, 275, 277
scepticism, 4–5, 55, 62–5, 147, 150–1, 224, 290, 293
Schengen zone, 259
Schleswig plebiscites, 34
Scottish Enlightenment, 190
SEA, see Single European Act
second industrial revolution, 199, 210

sectarianism, 280
sectoral hegemony, 209
security competition, 71, 98, 100
Security Council, 43–5, 49, 81–2, 128, 220–1
security interdependence, 5, 98–9
Seoul Plan of Action, 41
Serbia, NATO intervention, 247
service sector, 106, 217
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 220
Shanghai Five, 220
shared sovereignty, 94
sharing intelligence, 131
Shi’ā Islam, 283
shifting power differentials, 69
Sierra Leone, 43–5
Single European Act, 258, 265
social capital, 243
social market economy, 196, 217
social neoliberalism, 201
social pluralism, 260
social scientific theory, 146–7
socio-economic cleavages, 136
sociological liberalism, 19
socio-political philosophy, 24
soft power, 6, 112, 114, 150, 161, 227
Somalia, 128, 132, 231
South Africa, 48, 95, 221
South African Customs Union, 218
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation, 124
sovereignty, 28, 37, 97, 103, 147, 153–4, 167–8, 173–4, 179, 181, 184, 261
Millian, 168, 181–4
principle of, 16, 20, 28
rights of, 28–9
shared, 94
state, 49
US encroachments on, 139
Westphalian, 98, 174, 290
Soviet Communism, 195
Soviet Union, collapse of, 4, 34, 96, 121, 136
START, see Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
START II arms control, 97
state-as-unitary-actor, 159
statebuilding, 29, 288
state capitalism, 114, 198, 206
state-centric policy, 206
state-centrism, 154, 194
state interventionism, 198
The State of War, 60
state-owned industries, 26
state sovereignty, 49
Straits of Malacca, 76
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 138
structural realism, 74–80, 160
structural-systemic theory, 157
structuration, 190, 204–5, 207–10
subsumption, 190
superpower competition, 39, 42
superpower rivalry, 125
supranationalism, 254
Sweden, 259, 265–6, 268
Syria, 46, 154, 232, 270, 274–5, 278, 280
TACIS programme, 242
Ta’if Accord, 277
Taiwan, 78, 108, 229
Taliban, 129
tax breaks, 110, 153
Teaching and Research in International Politics, 160
Tea Party movement, 295
terrorism (terrorist)
attacks, 130–2, 279
groups, 148
jihadist, 98
networks, 98, 132
transnational, 118, 131
Thatcher, Margaret, 208
theory of democratic weakness, 151, 157
theory of international politics, 74, 173
A Theory of Justice, 53
third wave, 273
third world, 28, 122, 226
top-down democratising project, 2
totalitarian states, 156
trade associations, 201
trade organisation, 93
trade unions, 200–1
transatlantic relationship, 105–6, 111, 113
transition, 5, 68–9, 101, 194, 204, 226, 232, 240, 242
transparency, 61, 107, 218, 238
Treaties of Rome, 258
Treaty-based arms control, 138
Treaty of Lisbon, 258
Treaty of Maastricht, 258
Treaty on European Union (TEU), 260
Tribalism, 192
Trilateral Commission, 208
TRIP, see Teaching and Research in International Politics
trusteeship, 182
Tsar Nicholas II, 236
Tunisia, 249, 270, 273–4, 277, 282
Turkey, 100, 107, 275, 280, 283
Turkish liberals, 10
unipolarity, 97, 118, 130–1, 289
unipolar system, 75–6
United Kingdom (England, Britain), 111, 200, 265–6, 278
employment, 175
higher education, 111
Irish Republican Army, 132
private finance initiative, 200
property rights, 25
wealth, source of, 23–4
united liberalism, 21–7
United Nations Charter, 47, 120, 176
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 218
United States
Afghanistan factor, 113
Afghanistan’s invasion, 132
and Asian partners, 93
bargain for commercial deals, 107
bipartisanship over foreign policy, 127, 129
and Brazil, 219
and Britain, 275
and China, 77–8, 96
colonial settlements, 24
commitment to free trade, 134
congressional redistricting, 135
consensus building, 129
decline, 106–9
defence of free trade, 296
democracy and, 46–7
democracy movements, support to, 33
demographic developments, 134
dominant power, 76
economic sanctions, 153
encroachments on sovereignty, 139
expansion of democracy, 296
foreign policy, 6, 117, 140, 145, 290, 295
foreign problem, 80
and France, 295
hegemony, 3, 77, 89, 93–4, 149, 152, 157, 183–4, 191, 193, 289
higher education, 111
India nuclear cooperation approval, 82
Iraq factor, 113
Iraq's invasion, 132
leader in economic stability, 92
-led international liberal order, 5, 289
-led liberal order, 92–3, 96–8, 101
-led NATO policies, 76
liberal hegemonic order, 92
liberal hegemony, 98
liberal international order, 5, 93–4
manufacturing sector, decline of, 134
military power, 127, 141
missile defence, 76, 137, 155
model of liberal capitalism, 92
multilateral free trade, 175
nuclear treaty with India, 82
Operation Desert Storm, 128
partisan differences, 128
politic-o-economic project, 295
politics, 7, 117, 121–2, 129
power shift from, 110
property distribution, 26
rejection of Bush administration, 105
research and development, 108
sea-based offshore balancing, 78
self-effacing approach, 75
services to other states, 93
and Soviet rivalry, 127
statecraft, 119
threats and challenges, 98
unipolarity, 93, 99, 155
wealth disparities, 136
wider liberal order, 94
United States Agency for International Development, 34, 242
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 28, 47, 176
universal franchise, introduction of, 25–6
universalism, 57, 61, 63
UN Security Council, composition, 81
utopian imagination, 54
utopianism, 4, 288, 293
Versailles Peace Conference, 175
Versailles settlement, 72, 179
Versailles Treaty, 34
Vietnam War, 121, 125, 127, 138, 203, 289
Warsaw Pact, 40, 42
Washington Consensus, 216
wealth disparity, 136
welfare state, 26, 152–3, 189, 191, 199–200
disavowal of, 152
industrial, 210
introduction of, 26
liberal, 153
national identity and, 191
pervasive, 152
post-war, 199
restructuring of, 200
shrinking of, 189
Western colonialism, 275
Western democracies, 26, 92, 122, 175
Western economic liberalism, 245
Western foreign policies, 28
Western liberal democracies, 10, 96, 271
Western liberalism, 101, 239, 276, 284
Western neoliberals, 239
Western-style democracy, 156
Westphalian sovereignty, 98, 174, 290
Williams, Bernard, 53, 56
Willkie, Wendell, 120
Wilson, Woodrow, 34, 94, 119, 140, 149, 176, 274
Yalta Conference, 119
Yavlinsky, Grigory, 240
Yeltsin, 237–41, 244–5
Yemen, 132, 270, 277
Yuganskneftegaz, 248
Yugoslavia, 103
Zaslavskaya, Tat'yana, 238