# Contents

## List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

x

## Preface

xi

## 1 Introduction: Ideology in British Politics

1. Political ideas and ideologies 1
   - Ideas, power and interests 2
   - Ideology as dogmatism: the ‘end of ideology’ 4
   - Ideological conflict and consensus 4
   - Contemporary approaches towards the study of ideologies 5
   - Studying ideology: the issue of bias 6
   - Elements of ideologies 8
   - Classifying ideologies: left and right 10
   - Levels of ideology 13
   - Power, influence and indoctrination 15
   - Ideology and pragmatism in British politics 16
   - Moderation and consensus in British politics 18
   - The British political tradition 19
   - Political ideology in Britain? 21
   - Further reading 22

## 2 Liberalism

2. Introduction 24
   - Liberalism: Key concepts and values 26
   - Early influences on liberalism in Britain 31
   - The Whig tradition 32
   - Radicals 34
   - Classical economics and utilitarianism 36
   - Victorian liberalism 38
   - Liberalism, capitalism and democracy 40
   - The New Liberalism 42
   - The decline of the Liberal Party and the triumph of liberalism? The 1920s to the 1960s 45
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal revival and the Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From <em>The Orange Book</em> to coalition with the Conservatives</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The future of liberalism?</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further reading</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Conservatism</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is conservatism? Key values and concepts</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tory tradition</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction and reform</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical liberalism, neo-liberalism and the free market</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-conservatism</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions within Thatcherism</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology and pragmatism</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legacy of Thatcherism</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legacy of Thatcherism: from Major to Howard</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron’s conservatism in opposition</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conservatives in government: the coalition</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further reading</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Socialism, Social Democracy and Labour</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism, liberalism and conservatism</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism: key concepts and values</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolutionary and revolutionary socialism</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State socialism and its critics</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism in nineteenth-century Britain</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism and the British labour movement</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unionism and labourism</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical socialism</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabian socialism</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State socialism and alternatives to state socialism</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour in power: MacDonaldism</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour in power: the Attlee government</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisionism, fundamentalism and pragmatism</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic socialism and social democracy</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The international context: the Cold War and collapse of communism</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blair and New Labour: the end of labourism?</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New Labour in power (1997–2010) 126
Brown and election defeat: the end of New Labour? 130
2010 and after: the end of New Labour? 131
Further reading 134

5 **Anarchism** 136

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchism, capitalism and collectivism</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving anarchism: pacifism and violence</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchism in Britain: William Godwin</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchism in Britain: from the 1880s to the First World War</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, George Orwell and ‘Tory anarchism’</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchism and pacifism in Britain in the middle of the twentieth century</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent anarchism: the Angry Brigade and after</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchism, feminism and the greens</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The continuing relevance of anarchism</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further reading</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 **Nationalism** 152

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is nationalism?</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism and other ideologies</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations and states in Britain</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British nationalism</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish nationalism</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union and nationalism</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism and devolution</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem of England</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism and the future of the European Union and the United Kingdom</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The implications of the 2014 referendum on Scotland's independence</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The future of nationalism: globalization and the nation state</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further reading</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 Racism, Fascism and Populism 178  
Introduction 178  
Racism 179  
Racist ideology: critical issues 180  
Sources of racism: physical, cultural and religious differences 180  
Imperialism and racism 181  
‘Scientific’ racism 183  
Fascism and Nazism 184  
Fascism in Britain 187  
Immigration and race in Britain after the Second World War 189  
Racism and class 191  
A new racism? 192  
Institutional racism? 192  
Racism, religion and religious fundamentalism 194  
Euroscepticism, immigration and the rise of UKIP 195  
UKIP’s ideology: nationalism or populism? 196  
Further reading 200  

8 Multiculturalism 202  
Introduction 202  
Anti-racism and its limitations 203  
Culture and cultures 204  
The case for multiculturalism 211  
The conservative critique of multiculturalism 214  
The liberal critique of multiculturalism 215  
Key issues for multiculturalism 217  
Integration and multiculturalism 220  
The death of multiculturalism? 221  
Interculturalism or multiculturalism? 222  
Further reading 223  

9 Feminism 225  
Introduction 225  
The origins and development of feminist thought:  
    liberal feminism 226  
Criticism of liberal feminism 229  
Socialist and Marxist feminism 230  
Radical feminism 233
Contents

Eco-feminism 237
The impact of the New Right: conservative feminism? 238
Feminism and post-modernism 240
Post-feminism or new feminism? 241
A feminist revival? Third and fourth-wave feminism 244
Further reading 246

10 Green Ideology 248
Introduction 248
Science and ethics 249
Green and other ideologies 250
Key elements of green thinking 254
Limits to growth: sustainability 255
Ecocentrism 257
The holistic approach 259
Small is beautiful? 260
Green strategy 263
Green prospects 267
Further reading 270

11 Changing Ideologies? 271
Coalition politics 271
Anti-politics or new politics? 273
Broken Britain or reformed Britain? 275
The future of mainstream political ideologies in Britain 276

Bibliography 278

Index 299
Introduction: Ideology in British Politics

Political ideas and ideologies

While the serious study of political ideas goes back at least as far as Greece of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the study of political ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism and socialism, is of more recent origin. The term ‘ideology’ is itself problematic and contested (see below) but for the present may be loosely defined as ‘any system of ideas and norms directing political and social action’ (Flew, 1979: 150). The key words here are ‘system’ and ‘action’. An ideology involves, first, an interconnected set of ideas that form a perspective on the world. Second, ideologies have implications for political behaviour – they are ‘action-oriented.’

Most of the political ideologies that influence the way we think and act today have developed relatively recently, shaped directly or indirectly by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the American and French revolutions and industrialization, although influenced by older ideas. Thus while conservative habits of thought are perhaps as old as humanity, conservatism as a coherent political perspective was only expressed more systematically in response to radical political doctrines that sought to change the world, such as liberalism and socialism. Nationalism and feminism grew in the nineteenth century, but became more widely influential later. Some ideologies, including fascism and green thinking, were essentially products of the twentieth century, although again their core ideas developed out of, and in opposition to, mainstream political thinking from the Enlightenment onwards.

Before we proceed to a more detailed examination of specific ideologies it is important to discuss some general issues surrounding the study of political ideologies. Thus this opening chapter explores the nature of political ideology and its relationship with power and interests. It examines key elements of ideologies and their conventional classification on
Ideas, power and interests

How important are political ideas? Ideas, it might be urged, are the lifeblood of politics. There is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come. Thus the ideas expressed in the American Declaration of Independence or the French revolutionary slogan ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ transformed the world. The *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels inspired a revolution in Russia and an economic and political system that once dominated a third of the globe. More recently the rediscovery of the idea of the free market has stimulated political and economic change over the western, former communist and Third World.

From another perspective, politics is essentially about power and interests rather than ideas. As Thrasymachus in Plato’s *Republic* (tr. Cornford, 1945, 18) cynically argues, ‘just or right means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party’. Ideas of what is right involve rationalizations of interest. Those in power are well-placed to ensure that the ideas that are widely accepted are those that are in accordance with their own interests, or, as Karl Marx put it much later, ‘The ruling ideas of every age are the ideas of the ruling class.’

Marx was concerned with the source of ideas. How and why do ideas originate? One of his targets was idealism, the philosophical approach derived ultimately from Plato but featuring especially Kant and Hegel, that suggested that ideas are the ultimate reality, and the motive force in human history. Against this, Marx presented his own materialist conception of history. ‘Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life’ (Marx, 1977, 164). In other words, our experience of the world shapes our outlook, not the other way round. Thus ideas reflect social and economic circumstances. Marx, moreover, saw society as deeply divided, so that the moral and political ideas expressed at any time reflect conflicting class interests.

Such an approach provides insights into the mainstream ideologies of the western world. Thus traditional conservatism may be linked with landed interests, liberalism with financial and industrial capital, and socialism with the interests of the industrial working class.
Conservatives, liberals and many non-Marxist socialists would deny that their political convictions reflected such specific class interests, but claim instead that they have a universal relevance, and draw support across classes. Nevertheless, analysis of the membership, electoral support and policies of political parties associated with these ideologies suggests some significant, if not overwhelming, connections with class interests.

Relating political ideas to material interests is certainly a fruitful approach, whether ideologies are linked exclusively to economic classes in the Marxist sense, or associated more broadly with other interests in society, such as those based on gender, religion, nation or ethnicity. It does make sense to ask who is putting forward particular doctrines and why, and whose interests they serve. Answers to such questions can be very illuminating. Even so, there are ideologies such as environmentalism (or green thinking) that are less easily equated with specific interests within human society. Moreover, while ideologies may be strongly associated with material interests, this does not necessarily mean that they have no intrinsic validity.

Marx himself generally employed the term ‘ideology’ in a pejorative (or negative) sense, and identified ideology with illusion. The prevailing ideas in any society, he suggested, will reflect the existing power structure, the current pattern of domination and subordination, partly because those with economic and political power will be well-placed to control the spread of ideas, through, for example, education and the mass media. It follows that subordinate classes may not understand the real basis of power in their society, nor their own exploitation, but will hold a distorted, mistaken view of reality. Marx commonly used the term ‘ideology’ to describe this distorted view that a social class, such as manual workers, might have of their own position in society as a whole. Much of the prevailing wisdom of his day, such as the free-market ideas of the classical economists, Marx regarded as ideological rather than scientific. Their theories served the interests of capitalism. By contrast, Marx thought that his own method provided a powerful tool for penetrating below the surface and understanding the real economic and social forces which shape change. Thus Marxism was science rather than ideology, which Engels later described as ‘false consciousness’. However, Marx sometimes used the term ideology in a more neutral sense, and later Marxists, such as Lenin, Gramsci and Lukacs assumed a need to promote a working-class socialist ideology to counter the dominant ruling class ideology.
Ideology as dogmatism: the ‘end of ideology’

Some modern, particularly American, social scientists have also, like Marx, employed the term ideology in a highly pejorative way, but in a quite opposite sense to his. Thus non-Marxist economists, sociologists and political scientists emphasized the need for detached, value-free, rigorous empirical research – which they saw as the essence of social science method. Marxism was regarded, by contrast, as dogmatic, unscientific and ‘ideological’. Ideology was identified particularly with closed ‘totalitarian’ systems of thought, under which heading they included both fascism and Marxist-inspired communism. Ideology was the enemy of western pluralist democracy. The future lay with non-ideological thinking, pragmatism rather than ideology. Preconceived ideas and all-embracing theories were useless or positively dangerous.

Just as many Marxists did not think their own political ideas were ‘ideological’ so these western political thinkers did not consider that their analysis was ideological either. An ideology was the political outlook of someone else. Their own ideas were scientific and non-ideological. Thus the triumph of pluralist liberal democracy marked ‘the end of ideology’ (Bell, 1960) More recently Fukuyama (1992) declared the fall of the Berlin wall and Soviet communism secured the victory of liberal capitalism and the ‘end of history’.

Ideological conflict and consensus

In Britain and western Europe ideological conflict apparently gave way to an ideological consensus (or agreement) in the post-Second World War era. In Britain it appeared that leading Labour and Conservative politicians increasingly shared the same assumptions, and often the same remedies. There was widespread acceptance ‘across the party divide’ of the social welfare ideas of William Beveridge and the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, and this was accordingly described as the Keynes–Beveridge consensus (Kavanagh, 1990, 34–60). Over western Europe generally there was a similar ‘social democratic’ consensus around the welfare state and managed capitalism (Judt, 2005, 360–73).

The extent of ideological consensus in the post-Second World War era has arguably been exaggerated. However, a widespread consensus
does not necessarily imply the ‘end of ideology’ in Bell’s sense. Rather it may suggest the dominance of a particular ideology, the acceptance by the political establishment, and perhaps the bulk of the masses also, of a set of ideas that becomes the ruling political orthodoxy. Indeed, as some twentieth-century Marxists like Gramsci have argued, the dominance of such a single ‘hegemonic’ ideology may be more the norm than the exception. It may become so widely accepted and unchallenged that it is not even perceived as ideological, but simply ‘common sense’ or ‘the way things are’, to which ‘there is no alternative’. It is only when the assumptions behind such a dominant orthodoxy are eventually challenged that its ideological character is acknowledged.

Contemporary approaches towards the study of ideologies

As McLellan (1995, 1) has ironically observed, ‘Ideology is someone else’s thought, seldom our own,’ underlining the pejorative interpretation of ideology both by Marxists and leading anti-Marxists, such as Oakeshott (1962) or Minogue (1985). An alternative approach assumes that all political thinking, including our own, is ideological (Freeden, 1996, 2003). The use of the term ‘ideology’ does not, by itself, imply any kind of judgement on the validity of the ideas discussed. Ideology is not necessarily to be identified with illusion or unreflecting dogma, nor should it be contrasted with ‘truth’ or ‘science’. Moreover, while ideologies may be employed to legitimate existing systems or regimes, they can also be used to justify their overthrow. Ideologies may thus be conservative, reformist or revolutionary, moderate or extremist. They may be associated with conflicting interests in society, but also with a system of belief that appears to command general assent. This more inclusive approach to the study of ideology (Seliger, 1976, 91–2), has now become sufficiently common to be described as mainstream, and implicitly or explicitly underpins a burgeoning literature surveying modern political ideologies (e.g. Adams, 1993, 1998; Eatwell and Wright, 1999; Eccleshall et al., 2003; Vincent, 2010; Heywood, 2012).

While not neglecting the importance of social context, power and interests, some exponents of this modern approach to the study of ideology also draw more freely on the older study of political theory and philosophy, and treat political ideas as worth studying in their own
right. Thus Freeden (1996, 7) seeks to ‘reintegrate’ the investigation of political ideologies ‘into the mainstream of political theory’. He links ideologies with ‘social groups, not necessarily classes’. He argues that ideologies ‘perform a range of services, such as legitimation, integration, socialization, ordering, simplification, and action orientation, without which societies could not function adequately, if at all.’ He sees ideologies as ‘ubiquitous forms of political thinking’ which are ‘inevitably associated with power, though not invariably with the threatening or exploitative version of power’. But he also argues that ‘ideologies are distinct thought-products that invite careful investigation in their own right’ (1996, 22–3), and goes on to treat them essentially as a specialist branch of political theory.

**Studying ideology: the issue of bias**

Vincent (1995, 20) observes, ‘We examine ideology as fellow sufferers, not as neutral observers.’ The warning is apt. This is not a subject in which one can expect objectivity. Those who write about ideologies in general have their own ideological convictions, which may be more or less apparent, however hard they seek to write dispassionately. Accounts of specific ideologies are even more likely to be partisan. Much of the literature on feminism or the greens is written by committed supporters, and some is frankly propagandist. Modern accounts of racism and fascism are almost universally hostile. Accounts of the mainstream ideologies of conservatism, liberalism and socialism are more mixed. A few may be obviously and markedly critical (e.g. Honderich, 1990, on conservatism), but even where they are clearly sympathetic overall, they will frequently reflect a particular interpretation or tendency.

Such obvious bias by both proponents and antagonists is scarcely surprising. Ideologies are action-oriented – paraphrasing Marx, they seek to change the world, not just interpret it. Those who are ideologically committed seek converts to their cause. Even academics who affect greater detachment inevitably have their own views which, consciously or unconsciously, influence the way that they treat their subject. Moreover, as we have seen, the study of ideology itself inevitably reflects ideological preconceptions. There are very different views on the definition and nature of ideology, and the relationship of ideology to power and interests on the one hand and science and truth on the other.
All this suggests some problems for students, both in terms of interpreting what others have written on specific ideologies and ideology in general, and in terms of formulating and presenting their own views. However, the contested nature of the subject matter does not mean that in the study of ideologies ‘anything goes’, allowing a free rein to the ventilation of personal prejudices. As in any subject for academic study there is an obligation to standards of accuracy over detail and rigour in analysis. Views attributed to particular thinkers, politicians, or parties require supporting evidence. The reasoning behind inferences and causal connections should be explained. Above all, awkward facts that do not fit a favoured interpretation should not be ignored. A particular standpoint or theory may ultimately be rejected, but in academic discourse there is a presumed obligation to present it fairly and accurately first.

Political ideologies are the very stuff of controversy, which is why many find them fascinating. But this means that no one who comes to the study of political ideologies can be free of preconceptions. It may seem difficult entirely to separate academic enquiry from personal political convictions, yet commitment to a particular political position should not preclude some reasonably dispassionate examination of its development, supporting interests, core principles and problematic areas. Equally, opposition to a particular ideology is not compromised by an attempt to understand its appeal to others. There are advantages to be derived from ‘knowing your enemy’. Even ideologies such as fascism or racism that may inspire repugnance still require some reasonably detached analysis to explain their apparent appeal to many, both in the past and today.

A one-sided or inadequate view of an ideology may not reflect prior prejudice, but simply weaknesses or bias in the source material. The best safeguard against falling for a partial, narrow or eccentric interpretation of an ideology is to read widely, but always critically. Contrasting interpretations, including both hostile and sympathetic treatments, should be deliberately sought out. Such an approach will help to identify both points of agreement and controversy. In all reading a questioning, sceptical approach should be adopted. Nothing should be taken on trust (including what is written here!). It is often useful to attempt to discern the author’s perspective. To know that a particular writer is a Marxist, a conservative or a neo-liberal may assist in interpretation, and also suggest critical questions.
Elements of ideologies

Although political ideologies may radically differ in terms of assumptions and practical implications, it is possible to identify some key elements that provide a basis for comparison. Three elements may be broadly identified – an interpretation of existing economic, social and political arrangements, a vision of the future, and a strategy for realizing that future. While ideologies are essentially action-oriented and prescriptive, any prescription for political and social action must ultimately rest on some assumptions, however crude, about existing society and human behaviour. For those who are broadly happy with existing economic, social and political arrangements, the vision of the future may closely resemble the present, and the strategy will be one of seeking to maintain the status quo. Those profoundly dissatisfied with the present will consider ways to achieve radical change or revolution.

Any view of existing circumstances will commonly include some assumptions about human nature and individual motivation. Indeed such assumptions lie behind the ideas of most of the great political thinkers of the past. Plato, Machiavelli and Hobbes, for example, were all fairly pessimistic about the capacity of human beings to live together sociably and co-operatively, without a considerable element of coercion or brainwashing, while Aristotle, Rousseau, and, in the last analysis, Marx, had a more optimistic view of human potential for fruitful co-operation. Among modern political ideologies, socialism is essentially optimistic, and traditional conservatism rather pessimistic about human nature. Free-market liberalism, drawing heavily on classical economics, sees individuals as motivated by self-interest, but suggests that the net consequence of everyone pursuing their own self-interest will be the greatest common good.

A linked consideration is the potential for changing human nature, from which a further question naturally arises. Is human nature the same everywhere, or is it substantially the product of the environment? Does vicious behaviour reflect the immutable nature of humanity, or is it the outcome of particular circumstances, which might be changed? Anarchists, for example, believe that power corrupts. A society without hierarchies of authority, and without government in the sense of coercive power would lead to more co-operative and civilized human behaviour. Socialists may argue that highly self-interested competitive behaviour is the product of the capitalist economic system rather than a universal human characteristic. They also suggest that substantial
inequalities in human capacities and attainments are not innate, but can be reduced through enlarging opportunities. Conservatives are usually rather more sceptical about the scope for improvements in human nature, although they may consider religious beliefs, cultural traditions or stable family backgrounds as possible ameliorative factors. Some feminists would distinguish between male and female nature, suggesting that men are naturally aggressive and competitive, while women are caring and co-operative, although other feminists would suggest that this behaviour is largely culturally determined. The capacity for changing human behaviour is clearly important where prescriptions for the future require people to behave in different ways.

This highlights the question of the relationship of the individual to society. To Aristotle a proper human existence was inconceivable outside society; man was naturally a social and political animal. At the opposite extreme, some classical liberal thinkers have viewed society as an artificial construct, requiring a conscious and deliberate effort to bring it into being, and having no meaning apart from its constituent individual elements. (Margaret Thatcher once famously claimed that there was no such thing as society, only individuals and families.) By contrast, both traditional conservatism (or Toryism) and socialism have tended to view the individual as inseparable from society, with individuals, groups and whole classes bound inextricably to each other through ties of mutual dependence, although of course conservatives and socialists have sharply contrasting views on existing social relations. Finally in this connection it may be observed that what have been described as totalitarian ideologies involve, in theory at least, the total subjugation of the individual to the state.

Ideologies will commonly involve all kinds of other assumptions about the way society currently operates – the extent of equality within society, the organization of work and industrial relations, authority and power structures, and a host of further issues. Some of these assumptions may be substantially accurate, while others may be wildly inaccurate, but perceptions of how the world is inevitably colour perceptions of how it should be, so that description and prescription are closely interlinked.

Some people may be more fearful than desirous of change – for all sorts of reasons. They may be substantial beneficiaries of existing social arrangements. They may pessimistically fear that change is likely to be for the worse. They may be persuaded, perhaps against what others would regard as their objective interests, that change is impossible, dangerous, or undesirable. The essence of conservatism, as
the term implies, is to avoid major change, and a radically different future is neither sought nor desired, although a degree of gradual reform may be countenanced. For conservatives the problem is rather how to maintain social stability, and avoid social unrest and revolution. The choice may often seem to lie between granting reforms to appease dissatisfied elements, or refusing any concessions for fear that these will only create more instability in the long run. In general, conservatives are much more sceptical of the scope for deliberate social engineering than liberals or socialists, and more wary of the possible dangers of change. Some reactionaries, in the proper sense of the term, may seek a future that resembles a past, real or imaginary, the loss of which they regret.

Others may strive for a future that is nothing like the present or immediate past. The construction of utopias has been a favourite preoccupation of political thinkers since classical times. The problem with utopias is how to achieve them. The proposed utopia may be far more appealing than existing society, but how does one progress from (a) to (b)? Ideologies thus generally involve some assumptions about social change, although this element can in practice be fairly weak. Marx was critical of some of his socialist predecessors for lacking any coherent theory of social change. They had a socialist vision of the future, but no realistic strategy for achieving it. A major debate among socialists since Marx’s day has been over the prospects of the parliamentary road to socialism – whether socialism can be achieved solely or mainly through the ballot box and the election of governments with parliamentary majorities. Some socialists deny that this is possible. Parliamentary socialists tend to respond that the alternatives are even more problematic.

Classifying ideologies: left and right

One of the oldest ways to classify ideologies involves locating them on the familiar left–right political spectrum. The terms derive from the seating positions in the National Assembly arising out of the 1789 French Revolution, where the most revolutionary groups sat on the left and the more conservative or reactionary sat on the right. Since then the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ over time have acquired a universal currency. In many legislatures, particularly where the chambers are semi-circular, seating arrangements still mirror those of the revolutionary National Assembly, but even in countries like the
United Kingdom where they do not, politicians, parties, and political programmes are freely classified according to the terminology of left and right.

A ‘scale’ suggests that the terms are essentially relative, and that is how they are employed. Indeed further subcategories are often used, such as ‘far (or hard) left’, ‘extreme right’ or ‘centre-left’, to describe the position occupied on the spectrum more precisely. Frequently it is suggested that a certain politician, party or trade union is more left or more right than another, and the terms are also commonly used to describe intra-party factions. This can be confusing. Thus a particular politician or group in the British Labour Party might be described as ‘right wing’, strictly within the context of his or her party, while more generally they would be regarded as ‘on the left’. Similarly, factions within the Conservative Party are often loosely termed left, right or centre to explain their ideological position relative to others within their party, yet from an outsider’s perspective they are all essentially on the right. This emphasizes the importance of context in interpretation.

Yet if the classification is virtually universal, it is not unproblematic. What is the scale really about? A common interpretation is that the scale measures attitudes to change, with those seeking revolutionary change on the left, and those opposed to all change on the right, with cautious reformers somewhere in the middle. Thus socialists, anarchists and communists are on the left, conservatives on the right and progressive liberals in the centre.

Yet if revolutionaries succeed and become the new establishment, should they then be placed on the right? In practice, Lenin’s Bolsheviks continued to be regarded as ‘left’ after they seized power and established a new social and political system in Russia. Similarly, there is a problem with the ‘radical right’, almost a contradiction in terms if ‘right’ means opposition to change. Margaret Thatcher instituted radical change in Britain, although she and her allies were generally considered further to the right than the more cautious ‘One Nation’ Conservatives whom they had effectively displaced.

Another way of interpreting the left–right scale is in terms of attitudes to authority – with those championing individual liberty on the left, and

![Figure 1.1 Left–right: revolution and reaction](image)
those emphasizing discipline and order on the right. This also does not always accord with general usage. Thus anarchists and communists, both generally considered on the left or far left, tend to display radically different attitudes to authority, and there are similar differences between the ‘libertarian’ and ‘authoritarian’ right. By contrast, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ developed by some western theorists in the post-war period, implied that both communism and fascism, conventionally placed at opposite ends of the left–right scale, were essentially similar in subordinating individual liberty to state authority.

Alternatively, the scale may measure attitudes to state intervention in the economy, with ‘left’ linked with collectivism and ‘right’ with the free market. This is consistent with the description of communists and socialists as ‘left’, and also fits the common designation of free-market Conservatives as more ‘right wing’ than the interventionist ‘One Nation’ Conservatives. Yet, on this scale, anarchists, who oppose the state, should be regarded as ‘right’, while fascism, generally regarded as far right, would be located on the left, as fascists favoured substantial state direction, and made the state and its leader (duce or fuhrer) the object of allegiance and veneration.

In view of these problems with left and right, some have tried new ways of classifying political attitudes. Thus Eysenck (1957) proposed a two-dimensional model, with attitudes measured on two scales, one labelled radical-conservative (roughly equivalent to that in Figure 1.1 above), the other tough and tender (close to the distinction between authoritarian and libertarian, above). Brittan (1968), by contrast, suggests that ‘left’ and ‘right’ should be dropped completely. However, it seems unlikely that the long-familiar language of left and right can ever be banished from political discourse. Thus the conventional left–right scale is used here, despite its problems.

Even so, this conventional left–right political spectrum is more readily applicable to some ideologies than others. There are particular problems in locating nationalism, feminism and green thinking on
a left–right continuum. They each cut across the familiar distinctions based on economic intervention or social class interests. Nationalism in different times and places has been associated with ideas across the political spectrum from the left to the far right. Feminism is generally linked with the left, but it is questionable whether it should be. Although most green activists are also more commonly associated with the left, the familiar green slogan ‘neither left nor right but forward’ suggests that they see themselves on another dimension altogether. Thus some argue that ‘left’ and ‘right’ describe the old obsolete politics, while the women’s movement and the green movement and other currents of thought represent a new politics.

Levels of ideology

Ideologies can be interpreted and analysed at a number of different levels. While the traditional study of political theory has tended to focus on the writings of great thinkers and the relatively tiny political elite familiar with their ideas, the study of political ideologies is concerned with mass as well as elite ideas and behaviour. Ideologies may be systematically articulated, through, for example, the writings of key thinkers, or expressed more selectively and persuasively through political pamphlets or speeches. Yet they may be essentially latent, and unsophisticated, expressed in shorthand slogans, symbols and gestures. The clenched fist may seem a long way removed from Marx’s *Das Kapital*, but they are both aspects of one ideology.

Some ‘great thinkers’ who studied within the political theory tradition have clearly made a significant contribution to particular political ideologies, for example, Marx to socialism, Burke to conservatism or Mill to liberalism. Yet often writers who were not themselves profound or original thinkers did more to popularize particular doctrines. Harriet Martineau, who wrote little fables embodying the principles of classical economics, Edward Baines, the polemical editor of the *Leeds Mercury*, and Samuel Smiles, the author of Victorian homilies on self-help and other virtues were more widely read and understood than the
economists Ricardo or Nassau Senior. Indeed these populist writers can be considered more typical of laissez-faire liberalism.

At another level, the pronouncements and achievements of active politicians, whose ideas are insufficiently original or systematic for consideration in histories of political theory, may play a critical role in the development of ideologies and their subsequent interpretation. There are very few ‘great texts’ that provide much of a guide to an understanding of conservatism. Accounts of British conservatism emphasize the contribution of past politicians, such as Peel, Disraeli, Salisbury, Macmillan and Thatcher. Some of these politicians did describe their ideas in articles, novels, speeches and manifestos, but the ideas of others must be substantially inferred from their decisions and policies. For while political ideologies may influence political behaviour, they can also sometimes appear as rationalizations of political behaviour. However, few politicians would put it quite as bluntly as Herbert Morrison (1888–1965), Labour’s deputy prime minister from 1945–51, who once declared that socialism was what the Labour government did.

Ideologies do not just inform the beliefs and behaviour of politicians but of the masses. The popular version of an ideology may be less elaborate than that held by professional politicians and party activists but it will shape the attitudes people have to the great questions of the day. Thus ideological assumptions may influence how people vote, or indeed whether they vote, and their readiness to indulge in other political activity, such as demonstrations, law-breaking or even, on occasion, revolution. Although there may be a difference in sophistication between the elite and mass versions of particular ideologies, they normally reflect the same outlook on life, and inter-relate. Mrs Thatcher acknowledged the influence of thrift and duty learned from her upbringing in her father’s grocer’s shop in Grantham (Young, 1989, 5–7), alongside the writings of Adam Smith and Hayek (Thatcher, 1977). It is difficult to assess which made the more significant contribution to what came to be called ‘Thatcherism’. Everyday maxims have a greater resonance with the wider public. Newspaper headlines, slogans and graffiti, and non-verbal symbols, such as the British bulldog, or Britannia, or the Union Jack may reinforce or express particular political convictions. Some political ideologies are indeed almost entirely lacking in sophisticated intellectual expression. The Nuremberg rallies and the slogans painted in Mussolini’s Italy, ‘Believe, Obey, Fight’, ‘Live Dangerously’, ‘Better one day as a lion than a thousand years as a sheep’, perhaps
tell us more about the nature of fascism, and almost certainly had more influence on political behaviour than fascist theory.

**Power, influence and indoctrination**

Consideration of the ideological perspectives of the masses raises some awkward questions on the transmission of ideas – over, for example, the potential for deliberate indoctrination. There are some celebrated fictional accounts of thought control, and plenty of real-life illustrations of more or less successful attempts to mould opinion, by no means all of which are to be found in so-called totalitarian states. For example, the allied authorities in Germany after the Second World War embarked on a deliberate counter-indoctrination programme which employed many of the means of their Nazi predecessors – censorship of newspapers, burning of books, screening teachers for ideological soundness, and the like. Most attempts to influence people’s minds on political issues are less extensive and systematic than this, but there is still a certain amount of quite conscious manipulation even in a supposedly liberal democracy like Britain.

If deliberate manipulation of people’s minds by those in power was regularly employed and always successful, there would be no ideological conflict, just the universal acceptance of one ideology. Plato wanted to eliminate conflict in this way in his ideal state, and there are celebrated, more recent, fictional examples, such as Orwell’s *1984* and Huxley’s *Brave New World*. Real-life governments have found it rather more difficult to stifle all dissent. However, at the very least it can be said that they have substantial means at their disposal to influence opinion.

The role of the media in shaping opinion is another controversial area. The narrow concentration of media ownership in the UK and the influence of a handful of media tycoons rather undermines the comfortable liberal pluralist assumption that people are exposed to a wide range of sources and views, enabling them to make up their own mind on political questions. Most national newspapers have long exhibited a marked political bias, while the assumption of television neutrality has been challenged from both left and right. Moreover, although the internet offers the prospect perhaps of more open and pluralist political debate, its full political potential has yet to be realized. Media concentration and bias may not matter that much if, as some academic research suggests, people use the media to reinforce their own ideas, and filter out messages which do not match preconceived attitudes.
However, others argue that our thinking must be influenced, if sometimes subliminally, by the constant repetition of media images and associations. Thus not only our perceptions of particular politicians and parties, but our images of women, our attitudes to minorities, and our views on a whole range of issues from paedophiles to fracking, from fox-hunting to the European Union, are inevitably influenced and perhaps even determined by the media. This is more likely to be the case on issues where we have no direct personal experience.

Too much emphasis can be placed on deliberate indoctrination by governments or on media propaganda. Far more significant, it might be argued, is the largely unconscious process by which beliefs are transmitted and sustained from the elite to the masses, and across generations. Existing institutions, work practices, patterns of social organization, habits and beliefs may generally be taken for granted. In some cases it may require a considerable effort to even imagine alternatives. The weight of tradition is always likely to be a major constraint on political thinking, which will tend to justify the status quo, and serve the interests of those who benefit principally from the status quo. Thus the ideas of established dominant groups may often be fairly generally accepted throughout society, without any deliberate action to ensure this. While the dominant ideology may not be all-pervasive, some of its core assumptions may gain wide acceptance among subordinate groups.

The battle of ideas, then, is inevitably fought with loaded dice. The failure of some political perspectives, such as radical feminism, or anarchism, or dark green environmentalism, to gain a wider following may reflect inherent weaknesses in the ideology. Alternatively, it may be an indication of the overwhelming difficulties any radical perspective faces in combating the mass of routinely accepted assumptions bound up with the existing economic, social and political order. Yet it may not just be radical left-wing views that fail to secure a fair hearing. Both neo-liberals and neo-conservatives have claimed that the post-war progressive consensus effectively excluded their ideas from political debate until recently.

**Ideology and pragmatism in British politics**

An explicit assumption of this book is that political ideas are important, and indeed that ‘all politics is ideological’ (Seliger, 1976, 146). However, not everyone would agree that ideas have generally been
important in British politics, or even indeed should be. Much has been made of British empiricism, involving a rejection of abstract reasoning. Although Mrs Thatcher showed a positive enthusiasm for ideology this was markedly at variance with traditional British conservatism (as noted in Chapter 3). From Burke through Peel to Oakeshott (1962) and Minogue (1985) in the latter part of the twentieth century there has been a conservative distrust of abstract rational theory and doctrine and a positive aversion to ‘ideology’. Yet an apparent British aversion to ideology is not just confined to conservatism, but can even be discerned in the British versions of liberalism and socialism. British liberalism, although more obviously influenced by theory than conservatism, has generally been flexible and pragmatic in execution. Even the British Labour Party was heavily constrained by the British empirical tradition and much less influenced by Marxist or any other theory than socialist or social democratic parties elsewhere.

Yet if ‘ideology’ clearly, for many, retains pejorative associations, ‘pragmatism’ is also, for some at least, a dirty word. Pragmatism ‘all too easily slips into opportunism and is a synonym for short-term expediency’ (Robertson, 1993, 394). Opportunism and short-term expediency were the charges critics often laid against former Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson, who coined the phrase ‘a week is a long time in politics’. (The phrase was more recently updated by another Labour prime minister, Gordon Brown, in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis as ‘an hour is a long time in politics’.) Indeed, pragmatism, the relative neglect of ‘grand theory’ and the absence of long-term vision is sometimes seen as a weakness of British politics.

Ultimately, however, the dichotomy between ideology and pragmatism is a false one (Seliger, 1976, 123–47). Politics can hardly be conducted without reference to values and principles (or ideology), but also ineluctably requires flexibility and compromise (or pragmatism) in pursuit of ideological goals. Moreover, ‘pragmatism, with its dogmatic insistence on the impossibility of far-seeing deliberate reform, is itself a deliberate “ideological” standpoint on human nature’ (Robertson, 1993, 394).

Thus even those political thinkers such as Burke, Oakeshott and Minogue who apparently decry an ideological style of politics, themselves reflect ideological assumptions over, for example, human behaviour and motivation, the nature and distribution of property, and the scope and limitations of government. Indeed, for all their denunciation of ‘reason’, ‘rationalism’ and ‘ideology’, their writings were the product of a rational intellectual process, and were deliberately articulated as a persuasive interpretation of politics, with clear implications for
political behaviour. Thus traditional conservatism was as ‘ideological’ as the free-market conservatism that succeeded it.

The assumption here is that all politics implicitly or explicitly reflects ideological assumptions. Thus New Labour, for all its pragmatic emphasis on ‘what works’, was as ideological as Old Labour. While ideologies may sometimes be inspired by utopian visions, they are all about influencing political attitudes and behaviour. They are not about pure ideas abstracted from reality but are ‘action-oriented’ and necessarily involve an interdependence between theory and practice, particularly when politicians obtain power and the chance to implement their ideas. Yet while policy is inevitably guided or constrained by ideological assumptions, practice, over time, is bound to modify initial theoretical expectations, reinforcing some and leading to the modification or discarding of others. Thus ideologies evolve as they are tested against reality. While the ‘New Right’ and, more recently, ‘New Labour’ emerged out of a conscious intellectual debate over ideas and values, as they developed they both embodied some rationalization of trial and error responses to specific problems and circumstances. They necessarily combined ‘ideology’ and ‘pragmatism’.

**Moderation and consensus in British politics**

Yet if British politics is inevitably ideological, it is generally associated with continuity, moderation and compromise. Since the violent upheavals of the seventeenth century there have been no revolutions, regime changes or sharp breaks in the development of the political system. Periodic crises that threatened political stability have been peacefully resolved, and strong opposition to the government of the day has seldom been translated into significant opposition to the whole system of government. Revolutionary parties and ideologies have rarely attracted a mass following, and communism and fascism have never secured more than fringe support. The Labour Party was never Marxist, and generally avoided the language of confrontation and class conflict. The Conservative Party would not have survived and thrived had it remained tied to narrow reactionary interests. In terms of the left–right ideological spectrum, British voters have been offered a constrained choice between the centre-left and the centre right. Extremism is of course a question of definition and perspective, but mainland British politics has rarely faced a significant internal challenge from those regarded as extremists (Ireland, of course, is another matter).
Indeed, it has often appeared that major British parties have been competing for the centre ground, and at times British politics has been more characterized by consensus (or agreement) than conflict. In war and periods of national emergency political leaders have been prepared to enter coalitions, or at least suspend normal party conflict. Yet at other times such as the 1950s and 1960s many have observed an absence of sharp ideological differences between the major parties. This ‘post-war consensus’ appeared to break down in the 1970s and early 1980s, as the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher moved to the right and the Labour Party increasingly appeared dominated by the left. Yet this period was followed by the more consensual style of John Major, and subsequently Tony Blair’s attempts to bring Liberal Democrats and moderate Conservatives within his ‘big tent’. More recently commentators have drawn attention to the similarities between the political rhetoric of the leaders of all three parties.

The British political tradition

Yet if British politics has rarely been characterized by violent or extreme conflict, it has involved significant disagreements or tensions. The dominant theme in some older influential interpretations of British politics has been the tensions between libertarianism and collectivism, or between the free market and the state, and this has been reaffirmed in more recent accounts. Thus Beer’s *Modern British Politics* (1982) documented the victory of Conservative and Labour collectivism over traditional liberal individualism. Barker (1978, 5) ‘used attitudes to the modern state’ as the main organizing principle behind his analysis of *Political Ideas in Modern Britain*. According to Greenleaf (1983, vol. 2, 5) ‘the dialectic between the growing pressures of collectivism and the opposing libertarian tendency is the one supreme fact of our domestic political life as this has developed over the last century and a half’.

It is difficult to disagree with the statement that attitudes towards the state have been a massive theme in British politics, particularly for the mainstream ideologies of liberalism, conservatism and socialism, and obviously anarchism. Nineteenth-century liberalism sought to uphold the liberty of the individual against the encroachment of the state, while the New Liberalism of the early twentieth century struggled to reconcile individual liberty with state-sponsored social reform (Chapter 2). Conservatives recurrently championed state protection of
British agriculture and industry, and, subsequently, paternalist social reform (Chapter 3). The dominant British interpretation of socialism involved the growth of state intervention to provide public services (Chapter 4). Anarchism (Chapter 5) is commonly linked with socialism, but while most anarchists favoured either the abolition of private property, or at least its substantial redistribution, they opposed both government and state collectivism. Thus much of the debate within and between these ideologies has been over the powers of the government and the freedom of the individual, and the boundary between public and private spheres, or state and civil society.

Yet important though the state/market debate is in the ‘battle of ideas’, it is a mistake to regard it as the only debate that matters in British politics. Even the mainstream ideologies are concerned with many issues that are only tangentially if at all connected with the state–market dichotomy, while for other political perspectives the issue of state economic intervention is secondary. Nationalism, for example, generally assumes that nations should constitute states, but is essentially concerned with the politics of identity and allegiance rather than economic arguments about the functions of the state (Chapter 6). Similarly, the politics of race and ethnicity revolve more around issues of identity than economics, even if economic deprivation is among the factors that fuel racism and populism (Chapter 7). Multiculturalism is a more recent political perspective stressing diversity that developed in response to exclusive nationalism and racism but with some contentious implications for mainstream ideologies also (Chapter 8). Feminism, particularly in its radical form, asserts the primacy of gender relations over economic class conflict; the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ has redrawn the boundaries of politics, and transcends the old liberal distinction between the state and civil society (Chapter 9). Finally, green ideas are about the relationship of humanity with its environment; the role of the state in this relationship is an important and controversial issue for greens, but it is an essentially secondary question (Chapter 10).

Some of this greater range of political thinking is reflected in a still evolving more complex party system, including not only the growth of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, but other parties outside the mainstream, such as the Green Party and (briefly) the far-right British National Party (BNP) and the anti-war Respect party, and more recently and dramatically, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Even so, mainstream British politics over the last few decades has (rightly or wrongly) centred substantially on the respective roles of the state and the market, even though issues of foreign policy and security
have sometimes taken centre stage in the wake of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed the financial crisis of 2007–08 and the ensuing economic recession has dramatically revived old ideological debates over public spending and free-market forces.

**Political ideology in Britain?**

This book relates ideologies specifically to British politics. This may seem questionable, on two important grounds at least.

In the first place it may reasonably be objected that most political ideologies transcend national boundaries. Liberalism and socialism are international creeds. Nationalism may take a variety of specific forms, but it is inspired by similar theoretical assumptions. Feminism focuses on the injustices suffered by women across the globe. Green ideas relate to ‘planet earth’. So why relate ideologies to a more specific national political context? Indeed, most books on political ideologies ostensibly take an international focus (although in practice they often exhibit a narrower western, Anglo-American or European bias). However, even explicitly international ideologies take on distinctive characteristics in different national political systems. The specific context matters. Thus British socialism (if indeed it can be called socialism) is distinctive. Although it is clearly influenced by international currents of thought and practice, it has been shaped largely by British thinkers and politicians and by British social and political circumstances. Similarly, British liberalism too is distinctive, differing, sometimes sharply, from the political theory and practice of liberals elsewhere in the world. British conservatism is even more unusual, managing to survive and flourish, to the extent of dominating British politics for much of the twentieth century, while comparable political creeds and parties elsewhere largely withered. Although feminism and green thinking transcend frontiers, the British women’s movement and Green Party have some distinctive features relating to British politics. Thus there is room both for the study of ideologies globally, and the application of ideologies in a more specific context. Moreover, while the focus here is on ideologies in Britain, wider influences are discussed and comparisons made with ideological theory and practice elsewhere.

A second objection to the British focus is not that it is too narrow, but too broad, particularly in relation to ongoing political developments within Britain. Fifty years ago most inhabitants of this island...
would acknowledge a British identity. The same political parties were competing to control a single British parliament and government. Much the same political differences were shown across the component nations and regions of Britain, although the politics of Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom, was always distinctive. Yet this British political homogeneity no longer exists. There are sharp differences in the politics of Britain’s component parts. Scotland and Wales have their own parliament and assembly. The Scottish National Party (SNP) acquired an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament from 2011, which led to a referendum on independence for Scotland in 2014, defeated by a margin of 55 per cent to 45 per cent. Had it been successful, the United Kingdom and Britain as a meaningful political entity would no longer exist, and ‘British politics’ could only be discussed in the same terms as, for example, Scandinavian politics or central American politics. Yet after the referendum, Britain survives as a meaningful political entity, at least for the immediate future. Even so, political disparities remain considerable not only between the component nations of the United Kingdom, but within the regions of England, where Labour retains few Westminster seats in the south outside London, while in northern industrial cities Conservative strength, once considerable, is now negligible (Colley, 2014, 73). Thus generalisations over ‘British politics’ and ‘British ideologies’ now need to be treated with due caution.

Further reading

Useful extended definitions of ideology and other concepts discussed here are provided in various specialist dictionaries such as those by Williams (1976), Bullock and Stallybrass (1977), Bottomore (1991), Robertson, 1993, Maclean and McMillan (2003), Scruton (2007). Particularly useful is Heywood’s (2000) more extended analysis of Key Concepts in Politics. These are handy reference works from which to begin an exploration of the numerous highly contested concepts discussed throughout this book, but the reader should be warned that the treatment of ideas even in such reference books reflects the different perspectives of authors.

Students may wish to sample some of the alternative surveys of modern ideologies, including Adams, (1993), Eatwell and Wright (1999), Eccleshall et al. (2003), Vincent (2010), Heywood (2012). Most of these include brief introductory discussions on the nature of ideology. This
is usefully examined in a slim volume by McLellan (1995). Still the most useful and authoritative modern source is Seliger (1976). Freeden (1996) has contributed a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between ideology and political theory, which also includes his own analysis of the core components of mainstream ideologies, and a briefer discussion of feminism and green ideas. The same author’s *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (2003) is much briefer, and stimulating, but despite the title, is not really an introductory text, and best read after other material.

Index

abortion 47, 76, 233, 238
absolutism 24, 32
Adam Smith Institute 79
affirmative action 221
Afghanistan 147, 194
agency 138, 150
Aliens Act (1905) 184, 187
Almond and Verba 198
American civil war 227
American Declaration of
Independence 2
American revolution 1, 33, 55, 58
anarchism 8, 12, 16, 19–20, 112,
136–51, 253, 261–2
Anarchist Federation 147
anarcho-capitalism 137
anarcho-syndicalism 101, 108, 141
Anderson, Elizabeth Garrett 228
Anderson, Elizabeth 220–1
Anglicanism see Church of England
Angry Brigade 145–7
animal rights 238, 250, 257–8
anthropocentrism 255, 257–8
anticlericalism 32, 136
Anti-Corn Law League 39
Anti-Nazi League 189
anti-racism 204–4
anti-semitism 178, 180, 182,
185–6, 188
Arblaster, Anthony 41
Aristotle 8–9, 139
‘Asian community’ 211
Ashdown, Paddy 49
Asquith, Herbert H 44–5
assimilation 208, 211, 214
Astor, Nancy 239
asylum seekers 181, 206
Attlee, Clement (and Attlee
government) 71, 79,
115–17, 119
autarchy 262–3, 269
authoritarian populism 75
authority 60–1, 65
Baines, Edward 13, 38
Bakunin, Michael 136, 138, 147–8
Barry, Brian 216–7, 220, 259
Beer, Samuel H. 19, 63, 67–8
Bell, Daniel 4–5
Benn, Tony 120, 133
Bennett, Natalie 267
Bentham, Jeremy 27, 32, 36, 42, 105
‘Better Together’ 173–4
Bevan, Aneurin (Nye) 116–7
Beveridge, William (and Beveridge
Report) 4, 25, 41, 47, 69,
105, 116
Bevin, Ernie 107, 116
bias 6–7
big society 87
bio–regionalism 262, 269
Bitcoin 150
Black Wednesday (1992) 81–2
blacks and Asians 179–80, 182,
190–1, 209–10
Blair, Tony 19, 49, 85–6, 109, 121,
123–30, 254
Blake, Robert 68
Blue Labour 132
Bookchin, Murray 148
Brand, Russell 150
Breuilly, John 152–3
Bright, John 35, 39–40, 75
Britain, 21–2, 152, 161, 178, 187–91,
275–7
British National Party (BNP) 20, 189
British Union of Fascists (BUF) 188
Brown, Gordon 123–5, 127,
129–32, 174, 254
Brownmiller, Susan 234
Bryson, Valerie  243
bureaucracy  37, 72
Burke, Edmund  13, 17, 57, 59, 61, 214, 261
Butler, Richard A. (‘Rab’)  63, 69

Cable, Vince  51
Callaghan, James  73, 119–20
Cameron, David  50, 52, 85–91, 131, 171, 215, 251, 253, 271, 273
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)  145
Campbell, Alastair  125
Campbell, Menzies (Ming)  49–50
Cantle  222–3
capitalism  3, 30–2, 34, 39–41, 71, 95, 100, 115, 126, 137, 148, 178, 253–4, 271
Carswell, Douglas  199
Castle, Barbara  1–20
Catalonia  142, 150
Catholic emancipation  33, 66–7, 165
Centre for Policy Studies  79
Chadwick, Edwin  37
Chamberlain, Joseph  42, 44, 57, 68
Chamberlain, Neville  68
change  9–10, 58–9
Chartism  103
Christianity  181, 204–5
Christie, Stuart  146
Church of England  39, 62, 65, 205, 218
Churchill, Lord Randolph  67
Churchill, Winston  44–5, 68–9
Citizen’s Charter  81
civic culture  198
civil liberties  33, 51, 55
civil society  225
Clarke, Ken  85–6
class  2–3
classical economics  3, 25, 36, 38, 47
Class War  145, 147
Clause Four (Labour Party)  111, 118, 123
Clegg, Nick  50
climate change  256
Cobbett, William  35
Cobden, Richard  39
Cold War  106, 115, 121–2
collectivism  19, 40, 45, 74, 95, 98–9, 111
colonialism  157–9, 181–2
Comfort, Alex  14–5
communism  12, 102–3, 178
Communist Manifesto  2, 104
Communist Party of Great Britain  106
communitarianism  126
community  97, 125–6
consensus  4, 18–19, 47, 70
consent  29, 32
conservation  58–9, 252
conservatism  1–3, 6, 8–10, 17, 19–20, 29, 57–91, 95, 202, 214–5, 238–240, 251–2, 276
environmental conservatism  86, 251–2
liberal (and libertarian) conservatism  77
neo-c-conservatism  75–7
neo-liberal conservatism  71–4, 76–7
One Nation conservatism  69–1, 84
Peelite conservatism  65–6
progressive conservatism  87–9
Conservative Party  11, 18, 57–91, 149, 171, 215, 273, 276–7
constitution (and constitutional reform)  54, 84, 89, 128–9, 275–6
constitutional government  29
consumerism  264
contract  29
Cook, Robin  129
co-operation (and co-operative movement)  95, 97–8, 104, 112
Council for the Protection of Rural England  252
Corn Laws  67
corporatism  76–7
Countryside Alliance  83, 86, 252
credit crisis (2008)  26
Crosland, Tony  117–8, 254
cultural diversity 209–12, 214
cultural homogeneity 208
-cultural pluralism 208
cultural segregation 210–11
culture 203–8

Dahrendorf, Ralph 122
Dalyell, Tam 169–70
Darwin, Charles
(and Darwinism) 183–4
Davis, David 86
Davidson, Emily 228
de Beauvoir, Simone 233
decentralization 261–3
Declaration of Independence 33
democracy 30, 41–2, 60–1
Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) 166
devolution 128–9, 169–72, 173–5
‘devo max’ 90, 173–5, 275
direct action 265, 269
direct democracy 197–8
discrimination 179, 193, 205, 210,
216, 221, 225–6, 230
Disraeli, Benjamin 14, 59, 63, 66–7,
69, 78, 251
dissent, dissenters 31
divorce law reform 47, 76
domestic violence 245
Duncan Smith, Iain 85, 87
Dworkin, Andrea 234

Earth First 255, 258
Easter rising (1916) 165
eccentricism 254–5, 257–9
ecoligion 248
see also greens
Eden, Anthony 63, 79
end of ideology 4–5
Engels, Friedrich 3, 99–100,
104–5, 230
England 162, 170, 192, 275
English civil war 31
English Parliament 275
English votes for English laws
170, 275
enlightenment 1, 24, 32, 36, 58, 67,
139, 184, 204, 241

environment 77
environmentalism see Greens
Equal Pay Act (1970) 229
equality 28, 95–6, 149, 277
equality of opportunity 62, 212
ethnic minorities 179–80, 192,
203, 206, 215
ethnic minority cultures 206
European Convention on Human
Rights 129
European Parliament 176, 199
European Union (EU) 53, 64, 77,
81–2, 84–5, 90, 118, 121–2, 152,
167–9, 171–3, 176, 179, 195–6,
198
Euro scepticism 81–2, 84–5, 90,
152, 195–6
Eysenck, H. J. 12
Fabian Society (and Fabian
socialism) 48, 101, 107,
109–12
fair trade 68, 72
faith schools 218
Falklands war 75, 169
‘false consciousness’ 3
family (and family values) 76, 210,
235, 239–40
Farage, Nigel 196, 198–9, 274
fascism 1, 6, 8, 12, 20, 158, 178,
184–9, 202, 252
Fawcett, Millicent 228
fellowship 97
female genital mutilation 220
feminism 1, 6, 8, 20, 148, 225–246,
251, 277
black feminism 226, 237
conservative feminism 238–40
eco-feminism 226, 237–8
first wave feminism 225
fourth wave feminism 226,
244–5
liberal feminism 226–30
Marxist feminism 26, 230–3, 235
post- feminism 242
post-modernist feminism 226,
240–1
radical feminism 16, 226, 233–7
feminism – continued
  second wave feminism 225–6, 228–9
  socialist feminism 230–3
  third wave feminism 226, 244
Figes, Eva 234
‘final solution’ 184
Firestone, Shulamith 234
Foot, Michael 120
forced marriage 219–20
Fordism 261
Fox, Charles James 33
fracking 16, 89, 250, 256
Franco, General 142, 146, 186–7
fraternity 95–7
free collective bargaining 106–8
Free Democratic Party (FDP) 51–2, 54
free market 2, 12, 19, 25, 28, 34, 37–8, 62, 71–2, 74, 76, 82, 95, 122, 252, 277
free trade 39, 46, 68, 73
Freedon, Michael 64, 156
freedom 27–8, 43
see also liberty
French Revolution 1, 10, 33, 58–9, 67, 99, 139, 154
Friedan, Betty 228, 235–6, 239
Friedman, Milton 25, 47, 63, 71–4
Friends of the Earth 265–6
Fukuyama, Francis 4
Gaia (and Gaia hypothesis) 258
Gaitskell, Hugh 117–8
Galloway, George 198
Gandhi, Mahatma 138
gay marriage 86, 91
gays and lesbians, gay pride 210
Gellner, Ernest 153–4
General Strike (1926) 108, 141
genetically modified (GM) crops 250, 254, 265
Giddens, Anthony 124
Gilgour, Ian 70, 75
Gladstone, William Ewart 38–40, 68, 165
Glasman, Maurice 132
global capitalism and globalization 149–50, 155, 159, 175–6, 265, 277
Glorious Revolution (1688) 31–2, 162
Gobineau, Comte de 185
Godwin, William 136, 138–40, 227, 239
Goldman, Emma 136, 138
gradualism 70, 105, 110–2, 263
Gramsci, Antonio 3, 5
Gray, John 37, 45
Great Crash (1929) 114
green ideas and ideology 1, 3, 13, 20, 148, 238, 248–69, 277
Green Party 20, 262, 266–7, 269
Green, T.H. 42, 47
greenhouse gases 265
Greenleaf, W.H. 19, 64, 73
Greenpeace 265–6
Greer, Germaine 234, 244
Griffin, Nick 189
Hague, William 76, 83–5, 195
Hall, Stuart 26
Hardie, Keir 109, 112, 230
Hattersley, Roy 120, 132
Hayek, Friedrich von 14, 25, 37, 47, 63, 71–4, 96–7
Healey, Dennis 73, 120
Heath, Edward 48, 70, 73, 190
Hegel, G.W.F. 2, 43
Heseltine, Michael 83, 85
Hitler, Adolf 142, 178, 184–6
Hobbes, Thomas 8, 139
Hobhouse, Leonard 41, 43–4, 47, 105
Hobsbawm, Eric 154, 159
Hobson, Joh 43, 48, 105
Hodgkin, Thomas 104
Hogg, Quintin (Lord Hailsham) 59–60
holism and holistic approach 254–5, 259–260
holocaust 178
homosexuality 76
Howard, Michael 85, 191
Howe, Geoffrey 71, 80
Huhne, Chris 50, 54, 253
Index

human nature 8–9, 59–60, 97, 136
human rights 55, 216, 220, 277
Human Rights Act 129
Hume, David 29, 36
Huntington, Samuel P. 204, 214–5, 221
Hutton, Will 126
Hyndman, H. M. 105, 107
identity 22, 203, 205, 207–8, 214, 222–3, 225
ideology 1–23, 57, 78–9
immigration 75, 85, 171, 179, 189–191, 195–6, 206, 209, 221
imperfection 59
incomes policy 76, 119
Independent Labour Party (ILP) 109, 111, 114
indigenous minorities 206, 212–13
individualism 26–8, 35, 40, 45, 97, 184
indoctrination 15, 67
industrialization 1, 24, 58, 95, 254, 258
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 79
integration 221
inequality 62, 180, 252
Institute of Economic Affairs 79
interculturalism 202, 222–3
interests 1–2, 32–4, 39, 41, 65, 68, 268
international law 30
International Working Men’s Association 99
internationalism 30–31, 99
international relations 51
Iraq war 49, 52, 85, 130, 147, 194
Ireland 162, 164–6
Irish Free State (1922) 165
Irish home rule 68, 165, 169
Irish Republic (Republic of Eire 1937) 165
Irish Republican Brotherhood 165
Islam 181, 194, 205, 209, 211, 215, 217–18
Islamophobia 180, 194, 203
James I and VI 31, 162
Jenkins, Roy 119–20, 212
Jennings, Sir Ivor 209
Jews 181, 185–9, 207
Johnson, Boris 91, 198
Jones, Owen 134
Joseph, Keith (Lord) 70–1, 73, 79
justice 28–9
Kant, Immanuel 2, 43
Kedourie, Elie 153–4
Kennedy, Charles 49, 52
Kingsley, Charles 109
Kinnock, Neil 121
Kropotkin, Peter 136, 138–40, 251
Kymlika, Will 212–3, 216–17, 223
Kyoto agreement (1997) 129, 265
Labour Party 11, 17–18, 48, 94, 106–34, 141, 143, 254, 273, 276
Labour Representation Committee 106–7
laissez faire 25, 38–40, 63
land (landed property) 59
language 205, 210, 217
Lawrence, Stephen 193
Laws, David 50
Lawson, Nigel 70–1, 80
leadership 60–1
League Against Cruel Sports 258–9
left and right 10–13, 25, 178, 197, 238–9, 250–4
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich 3, 11, 1002, 158
lesbianism 235
liberal democracy 30
Liberal Democrats 25–6, 48–55, 88–91, 197, 253, 271–2, 277
liberalism 1, 2, 8, 19, 21, 24–55, 58, 94–5, 156, 184, 202, 213, 215–16, 277
classical liberalism 2, 57, 71
economic liberalism 50
Manchester liberalism 39–40
neo-liberalism 25, 71, 240
Index

liberalism – continued
  New Liberalism 19, 24, 28, 42–7, 55
  radical liberalism 34–6
  social liberalism 28, 50
  Victorian liberalism 25, 36
Liberal Party 25–6, 36, 38–40, 44–8, 120, 272
libertarianism 19, 63–4
liberty 95–6, 277
  see also freedom
limits to growth 254–7
Lloyd George, David 44–5
Locke, John 28, 32, 139
London bombings (2005) 215
Lovelock, James 256, 258
Lucas, Caroline 250, 267
Lukacs, Georg 3
Maastricht Treaty 81
MacDiarmid, Hugh 166
MacDonald, James Ramsay 112–14, 141, 230
Machiavelli, Niccolo 8
Macmillan, Harold 14, 69–72, 79
Macpherson Inquiry (1999) 193
Major, John 19, 76, 80–3, 169
Malthus, Thomas 36, 251, 255
marriage 239
Martineau, Harriet 13, 38
Marx, Eleanor 230
Marx, Karl 2, 6, 8, 13, 99–100, 102, 104–5, 10910, 117, 230, 253
Marxism 3–5, 30, 39, 102, 106, 109, 159, 253, 271
Marxism-Leninism 102
masculinity 243
Mazzini, Giuseppe 1556
media (and mass media) 16, 150, 154, 175–6
Meek, James 134
Meltzer, Albert 146
Merkel, Angela 222
Metropolitan Police Service 193
middle way 178, 185
Miles, Robert 189, 192
Miliband, David 132
Miliband, Ed 132–3
Miliband, Ralph 114, 122
Militant Tendency 106
Mill, James 37, 42
Mill, John Stuart 13, 28, 32, 36, 4–2, 47, 75, 105, 156, 213, 227–8, 235, 243
Millett, Kate 234
Mitchell, Juliet 232
mixed economy 71
monarchy 59, 65
Monbiot, George 256
monetarism 734
Morris, William 112, 137, 140–1, 251, 253, 261
Morrison, Herbert 14, 116
Mosley, Oswald 188–9
motherhood 235, 237–8
multiculturalism 20, 180, 202–3
Muslim see Islam
Mussolini, Benito 142, 184–6
mutualism (and mutual aid) 136–7
Nairn, Tom 163, 167
nation (and nation state) 153, 175, 205
National Economic Development Council 70–1
National Front 189
National Health Service (NHS) 72, 78, 88, 116, 128
National Incomes Commission 70
National Liberal Federation 36, 39
national sovereignty 64, 77
National Trust 252, 265
nationalism 1, 13, 20–1, 24, 30–1, 39, 64, 152–76, 188, 196–7, 202, 277
anti-colonial nationalism 159, 161
British nationalism 157–8, 162–3
civic nationalism 159, 167
conservative nationalism 64, 157–8, 160
cultural nationalism 160
English nationalism 152, 170–1, 175, 192, 276
ethnic nationalism 159, 178, 192
fascist nationalism 16, 18, 81
Irish nationalism 164–6
liberal nationalism 39, 156–7, 160
modernization nationalism 154, 158, 160
peripheral nationalism 176
revolutionary nationalism 156, 160
Scottish nationalism 152, 155, 163, 166–7, 170, 273–6
separatist nationalism 159, 161, 175
Welsh nationalism 152, 166–7, 170,
nationalization 115–18
natural rights 32
Nazism 178, 185–7, 189, 239
New Labour 18, 123–32
New Party 188
New Right 18, 25, 47, 71, 82, 238
Newcastle Programme 44
NIMBY (Not in my back yard) 252–3, 260
Niskanen, William 63, 72
nonconformism 25, 39
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 121, 168
Northern Ireland 129, 169
nuclear disarmament 118
nuclear power 250, 254, 256
Oakeshott, Michael 17, 58–9, 62, 214
objectivity 6
Occupy 147
Ohmae, Keniche 155, 175
Okin, Susan Moller 229
Orange Book 50–2, 55
organic society 60
Orwell, George 15, 142–4, 149–50
Osborne, George 86–91
Owen, David 120
Owen, Robert 97, 104, 112, 137, 253
pacifism 1378, 143–5
Paine, Tom 4, 34–5, 139, 227
Palmerston, Lord 39
Pankhurst, Christabel 228
Pankhurst, Emmeline 228, 239
Parekh, Bhikhu 207–8, 212, 215–17, 219, 223
parliamentarism 111–12, 114, 149, 184
parliamentary reform 35, 38–9
parliamentary sovereignty 24, 34, 168
Parnell, Charles Stuart 165
paternalism 62
patriarchy 148, 23–4, 236
Peace Pledge Union 145
Peel, Robert 14, 59, 64–7
permissiveness 76
Piketty, Thomas 134
Plaid Cymru 166, 169, 173, 196, 273
Plane Stupid 254
planning 95, 97, 122
Plato 2, 8, 15, 58, 60
Poll Tax 78, 81, 167
pollution 257, 268
Poor Law Amendment Act (1834) 37
Poplarism 113
popular sovereignty 197
population 255, 257
populism 70, 178–9, 197–200, 273–4
pornography 235, 239
positive discrimination 180, 203
post-feminism 226
post-Fordism 261
post-industrial society 176
post-material values 257
post-modernism 240–1, 255
Powell, Enoch 71–2, 168, 190, 192, 195, 198
power 1–3, 15–16, 30, 32–3
pragmatism 4, 16–18, 57, 70, 78–9
presbyterianism, 162
Prescott, Jake 146
pressure groups 265–6, 269
privatization 74, 77–8, 81, 149, 167
property 28, 32–3, 61–2, 95, 137
protection (and protectionism) 68
Protestant ethic 31–2
Protestant reformation 31
Protestantism 31–2
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph 1367, 139
public (rational) choice theory 72
public ownership 96, 99, 116
Quek, Kay 219–20
race 20
race relations 189
race riots 191
racism 178–96, 202–3
anti-Irish racism 182, 191
biological racism 184
cultural racism 190, 192
institutional racism 192–3
‘new’ racism 192
‘scientific’ racism 183–4, 192
racism and class 191
radicals (and radicalism) 26, 34–6, 70
rape (and date rape) 234–6, 245
Rathbone, Eleanor 230
rationalism 27, 36, 59, 184, 241, 265
Rawls, John 87, 97, 229
Read, Herbert 144–6
Reagan, Ronald 76
Red Clydesiders 111
redistribution 95, 127
Redstockings Manifesto 237
Red Toryism 87
Reckless, Mark 199
Redwood, John 82
referendum 197–8
on alternative vote (2011) 89
on devolution (1979) 169
on devolution (1997) 170
on regional assembly for North East England 171
Referendum Party 195
Reform Act (1832) 33–5
Reform Act (1867) 67, 228
Reform Act (1884) 40
relativism 241
religious fundamentalism 194
renewable energy 250, 256
republicanism 35
Respect 20
revisionism 117–8
Rex, John 213
Ricardo, David 104
Richards, Janet Radcliffe 228–9, 236–7
Richards, Vernon 142–6
rights 29–30
natural 9–30, 32
universal human 29
women’s s 227–8
Rosebery, Lord 45
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 8, 251
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) 265
RSPCA 258–9
rule of law 29
Rushdie, Salman 194, 218–19
Russell, Bertrand 145
Russian (Boshevik) Revolution 2, 100, 106, 139, 142
Salisbury, Lord 14, 61, 68
Salmond, Alex 131, 173–4
Samuel, Herbert 42
Schumacher, E. 261
Scotland 22, 69, 84, 129, 152, 162–4, 166–7, 196, 210, 273
Scottish National :Party (SNP) 22, 166–9, 173–4, 196, 274–5
Scottish Parliament 170, 173
Scruton, Roger, 62
science 249–50
self-interest 27, 29
self-sufficiency 262–3
segregation 218, 222
sexual abuse 245
Shaw, George Bernard 110
Sinn Fein 1656
Sixth Extinction 257–8
slavery 180, 182, 227
‘small is beautiful’ 260–3
Smiles, Samuel 13, 38
Smith, Adan 14, 36, 72, 74
Smith, John 109, 121–3
Snowden, Philip 112
social democracy 48, 103, 117–8, 121–2, 124, 132
Social Democratic Federation 105–6
Social Democratic Party (SDP) 48–9, 120–1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>social justice</td>
<td>28–9, 61, 87, 95, 97, 127, 148, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social reform</td>
<td>62–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialism</td>
<td>1, 2, 10, 14, 20–1, 29, 94–134, 136–7, 140, 158–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>109, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethical</td>
<td>108–10, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evolutionary</td>
<td>99–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabian</td>
<td>107, 110–12, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>99–100, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>101, 112–3, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopian</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also</td>
<td>anarchism; labourism; Marxism; social democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solidarity</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorel, Georges</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union (USSR)</td>
<td>115, 121–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Civil War (1936–9)</td>
<td>139, 141–2, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer, Herbert</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholding</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state (and state intervention)</td>
<td>19–20, 43–4, 63, 74, 76, 98–9, 101, 110–11, 115–16, 118, 137, 149, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalin (and Stalinism)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub-cultures</td>
<td>205–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suffragettes</td>
<td>225, 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sustainability</td>
<td>254–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamworth manifesto</td>
<td>65, 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawney, R. H.</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Harriet</td>
<td>226–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tebbit, Norman</td>
<td>71, 76, 80, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatcher, Margaret</td>
<td>9, 11, 14, 19, 47, 70–80, 84–5, 121, 169, 191, 198, 239, 251–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatcherism</td>
<td>14, 66, 70–81, 124, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also</td>
<td>New Right; neo-liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third way</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, William</td>
<td>104, 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toleration</td>
<td>24, 27–8, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolstoy,</td>
<td>138, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tories (and Toryism)</td>
<td>57, 65–7, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tory anarchism</td>
<td>137, 142–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tory collectivism</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tory democracy</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tory radicals</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totalitarianism</td>
<td>4, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade unions (and trade unionism)</td>
<td>76, 101, 106–8, 111–12, 115–16, 119, 122–3, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades Union Congress (TUC)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tradition</td>
<td>36, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
<td>165–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union (of England with Scotland, 1707)</td>
<td>162–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union (of Britain and Ireland, 1801)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionism</td>
<td>66, 69, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>22, 152, 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)</td>
<td>29, 82, 90, 133, 152, 171–2, 176, 179, 196–200, 273–4, 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal human rights</td>
<td>27, 202, 216, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universalism</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban riots</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utilitarianism</td>
<td>36–8, 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopia, and utopianism</td>
<td>10, 18, 142, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetarianism</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voltaire</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldegrave, William</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>22, 69, 84, 152, 162, 164, 166–7, 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter, Natasha</td>
<td>237, 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward, Colin</td>
<td>144–5, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘war on terror’</td>
<td>149, 194–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb, Sidney and Beatrice</td>
<td>101, 110–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, Max</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welfare state</td>
<td>35, 71, 76, 79, 115–6, 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells, H. G.</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Assembly</td>
<td>170, 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lothian question</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whigs (and Whiggism)  26, 32–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilde, Oscar           137, 140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilkinson, Ellen       230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams, Raymond      204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Harold         17, 119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Woodrow        155–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wollstonecraft, Mary   140, 226–7, 239</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Against Violence Against Women     235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Parliament    229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Liberation Movement  148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rights         219–20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodcock, George       139, 142–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Centre (attack on, 11/9/2001) 147, 194, 215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>working class          95, 107, 111, 123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsthorne, Peregrine  75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Hugo            75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>