# Contents

*List of Figures and Tables* ix

*Acknowledgements* x

*Notes on Contributors* xi

**Introduction**

*Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith* 1

## Part I  Counter-insurgency: History and Theory

1  *Minting New COIN: Critiquing Counter-insurgency Theory*

   *Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith* 9

2  *COIN and the Chameleon: The Category Errors of Trying to Divide the Indivisible*

   *M.L.R. Smith* 32

3  *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unspoken Paradox of Large-Scale Expeditionary COIN*

   *Jeffrey Michaels* 58

4  *Government in a Box? Counter-insurgency, State Building, and the Technocratic Conceit*

   *Colin Jackson* 82

5  ‘Our Ghettos, Too, Need a Lansdale’: American Counter-insurgency Abroad and at Home in the Vietnam Era

   *William Rosenau* 111

6  *Bringing the Soil Back in: Control and Territoriality in Western and Non-Western COIN*

   *James Worrall* 127

7  *Counter-insurgency and Violence Management*

   *Paul Staniland* 144

8  *Mass, Methods, and Means: The Northern Ireland ‘Model’ of Counter-insurgency*

   *John Bew* 156

9  *David Galula and the Revival of COIN in the US Military*

   *Douglas Porch* 173

## Part II  Counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan?

10 *Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?*

    *Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro* 201
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>After a Decade of Counter-insurgency, Eliminate Nation-Building from US Military Manuals</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bing West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Conceit of American Counter-insurgency</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gian Gentile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>‘The Population Is the Enemy’: Control, Behaviour, and Counter-insurgency in Central Helmand Province, Afghanistan</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ryan Evans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Reluctant Counter-insurgents: Britain’s Absent Surge in Southern Iraq</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huw Bennett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Part III</strong> Counter-insurgency and Future Warfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Questions about COIN after Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joshua Rovner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The Military Utility and Interventions Post-Afghanistan: Reassessing Ends, Ways, and Means</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matthew Ford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>‘What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again?’ Western Counter-insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Schulte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Celebrte Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones
and M.L.R. Smith

The rise and fall of intellectual fashions is something that analysts sometimes ponder, attempting to discern the factors that inspired them and the manner in which they eventually fade into irrelevance. The past ten years witnessed the rise to ascendancy of counter-insurgency orthodoxy within military, political, and academic circles, notably in Washington and Westminster. The origins of this orthodoxy are not hard to trace. They date from 11 September 2001 when the al-Qaeda jihadist network hijacked four airliners, two of which were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, the other striking the Pentagon in Alexandria, Virginia, while the fourth crashed into a Pennsylvania field. The loss of nearly 3,000 lives on that fateful day was the defining factor that eventually saw counter-insurgency as its logical response.

At first, analytical attention in the wake of this attack focused on the al-Qaeda network and its capacity for ‘asymmetric’ assaults on Western targets. The years following 9/11 saw further deadly attacks and conspiracies by al-Qaeda franchises, most notably in the cities of Western Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Many of these attacks were perpetrated by so-called ‘home-grown’ jihadists. Consequently, among other things, much attention focused on how states could secure themselves from such threats through the provision of legal and intelligence measures, strengthening internal resilience through greater social cohesion, mutual cooperation between threatened states, and programmes that aimed to ‘de-radicalise’ either actual or potential jihadist operatives.

Much of the practical and scholarly work undertaken by governments, defence planners, and academics in the first few years after 9/11 may reasonably be described as the first wave of counter-insurgency thinking (although it was not labelled such at the time), concerned as it was with understanding, confronting, and defeating the attempt by violent, transnational jihadism to disturb the modern secular Western world order through a programme of radical subversion. This initial wave was the harbinger of a more distinctly counter-insurgent-focused second wave that broke after 2004. In the weeks following the...
9/11 attacks Western coalition forces invaded Afghanistan. The hard-line Islamic Taliban regime that had provided a safe haven for the core leadership of al-Qaeda was swiftly deposed. Western forces subsequently assumed an uneasy posture supporting the new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai, whose authority was under constant armed challenge from the remnants of the Taliban, particularly in the Pashtun heartlands of Helmand Province. The difficulties Western forces faced in addressing an ethnically fragmented and fragile Afghanistan society whilst propping up the increasingly corrupt Karzai government presented seemingly classical counter-insurgency dilemmas in terms of winning the support of the people for the government cause and securing the country against Taliban resistance. Twelve years on, the Afghan conflict, and the problematic Western efforts to end it, remain unresolved.

It was, however, the controversial decision of the US administration of President George W. Bush to invade Iraq in March 2003 that provided the real impetus for the second wave of counter-insurgency writing. The optimism that initially followed the ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime, which over three decades had systematically brutalised Iraqi society, quickly gave way to uncertainty as the occupation forces faced growing violence and disorder in the country. The combination of Saddam’s fall, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s missteps, a weak transitional government that struggled to establish popular legitimacy, and the lack of troops on the ground helped fuel Iraq’s descent into anarchy. Feuding between the Shiite majority and the once politically dominant Sunni minority population resulted in sectarian conflict, while jihadist elements, now functioning under the umbrella of ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’, exploited the political vacuum to launch indiscriminate attacks on government targets, coalition troops, and their mainly Shiite religious enemies.

As Iraq fragmented, the provisional authority struggled to interpret and respond to the spreading chaos: counter-insurgency experts, often self-appointed, suggested that the coalition’s military operations were too focused on hard ‘kinetic’ encounters intended to eliminate pockets of militant resistance. In this view, conventional force-on-force concentrations paid insufficient attention to the wider effects of such violence in populated areas, particularly with respect to non-combatant casualties and the collateral damage inflicted. Instead, these observers argued, provision of public services and engagement with the population would help gain their sympathy, and that this would, in turn, isolate extremists. Around the end of 2005, a variety of experts and military officers gathered under the leadership of General David Petraeus, then commander of the US Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to revise and update the Army’s manual on counter-insurgency. Animated by the belief that the US and its commanders were too ‘conventionally-minded’, these writers drew inspiration, in part, from a range of ‘classical’ writings on counter-insurgency
dating from the British and French experience of de-colonisation in the 1950s and 1960s. These soldier-scholars and their like-minded advisors in the military, academe, and non-governmental think tanks produced Field Manual 3–24 on Counterinsurgency. Utilising concepts of population-centric war and deep cultural knowledge of the enemy, and of the broader society from which it emanated, these officers and planners described a universal set of tactics that, they believed, could be used to effectively defeat any ‘insurgency’.

By the end of 2006, Iraq seemed on the verge of nationwide civil war. The Bush administration looked for a path out of the unfolding disaster. At the end of 2006, just as FM 3–24 was released with great fanfare, the administration appointed General Petraeus to lead a ‘surge’ in US forces in Iraq – an increase of approximately 30,000 troops. Armed with the new manual and accompanied by many of its contributors, Petraeus took over the war in Iraq in early 2007. Over time, violence in Iraq began to decrease, seemingly vindicating the new leadership and, presumably, the implementation of new tactics as defined by the manual. Counter-insurgency seemed to have solved America’s problems in Iraq, and a powerful new narrative emerged: the US replaced ‘conventionally’ minded commanders with allegedly more enlightened ones who, armed with new thinking about war among the people, implemented new tactics to win over the population. The new troops provided the necessary security on the ground to apply the new techniques of counter-insurgency, and to prize tribal chiefs away from al-Qaeda’s embrace in a ‘Sunni awakening’. As a result, violence declined, enabling Iraq to progress to elections, reconciliation, and effective self-government.

This narrative thus assumes recent history unfolding in a dialectic of challenge and response. Retribution for al-Qaeda and its fellow travellers via the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq followed swiftly upon the attacks on the United States of September 2001. Subsequently, the mishandling of the occupations of these fragile states saw a promising situation slide out of control. However, dynamic, innovative leaders capable of bold, decisive action saved the situation (at least in Iraq). This narrative achieved, between 2007 and 2010, quasi-official sanction. Military handbooks codified the creed of counter-insurgency and media commentary extolled its virtues.\(^4\) Counter-insurgency (COIN) advocates subsequently advanced the doctrine as an all-purpose template for future wars of similar kind.

It was the largely uncritical acceptance of this COIN narrative that forms the background to this edited volume. Even as the COIN myth evolved a number of military and academic commentators, who did not necessarily deny the part that effective leadership and new ways of thinking came to play in Iraq, came to question the theoretical assumptions and anachronistic use of history that seemed to inform the newly minted COIN orthodoxy. The emergence of the neo-COINs as a distinct ‘lobby’ within
the Washington Beltway, promoted by entrepreneurial, but not necessarily always historically informed, enthusiasts, also prompted commentary. Critical voices particularly those with practical knowledge of serving in Iraq, either as soldiers or civil servants, expressed concern at the ease with which this lobby dominated the terms of debate, resisted any questioning of its premises, and sought to exclude from the debate those that might have presented alternative readings both of the accuracy of the COIN narrative of success in Iraq and the broader implications for policy that this intimated.

It was in an attempt to broaden debate about the theory and practice of contemporary counter-insurgency that guided the various authors who have contributed to this book. Its origins lie in a two-day seminar held in June 2012 at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, hosted by the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas. The chapters in this volume thus present the work of those participants. The seminar brought together a diverse range of views broadly critical of the received wisdom of COIN as it had evolved after 2002. Those involved included academics, journalists, former military commanders, and former civil servants or advisors with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan. They address the subject of COIN from different standpoints. It was the intention of the seminar to allow contributors to speak, where relevant, from their own experience, and from their own professional perspectives rather than through a predetermined academic framework. This pluralism is evident in the following chapters, which reflect the differing perspectives of the scholar, the journalist, the soldier, the civil servant, and the political advisor. The editors considered such pluralism vital to raising crucial questions about the viability of the contemporary COIN advocacy. Consequently, this volume raises questions about the theoretical basis and plausibility of counter-insurgency as a distinct concept, points to the shaky historical assumptions that underlie COIN, critically evaluates case studies of examples of supposedly successful counter-insurgency practice, and presents assessments of the accuracy of the existing COIN narrative of success in Iraq, and its questionable relevance for other arenas of future conflict.

Contributors addressed the problem of COIN from three general perspectives, which form the major sections of this volume: (1) the theory of COIN and its historical underpinnings; (2) COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (3) COIN and future warfare. Each of these broad categories is a critical aspect of the recent debate over COIN and merits further discussion. While by no means a comprehensive assessment of COIN, the contributions of this volume represent the beginning of a broad challenge that, it is hoped, will continue to receive the attention of scholars and practitioners.

While the modern-day counter-insurgency advocates achieved great influence over policy making in the course of the last decade, the high watermark of their impact has begun to recede. Arguably, this has happened as the claims of counter-insurgency have come under scrutiny from the
interrogative voices of the kind represented in this volume. Nevertheless, the intractability of ongoing practical problems, most clearly illustrated by the instability in Afghanistan that has long bedevilled Western forces in that country, underscores the criticism that the COIN template possesses qualities that are far from relevant and timeless.

Moreover, the power of the COIN narrative still exerts its potency in popular commentary, and remains, to some extent, embedded in influential sections of the armed forces and defence establishments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. The overarching view of the majority of the contributors to this volume is that COIN’s conceptual underpinnings are weak, its practical claims questionable, and that COIN does not represent the way of war for the future. Irrespective, though, of whether we have ultimately witnessed the passing of the ‘new’ counter-insurgency era, the primary goal of this collection of essays is to represent a range of sceptical analysis, the validity of which informed readers can weigh up in their own mind against the claims of COIN advocates.

Notes

3. In fact, US troops throughout the conflict routinely conducted engagement with the population and spent billions in reconstruction funds to build schools, sewage plants, electrical production and distribution facilities, roads, and hospitals.
5. See, for example, Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).
Index

A
ADP Operations, 322
Affaires indigènes (AI), 89
Afghanistan
absence of competent and legitimate host government, 9
America’s core goal for American military in, 250
civil governance, 82
decision on operational framework in, 241
FM 3–24 failure in, 235
General McChrystal offensive operation in Marjah, 82
increasing of US forces in 2009, 58
large-scale foreign military presence in, 61–7
NATO policy in, 164
new counter-insurgency strategy by US, 10
Obama’s speech on Afghanistan strategy at West Point in 2009, 242
surge in 2009, 10
troop deployments from 2003–12, 289
Western coalition forces invaded, 2
white areas practice in, 15
Afghan Local Police (ALP), 221
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 20, 258–9, 261, 270, 273
Afghan Public Protection Police (APPP), 221
Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 259, 263, 269
AFM Countering Insurgency, 322
air power doctrine, 12
AK-47, 77n24
Albu Nimr tribe, in Iraq, 208–9
Algerian conflict/war, 52, 177
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 282, 286–7
All In (Paula Broadwell), 248
al-Maliki, Nouri, 75n10, 221, 229n49, 236, 280–1, 300, 350
al-Qaeda, 18, 44, 52, 248–9, 353
functioning in Iraq, 2
jihadist network hijacked four airliners, 1
retribution for, 3
Sunni uprising in Iraq against, 201
Sunni awakening, 3
Taliban regime assistance to leaders of, 2
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 201, 208–10
American war in Iraq (2003–2011), 242
in Vietnam (1965–1973), 242, 245, 250
America’s broken strategy, in Afghanistan, 240
Anbar Awakening, in western Iraq, 148–9, 201–3, 208–10, 248
Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), 164
anti-capitalism, 344
anti-globalisation, 344
anti-Occidentalism, 344
anti-riot dispensing tetrahedrons, 120
anti-technological, 344
anti-terrorist operations, 167–8
anti-war, 344
anti-Zionism, 344
Arab–Israeli Wars, 26
areas of operation (AOs), within Iraq, 204
armed social work, 16–17, 130, see also military doctrine
Armenia’s borders, 136
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 63, 77n24, 246
asymmetric war, 33
authority, 116–17
crisis of, 100
B
Ba’athist regime, Britain reduction of force after overthrow of, 280
Baghdad, 299
ghetto security in, 141
militias and insurgents stronghold in, 131
neighborhoods, 207
Sunni, 206
Index

Banana War, 112
dandit war, 33
Basra's liberation, 280–1
Battle of Algiers (1957), 177
*The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building*, 330
Big Boy's Rules, 162
Bin Laden, Osama, 80n55, 237, 241–2, 250, 349, 353, 364n48
black terrorist movement, 114
Blackwill, Robert, 22
Blair, Tony, 286–7, 321
Bloody Sunday (1972), 159–60
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), 323–4
Briggs Plan, 244
Britain/British Army's campaign in Northern Ireland (1969–2007), 156
learning from mistakes and refining security (1969–1975), 159–62
resisting to return Malayan methods, 165–7
defeated Malayan communist insurgents, 244
military contribution to NATO mission in Afghanistan, 286
participation in Iraq war, 278
‘Building Overseas Stability Strategy’ (BOSS) paper, British government, 354
bureaucratic incentives, 145
Bush, George W., 2–3, 63, 201, 232
C
calibration, 302, 308–12
Center for Research in Social Systems, 115
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 113
chiclets, 92
Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), 278, 281–2, 286–8
Chinese Civil War, 303
circular security pattern, in America, 112
civic actions of government, during war, 11
civil–military engagement, 354
civil strife, dynamics of, 115–16
civil conflicts, 14, 156, 160, 222, 304, 309–10
unrest, 113, 121
violence, 121
civil wars, 3, 13–14, 222
formal institutions limitation as tool of influence in, 101
guerrilla methods use in, 34
politics of, 82–3, 99–100, 103
classic cell-based terrorist organisation, 157
Clausewitzian war, 18, 44
Clemenceau, Georges, 240–1
coalition troops, 2
Cold War, 37, 41–3, 50, 115, 236, 310, 320
colonialism, 130–1
Combined Arms Center, 299
Communist Front, 15–16
comprehension territoriality, 136, 139, 141
comprehensive approach, 320, 354
conceit, behind American-style counter-insurgency, 240
consolidation of state authority, importance of, 306
containment strategy, for violence management, 151–2
contemporary warfare, 17
control territoriality, 136, 139, 141
conventionally minded commanders, US, 3
conventional war, 36
counter-insurgency (COIN), concept of approaches of, 130
big interventionary, 341–3
classical writings on, 2–3
continuation of established authority, 11
as doctrine, 12–14
emergence of neo-, 3–4
evolution of, 4
features of, 18
Galula’s prescriptions for success of, 176–91
grey zones for next decades, 352–7
and homefront, see homefront and counter-insurgency
as liberal way of war, 128
limitation of, 352–7
limited debate on, 145–7, 299
counter-insurgency (COIN) – continued
modalities of
abstention from direct involvement, 352–4
active assistance in suppressing insurgents, 355–6
embedded training, advising, and equipping of government security forces, 354–5
preventative civil–military engagement, 354
protection of population, 357
new American way of war, 241
orthodoxy in Washington and Westminster, 1
as paradox, 26
policy and research, implications for, 152–4
as political spin, 25
problems of, 4
and rationalist disdain for politics, 17–19
rediscovery of, 173
scholarship, 301
as a statement of obvious, 24–5
steps for success of
destroying or evicting insurgent forces, 304
destruction of insurgent political organisation, 304
mopping up any remaining insurgents, 304
protection of population, 304
as a story, 23–4
as subtext, 24
technique as a substitute for political understanding, 19–23
techniques used by foreign forces, 65
and use of history, 14–16
counterinsurgency faddism, 41
counter-terrorism, PIRA campaign for, 156–7
de-colonisation
British and French experience of, 3
deepest cultural knowledge of the enemy, concept of, 3
deep ecology, 344
defence establishment, America’s, 252
destructive counter-insurgency, 116–17
disarmament, 79n52
The Discourses (Machiavelli), 305–6
dissolution of war, in Balkans and Transcaucasia, 43–4
District Delivery Plan (DDP), 95
District Support Teams (DSTs), in Afghanistan, 92, 95
Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations, Indian Army, 345
drones, use by US in Pakistan, 355
E
early warning, 354
economic austerity, 357
economic war, 11
effects based approach, 324
effects based operations (EBO), 335n41
enemy centric approach, of counter-insurgency, 130
enemy-centric security policy, 158
ethnic wars, 43, 222
European Union (EU), 323, 340
exit strategy, 280–5
expensive wars, 68
F
favouritism strategy, for violence management, 148–9
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 113
feudalism, 102–3
Field Manual 3–24 on Counter-insurgency, 3
financial impact on US, of military escalation, 69
force-on-force clashes, 36
Force Research Unit (FRU), Army, 162, 168
foreign military presence in large-scale, problems arising due to, 61–7
foreign policy, 9, 21, 51, 64, 69, 71, 115, 313, 321
Fort Hood shootings (2009), 344
Fourth Generation War (4GW), concept of, 353
fragile states, 3
France
counter-insurgency campaign against Viet Minh in Indochina, 83
threat of Chinese-trained Viet Minh army and guerillas, 83
French War College, 177
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), 88, 175, 178

G
Galula, David
prescriptions for counter-insurgency success
army turning into policing as its central mission, 187–8
decapitation strategy of France, 188–9
denial of safe havens for insurgents, 190–1
differentiate between people and rebels, 185
eyearly recognition of insurgency, 179–82
effective information operations campaign, importance of, 189
FLN realisation of greatest psychological effect on French, 182–4
pacification of order, 176–7
separation of population from rebels, 184–5
women rights promotion, 185–7
The Gamble (Thomas Ricks), 248
gang violence, 121–2
Gates, Robert, 341
Ghetto rebellion (1960s), 113–15
dynamics of civil strife, 115–16
military-police nexus, 117–20
ghetto rioters, American, 115
global asymmetric threats, 10
global insurgency, 18
of violent jihadist groupings, 52, see also al-Qaeda
globalisation process, 320–1, 347
Global War on Terror (GWOT), 111–12
good governance, 147, 150, 165, 169, 306
good strategic judgement, 52–3
‘government in a box,’ 82–3
PRT in Afghanistan, 91–8
technocratic conceit and, 98–102
Government of Vietnam (GVN), 63–4
Great Society programme, 68
The Green Berets (John Wayne), 23
Groupements Administrifs Mobiles Opérationnel (GAMOs), 83–8, 91, 93–4, 96–7
Groupes de Mixte Aéroportés (GCMA), 39
The Guardian, 10
guerre révolutionnaire, 37
guerrilla operations/war, 13, 33–4, 47–8
Gulf War (1990–1991), 46

H
hard power, 16, 158, 163, 169
harkis, Algerian, 357
hit-and-run tactics, 34, 303
Hizbollah, 251
homefront and counter-insurgency, 67–70
home-grown jihadists, 1
host state, role in delivering security and refocus attention on civil society, 327
House of Commons Defence Committee, 290–1
human element problems, of conducting counter-insurgency with professional forces, 67
humanitarian orientation, 9
human security, 319–23, 329, 346
human terrain systems (HTS) approach, 137–8, 325
Huntington, Samuel, 66, 75n10, 77n22
Hussein, Saddam, 2, 232

I
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 210, 261, 270
Indochina war (1945 and 1954), 37–8, 40
GAMOs introduction in, 83
military non-preparation for war, 88
Indo-Pakistan War, 26
instant banana peel, 120
insurgency, notion of, 10–11, 13, 26
definition of, 32
distinction between terrorism and, 157
importance of political aspects, 349
and its diverse remedies, 343–246
stages for successful, 303
treating of, 47

*The Insurgents* (Fred Kaplan), 248

insurrection, 33
by North Vietnamese in South, 48

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 341

internal security act (ISA), 15

internal war, concept of, 14

International Criminal Tribunal, 330

international jihadism, 344

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 29n51, 95, 239, 259, 267–8, 273, 286

international security policy, of US, 111

inter-state wars, 42

interventionary COIN, future operational environment for fighting and eliminating insurgents, 349

protection of force, 347

sparing civilians, 348–9

interventionist powers, 320, 324, 326, 329–30

intervention of military from global perspective, 321–4
from hybrid perspective, 329–30
from local perspective, 324–8

intractable conflicts, 327

intra-state wars, 42

invisible capillaries of empire, 112

Iraq
Bush’s decision in 2003 to invade, 2
civilian fatalities in mid-2007, 201, 278
coalition’s military operations in, 2
FM 3–24 failure in, 235
increase in violence, 3
large-scale foreign military presence in, 61–7
post-Saddam, 324
reduction of violence in Anbar Awakening, 208–11
comparison between surge and synergy, 211–19
evidence and approach, 203–5

sectarian cleansing, 205–8
Shiite-dominated governments in, 146
surge in 2007, 10
troop deployments from 2003–12, 289
US forces/military in, 3
fatalities from 2007, declining rate of, 201
withdrawal of troops, 234
Iraq body count (IBC), 204
Iraqi security forces (ISF), 201, 228n45
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 157
irregular war, 33, 43
Islamic Taliban regime, 2
Israeli Army in Lebanon war with Hizbollah in 2006, 251

J
Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), 206–8, 213
*JD P 3–40 Security and Stabilisation*, 322
jihad/jihadism/jihadist, 16, 52
home-grown jihadists, 1
ideology of, 19
international, 344
Jones Commission, 228n45

K
Karzai, Hamid, 263, 341, 350
Kennedy, John F., 48
Kerner Commission, 115–16
Khadafi regime in Libya
US air campaign to remove, 252
King, Martin Luther, 113
Korean War, 26, 46
Kosovo, 266, 291, 357

L
land warfare, 12
Law and Order Assistance Research and Development Program, 120

*Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (John Nagl), 15, 24

Lederer, William J., 58
legitimacy, crisis of, 100
liberal interventionism, 136, 141, 320
liberal peace, 320, 322
Libya
America’s air campaign against Khadafi’s regime in, 252
America’s state building operations in, 251
light footprint idea, 161
limited warfare, 13
Limited War Laboratory (LWL), 119–20
lines of efforts (LOEs), for nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan
development of honest and democratic governance, 235
implementation of Western rule of law, 235
providing population good, services and economic development, 235
provision for security to population against insurgents, 236
The Logic of Collective Action (Mancur Olson), 268, 270
London Bombings (2007), 344
The Long Long War (Richard Clutterbuck), 15
low-intensity conflicts, 10, 33
M
Malayan Emergency, 14–15, 350
British forces crushed rebellion during, 14–15
model COIN campaign, 15, 165
Mali, 357
America’s state building operations in, 251
Manoeuvrist approach, 168
maritime doctrine, 12
military doctrine, 12, 16–17, 322
Military History Institute (MHI), US Army, 204
military–police nexus, 117–20
Military Review, 242
military’s cultural competence, 137
military war, 11
Ministry of Home Affairs, India, 155n15
mobile warfare, 42
modern-day counter-insurgency, advocacy of, 4
monopolisation strategy, for violence management, 149–51, 153
monopolised violence, 146
Moro Liberation Front, 355
Mountbatten, Louis, 166
Multinational Division South East MND (SE), 279, 281, 290
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), 203
multiple cattle prod booms, 120
Muslims
acceptance of permanent second-class citizenship in world, 16–17
jihad choice for, 52
N
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 115
nationalisms, 344
National Reconciliation and Land Reform, Vietnam, 77n23
national security, 70
cost–benefit calculus of, 60
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 122
Nazi Germany, 241
New Villages, 245
9/11 attacks, 1–2, 32
Nixon, Richard, 121
nonlethal weapons, 119
relationship with Pakistan, 340
strategic debate within, 341
Northern Ireland, 121, 153
British Army’s campaign in, 156
British security policy in, 156
conflicts in, phases of, 157
politics primacy in, 162–5
nuclear proliferation, 79n52
O
Obama, Barack, 10, 63, 69, 202, 234, 236, 239n7, 242, 250, 255n31, 300, 313–14, 334n30, 341, 365n60
Omar, Mullah, 237
operational framework, in Afghanistan, 241
Operation Atlante, 86–8
Operation Charge of the Knights, 290
Operation Herrick 13, 258, 261
Operation Moshtarak, 94
Operation Motorman (1972), 161–2
Operation Panther, 261
Operation Serval, 340
Operation Sinbad (2006), 279–81
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 215
organizational
culture, 145
rigidity, 145
organized movements, 32

P

Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958 (David
Galula), 173, 175–6
Pakistan, 250
Al-Qaeda escaped into, 232
insurgency in, 75n7
militancy rise in Swat, 151
Taliban's relationship with, 340
Taliban presence North and South
Waziristan, 151
paramilitary operations, 13
paramilitary war, 11
partisan war, 33
‘pathological city’ trope, 121
Pentagon, expenditure on war on terror
by, 78n41
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ),
London, 280–2, 284–7, 290
Philippines
US colonial administrators used
information technology in, 112
pivot, 313
political action, 48
order, 14, 83, 90, 99–100, 102–3
risk aversion, 357
war, 11
political space, notion of, 132
politics
of civil war, 103
primacy of, 162–5
and war, relationship between, 52
Politics and the Stages of Growth (Walt
Rostow), 20
population centric approach, of
counter-insurgency, 130, 138–9
population-centric counter-insurgency,
257
population-centric war, concept of, 3, 48
positional warfare, 42
post-Gaddafi Libya, UN peacekeeping
efforts after, 252
post-Maoist global insurgency, 344
pre-war planning, 280
primitive war, 44
The Prince (Machiavelli), 305–6
principled incrementalism, 330
problem, defining counter-insurgency,
130–4
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
model, US, 83, 91–8
Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA), 156–60, 164–5, 168–9
psychological operations, 177–8, 190,
194n6
psychological war, 11
psy-war, 111
purging strategy for violence
management, 152
Pyrrhic victory, 74

R
radical war, 148
RAND Corporation Symposium on
counter-insurgency, 21
The Rape of the Masses (Serge Chakotine),
37
rapid crisis prevention and response,
354
rational-choice theory (RCT), 259,
268–71
Reagan, Ronald, 30n71, 121
Rear Echelon Motherfucker (REMF)
behaviour, 340
Rebellion and Authority study, 117, 119, 270
rebellions, 14–15, 18, 52, 116–17
expression of crisis, 100
regular warfare, 43
remote-area conflicts, 115
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), 252
revisionist history on
counter-insurgency, 305
revolutionary colonialism, 77n23
revolutionary war, concept of, 33, 39, 41
riot control agents (RCA), 119
riot control wagon, 120
rival ethnic group, in Iraq, 65
Royal Highland Fusiliers, 258
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 157,
161–2, 169
Rumsfeld, Donald, 357

S
sacred spaces, 136
Samarra Mosque bombing in 2006, Iraq,
206
2 SCOTS, 258–9, 261–7, 269, 271–2
search and destroy operations, 66–7, 233, 246–7
Second World War, 46
sectarian cleansing, in Iraq, 205–8
Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS), 83
  in Algeria (1955–1962), 88–91
  conversion into pattern of conflict, 167
sequence, notion of, 303–8
sequential approach to counterinsurgency, concept of, 306–7
Shi’a militia in greater Basra
  Nouri al-Maliki’s decision to attack, 300
Shiites, in Iraq, 2
  demand for foreign forces, 65
Significant Activities (SIGACTs), 203–5, 229n54
Six Day War, 46
small wars, 10, 15, 43, 157–8, 174, 177, 179, 251
soft power, 158
Sons of Iraq (SOIs), 208, 210, 212–14
  areas of operation with, 216
  violence trends in areas of, 215
  violence trends pre-and post, 217
South Vietnam (SVN), 73, 246
Southwest Babaji, Afghanistan
  local national behaviour in, 267–71
  local national narrative of returning of stability, 266–7
  Taliban control, 262–3
  TFH challenges, 263–5
  operational context of, 260–1
Royal Highland Fusiliers (2 SCOTS) in, 258
Soviet Union, 37, 43–4, 58, 79n52, 232
space, concept of
  dimensions of, 133
  problems with, 133
Special Air Service (SAS), 162
special operations forces of America, killed
  Osama bin Laden in 2011, 241
special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, 121
SS massacre of civilians, in France (1944), 178–9
stabilization, unstable intercultural physics of, 350–2
state building approach, 130, 133, 138–40
  in civil wars, 102
  deals with violent entrepreneurs, 105
stop-loss practice, 67
strategic
  communication, 68
  community, 9
  cost–benefit calculus, alteration of, 70–2
  defensive, 303
  offensive, 303
  stalemate, 303
strategy(ies)
  concerns about deployment and armed force use, 273
  exit, 280–5
  meaning of, 11
  sublimited warfare, 13
Sunnis, in Iraq, 2
  demand for foreign forces, 65
  uprising against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 201
surge
  in Afghanistan in 2009, 10
    Obama’s decision to go ahead, 69
    comparison between synergy and, 211–19
  in Iraq in 2007, 10
    announced by President Bush, 63
    by US forces, 3, 23
Swat, militancy rise in, 151
Syria, 323, 344
  America’s air campaign against Khadafi regime in, 252
  America’s state building operations in, 251
Civil War, 240, 252
T
tacticization, 53
Taliban regime, in Afghanistan, 19
  control in Southwest Babaji, 262–3
  Pakistan presence in, 151
  US success in toppling of, 91
Tamil Tigers, in Sri Lanka, 147, 150
Task Force Helmand (TFH), British-led, 257–8, 261, 270
  challenge in Southwest Babaji, 263–6
technocratic conceit
  and government in a box, 98–102
  and its competitors, 102–5
Tell Me How this Ends (Linda Robinson), 248
Index

territorial control, 38, 139–40, 303, 310

territoriality, concept of, 128–9, 138–40

academic literature on, 135

comprehension, see comprehension
territoriality

control, see control territoriality
definition of, 135–6

HTS approach, 137

impact of control, 135–6

importance in COIN, 134

sacred spaces role in, 136

terrorism, 14

distinction between insurgency and, 147

international, 344

terrorists, 90, 157, 167

Thatcher, Margaret, 165

Third World, 111, 115

Third World War, 37

‘tiger of Malaya,’ 244

Toulouse murders (2012), 344

transition, 281, see also exit strategy
troop(s)

American leadership permission to US
troops, 62

colission, 2

deployments

in Gulf, 290–1

in Iraq and Afghanistan from

2003–12, 289

-intensive policy, 69

shutdown of Basra police’s Serious

Crimes Unit by British, 281

‘Turb-a-Fog’ tear gas dispensers, 120

U

The Ugly American (William J. Lederer), 58

ultra-leftism, 344

unconventional war, 33

United Nations (UN), 232, 252, 352

Resolution 1973, 323

Security Council, 321, 323

Brazil claims to be become

permanent members of, 324

stabilisation mission in Haiti, 324

United States (US)

deployment of forces in three

large-scale counterinsurgencies, 66

economic impact of large-scale

counterinsurgencies in, 70

escalation in Vietnam, 67

FBI warning in 1967 confidential

report, 113

financial impact of military escalation, 69

idea behind American

Counter-insurgency, 242

problems in front of, 79n52

use of drones in Pakistan, 355

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 69

UNOSOM II (1993–1995), 327

upstream prevention, investment in, 354

urban-control operations, army’s interest in, 120

US Agency for International

Development (USAID), 92, 115–16

US Army and Marine Corps, 32

risk of degrading of national security, 232

US Army War College workshop (2007), 10

US Defense Department, 78n39, 112

US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 92

US House Committee on Un-American

Activities, 113

US Marine Corps, 324

US Military Assistance Command

Vietnam (MACV), 119

USSR, 70, 79n52

V

Viet Minh

capitalisation on French forces, 84

Communist insurrection of, 37–8

Vietnam war, 46, 68

large-scale foreign military presence in, 61–7

minimum ratio employed during, 77n27

priority on supply to US forces, 77n24

requirement of lawyers by military

command of US, 75n9

US defeat in, 248

violence, 100, 103

communal, 115

gang, see gang violence

in Iraq after ouster of Saddam

Hussein’s regime, 2, 9

management, strategies of

containment strategy, 151

favouritism strategy, 148–9
monopolisation strategy, 149–51, 153
purging strategy, 152
mass, 105
monopoly of, 145–6
by non-state actors, 45
political, 104
political dialogue through means of, 34
trends in SOIs areas, 215
war for political purpose, 42
violent dialogue, 353

W
war(s), 11–12
character of, 35
Clausewitzian view of, 18
de-decontextualisation of, 45–7
de-intellectualisation of, 42–5
de-strategisation of, 49–52
direction and duration of, 36
exceptionalisation of, 36–42
governed, 44
inter-state vs intra-state, 42
nature of, 34
over-prescription in, 47–9
purpose, 13
zone's population, 257
warfare theory, 9
types of, 42
War on Drugs, 121
wartime political
cooporation, 311
orders, 146, 310–11
wartime realities, 252
Washington Beltway, 4
‘way of war,’ of US, 64
Weberian state, 327
Weber, Max, 100, 103, 110n86, 139, 149, 325–8
Western counter-insurgency, modern, 128–9
disregarding of territory in, 132
divisions and uncertainties within, 346–7
human terrain systems (HTS) approach, 138
as population centric, 132
white areas, security of, 15
World War I, 26, 179, 240, 360n3
World War II, 26

Y
Yugoslavia, 43, 50
International Criminal Tribunal assistance to, 330

Z
zeitgeist, 41