Contents

Acknowledgments viii

Introduction 1

1 Should Sociologists Offer Alternatives? Value-Free and Critical Sociologies 7
Normativity and sociology 7
Max Weber: the value dispute 8
The Becker/Gouldner debate 14
Further writings on value-freedom 18
Critical sociology 20
Conclusion 22

2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: ‘Recipes for the Cook-Shops of the Future’ 24
Marx and Engels’ critique 25
The wastefulness of capitalism 28
The revolution 29
Marx and Engels’ alternative: communism 30
Conclusion: would Marxist communism solve the problems of capitalism? 42

3 Émile Durkheim: Curing the Malaise 44
Durkheim’s Rules of Sociological Method and critique 45
Durkheim’s critique: the ‘malaise’ 47
Durkheim’s alternatives 53
Conclusion 60

4 W.E.B. Du Bois: A Black Radical Alternative 62
Du Bois’ early life and key concepts 62
Du Bois’ early critique: The Philadelphia Negro 64
Du Bois’ first alternative: the Talented Tenth and education 67
Du Bois’ turn to activism 68
Du Bois’ second critique: the legacy of the civil war 70
Du Bois’ second alternative: black economic cooperation 72
Du Bois’ later years and his socialism 76
Conclusion: Du Bois’ alternatives 77
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>George Herbert Mead and Karl Mannheim: Sociology and Democracy</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Herbert Mead</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mead’s critique: narrow ‘personality’ democracy</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mead’s alternative: rational democracy through scientific reform</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessing Mead’s activities as alternatives</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karl Mannheim</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mannheim’s critique: laissez-faire mass society</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mannheim’s alternative: The Third Way</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sociology in a militant democracy</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion: Mead and Mannheim on democracy</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Henri Lefebvre and Herbert Marcuse: Neo-Marxist Alternatives</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Henri Lefebvre</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lefebvre’s critique: everyday life as alienation</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lefebvre’s alternative: autogestion</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would Lefebvre’s alternative solve the problems?</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herbert Marcuse</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcuse’s critique: the repressive totalitarian-technological stage</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcuse’s potential liberation: the utopian potentials of capitalism</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcuse’s transition: the Great Refusal</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The new sensibility</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marcuse’s alternative: a society based upon the new sensibility</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion: comparing Lefebvre and Marcuse</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Selma James, Andrea Dworkin and Their Interlocutors: Feminist</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feminist alternatives</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wages for housework</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would wages for housework lessen patriarchy?</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Banning pornography</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The feminist critique of pornography</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contemporary anti-pornography feminism</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The alternative: ‘MacDworkin’ and the campaign to ban pornography</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feminist critics of banning pornography</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck: Cosmopolitan Alternatives</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anthony Giddens</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giddens’ late modern world</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Giddens’ critique: the emergence of life politics</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

Giddens’ alternative: generative politics in The Third Way 147  
Giddens’ solution and being a public intellectual 149  
Ulrich Beck 151  
Beck’s second modern risk society 152  
Beck’s critique: methodological nationalist sociology and society 155  
Beck’s alternative: a cosmopolitan world 156  
Conclusion: the alternatives of Giddens and Beck 160

### 9 Sociology and Utopia 162

- The history of sociology and utopianism 163  
- Ruth Levitas: utopia as the imaginary reconstruction of society 164  
- Sociology as utopia and utopia as sociology 166  
- Levitas’ utopian reading of government discourse under neoliberalism 168  
- Erik Olin Wright: Marxist utopianism 170  
- Real utopias 171  
- The basic income 173  
- Criticisms of the basic income 175  
- Conclusion: the relationship between sociology and utopia 178

### 10 Public Sociology 180

- Burawoy’s case for public sociology 181  
- Doing public sociology 183  
- Public sociology in sociological alternatives 186  
- Criticisms of public sociology 189  
- Conclusion: the case of Pierre Bourdieu 194

Conclusion: Sociology and Alternatives 198

Bibliography 206

Index 227
This book concerns ideas for alternatives offered by social theory – as I have termed them, sociological alternatives. Such a topic leads to an obvious initial question: should sociologists even offer alternatives? This will be discussed in this opening chapter.

Of course, the very fact that this book continues beyond this chapter suggests that sociologists have offered alternatives. However, as we shall see, while doing so some have been restrained by the possibilities they felt were available to intellectuals (as for Marx and the Marxists who followed) whereas others have fully embraced the supposed potential for sociology to provide clear guidelines for an alternative society (for example, Durkheim and Mannheim). Therefore, this question will remain with us throughout the text.

Before that, this chapter traces a history of some of the key debates concerning ‘value-free’ and ‘critical’ sociology; these hold differing views on the role of sociologists in offering alternatives. This will begin with the writings of Max Weber, which advocated a divide between empirically testable ‘facts’ and individually decided ‘values’. Then, we will turn to the ‘Becker/Gouldner debate’. Both writers diverged from Weber’s distinction but had a disagreement on whether sociologists should be on the side of the underdog or of values. Then, we will discuss the position of Dorothy Smith, which critiques the truth claims of mainstream sociology. Finally, this chapter will discuss what it means to do ‘critical’ sociology, most notably, Bauman’s advocacy for sociology as a ‘science of freedom’. First, we need to consider what it means to be ‘normative’.

Normativity and sociology

To ask if sociology should offer alternatives is to ask if it should be normative. This is a term used very broadly in the literature. It can alternatively mean having a particular position and viewpoint (for example, being a socialist), making claims as to what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’, having certain goals to achieve or defining the socially sanctioned ‘norm’ (heterosexuality is a normative sexuality, asexuality is a ‘non-normative’ sexuality). However, if we consult a dictionary of sociology we find ‘normative theory’ defined as ‘hypotheses or other statements about what is right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, just or unjust in society’ (Scott and Marshall 2005:453), a definition which will be used here. Therefore, to be normative is to make statements about what ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to happen.
We are all normative beings. We continually make statements about what we, others or indeed society as a whole ‘should’ do. In doing so we may draw upon moral guidelines (as in the claim ‘this isn’t fair’) or social rules themselves (if someone sends you a gift you should send them a thank you note). Sociologists are of course interested in these normativities. They seek to understand how we come to develop our beliefs and ‘why things matter to people’ (Sayer 2011).

But is it correct for sociology itself to make such normative statements? Sociology, as a field of knowledge and programme of research, could be seen as defined more by statements about what ‘is’ or ‘has been’ rather than what ‘should be’. Indeed, if we return to our dictionary of sociology we find that the entry for normative theory continues to say:

The majority of sociologists consider it illegitimate to move from explanation to evaluation. In their view sociology should strive to be value-free, objective, or at least to avoid making explicit value judgements ... The majority of sociological enquiries are therefore analytical and explanatory. They do not pose normative questions such as ‘Which values ought to provide for social order?’ and ‘How ought society to organise itself?’ (Scott and Marshall 2005:453)

As we shall see, many social theorists have in fact rejected such a position. Nevertheless, the claim of our sociology dictionary does emerge from a key writer in the discipline: Max Weber (1864–1920).

Max Weber: the value dispute

Weber once remarked that ‘endless misunderstandings and a great deal of terminological – and hence sterile – conflict have taken place about the term “value-judgement”’ (Weber 1949a:10) and, in many ways, this is as true of the years following Weber’s writings as it was then. In the repetition of Weber’s claims on value-freedom a somewhat simplified version of his argument has been produced which I will refer to as the ‘standard’ version. This standard version is, as we shall see, fundamentally opposed to any form of normative theory. However, if we return to Weber’s writings and their context, we will see a much more complex argument which, while still opposed to such activity in our role as sociologists, contains an awareness of the difficulties of obtaining value-freedom and recognises how we can offer alternatives outside the role of sociologist.

We begin with the standard version which, while simplified, does draw upon some of the key assertions found in Weber’s writings. Here we have the claim that Weber draws a distinction concerning the role of our values in the stages of the research process. Initially it is true that the topics we choose to research will be influenced by values. These can be either our own personal values (as in the things we find interesting/have experience of) or ‘cultural values’ which society
as a whole is interested in (Weber 1949b:56, 61). For example, sociologists may research inequality because they personally consider it important – perhaps due to a political belief in its unjust nature – or since as a society we are interested in knowing, and tackling, forms of inequality.

However, once we actually begin research, we should be ‘value-free’ and not let our personal values and beliefs enter into the research process. The justification for this position rests upon a split between facts and value-judgements. Facts rely upon ‘our capacity and need for analytically ordering empirical reality in a manner which lays claim to validity as empirical truth’ (Weber 1949b:58) in that their being proven ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ relies upon empirical evidence. The claim that ‘water boils at 100 degrees Celsius’ is a fact since it can be empirically demonstrated by, in normal conditions at ground level, water continually boiling at 100 degrees. If water were to suddenly boil at a different temperature we would be forced to reject the claim. Value-judgements on the other hand are ‘practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence’ (Weber 1949a:1) and therefore involve normative claims about what is good or bad. Unlike facts, ‘to judge the validity of such values is a matter of faith’ (Weber 1949b:55). We believe certain things to be good due to faith in a religious sense or according to a certain set of moral precepts. Neither of these, for Weber, are empirically testable but rather, as beliefs, are beyond the claims of an empirical science.

How does this split work in practice? Let us continue with the example of inequality. As we have seen, values may lead us to research this issue but once we begin our research we need to avoid such value-judgements. This means that we could highlight the nature of inequality in our society, what the top and bottom 10 per cent earn, how this has changed over time, the groups most likely to be found at the top and bottom of the scale and so on. All of these claims are empirical facts, which can be tested by analysing data. But we cannot from this analysis say ‘such undesirable inequalities show the unjustness of the capitalist system’ since this would be a value-judgement. The opposite claim that ‘such desirable inequalities show the benefits of capitalism as an economic system which rewards hard work and talent’ is equally based on faith. Neither statement can be fully proven or disproven but rather both are based upon beliefs of what makes a good society (Weber 1949b:66). Indeed, some have accused sociologists of automatically, based upon their own left-of-centre political position, seeing inequality as ‘bad’ (Saunders 1995), reflecting a wider ‘resentment’ towards capitalism among sociologists (Cushman 2012). Of course, such writers are replacing one value-judgement with another where such inequalities are positive or inevitable elements of the good capitalist society (Black 2014:775).

What does this mean for sociological alternatives? Sociologists can, for Weber, discuss alternatives offered by others – ideas for lessening inequality, such as socialism, can be analysed according to their social origin and underpinning assumptions (Weber 1949b:67–9) – but since ultimately ideas about what we should do are ones of personal value ‘it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for
immediate practical activity can be derived’ (Weber 1949b:52). Or, as Weber put it in the introduction to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*:

> He who yearns for seeing should go to the cinema … Nothing is farther from the intent of these thoroughly serious studies than such an attitude. And, I might add, whoever wants a sermon should go to a conventicle … It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appall him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentator [sic] to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form. In most other cases the voluminous talk about intuition does nothing but conceal a lack of perspective toward the object, which merits the same judgment as a similar lack of perspective toward men. (Weber 1930:xli)

Consequently, the ‘standard’ reading of Weber seems to resolutely close down the possibility of sociological alternatives. It is here that a further reading of Weber’s views, and the context in which they were offered, yields a more sophisticated discussion concerning the role of sociologists. This reading, while still opposed to sociological alternatives, highlights the potential difficulties of obtaining value-freedom.

Weber’s work on value-freedom occurred as part of what became known as the *werturteilsstreit* or ‘value dispute’ in German sociology during the years preceding World War I. Weber and his colleagues, considered at the time a radical left wing of sociology, aligned themselves and their idea of value-freedom against a group of scholars who advocated normative social analysis largely in order to aid the German government. At the time, it was a conflict Weber and his colleagues lost, with the 1914 meeting of the Association for Social Policy being so hostile to value-freedom that, sensing his defeat, Weber simply got up and left (Dahrendorf 1968:1–4). As this indicates, the German context in which these ideas were offered was a politically charged atmosphere and many of the protagonists, including Weber, were heavily involved in politics (Mommsen 1974). Therefore, those holding to the doctrine of value-freedom were hardly impartial when it came to normative questions and shared Weber’s view that ‘an attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific “objectivity”’ (Weber 1949b:60) and his suggestion that ‘nor need I discuss further whether the distinction between empirical statements of fact and value-judgments is “difficult” to make. It is’ (Weber 1949a:9). Part of the purpose of the debate was to allow both activities, that of science and politics, to exist alongside each other (Dahrendorf 1968). Scholars could hold on to their strongly held political beliefs yet still work with those who, equally strongly, held the opposite view. To do this, Weber created a separation between the roles of ‘citizen’ and ‘sociologist’ in two areas: research and teaching.

As we saw, Weber argued values can influence the choice of research topic. He also suggested values can influence the choice of how that research is
conducted, specifically the measures we choose as relevant for the task. A good example of this for Weber is economic research, much of which takes economic growth as its focus (Weber 1949b:85). This position was largely unchallenged for much of the history of economics but is, for Weber, a fundamentally capitalist conception of what defines a ‘strong’ economy. The emergence of socialist economics, emerging from a different conception, questions this and highlights the value-claims in capitalist research (Weber 1949b:86). This makes the dividing lines between values and facts much less clear since, as Weber put it:

In the *method* of investigation, the guiding ‘point of view’ [values] is of great importance for the *construction* of the conceptual scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their *use*, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is *valid* for all who *seek* the truth. (Weber 1949b:84)

Therefore, sticking with our example, once we decide economic growth is our measure then the socialist and capitalist researcher should come to the same conclusion. But it is likely given their contrasting values that our researchers may have chosen different methods for investigation.

Consequently, when values influence not just our topic but how we research this it puts an additional demand on the researcher to be aware of their impact; to use contemporary parlance, we must be reflexive. Weber suggests that at the bare minimum, if researchers do offer value-judgements they must make very clear that they are value-judgements, beyond the reach of empirical claims (Weber 1949b:110). Furthermore, when doing so, we should realise that for most the value-judgement they reach is shaped ‘to a quite significant degree by the degree of affinity between it and his class interests’ (Weber 1949b:56).

This was something Weber made clear in his own normative claims concerning economic policy where he argued ‘I am a member of the bourgeois classes. I feel myself to be a bourgeois, and I have been brought up to share their views and ideals’ (Weber 1895:23).

Therefore, Weber does highlight the difficulties of obtaining value-freedom and the role of values in the research process. What space does this leave for sociologists to outline possible alternatives? Weber’s example here takes the form of a thought exercise: imagine someone approached you as a sociologist and asked ‘should I be a syndicalist?’. Syndicalism is a form of anarchist theory which we could replace with ‘environmentalist’, ‘socialist’, ‘libertarian’, ‘feminist’ and so on. In such a case Weber (1949a:18) argues you can respond with three points:

1. The unavoidable means of creating a syndicalist society
2. The unavoidable side effects which would happen as a result
3. The conflicting value-judgements which would emerge along the way
In doing so, you may show that being a syndicalist is ‘useless’. The means of creating such a society may be unavailable. Or it would be possible to create such a society but the side effects of it (for example, loss of individual freedom) would be worse than the problems now. Or the conflicting value-judgements may be unanswerable (would they be willing to jail, or even kill, those who disagree with their ideal society?). Nevertheless, while:

You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist ... that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in increasing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its ascent – and you will not make the slightest impression upon him. If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for evil. (Weber 1921:120–1)

In short, the question of whether to advocate syndicalism, or any of the alternatives offered in this book, is a value-judgement. While sociologists can advise as to the practicalities of such ideas, they cannot advise on their ultimate value. This highlights a key element of Weber’s writings. We will all, sociologists and non-sociologists, have values we hold and are, at the minimum, ‘occasional’ politicians by voting, expressing political opinions or taking part in political action (Weber 1921:83). For Weber, this is not only inevitable but to be encouraged. However, in our professional work as a ‘sociologist’ we need to leave such values behind and be value-free. This reinforces a divide between the citizen and the sociologist who operate in different spaces:

To take a practical political stand is one thing, and to analyse political structures and party positions is another. When speaking in a political meeting about democracy, one does not hide one’s personal standpoint; indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one’s damned duty. The words one uses in such a meeting are not means of scientific analysis but means of canvassing votes and winning over others. They are not ploughshares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought; they are swords against the enemies: such words are weapons. It would be an outrage, however, to use words in this fashion in a lecture or in the lecture-room. (Weber 1922:145)

This leads us onto the second element of Weber’s discussion of value-freedom: teaching.

A striking element of Weber’s writings on value-freedom is how much space is given over to teaching. In some of these, including the famous ‘Science as a Vocation’ lecture (Weber 1922), teaching is more prominent than research. Here, as in research, Weber sees values as not appropriate. This is due to the role of teachers, which is to impart facts and methodology (Weber 1949a:1–10). Much like in the werturteilsstreit Weber found himself in the opposite corner to a general
acceptance of value-judgements as part of a lecturer’s role. The reason for this was the ‘competition for students’ whereby lecturers develop a ‘cult of personality’ in order to attract students to their class (Weber 1949a:6, 9). The easiest way to do this was to adopt the role of the preacher or ‘prophet’. Lecturers who discuss their beliefs and urge their students onto action are, inevitably for Weber, much more interesting to listen to, since they will speak with passion (Weber 1949a:2). Other, non-prophet-like, lecturers tend to be defined by ‘calm rigour, matter-of-factness and sobriety’; in short, they’re boring (Weber 1949a:4).

The problem with the role of the prophet is that whereas there are professional credentials which demonstrate one’s competence to teach freely (such as degrees in the subject) there is ‘no specialised qualification for personal prophecy, and for this reason it is not entitled to that privilege of freedom’ (Weber 1949a:4). It is especially problematic when such prophecy is done in a lecture hall since here it gains a cloak of ‘science’ and is given more credit than simply the personal prophecy of the individual speaking. As we saw above, Weber thought the appropriate place for such prophecy was the church.

However, as in his views on research, Weber acknowledges the complexity of his position. The question of the role of values in teaching is in fact an ‘unresolvable question – unresolvable because it is ultimately a question of evaluation’ (Weber 1949a:8). Saying what lecturers should do is ultimately based upon a value-judgement of what you think universities are for. For Weber, universities are for the training of scholars and the further enriching of the national culture (Weber 1895). Therefore, this requires value-freedom. A different conception, say of universities as the breeding ground for a ruling class intelligentsia as advocated by Mannheim in Chapter 5, would lead to a different conclusion. Consequently, Weber acknowledges that others may not agree with him and instead may believe that value-claims can enter into lectures. In that case Weber suggests two qualifications. Firstly, as in research, when value-claims are made by lecturers they must be clearly identified as such. Secondly, if value-claims are allowed then ‘all party-preferences’ should be ‘granted the opportunity of demonstrating their validity on the academic platform’ (Weber 1949a:6–7). For Weber, the latter condition was not recognised at the time due to the reluctance to allow Marxists and anarchists to lecture. We may now question whether we would allow neo-Nazis to lecture and, if not, we may not satisfy Weber’s conditions.

Even if these conditions are met, Weber still advises against value-claims in teaching. He argues that teaching should be concerned with providing ‘inconvenient facts’ by challenging the views of the students (Weber 1922:147). Doing so will, for Weber, increase the respect accorded to the lecturer when they leave the classroom and express their values. Here we return to the split of our roles as citizens and sociologists, leading Weber to say:

In the press, in congresses and associations, in essays – in short, in any form which is available equally to every other citizen – [the lecturer] may (and ought to) do whatever his God or his demon calls him to do.
But what the present-day student should learn from his teachers above all, at least in the lecture hall, is, first, to fulfil a given task in a workman-like manner; secondly, definitely to recognise facts, even those may be personally uncomfortable, and to distinguish them from his own evaluations; and thirdly, to subordinate himself to the task and to repress the impulse to exhibit his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily. (Weber 1949a:5)

Therefore, lecturers can speak their values in any forum available to all citizens, but should not do so in their role as lecturers (Weber 1949a:5). Therefore, alternatives are not the responsibility of sociologists as researchers or teachers, though they will hold normative beliefs as citizens. This split in the ascribed roles of sociologist and citizen is central to the Becker/Gouldner debate.

The Becker/Gouldner debate

Despite Weber’s defeat in the werturteilsstreit, the idea of value-freedom quickly became dominant in the years preceding, and following, World War II. There are reasons for this, some of which we will explore below, but the key one was sociology’s search for scientific respectability. Claiming to be value-free aligned sociology with ‘expert’ and scientific knowledge and allowed sociologists to claim they did not threaten any social formation with political views (Seubert 1991). It also ensured sociologists who were also involved in schemes for reform, such as Robert Park, could define such work as separate to their ‘scientific’ work as sociologists and, therefore, not worthy of academic comment (Deegan 2006). This was especially prominent in American sociology which searched for this scientific recognition in order to lose its previous association with community activism suggested in the work of, among others, Park’s wife Clara Cahill Park and Jane Addams who collaborated with Mead and other female sociologists in her efforts for social reform (Deegan 1988, Turner 2014).

Into this context stepped Alvin Gouldner and his 1962 article ‘Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology’, which began with the following:

This is an account of a myth created by and about a magnificent minotaur named Max – Max Weber, to be exact; his myth was that social science should and could be value-free. The lair of this minotaur, although reached only by a labrynthian logic and visited only by a few who never return, is still regarded by many sociologists as a holy place. In particular, as sociologists grow older they seem impelled to make a pilgrimage to it and to pay their respects to the problem of the relations between values and social science … Today, all the powers of sociology … have entered into a tacit alliance to bind us to the dogma that ‘Thou shalt not commit a value judgment’ especially as sociologists. Where is the introductory textbook, where the lecture course on principles, that does not affirm or imply this rule? (Gouldner 1962:199)
As this quote indicates, for Gouldner value-freedom was a ‘myth’ in both sense of the term. It was a myth since it wasn’t possible beyond a very small selection of possible cases (if at all) but it was also mythical given that, despite this, sociologists continued to believe in it. Indeed, a belief in value-freedom was one of the things that made one a sociologist. Problematically, for Gouldner, those who worshipped at the altar had not read the gospel; few had actually read Weber’s work and in particular the careful and complicated lines which, as we saw above, Weber drew between a value-laden citizen and a value-free sociologist. When we recognise those complex lines there are three criticisms we can make of this myth for Gouldner.

Firstly, it is of its time and place. The Germany of the first decade of the twentieth century was, as we saw, a highly politically charged and confrontational arena. In any one academic meeting it may be possible to find anarchists, Marxists, liberals, conservatives and nationalists. In that context any political debate was largely impossible and Weber’s claim for value-freedom ‘was a proposal for an academic truce. It said, in effect, if we all keep quiet about our political views then we may all be able to get on with our work’ (Gouldner 1962:202). This was especially notable in Weber’s views on teaching, where an attempt to keep politics out of the classroom was encouraged by the fact that a lecturer’s income, and potential for promotion, was linked directly to student numbers in their lectures (Gouldner 1962:201). None of these conditions still hold for Gouldner; not only are lecturers now promoted primarily on the basis of their research but the universities of the early 1960s America, along with wider society, were marked by their unpolitical nature. Therefore, instead of discouraging political debate it may be better to encourage it and therefore extend the political engagement and pluralism of society more broadly (Gouldner 1962:202).

Secondly, the distinction Weber makes between a value-heavy citizen and a value-free sociologist is untenable. In making this distinction Weber is separating the two traditions of reason and faith. For Gouldner, this allows Weber to have his cake and eat it too since it means the reasonable, rational sociologist could, in Weber’s case, praise the rationalisation of society while the romantic citizen with faith could also condemn the disenchantment it created (Gouldner 1962:210). Weber ‘wanted the play to be written by a classicist and to be acted by romanticists’ (Gouldner 1962:211). Such a split is impossible for Gouldner since it demands cutting our personality in two. It is also unstable since it robs knowledge of its moral components and ‘leaves feeling smugly sure only of itself and bereft of a sense of common humanity’ (Gouldner 1962:212). Amoral knowledge does not relate to the types of lives we live; instead knowledge is always changed with moral ideas. For example, our idea of what ‘poverty’ is will always be shaped by moral ideas of the good life and, most likely, the (im)moral causes of such poverty.

Finally, the myth of value-freedom has been damaging for sociology. By arguing sociology is purely a profession with no commitment to values it means sociologists can sell their skills to the highest bidder. An example of this is ‘doing market research designed to sell more cigarettes, although well aware of the implications of recent cancer research’ (Gouldner 1962:204). This was not an unusual activity for sociologists (see Berger 2011:169–75).
Therefore, as a result of this, Gouldner encourages us to slay the minotaur and its doctrine of value-freedom, allowing space for normative claims. A similar message would, initially, appear to be contained in Howard Becker’s classic article ‘Whose Side Are We On?’ (1967). Whereas Gouldner’s argument was largely theoretical, Becker’s referred to the process of research and the frequent accusations against sociologists of ‘bias’. This, for Becker, reflects the nature of sociological research which is inevitably one-sided: we always look at the social world through the eyes of our participants. What is significant here is that, given the broadly left-leaning political position of sociologists, ‘we usually take the side of the underdog’ (Becker 1967:244). This is not a problem to be solved, rather, as we shall see, it is an inevitability to be acknowledged (Becker 1967:245).

The accusation of bias engendered by such research can be understood with reference to what Becker terms the ‘hierarchy of credibility’. Defined as ‘any system of ranked groups’ (Becker 1967:241) this involves a situation where one group has power over a group below it and therefore is able to direct their daily activities and define their position. Given their politics sociologists tend to take the group at the bottom of the hierarchy; sociologists tend to research the working class and not the bourgeoisie, prisoners rather than guards and protesters rather than politicians. This can then lead to claims of bias in two ways. In an ‘apolitical’ situation no one has questioned the hierarchy of credibility and therefore sociological research is seen as misleading by taking the underdog’s position. After all, ‘everyone knows’ that teachers do what is best for students, so why ask the children themselves? Everyone knows that prisoners have, by definition, wronged against society and are there to be punished, so why ask what they think the value of prison is? Consequently, since ‘no one proposes that addicts should make and enforce laws for policemen, that patients should prescribe for doctors, or that adolescents should give orders to adult’ (Becker 1967:241), sociological research is biased in seeking their views.

The second situation is a political situation. Here the hierarchy of credibility has been called into question; the subordinate group has questioned the superordinate and their right to rule. The best example of this is a riot or large-scale protest. In such a situation, both sides have their spokespeople and arguments they wish to make. Such spokespersons will view sociological arguments not through their validity but rather through how they help their cause. Those findings which don’t help will inevitably be termed ‘biased’. In this case spokespersons ‘base the accusation not on failures of technique or method, but on conceptual defects’ and ‘accuse the sociologist not of getting false data but of not getting all the data relevant to the problem’ (Becker 1967:245). In such a political situation it is therefore inevitable that we end up on one side or the other: we are on the side of the rioters or the police.

The immediate response to such an argument is that sociologists should endeavour not to cover one but all sides. This, for Becker, is impossible:

By pursuing this seemingly simple solution, we arrive at a problem of infinite regress. For everyone has someone standing above him who prevents
him from doing things just as he likes. If we question the superiors of the prison administrator, a state department of corrections or prisons, they will complain of the governor and the legislature. And if we go to the governor and the legislature, they will complain of lobbyists, party machines, the public and the newspapers. There is no end to it and we can never have a ‘balanced picture’ until we have studied all of society simultaneously. I do not propose to hold my breath until that happy day. (Becker 1967:247)

Instead ‘the question is not whether we should take sides, since we inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on’ (Becker 1967:239) which, for Becker, should be the side of the underdog. While such one-sidedness is an inevitability we should seek to ‘use our theoretical and technical resources to avoid the distortions that might introduce into our work … and field as best we can the accusations and doubts that will surely be our fate’ (Becker 1967:247). A good example of such an approach can be found in Lumsden’s (2012) work on ‘boy racers’ in Scotland. Lumsden found that through her work with this group – who were largely condemned by others and dictated to by the police trying to limit their driving – she increasingly sought to ‘take their side’ and put their case forward in the public sphere (for example, via media appearances to advocate their position). Therefore, being on the side of the underdog leads sociologists to consider, and advocate, solutions for improving their situation.

In many ways, Becker’s position chimes with Gouldner’s; both, for slightly different reasons, argue that value-freedom is an impossible position. However, there is a key difference, picked up on by Gouldner (1968) in a response to Becker. Whereas Gouldner argued sociologists should take the side of certain values, Becker thought they should take the side of groups creating, as Gouldner puts it, a ‘sentiment-free social scientist’ (Gouldner 1968:105). The reason for this takes us to Becker’s research which was part of ‘a school of thought that finds itself at home in the world of hip, drug addicts, jazz musicians, cab drivers, prostitutes, night people, drifters, grifters and skidders: the “cool world”’ (Gouldner 1968:104). This desire to be with the cool world meant that Becker sided with certain underdogs against certain authority figures: the underdogs were the drug takers, the authority figures were the ‘squares’. To be exact, the squares were the police who take the cool people’s drugs or the managers who fired them. Often, the squares in such scenarios are not those with true power but rather middle managers and administrators – not as much ‘top dogs’ as ‘middle dogs’. This meant that:

The new underdog sociology propounded by Becker is, then, a standpoint that possesses a remarkably convenient combination of properties: it enables the sociologist to befriend the very small underdogs in local settings, to reject the standpoint of the ‘middle dog’ respectables and notables who manage local caretaking establishments, while, at the same time, to make and remain friends with the really top dogs in Washington agencies or New York foundations. (Gouldner 1968:110)
Therefore, while Becker’s approach may solve the problems of the split between the sociologist and citizen it does not solve the problem of turning sociology into a profession and putting its services up for sale. The emergence of the welfare state and the identification of sociologists with the left-of-centre parties which advocated this – the Democrats in the US, the Labour Party in the UK and so on – meant that Becker’s focus on the under/middle dog dynamic allowed him to not take sides in the larger issues – the conflict between government and people, or capital and worker – which Gouldner saw as truly important. Instead, Becker’s position allows sociologists to go to the true top dog, welfare state governments, and ask for funding to research the relation of under and middle dogs. Consequently it ‘is the sociology of young men with friends in Washington’ (Gouldner 1968:110). In opposition to Becker, Gouldner argues that ‘it is to values, not factions, that sociologists must give their most basic commitment’; these values should be the recognition and intolerance of suffering (Gouldner 1968:116).

Therefore, the Becker/Gouldner debate has highlighted that if we do not accept the position of Weber on value-freedom, this is only the beginning of a wider conversation. This concerns not just the position of values in sociology but also the position of sociology in relation to other groups, such as underdogs and governments. Their debate opens up a key divide in what alternatives are for. From Becker’s position we could say alternatives are for groups to lessen the problems confronted by the underdogs. For Gouldner, alternatives are focused on furthering certain values, such as lessening suffering. Similar debates continued in later years.

**Further writings on value-freedom**

Following the Becker/Gouldner debate there have been some interventions in favour of reasserting the idea of value-freedom. For Hammersley (1999) Gouldner engages in ‘moral gerrymandering’ by proclaiming a set of values as ‘sociology’s values’. Like Weber’s claim for there being no qualifications in prophecy, Hammersley argues that there is nothing within sociology which suggests some values are ‘better’ than others. Instead ‘sociology alone cannot tell us what it is itself for, in the sense of what it should stand for or aim at’ (Hammersley 1999:4.1). Therefore, we should not seek to have sociology do something for which it isn’t fit. Instead, we should return to the split between the sociologist and citizen. Also, for Black (2014), the dismissal of value-freedom by Becker and others has meant that ‘much of what they call sociology is little more than the promotion of liberal or otherwise left-wing ideology’ (Black 2014:764). Rather than proclaiming value-freedom as impossible we should recognise that value-freedom means simply not letting our values enter into matters of fact and stick to that creed.

For writers such as Hammersley and Black, attempts to jettison value-freedom discredit the truth claims of sociology and, ultimately, its attempt to be
identified as a science. Science is based on universalism of knowledge (Merton 1973:267–78) and, as we have seen, values aren’t universal. However, other writers have taken a different perspective on the importance of such universal knowledge, an example of which can be found in the work of Dorothy Smith.

For Smith, the claims of value-freedom and objectivity in social science have only been achieved by taking one position, the position of dominant men, and presuming this to be universal. This creates a particular approach to doing sociology:

A sociology is a systematically developed consciousness of society and social relations. The ‘established’ sociology ... gives us a consciousness that looks at society, social relations and people’s lives as if we could stand outside them, ignoring the particular local places in the everyday in which we live our lives. It claims objectivity not on the basis of its capacity to speak truthfully, but in terms of its specific capacity to exclude the presence and experience of particular subjectivities. Nonetheless, of course, they are there and must be. (Smith 1987:2)

Therefore, sociology has established itself as a truth-teller which stands outside, and above, people’s experiences (Smith 1987:1–10). The value-freedom and objectivity this is seen to give are based upon the universality of its statements; they are the facts, not the values, which Weber prized so much. However, this rests upon two problems. Firstly, it is based upon removing particular voices and subjectivities. In this case, for Smith, the everyday experiences of women, their routinised activities of domestic work, childcare and relationships, are largely removed in favour of the macro-level discussion of topics such as industrial work, politics and public activity. Women exist ‘outside the frame’ (Smith 1987:61–9) and the knowledge presented is that of the male world, with its values converted into ‘facts’. This is what Donna Haraway (2004:87) terms a ‘god-trick’ of claiming one can present a universal and objective picture of the world. Secondly, in doing so, sociology tends to present, and validate, the ‘relations of ruling’ in society. These rely upon a ‘continual transformation of the local and particular actualities of our lives into abstracted and generalised forms’ (Smith 1987:3). In order to control us governments, the law, business and educational institutions need to group us into abstract categories (such as the ‘working class’, ‘students’, ‘offenders’ and so on). Sociologists, by researching and helping give names to these groups, have helped establish the relations of ruling (Smith 1987:105–11) which, for Smith, reflects the fact that much sociology comes ‘from the standpoint of men who do that ruling’ (Smith 1987:2). Here, Smith shares Gouldner’s fear about Becker’s potential link to the top dog, and ruling relations, of the welfare state. But she adds an important gendered component.

Therefore, for Smith, claims for value-freedom have existed only through ignoring certain experiences and by validating the relations of ruling. The values of such, predominantly male, sociologists are presented as facts. Instead
she advocates a ‘sociology for women’ – or, as she later put it, a ‘sociology for people’ (Smith 2005) – which starts from those particular experiences and everyday encounters which shape our knowledge and activity in the world (Smith 1987). This is a ‘standpoint’ theory in the sense that it seeks to see the world from a particular position (that of everyday women) and uses it to allow the ‘absent experience … to be filled with the presence and spoken experience of actual women’ (Smith 1987:107).

Standpoint theories opened up a cleavage within feminism to the extent that they could be said to operate as ‘successor sciences’ (Stanley and Wise 1990). Some, such as Sandra Harding, have argued that standpoint theory produces truer scientific knowledge since the oppressed see both their own experience and that of the dominant, whereas the dominant only know their own experience. Therefore, it is truly universal (Harding 1987). However, as Stanley and Wise (1990:29–36) note, this relies upon a universal ‘female’ standpoint which isn’t true given the various inequalities between women, a position Smith (1987:106–7) also holds. Therefore, Smith’s version of standpoint theory does not imagine a privileged position for universal female experience and is less likely to claim successor science status. A similar claim is found in Haraway’s (2004:87) suggestion that ‘feminist objectivity’ is defined by the ‘limited location and situated knowledge’ of intellectual claims, rather than the ‘god-trick’ of false universalism. This position advocates the extension of everyday forms of knowledge with an ‘intersectional’ awareness of how people may occupy many different social positions. This has been advocated most notably by black feminists who highlight that some feminist standpoints are actually those of white women (Crenshaw 1991, Collins 2000).

What do such discussions mean for value-freedom and sociological alternatives? They make three claims. Firstly, as we have seen, pre-existing definitions of value-freedom can only claim such status by marginalising particular experiences and claiming one view of the world as a universal fact. In this case, the values of the male world are presented as such facts. Secondly, in doing so such a sociology can be complicit in maintaining, and even extending, ruling institutions (similar to Gouldner’s claim). And finally, we should be careful about claiming any kind of universal experience of a social world which is highly unequal and differentiated. Consequently, alternatives should be aware of these diverse subjectivities and not seek to universalise the experience of one group. Therefore, not only were the writings of Smith and others critical of claims for value-freedom, they also indicate a shift towards the idea of ‘critical sociology’.

**Critical sociology**

The idea of sociology being ‘critical’ has now become ubiquitous; indeed, whereas Gouldner claimed a belief in value-freedom made you a sociologist, it could now be said a belief in being critical makes you a sociologist. To speak of a sociologist’s work as ‘uncritical’ is ‘a criticism verging on the insulting’
Should Sociologists Offer Alternatives? 21

(Levitas 2013:99). Nevertheless, this is a relatively recent occurrence, from roughly the 1970s onwards, and has seen some criticisms, with Hammersley (2005) again arguing against and in favour of the split of sociologist and citizen. A ‘critical’ sociology is one which seeks not just to explain the social world but rather to see what is hidden and, in particular, to highlight the forms of power and inequality which exist. As a result, it will often take the position of the powerless against the powerful. In this sense, it follows on from Becker’s idea of the sociology of the underdog but with a wider normative goal. Critical sociology, or, as it is also called, ‘liberation sociology’ (Feagin et al. 2015), aims not just to understand the underdog but to ‘emancipate’ them (Boltanski 2011); the goal is not to recount the inequities of society but to change them. In doing so, non-critical forms of sociology are condemned as something which ‘helps as much as a painstaking description of the technology of making nooses helps the convict overcome his fear of the gallows’ (Bauman 1978:193).

There are different ways in which critical sociology is advocated (see Sayer 2009) but one of the most comprehensive ones comes from Bauman (1976a). For him, sociology has two key elements. Firstly, it is concerned with the limits provided by ‘second nature’. Whereas there are ‘natural’ limits to our behaviour (for example, we cannot fly) the social limits are second nature which restrict our behaviour, including the norms, values and inequalities found in the social world. Part of the sociological mission is to understand how second nature works and its role in shaping our action (Bauman 1976a:1–14). The second element is common sense; sociology ‘is a sophisticated elaboration upon crude commonsense’ (Bauman 1976a:28) and seeks to understand, and see what is underneath, commonsense claims about the world. As Bauman puts it, this involves ‘defamiliarizing the familiar and familiarizing (taming, domesticating) the unfamiliar’ (Bauman 2011:171).

Such a conception of sociology is not wholly unique (see Berger 1963), and similar claims are often the basis for the innately critical nature of sociology (Back 2007). What is unique in Bauman’s conception is his claim that such attributes are not necessarily transgressive. An awareness of what leads people to act in certain ways and how norms and values shape our perception of the world can be used in order to control those people. For example, workplaces can be shaped to engender certain forms of action (Bauman 1976a:35–9) and sociological knowledge can be used by totalitarian regimes (Bauman 1976b). This could also be done in a paternalistic way by shaping institutions to ‘encourage’ people to adopt healthy lifestyles akin to ‘nudge theory’ (White 2013). In doing so sociology:

Saves the individual from the torments of indecision and the responsibility he is too weak to bear, by sharply cutting down the range of acceptable options to the size of his ‘real’ potential. The price it pays, however, for playing such a benign and charitable role is its essentially conservative impact upon the society it helps people to explain and understand. (Bauman 1976a:35)

Copyrighted material – 9781137337320
Such an approach Bauman terms ‘the science of unfreedom’. Here the goal is to lessen the scope of human freedom, for either paternalistic or authoritarian ends (Bauman 1976a:27–42). This highlights ‘the intrinsically conservative role of sociology’ found within its potential as the science of unfreedom (Bauman 1976a:36).

In opposition to such an approach Bauman advocates a ‘science of freedom’. This seeks not only to highlight the limits to freedom but to transcend them, meaning that ‘its struggle is not with commonsense, but with the practice, called social reality, which underlies it’ (Bauman 1976a:75). Consequently:

> By doing its job – re-presenting human condition as the product of human action – sociology was and is to me a critique of extant social reality. Sociology is meant to expose the relativity of what is, to open the possibility for alternative social arrangements and ways of life, to militate against the TINA (‘There Is No Alternative’) ideologies and life philosophies. As an interpretation of human experience laying bare its invisible, hidden or covered-up links, the mission of sociology, as I understood it all along, was to keep other options alive. (Bauman 2008:238)

Therefore, a science of freedom aimed at emancipation is fundamentally concerned with expanding the potential for human freedom. In doing so, for Bauman, it raises the possibility of alternatives. While this is not a universal claim – critical theorists such as Adorno rejected the prospect of being ‘terrorised into action’ by engaging in utopian speculation (Adorno 1991:202) – it could be said that if we critique and say that something is negative or bad then we imply some idea of a ‘good’ society in which such negatives are removed. Such a perspective of sociology as the science of freedom is implicit in many of the sociological alternatives offered throughout this book.

We can take the key point from Bauman that sociology faces a choice between the science of freedom and of unfreedom. If it chooses the latter, as it seems writers like Becker, Gouldner and Smith advocate, then the question of alternatives is inevitable. A critical approach implies sociological alternatives. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 9, for Levitas, this is a utopian perspective.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have traced a brief history of debates on value-freedom and critical sociology. As we have seen, the initial push for value-freedom in sociology from Weber came in a particular context of a politically charged Germany and rested on a split between the sociologist and the citizen. The former was not able to offer value-judgements, but the latter was. This distinction was a key part of the critique offered by both Becker and Gouldner. However, this debate threw up a further question: might the advocacy of values just create a partisan sociologist who sides with the newly emergent welfare state? Such
concerns were expanded upon by Smith, who highlighted not only the link between sociology and the relations of ruling but how these relied upon the universalisation of a male viewpoint at the expense of female subjectivities. In comparison to such a perspective, the idea of sociology as ‘critical’ has emerged in recent decades. But, as Bauman noted, this is not an intrinsic good; instead we have a choice between the science of freedom or unfreedom.

So, to return to the question which began this chapter: should sociologists offer alternatives? The answer, from the debates we have discussed in this chapter, ultimately relies upon a value-judgement: what is it that we wish sociology to be? If the goal is to imagine a science based upon the values of universalism (Merton 1973) then alternatives, as value-judgements, should be avoided or, at the very least, kept to a minimum and clearly highlighted as value-judgements. This does not mean we as individuals will not have values rather that these are kept out of our professional sociological work. If we reject the possibility of such a divide or, following Bauman, argue the question of a science of freedom or unfreedom is inevitable, then alternatives become part of the sociological project. As we shall see, for a variety of reasons, the social theorists covered in this book have shared this point of view and, in different ways, have argued that sociologists should offer alternatives.
Index

Acker, Joan 124–5, 188, 191
activism 14, 64–5, 68–70, 91, 97, 114, 116, 124, 135, 188–189, 195, 198
Addams, Jane 14, 85, 86, 89, 121, 181, 182, 204
Adorno, Theodor 22, 100
alienation 26–7, 30, 36–7, 42, 83, 103–6, 138, 165
see also Lefebvre, Henri; Marx, Karl
American Sociological Association (ASA) 181, 190–1
Avineri, Shlomo 31, 33, 34, 40
Back, Les 21, 180, 204
basic income 129–30, 173–8
see also Levitas, Ruth; Wright, Erik Olin
Bauman, Zygmunt 101, 166, 173, 194, 205
on Bourdieu 197
critical sociology 22, 204
legislators/interpreters distinction 6, 98–9, 182, 201, 203
in Poland 79
on socialism 164, 202–3
utopianism 164, 166
Beck, Ulrich 151–61
alternative 156–60
biography 151–2
civil labour 159
class 153, 155–6
cosmopolitan states 157–8, 199
cosmopolitanism 154, 160, 201
critique 155–6
ecology 152–3, 158
European Union 157–160
individualization 142, 153, 154
risk society 152–3
on sociology 155
subpolitics 157
Becker, Howard 16–18, 19, 21, 22, 197, 204
Benston, Margaret 125–6
Berger, Peter 15, 21, 191, 204
Bhambra, Gurminder 2, 62
black radical tradition 62, 116, 189
Blair, Tony 147, 150, 169
Bloch, Ernst 164, 168
Bottomore, Tom 201
Bourdieu, Pierre 3
on Giddens 150
public sociology 194–7, 203, 204
Boyle, Karen 132, 133, 135
Brown, Wendy 123
Burawoy, Michael 180–6
forms of sociology 183–4
public sociology, defence of 193–4
public sociology, definition of 182
sociological division of labour 184
waves of sociology 181–2
advertising 101, 104, 112, 158
public/private divide and 124–5, 129
wastefulness of 28–9, 42–3, 101, 158
Chicago 80, 84, 86, 188
Chicago School 65, 80
civil society 34, 159, 183, 188, 190, 192, 196
civil war (American) 70–2
class 3–4, 24–5, 30, 36, 40, 50–1, 65–6, 68, 71–2, 74, 95–6, 100, 102, 105, 127, 142, 144, 147, 153, 155–6, 170, 198–9
see also working class
Cole, G.D.H. 1–2, 32, 39, 173, 177, 204
guild socialism 5, 61
on sociology 5, 182
Collins, Patricia Hill 132, 188, 191, 203
communism 24, 25, 30–43, 53, 70, 77, 93, 94, 95, 112, 123, 128, 143, 171, 172, 190, 201
see also Marx, Karl
conservatism 44, 112, 146, 147, 195
sociology and 21–2, 183, 191, 202
consumption 35–6, 72, 101, 104
cooperatives 44
Du Bois 72–5, 199
Wright 173, 178
corporations 44, 54–6, 59, 200
cosmopolitanism 141–3, 145, 149, 154–61, 199
see also Beck, Ulrich
critical sociology 20–2, 61, 167, 184, 189, 204
see also Bauman, Zygmunt
Dalla Costa, Mariarosa 126–7, 129
Deegan, Mary Jo 5, 14, 86, 87, 88, 121, 181
degrowth school 158, 176
democracy 5, 54–5, 73, 79–99, 106, 144, 146, 165, 170, 193, 200
associative 80, 108, 176
liberal 53, 82–3, 192
sociology’s supposed link to 79–80, 183, 204
Dines, Gail 132–3, 135
double consciousness see under Du Bois, W.E.B.
Dreyfus Affair 186–8
Du Bois, W.E.B. 62–78
activism 68–70, 188
biography, use of 68–9
Black Reconstruction in America 70–2
class 65–6, 68, 71–2, 74, 77
cooperatives 72–5
double consciousness 63–5, 75, 77
first alternative 67–8
first critique 64–7
Marxism 70, 72, 76–7
NAACP, role in 69–70, 75, 77, 188
‘Negro Academy’ 67–8, 75
Philadelphia Negro 64–6
public sociology 188, 204
race 62–4
second alternative 72–5
second critique 70–1
socialism 70, 76–7, 146
talented tenth 67, 73
Durkheim, Émile 44–61
alternative 53–60, 167
anomie 51
civic morals 48
corporations 54–6, 200
critique 47–53
Dreyfus affair 186–8
individualism 47, 51, 91
Individualism and the Intellectuals 44, 61, 186–8
inequality 50–2, 5, 57, 62, 198
inheritance 51, 57–8
malaise 47
moral education 58–60
professional ethics 48–9, 51, 54, 55–6, 58, 61
public sociology 181, 186–8, 203
social facts 45–6, 163
socialism 61, 202
state 52–3, 55, 58, 84, 141
Dworkin, Andrea 130–9
alternative 134–6
critics of 136–9
critique 130–2, 199
‘MacDworkin’ law 134–5, 137–8, 200
definition of pornography 134
Pornography: Men Possessing Women 130–1, 137
public sociology 188
ecology 29, 100, 142, 148, 158, 160, 175
education 3–4, 30, 34, 38, 42, 46, 64–5, 67–8, 71–2, 86, 92–3, 94, 98, 101, 114
inequalities in 3–4
moral 58–60
sociology and 96–7, 185
special needs 87, 88
Eldridge, John 93, 143
Engels, Friedrich 186, 200
Paris Commune 40–1
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific 32–3
see also Marx, Karl
equality see inequality
Europe 2, 73, 91, 100, 123, 141, 152, 157–60, 188, 196
everyday life 102–6
exploitation 102, 112, 122, 128
for Marx 27–8, 30, 36, 42
feminism 2, 121–40, 166
critique of sociology 19–20, 121–2, 188–9
Index

liberal 122–3, 136–8
Marxist 123, 124–30, 138–9
public sociology 188–9, 191, 203–4
radical 130–3
science 20
social movement 124
standpoint theory 20, 122
and value-freedom 18–20
see also Sociologists for Women in Society (SWS)
France 31, 38–41, 46, 58, 100, 102, 186–8, 194, 195
Fraser, Nancy 177
Freud, Sigmund 110
Friedan, Betty 122–3
Friedman, Milton 177
Fromm, Erich 100, 173, 204
Geddes, Patrick 181, 204
gender 36, 47, 102, 144, 146, 154, 170, 175, 177
marginalisation of 121–2
in sociology 188–9
Giddens, Anthony 2, 100, 143–51
alternative 147
biography 143
cosmopolitanism 145, 149
critique 145–7
individualization 142
intellectual in politics, defence of 149–51, 200
Labour party, association with 143, 147–8, 150, 161, 196, 200
late modernity 143–5
as legislator 150–1, 201
as libertarian socialist 143
life politics 145–50, 160
Lords, member of 143, 188
post-traditional order 143–5
Third Way 93, 147–150, 199, 200
welfare state 148
Gorz, Andre 113, 173
Gouldner, Alvin 14–16, 17–18, 180, 182, 193, 197, 204
Graeber, David 141
Habermas, Jurgen 2, 80, 141
Hammarsley, Martin 18, 21
Haraway, Donna 19, 20
Harding, Sandra 20
Harvey, David 101, 168
Held, David 79, 141, 142
Hirst, Paul 80, 108, 176
Holmwood, John 190
housework 124–30
unequal nature 124–5
wages for, advocacy 126–8
wages for, criticism of 128–9
Imaginary Reconstruction of Society (IROS) 165, 168–70, 178
immigration 83, 86, 149
individualization see under Beck, Ulrich; Giddens, Anthony
Inglis, David 2, 141, 203
inheritance 34, 44, 50–1, 57–8, 60–1, 198
interpreters 6, 98–9, 201, 203
see also legislators
Irish sociology 202
James, Selma 126–30
housework, wages for 126–30
International Wages for Housework Campaign 126, 188, 201
Marxism 128, 129, 146, 202
public sociology 188, 189, 204
Kumar, Krishan 163, 166
Labour Party (UK) 18, 123, 143, 147–8, 150, 168, 196, 200
Latouche, Serge 158, 176
Law, Alex 6
Lefebvre, Henri 101–9, 118–19, 150
advertising 103–4
alienation 102, 103–6, 129
alternative 106–9
autogestion 106–9, 141
biography 101–2
class 105, 119, 198
critique 103–6
eyeeveryday life, value of studying 102–3
festivals 105
leisure 103, 105
Marcuse, critique of 119
uneven development 104–5
legislators 6, 98–9, 182, 201, 203
see also interpreters
Lenin, Vladimir 25, 36, 41, 101, 102, 119
Levitas, Ruth 164–9, 173–9
alternative 174, 202
basic income 174–8
Beck and Giddens, critique of 161
neoliberalism, utopian critique of 168–70
sociology, utopian nature of 20–1, 22, 164, 166–8, 178–9, 204
topia as method 165, 167–8, 199
utopianism, definition of 164–5
utopianism, prevalence of 166
Wright, critique of 178–9

life politics see Giddens, Anthony
London School of Economics (LSE) 90, 143, 163
Lumsden, Karen 17

MacKinnon, Catherine 130–2
‘MacDworkin’ law 134–6, 137–8

Mannheim, Karl 89–98
alternative 93–7
biography 89–90
critique 91–3
education 13, 92–3, 95–6
Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning 200
as legislator 98–9, 141, 163, 188
‘militant democracy’ 94
Moot, the 97
public sociology 188
‘social techniques’ 92
as ‘socio-analyst’ 90–1
sociology, value of 96–7, 204
Third Way 93–4, 188
utopianism 163–4, 165

Marcuse, Herbert 109–19
aesthetics 115–7
alternative 116–8
authoritarian, alternative seen as 118–19
biography 109–10
class 112, 114, 119–20, 198, 199
critique 110–12
‘Great Refusal’ 113–14, 121, 202
negativity 111
‘new subjectivity’ 115–16
public sociology 188
utopianism 112–13, 120

Marx, Eleanor 121

Marx, Karl 24–43
alienation 26–7, 30, 36–7, 42, 83, 102, 103, 174
alternative 30–43
alternative, reluctance to outline 24, 44, 53, 61, 100, 199–200
capitalism, wastefulness of 28–9
Civil War in France 39–41
communism 30–43, 62, 84, 112, 165, 172, 190, 199

communism, pre-existing conditions for 35–8
Communist Manifesto 33–4, 38
communist strategy 33–5
critique 25–9
Critique of the Gotha Programme 35
dictatorship of the proletariat 33
exploitation 27–8
globalization 28, 141
inequality 25, 50, 62, 168, 198
Paris Commune 38–41
public sociology 181, 186
revolution 29–31, 35, 41, 143, 188
see also Engels, Friedrich; Marxism

Marxism 70, 74, 89–90, 100–1, 112–13, 115
alternatives, reluctance to outline 7, 100, 108–9, 117, 118, 200
feminism 123, 124–30, 138–9
neo-Marxism 100–120
public sociology 190
utopianism 3, 162, 163, 167, 170–71

McGregor, Shelia 138, 139
Mead, George Herbert 80–9, 97–9
alternative 84–9
biography 80
critique 82–4
education 87
experimental method 85, 88, 181, 188
Hull House 85–6
I/me distinction 81
immigration 83, 86
as interpreter 99, 200, 201
personality democracy 82–4
public profile 84, 188
public sociology 188
rational democracy 84–5
social self 80–2, 84, 89
socialism 83–4, 162, 202, 203
strike arbitration 87
media 17, 92, 94, 105, 123, 138, 184, 188, 189, 193, 195
Mills, C. Wright 79, 180
modernity 2, 143–8, 152–4, 158, 160, 203
Móndragon 173, 178
Morris, William 165, 167

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 69–70, 75, 77, 188
neoliberalism 147, 150, 165, 177
critique of 168–70
public sociology, role in creating 182–3, 186, 189, 195–7
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>normativity</td>
<td>10, 14, 16, 21, 43, 98, 145, 156, 178–9, 203, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>7–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakley, Ann</td>
<td>128, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen, Robert</td>
<td>32, 203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park, Robert</td>
<td>14, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Commune</td>
<td>31, 38–41, 106, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participatory city planning</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pateman, Carole</td>
<td>79, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patriarchy</td>
<td>123, 127–8, 130, 134, 136, 138–40, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phipps, Alison</td>
<td>132, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plummer, Ken</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pornography</td>
<td>111, 192, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critique of</td>
<td>130–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defence of</td>
<td>136–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>postcolonialism</td>
<td>2, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public sociology</td>
<td>62, 69, 180–97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criticism of</td>
<td>189–94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>180, 183, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history of</td>
<td>181, 186–9, 203–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>190, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organic</td>
<td>185–6, 188–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional</td>
<td>184–5, 186–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative forms of</td>
<td>9, 21–2, 44, 183, 191, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy, supposed link to</td>
<td>19, 182, 183, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normative goals</td>
<td>204–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialist forms of</td>
<td>201–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopian</td>
<td>166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value-free</td>
<td>8–20, 97, 163, 190, 193, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>163–4, 166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social settlements</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social theory</td>
<td>1–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definitions of</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theory-baiting</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turn-taking</td>
<td>6, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialism</td>
<td>9, 11, 32, 35, 39, 44, 61, 76–7, 83, 100 104, 114, 115, 117, 123, 127, 142, 146, 147, 171, 177, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as ‘counter-culture’</td>
<td>201–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guild socialism</td>
<td>5, 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and public sociology</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and sociology</td>
<td>4, 201–3, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopian</td>
<td>32, 35, 84, 164, 167, 170, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociological alternatives</td>
<td>3–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choice of theorists</td>
<td>5–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>3–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>race</td>
<td>63–8, 77–8, 93, 184, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third way</td>
<td>see Giddens, A., Mannheim, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>79, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teaching</td>
<td>1, 10, 12–14, 15, 58–60, 62, 86, 109, 185–6, 193, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Way</td>
<td>see Giddens, A., Mannheim, K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>18, 31, 33, 123, 125, 133, 142, 147, 150–1, 163, 174, 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal class</td>
<td>30, 39, 77, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>14, 15, 62, 64–5, 67–8, 70–2, 80, 111, 136, 186, 190, 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Soviet Russia</td>
<td>41, 70, 73, 100, 104, 106, 114, 164, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopia</td>
<td>162–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>3, 162, 163, 167, 170–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>163–4, 166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>163–4, 166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociological alternatives</td>
<td>3–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choice of theorists</td>
<td>5–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>3–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative forms of</td>
<td>9, 21–2, 44, 183, 191, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy, supposed link to</td>
<td>19, 182, 183, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normative goals</td>
<td>204–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialist forms of</td>
<td>201–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utopian</td>
<td>166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value-free</td>
<td>8–20, 97, 163, 190, 193, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>163–4, 166–8, 170–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociological alternatives</td>
<td>3–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>choice of theorists</td>
<td>5–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>definition of</td>
<td>3–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociology</td>
<td>201–5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
value-freedom  see sociology, Weber, Max

Walby, Sylvia  122, 125, 128
Washington, Booker T.  64–5, 68, 69, 71
Weber, Max  8–14
  Marxism, critique of  200
  politics  12, 180
  research  10–12
  socialists, critique of  202
  ‘standard reading’  8–10
  teaching  12–14
  value-freedom  8–14, 15, 18, 190
welfare state  18, 22, 76, 112, 147–9, 153, 156, 160, 176, 181–2, 184, 193, 195, 196

Wells, H.G.  163, 168, 178
Wikipedia  172
women in sociology  see
Sociologists for Women in Society (SWS)
working class  16, 24, 31, 33, 38–9, 47, 71, 74, 101, 112, 114, 116, 120, 126–7, 198, 199
Wright, Erik Olin  170–9
  alternative  172–3, 202
  basic income  173–5
  Marxism  25, 170–1, 180
  real utopias  171–3, 178–9
Young, Michael  165