Contents

Preface vii

List of Contributors ix

Introduction 1
Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer

Part I Fundamental Problems

1 On Getting a Good Look: Normativity and Visual Experience 17
Charles Siewert

2 Perception and Normative Self-Consciousness 38
Maxime Doyon

3 Seeing Our World 56
Michael Madary

Part II Delusions, Illusions and Hallucinations

4 Illusions and Perceptual Norms as Spandrels of the Temporality of Living 75
David Morris

5 How is Perceptual Experience Possible? The Phenomenology of Presence and the Nature of Hallucination 91
Matthew Ratcliffe

Part III The Sociocultural Embeddedness of Norms

Shaun Gallagher

7 Normality and Normativity in Experience 128
Maren Wehrle

8 Social Visibility and Perceptual Normativity 140
Thiemo Breyer
### Part IV   Issues in Epistemology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Perception and Its Givenness</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Aude Bandini</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Arnaud Dewalque</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Evidence as Norm of Normativity in Perception</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Virginie Palette</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Grammar of Sensation</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Valérie Aucouturier</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Index* 227
Human activity is permeated by norms of all sorts: moral norms provide the ‘code’ for what we ought to do and how we ought to behave, norms of logic regulate how we reason (or ought to), scientific norms set the standards for what counts as knowledge, legal norms determine what is lawfully permitted and what isn’t, aesthetic norms establish the canon of beauty and thus shape artistic trends and practices, and socio-cultural norms provide the criteria for what counts as tolerable, just, praiseworthy, or unacceptable in a cultural milieu. These and similar phenomena are to a high degree responsible for the structure and configuration of our shared world, which is a multi-faceted normative space that allows or encourages certain behaviors and practices and disallows and discourages others. For this reason, we recognize (more or less consciously) in these norms a certain motivational strength, sometimes even a constraining or prohibitive force, thereby provoking reflections, doubts, and hesitations, feelings of regret or culpability, but also social disapprobation or exclusion in the forms of rejection, denunciation, marginalization, stigmatization, or even punishment.

Traditionally, philosophy has mostly paid attention to the moral or ethical dimension of normativity. Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Kant’s deontological approach to ethics provide good historical examples of the intertwinement of the normative and the ethical. More recently, however, it has become apparent to anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers alike that it isn’t just moral behavior that is guided by norms: norms play a decisive role in the vast majority of our practices. Indeed, human action in general is guided by norms of all kinds. Our everyday activities and behaviors are constrained and sometimes even dictated by laws, politics, moral codes and social expectations; our intellectual projects are shaped by academic standards and
institutional demands; and our daily choices and decisions are often powerfully influenced by the advice and recommendations we receive from people we love and admire (friends and family members), persons that have a certain authority over us (mentors and educators), and by the ideals and values that we cherish.

More generally still, even how we speak displays a high normative profile, since the very signification of the words we use requires not only that their referent be known, but also in which circumstances and with which others words they can be used, thereby making patent that language is restricted by ‘constraints’ of all kinds, even when these have become virtually indiscernible to the laymen. The same holds for ‘rationality’, and its implicit demands of coherence and precision.

Conversely, people suffering from mental health problems, such as depression or schizophrenia, are considered ‘irrational’ or ‘abnormal’ in a folk-psychological understanding, precisely because their behaviors deviate from norms or standards that are prevalent in their culture or society. The delusions characteristic of such psychopathological states often contain assumptions about the world that are idiosyncratic and immune to revision by evidence to the contrary. The delusional content thus becomes a ‘norm’ that is valid only for the psychotic subject. If the world appears differently to the subject in delusion, this subject cannot participate in the conventional life-world of a community in the same way any more: i.e. the space of shared norms such as beliefs, attitudes, and codes of conduct is dramatically narrowed down.

Given the diversity of norm-governed phenomena prevailing in our everyday experience, it is not surprising that the question of normativity has generated important debates in a variety of philosophical subdisciplines, such as philosophy of action (Dancy, 2000; Korsgaard, 2008; Parfit, 2011), philosophy of language (Engel, 2007; Brandom, 1994), philosophy of mind (McDowell, 2009; Prinz, 2002; Wedgewood, 2007), and philosophy of psychiatry (Bermúdez, 2001), to name just a few. However, the more specific question, concerning the nature and function of norms in perceptual experience, has received comparatively little attention thus far. With few exceptions (Crowell, 2013; Dreyfus, 2014; McDowell, 1994), this topic has, if not wholly passed under the radar of philosophical research, at least not received all the attention it deserves. For this reason, several fundamental questions remain unanswered and are at times not even posed.

To begin with: what, exactly, is a perceptual norm? Is it something we perceive or rather something that guides and orients our perceiving without being noticed itself? Are there various types of perceptual norms
depending on the types of activities we carry out (practical, theoretical, etc.), and if so, by which criteria do we differentiate them? Also relevant here is the question of their sources: where do these norms come from? Should we think of them as being *a priori* or *a posteriori*? Are they better understood as intellectual or as embodied capacities? Correlatively: how do they influence our judgments and behaviors (if they do)? It is problems and questions like these that have motivated this project, and that the contributors to the present volume have taken on in various ways.

Even if the debate around the normative in perception itself is relatively new, a survey of the literature shows that a variety of answers to the kinds of questions just mentioned have been proposed in more or less explicit fashion since the beginning of the 20th century. A detailed mapping of all the intricacies relating to these questions and the debates they generated is not possible here, but two general tendencies may nevertheless be observed. If the question of how the normative is intertwined with the perceptual was in the early days of the Anglo-American philosophy of perception more clearly approached in ontological terms – think of the realism/idealism debate opposing Moore (1905) and Russell (1912) to Bradley (1914), for instance – the question has more recently been tackled from an epistemological angle – foundationalism (BonJour, 1985) vs. coherentism (Davidson, 1986; Lehrer, 1985) –, or by combining more explicitly ontological and epistemological concerns, as is the case in recent disjunctive theories of perception (Hinton 1973; Snowdon, 1979; McDowell, 1987; see the anthologies of Haddock and Macpherson, 2008, and Byrne and Logue, 2009, for surveys of the literature). Intuitively, we may understand why epistemological worries have become so fundamental in these discussions. For, to have a perceptual experience is by default to be confronted with a possible way the world is. Quite naturally, then, the question concerning perception’s (tacit) pretense to (re)present objects as they actually are is bound to emerge. How can perception secure access to worldly objects in such a way that empirical judgments about them satisfy conditions of truth and falsity? In other words, how are we to conceive the nature of perceptual content to make it fit with our epistemic demands?

It is within this broader context that the discussion between conceptualist and nonconceptualist theories of perception is located. By drawing inspiration from Kant, ‘conceptualists’ (Brewer, 2005; Byrne, 2004; McDowell, 1994) have argued that experience would be impossible if the conceptual content of our discursive activity were radically independent of the sensory manifold. If perceptual content can really be normatively attuned to the world and so capture how things are,
then its content must already be conceptually formed. The point is that our conceptual capacities must be at work even at the most minimal stage of human sensibility; otherwise, we couldn’t even start explaining perception’s normative pretense, let alone justify its claim to truth. This last claim is exactly what so-called ‘nonconceptualists’ (Bermúdez, 2003; Heck, 2007; Peacocke, 2001; Tye, 2006) and phenomenologists alike dispute.

The fact that this quarrel has been going on for quite some time now and has produced a vast literature (see Gunther, 2003, for a survey) shows that dichotomies such as the one between conceptual and nonconceptual, but also those between sensory and categorical, linguistic and pre-linguistic, reflective and pre-reflective, etc., are common starting points among many philosophers who study perception. Even if they do not precisely map on to one another, taken as a whole these antagonistic oppositions nonetheless give us a clue about the binary structure in which many philosophers think about the issues in question.

Phenomenologists have regularly argued against any such dichotomy, using antagonistic concepts only as analytic reference points for an inquiry that would make them appear as reflective, retrospective abstractions from an experience in which the phenomena behind them are originally intertwined and inseparable. Such intertwinement can be studied in the domain of habits, for instance, where one can easily notice how sociocultural norms shape the way we perceive the world. The normality and style of looking at things and persons, of paying or not paying attention to them, for example, is part of our everyday interactions, and it is often hard to say which habitual elements have developed out of conventional instruction (e.g. table manners) based on collective meanings, or out of individual preferences in sensory stimuli (e.g. certain colors or shapes). In any case, the style of perceiving is always shaped by the norms and conventions we have acquired in a given milieu or sociocultural setting.

Another example concerns the role of bodily activities in perception, and the various subpersonal mechanisms that are supposed to enable their realization. Our body is mobile and explores its environment actively. Perception involves the possibility of changing location and keeping track of objects, persons, and events. Seeing things as thus and so would not only engage my cognitive capacities but, more fundamentally still, would imply that my body first has the capacity to achieve access to the object by moving my sense organs. Perceptual norms now appear to be tied to the potentiality of my body (what Husserl called the ‘I can’), however we may conceive of them.
This is a basic insight at the heart of the enactive approach put forward in recent years by philosophers such as Shaun Gallagher (2005) and Alva Noë (2012). For Noë, for instance, it is our implicit understanding of the patterns of sensorimotor dependence governing our relation to an object that functions as a norm. The kind of understanding is pragmatic and practical, as it refers to our skillful way of coping with and in the world. Yet, the relevant bodily activities operate below the threshold of conscious activity. In normal everyday perceptual experience, the grasp of sensorimotor relations is automatic, occurring without any active engagement on the part of the subject. This is so, it is argued, because the norm is set up by patterns of stimulation of nerve fibers (Noë, 2004) and involves very basic forms of auto-affection like proprioceptive awareness (Zahavi, 1999). At the same time, however, perception is adaptive and context-sensitive, and thus appears to be an intentional type of conscious experience, not a matter of mere bodily reflexes or automatic impulses; but then a precise assessment of the respective influences of the various cognitive and bodily capacities involved in experience becomes very hard to deliver.

Since normativity is embedded in the sphere of perception, phenomenologists often understand the source of the normative in perceptual experience neither as a set of propositions, nor of cognitive mechanisms of attribution and deliberation, but as bodily forms of intentionality (Husserl, 1979; Merleau-Ponty, 2013). In the Anglo-American philosophy of mind, on the other hand, this question concerning the sources of normativity is much debated in connection to morality (Korsgaard, 1996) and epistemology (Depaul and Ramsey, 1998; Goldman, 2007), but rarely in relation to perception per se (McDowell, 1994, is a notable exception).

If most involved parties agree that perceptual norms are (at least partly) determined by contextual elements, analytic as well as phenomenological philosophers typically insist on different features. Whereas the reference to the conventions of ordinary language remains a typical move for the former (Anscombe, 1965; Austin, 1962; Benoist, 2011; Travis, 2004), the broader historico-cultural horizon of experience (Gurwitsch, 1979; Schütz & Luckmann, 1973) is more emphasized by the latter. Temporality could also be seen as a dividing notion. If it was a source of great philosophical worries for early 20th-century defenders of the sense-data theory, since they ought to explain the apparent consistency and permanence of ordinary objects (Carnap, 1928; Russell, 1918; Schlick 2009), it is nowadays hardly a disputed question in contemporary philosophy of perception. In the phenomenological tradition, however, things are a
bit different: temporality was central ever since Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments on the topic. Time is crucial, they would hold, for there can be no convergence with or divergence from anything without a reference to the past and future. Assessing the normative character of anything requires that things endure and events are stretched over time, embedded in a temporal horizon that provides the background against which the relative fulfillment of the experience can be measured. Furthermore, the role of others in perceptual experience is dealt with in different ways: while Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre have delivered detailed analyses of the structuring role of intersubjectivity in perceptual experience, the topic in analytic philosophy of mind tends to be studied mostly in relation to the ‘problem of other minds’; which is, admittedly, an important epistemological problem, but not immediately a problem of perception per se.

Obviously, these issues and approaches do not exhaust the topic of perceptual normativity. We hope, however, that they give a sense of the width and richness of this vast question, which the contributors to the present volume have been invited to unfold in their own specific and novel ways in their essays. As the collection demonstrates, there are plenty of overlapping areas of investigation that defy the traditional schism we have just alluded to between continental and analytic philosophy, both methodically and in terms of material analyses. By assembling such a diverse and yet concentrated set of contributions from different perspectives, we hope to further the ongoing dialogue between what has for a long time been regarded as separate domains of philosophical inquiry.

Chapter summary

In Chapter 1, Charles Siewert demonstrates how sensory experience, though distinct from the operations of rational judgment, confers warrant on it and belongs with it to a normative domain. He develops a conception of sensory intentionality that is neither based on an over-intellectualized notion of ‘objective purport’, nor on standard representationalist ideas. Rather, a phenomenology of sensory object constancy and recognitional experience is favored, which integrates the subjective character of experience with the activity of perceiving. To evaluate this proposal, Siewert focuses on the common experience of ‘getting a better look’ at things, which refers to the accuracy of visual experience, and asks about the conditions of possibility of such an experience. This commonplace experience, he argues, depends on the principle of ‘phenomenal
sensory constancy', i.e. the fact that certain properties of objects remain constant in experience even though the way they appear to us continuously changes. Because of this constancy in change (referred to as ‘intentionality’ or ‘objectuality’), things can become more or less apparent to us, and it is on the basis of this variation in the degrees of apparentness that we are able to improve our view of something, since making something more apparent often increases our chances of identifying or recognizing the object in question.

Chapter 2 by Maxime Doyon engages in a critical comparison of the Kantian ‘analytic’ tradition with classical phenomenology. Whereas in the former approach it is held that our perceptual openness to the world is essentially tied to epistemic justification, i.e. to our readiness to provide reasons for our actions and beliefs, in the latter the notion of norm-responsiveness is connected to perception’s capacity to guide action or elicit certain behaviors. If philosophers of both Kantian and Husserlian inspiration agree that being answerable to the world presupposes that we are in a position to attend to and assess our perceptual situation, they disagree on the nature of this link. Whereas philosophers such as Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell draw on a notion of self-consciousness that borrows on the Kantian unity of apperception, the kind of self-conscious activity that the phenomenologists hold responsible for our attunement to the world rather depends on the passive contributions of the body. At stake here are two different conceptions of intentionality: while the first is understood as a mental disposition, the second is bodily informed and includes pre-reflective forms of self-relating. The paper argues for the superiority of the phenomenological model to explain the normative character of perceptual experience.

Michael Madary, in Chapter 3, defends the thesis that visual content always has a strong social element, i.e. that we don’t just see the visual world, but that we see our visual world. By providing both a priori and empirical support for the claim that visual experience has the general structure of anticipation and fulfillment, he makes a more general claim about mental architecture, namely that the sociality of visual experience extends beyond the perceptual access to other humans and other animate beings to the physical environment. Since the unfolding of visual content happens according to the temporal structure of anticipation and fulfillment, and since this structure cannot be dissociated from the culturally shaped categories of ‘familiarity’ and ‘abnormality’, all visual content to some degree involves social content. Drawing on sources from the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and empathy, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and recent analytical
Maxime Doyon and Thiemo Breyer

philosophy of mind, the author shows how rationality can be embedded in the cycle of action and perception, thereby refuting the representational ‘sandwich model’ of the human mind and cognition.

Chapter 4 by David Morris moves the discussion of the normativity in perception to the domain of ‘abnormal’ perceptions, such as illusions. It challenges the view that they are mistakes by emphasizing how the concept of illusions-as-mistakes relies on perspectives unavailable within illusory experiences and introduces norms fixed outside such experiences. An examination of ‘rubber hand illusions’ suggests that illusions are not mistaken perceptions, but cases in which perceived objects make a different kind of sense – by virtue of a norm that is not fixed to an objective standard but ongoingly engendered within the dynamics of living, perceptual behavior. This leads to the view that perception is not founded on readymade norms that transcend living dynamics. Rather, norms emerge from a past that is intertwined with the lived present – they are ‘temporal spandrels of living temporality’, as the author calls it. By extending the scope of the discussion to this dynamic unfolding and temporal emergence of norms, the chapter also puts into question the representationalist conception of mind and reality as adequation and leads to reconceive the relation between ‘normal’ and ‘illusory’ perceptions.

In Chapter 5, Matthew Ratcliffe continues the analysis of unusual or disturbed perceptual experiences by looking at the phenomenon of hallucinations. He first of all argues that the localized perception and recognition of individual entities, and the accompanying sense of their reality, presuppose a more enveloping, contextual sense of being immersed in a world. In other words, the ‘hereness’ and ‘nowness’ of objects – in short, their presence – is dependent on a general style of experiential unfolding, which Husserl characterized in terms of anticipation and fulfillment. The main objective is to show how this Husserlian account of presence can shed light on certain types of hallucinations, by shifting the focus away from the content of the hallucinations towards the basic, underlying structures of experience. One of the key insights here is that severe psychopathologies may involve a deep disturbance at the level of the fundamental anticipation-fulfillment structure of experience, which results in a blurring of different modes of intentionality (perception, remembering, imagination, etc.) and thus leads to delusional states of mind.

Shaun Gallagher’s Chapter 6 investigates habitual effects on perception. The view that perception is shaped by experience and learning has long been held by the empiricist tradition, ranging from Locke to James. Gallagher builds and expands on this view by showing that the process
Introduction

of perceptual maturation crucially involves affectivity and social interaction – two factors that have mostly been neglected by the tradition. The social affectivity of perception is explicated with the example of the gaze. Our own gaze is constantly, and from the very beginnings of life, deflected and reflected by the gaze of others towards objects, but also towards aspects of our own personality; thus, an intricate social process lies at the very heart of the dynamics of perception. More importantly still, there is an inseparable affective component to the dynamics of social attention: others look upon us either approvingly or disapprovingly, with interest or disinterest, etc. By way of such interactions, our perceptual field becomes intermeshed with an affective relief – or, more accurately, the two must be conceived as different aspects of a unique ‘perceptual-emotive-interactive experience’.

Chapter 7 by Maren Wehrle is guided by the idea that experience is not only a priori shaped by norms, but that these norms, as well as deviations from them, are experienced as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ by the subject. To make this point, Wehrle critically analyzes Husserl’s account of normality, where normality is characterized as concordant experience with an inherent relation towards an optimum. She argues that on a concrete level of experience this concordance is based on habits and the optimum is relative to them. Here, one can see that normality is not an objective reality, but rather the expression of a habitual style of experience. It can be grasped only form a certain perspective out of many: the one with which we are most familiar. This leads to a dynamization of the concept of normality, which is not to be regarded as a static descriptive category but a process of normalization involving various sociocultural meanings and attitudes, as well as historically contingent imaginations. This is explicated with recourse to Husserl’s notion of passivity.

In Chapter 8, Thiemo Breyer discusses the intersubjective and social dimension of normativity by analyzing ways in which recognition, and the attribution of social status to others as persons, is founded in certain perceptual behaviors and their expressive displays. He reviews some basic insights from phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, and social theory to develop an understanding of social visibility and invisibility, which is furthermore linked to some aspects of attention and empathy. Thereby, it becomes apparent how perceptual normativity emerges in simple acts of paying and withholding attention and how personhood is negotiated with empathetic gestures in the interactional space of seeing and being seen. The link between prepredicative intersubjective perception and predicative personal recognition is established by sensorial habitualization, for which directing and withdrawing attention plays
a crucial role. It is argued that, by training social attention in specific other-directed ways, certain typifications that reduce empathy (e.g. as a result of ideological or racial biases) can be overcome. The chapter shows that normativity is deeply embedded in direct social perception and that attention has an inherently ethical dimension.

Aude Bandini, in Chapter 9, brings the thematic of this volume to a more epistemological arena by offering a reflection on givenness as a distinctive feature of perceptual experience that might shed new light on the rational contribution of experience to knowledge. She claims that the non-arbitrary constraint exerted by perceptual content on the subject’s beliefs is closely related to the constitutive properties that singularize perception amongst other psychological states, such as belief, daydreaming, or memory. While all mental states involve content that may or may not be true, perception is the only gate through which the world is genuinely accessible to the subject’s mind. Hence, epistemology has to make room for phenomenological considerations of perception instead of overshadowing them. The author argues against the criticism famously raised by Sellars against the ‘myth of the given’ by stressing the particular phenomenal character of givenness, which she analyzes in terms of presence, inalterability, and robustness. These essential phenomenological traits of the given serve as pre-logical validation criteria for the formulation of judgments, and can thus be considered as the perceptual touchstones upon which thoughts and beliefs naturally arise.

In Chapter 10, Arnaud Dewalque discusses the claim that perceptual experiences may be said to be normative in the sense that they are capable of entering into rational transitions. Such transitions typically take place between judgments or doxastic states, which are considered paradigmatic cases of states with propositional content. Recent discussions in contemporary philosophy of mind have focused on epistemic justification, i.e. the relational transition from perceptual experience to perceptual judgment. This generates a version of the epistemological problem of perception: in virtue of what do perceptual experiences qualify as justifiers for perceptual judgments? This epistemological issue and the phenomenological issue (what is the nature of perceptual experiences?) have usually been addressed separately in the philosophy of mind. However, recently things have begun to change. In this chapter, the author argues for a ‘unified account’ of perceptual experiences, which could integrate their relevant epistemological and phenomenological aspects. It is suggested that perceptual experiences may enter into rational transitions in virtue of their being a certain combination of non-propositional content and phenomenal force. Once the plausibility of such
an account has been appreciated, it is possible to extend it to rational transitions from perceptual experience to perceptual experience.

Chapter 11 by Virginie Palette argues that there are two interdependent conditions for perception to be normative: first, the perceptual content must possess an intentional structure in order to be compatible with the content of judgment. Second, the perceptual content must be in agreement with the actual content of sensation. Thus, the initial question of normativity in perception involves another challenge: namely, that of asking the question of the ‘norm of normativity’; that is to say, that of exploring the limits of the normative role that phenomenology attributes to perceptual intentionality. In order to attest its own normativity, perceptual intentionality must be, in turn, normed by sensation. This is confirmed by daily and psychopathological cases of misperceptions in which intentional perception is in conflict with what is sensorily given. As the chapter shows, such empirical meta-reflection on normativity (which is decisive, since perception not only acts as a norm for our daily beliefs, but also for every kind of scientific judgments) can be integrated within the framework of a phenomenological analysis of perception, such as the one we find it in Husserl’s work.

Valérie Aucouturier’s Chapter 12 is a defense and clarification of Elizabeth Anscombe’s view about the intentionality of sensation (or perception, which are here treated synonymously) in response to a recent criticism by Charles Travis. Although both Travis and Anscombe defend non-mediated views of perception, Anscombe nonetheless ascribes intentionality to perception, which according to Travis is contradictory. According to Aucouturier, however, this apparent contradiction in Anscombe’s position results from a misinterpretation of the new ‘grammatical’ conception of intentionality that she was putting forward in her 1965 article. The originality of this position is to advocate a ‘use-pluralism’, according to which the truth-conditions of judgments containing sensation-verbs can vary depending on the object-concept (intentional or non-intentional) at play in the particular judgment being formulated. In this way, the question of what perception is becomes the question of how perception-verbs can be used in different circumstances, and the truth of perception is made to lie within the present situation, not in abstract ontological considerations.
References


Index

abnormal (anomalous) behavior, 2, 62–3
experience, 93, 99, 104, 107–8, 133–7
accuracy (of perception), 19, 29, 31–2, 39, 47, 134
activity (acting, action) and intentionality, 199, 213–5, 217–9, 224
and perception, 1, 4–5, 22, 34–5, 38–41, 43–50, 57, 63, 67–9, 98, 110, 123, 125, 128, 131–7, 150, 153, 193, 199
of thought/mind/concepts, 162–3, 167, 175, 214
affectivity (affects, affection), 5, 97, 100, 104, 110, 122–3, 125–6, 129, 131, 136, 148–51
Anscombe, Elizabeth (1919–2001), 208–9, 211–5, 217–8, 220–1, 223–4
Aristotle (385–322 BC), 1
Armstrong, David (1926–2014), 192
attention, 4, 26, 132, 140, 149, 153, 168
active and passive, 149–51
joint/social, 121–4, 144–5, 147–9, 152, 154
of infants, 118, 120–1
visual, 30, 59, 66, 153
attitudes, 2, 48, 53, 98, 100, 106, 121–2, 126, 137, 141, 145–8, 192–3
natural, 196, 198
propositional, 67, 101, 170
Austin, John (1911–1960), 208, 210–3, 215–6, 222, 224
Avenanti, Alessio, 154
Badcock, Johanna, 106, 108
Ballard, Dana, 59
Bar, Moshe, 125
Barrett, Lisa, 125
Bayliss, Andrew, 122
Berkeley, George (1685–1753), 193, 208–9
Blumenberg, Hans (1920–1996), 141, 153
lived (corps propre, Leib), 79–80, 129, 141
schema, 40, 48–50
Bradley, Francis Herbert (1846–1924), 3
Broome, Matthew, 111
Butler, Judith, 130
Campbell, John, 36
Carman, Taylor, 53, 84
Casler, Krista, 65
Cermolacce, Michel, 104
Church, Jennifer, 23
cognition, 4–5, 36, 40, 56, 67, 69, 94–5, 104, 140–1, 144–8, 152, 163, 165, 167, 170, 172–5, 179, 185, 205
access, 23
meta, 20
social, 64–8, 151
Index 229

habits (habituality), 4, 40, 49–50, 77, 80, 83–6, 100–2, 117, 129–30, 132–8, 140, 144–5, 147–50, 152, 154, 200, 205
Haggard, Patrick, 68
hallucination, 76, 92, 102–8, 110, 164, 173–4, 210, 219
Hamilton, William (1788–1856), 224
Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976), 39, 152, 199, 205–7
history, 5, 85, 87, 128–31, 135–7, 145
Honneth, Axel, 143–5
Hopp, Walter, 192
Hubel, David, 118
Huemer, Michael, 191
Hume, David (1711–1776), 24, 26, 42, 57, 190
Hurley, Susan, 67–8
hyle, see sensation
see Müller-Lyer and Necker
intersubjectivity, 6, 49–50, 59, 69, 118, 123, 128, 130, 132–7, 142, 144–5, 147, 153
invisibility (non-visibility), 46, 51, 79, 83–4, 140–5, 148, 151, 153–4
irrational(ity), 2
James, William (1842–1910), 118, 149
Jaspers, Karl (1883–1969), 95, 97–8, 101, 105
Jones, Simon, 106
Jureidini, Jon, 106
justification, 17–19, 20, 36, 38, 43–4, 49, 162–3, 166, 168–9, 172–3, 179–93, 199, 203, 205
Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), 1, 3, 30, 38–9, 41–4, 51, 57, 148–9, 162, 168, 174–5
Kelly, Sean, 84
Kelso, Scott, 78, 82
knowledge, 1, 17, 40, 42, 47, 51, 53, 78, 120, 125, 130, 133–4, 150, 153, 161–2, 165–9, 172–5, 204, 210, 222
language, 2, 5, 44, 49, 67, 193, 209–13, 215, 221
Larö, Frank, 104
Lee, Tai Sing, 59
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646–1716), 57
Levinas, Emmanuel (1906–1995), 152
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), 2, 153, 130, 132, 137
Locke, John (1632–1704), 117–9, 121
Margalit, Avishai, 144
Maybery, Murray, 106, 108
McCarthy-Jones, Simon, 103, 106, 110
McDowell, John, 21–2, 36, 38–9, 41–4, 49, 51, 53, 174–6, 193
McIntyre, Ronald, 199
Mead, George Herbert (1863–1931), 141
meaning, 4, 40, 46, 49–50, 124, 125, 141, 145, 196, 199, 203, 205–6, 212, 217, 223
Michie, Patricia, 106
Montague, Michelle, 94
Moore, George Edward (1873–1958), 3
Moritz, Steffen, 104
motivation, 1, 39, 41, 44, 46–7, 52, 131, 135
Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle, 101
Müller-Lyer (figure), 76–8, 164–5, 174–5
Mumford, David, 59
Nayani, Tony, 103, 110
Necker (cube), 78–9, 82–3
neuroscience, 57, 59, 64, 69, 118, 131
Noë, Alva, 5, 24, 76, 96–8, 153, 176
normality, 4–5, 61–5, 68, 128–38, 140, 145, 152, 191, 197, 205, 210, 212, 216, 224
see abnormal, familiar(ity) and habits
Nussbaum, Martha, 151
optimality, 1, 39, 45–7, 50–3, 133–5, 137
Parnas, Josef, 104
Paulik, Georgie, 107
Peacocke, Christopher, 36, 178
phenomenal(ity, ism), 26–30, 32–3, 36, 164–6, 168–71, 173–4, 180–1, 185, 192, 197
philosophy of mind, 2, 5–6, 166, 173, 175–6, 205
Pippin, Robert, 51
prediction, see anticipation
Prinz, Jesse, 64
proposition(al, alism), 5, 67, 97, 101–2, 140, 149, 166, 168–71, 180–4, 187–92
see content, (non)propositional
Pryor, Jim, 169–70, 176, 179, 192
psychiatry (psychiatric, psychiatrists), 2, 95, 103, 105, 108, 110, 170, 198, 200–3, 205–6
psychology (psychological, psychologists), 2, 18, 23, 32, 51, 57, 59, 65–6, 93, 131, 141, 143, 149, 151, 153, 163, 165
psychopathology, 1–2, 31, 102, 109, 131, 132, 197–9, 201, 206
Raballo, Andrea, 104
Rao, Rajesh, 59
reason(ing, s), 1, 17, 19, 20, 35, 38–9, 42–3, 128, 134, 161–2, 163, 168, 173, 174–5, 180–1, 185–90, 193, representantion(al, alism), 21–2, 24–5, 30–2, 35, 36, 42, 60, 68, 125, 145, 170, 188, 190–2, 204, 210
see content, (non)conceptual/(non) representational
Rietveld, Erik, 150
Robinson, Howard, 164
Russel, Bertrand (1872–1970), 3, 163, 209
Sacks, Oliver, 31–2, 103
Saks, Elyn, 102
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980), 6, 39, 76, 124, 142
Sass, Louis, 104–5
Schellenberg, Susanna, 23
schizophrenia, 2, 95, 97, 102–6, 110, 132
Searle, John, 182
self-consciousness, see consciousness, self:
sensation (hyle, sense-data), 5, 21, 52–3, 60, 117, 131, 165–8, 171, 197–9, 202–5, 207, 208–15, 218, 220–1, 224
kinaesthetic/bodily, 45–7, 50, 52, 119, 125
-verbs, 208–15, 217–8, 220–3
see content, of perception/sensation
sense-data, see sensation
senses (sensing), 17–9, 22, 30, 119, 126, 150, 209–10, 217
Seth, Anil, 92
Siegel, Susanna, 36
Smith, David Woodruff, 199
Smith, Joel, 60–2
Smith, Linda, 83, 87, 89
sociocultural norms, see culture
Sommers, Jaime, 80, 89
Spratling, Michael, 59
Stawarska, Beata, 153
Stein, Edith (1891–1942), 60–2
Steinbock, Anthony, 52
Stephens, Lynn, 104
Straus, Erwin, 104
Strawson, Peter (1919–2006), 38
style (experiential, cognitive), 4, 40,
  49–50, 66, 100–2, 105, 109–10,
  129, 134–6, 140, 153
Suzuki, Keisuke, 92
Talero, Maria, 84
Taylor, Charles, 146, 153
temporality, 5–6, 57, 67, 75–6, 78–9,
  82–8, 109, 130–2, 137, 172
Thau, Michael, 182
Thelen, Esther (1941–2004), 83, 89
Tomasello, Michael, 67
Travis, Charles, 208, 210, 212–7,
  219–20, 222, 224
truth (-value, -conditions), 3, 17, 20,
  101, 133, 140, 163, 170, 173–4,
  176, 196, 210, 216–7, 220, 223
Turner, Scott, 86–7
Tye, Michael, 36, 190
values, 3, 122, 124–5, 129, 143, 146
Van Den Berg, Jan Hendrik, 105
Van Os, Jim, 107
visibility, 25, 53, 97, 121, 125, 140–53
  see invisibility
Wahl, François, 153
Waldenfels, Bernhard, 148, 153
Waters, Flavie, 106
Wiesel, Torsten, 118
Williams, Michael, 163
Wilson, Cook, 170
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951),
  78, 92, 101, 200, 217, 220
world, 2–5, 34, 38–40, 43, 46, 48–50,
  52, 56, 59–61, 63, 65, 82–4, 87,
  89, 92–3, 97, 99, 102, 104–5, 108,
  110, 117, 121–2, 124–6, 129–30,
  132–7, 140–2, 148, 150–1, 161–3,
  166, 169, 173–5, 178–80, 185,
  188, 190, 204, 206, 210
  see lifeworld (Lebenswelt)
Zahavi, Dan, 51, 104, 152