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Introduction: The EEAS as a Catalyst of Diplomatic Innovation

Jozef Bátora and David Spence

This book focuses on one set of issues in a welter of European Union (EU) policy areas of contention: EU diplomacy. The implications of an emerging EU diplomacy for member-state diplomacies and for global diplomatic structures *volens nolens* affected by EU developments are immense. Yet they are arguably understood neither by European publics nor by the EU’s international partners. We wonder whether they are fully understood by EU actors – political and administrative – themselves. This situation is all the more challenging in a time of high turbulence in the EU’s neighbourhood and globally. There is a multitude of new threats emanating from an increasing number of fragile and imploded states as well as more traditional threats related to resurgence of geopolitics and the rise of revisionist great powers challenging the Western liberal democratic order. To use an often quoted metaphor, reforming the EU’s new diplomatic apparatus amidst this turbulence is like repairing a plane with the engine running and, we might add, under fire.

The EU is a transformational polity encompassing the policies of individual member states and of the European Union itself. The EU is not a state, but it fulfils many functions of the state. It is not a formally recognised global power, yet its power and influence in many disparate areas give it the trappings of global power, though so far without corresponding pretensions to military might. The EU is thus clearly a diplomatic actor, though in fact it challenges traditional conceptions of diplomacy. None of this should be surprising, for the EU is an essentially contested polity within its own borders. Despite growing political questioning, the post-Westphalian characteristics of a globalised society bring ever more pressure to bear on European governments to extend the competence of the EU and to create new suprastate powers to meet growing international challenges. The political stakes in the EU’s rapidly evolving institutional structures have thus increased. Indeed, they seem set to continue increasing despite the many challenges to the legitimacy of the European Union as a democratic polity and the implications of the economic crisis that has beset the EU in the 21st century.
The European diplomatic system is characterised by its multi-level approaches to the organisation and conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. National governments have delegated extensive responsibilities for foreign policy, trade policy, development and humanitarian aid, and even the international aspects of almost every domestic policy area. The resulting challenge for coordinated national policy-making, whether under prime ministerial or foreign ministry leadership, lies in achieving effective policy outputs despite the policy-making diversity. At EU level not only are coordination issues between different departments and institutions crucial, but the extent of necessary coordination with member states’ policy preferences is a key challenge.

The implications of all these issues for the ‘Westphalian’ diplomatic order are far-reaching. The contributions to this book question whether the institutions and practices of the emerging EU diplomatic system conform to established standards of the state-centric diplomatic order; or whether practice is paving the way for innovative, even revolutionary, forms of diplomatic organisation. The emerging diplomatic order consists of structurally diverse actors – including states and non-state entities and encompassing the EU and non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross or regional organisations such the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, none of which share the EU’s pretensions to supranationality and a federalised legal order. The issue is whether there is gradual adaptation by the EU to the Westphalian order or rather a profound reconfiguration of European diplomacy resulting both from the transformation of diplomacy as an institution worldwide and from the European integration process itself (Bátora, 2005).

The book focuses specifically on the evolving role of the ‘European External Action Service’ (EEAS, or Service) created by the Lisbon Treaty. It does this within the context of the ongoing dynamics of change in the organisation and conduct of diplomacy worldwide, but particularly in Europe. Exploring the issues from various perspectives and in separate empirical contexts, the book seeks to provide answers to underlying questions about the nature of changes in diplomacy in the 21st century, and specifically in the post-Lisbon European context. The book thus serves as a probe into the current state of affairs in the development of the EU’s diplomatic apparatus, while aspiring to comment meaningfully on more general diplomatic perspectives. This involves several levels of analysis: conceptual shifts in the organisation of diplomacy worldwide and in the EU, the implications for the EU of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the implications for international law of the creation of a European diplomatic service, the adaptive processes of the new EEAS institutional framework, the evolution of professional standards and structural developments, whether integrative or regressive. A focus on emerging patterns of EU diplomatic representation in third states and international organisations, for example, provides an empirical basis for
analysing whether we are witnessing a fundamental challenge to member states’ national arrangements for representation abroad – and the alternative options open to national decision-makers. There are many potential costs and benefits of retaining national diplomatic structures. Merging diplomatic instruments, substituting national approaches with a European institutional focus and creating a new EU-level diplomatic service are issues that expand the creative potential of a purely national approach. Whether institutions and diplomats can be melded into something different and innovative, if not revolutionary, is a key theme of several chapters. Importantly, however, the chapters need to be contextualised in terms of how the EEAS ‘fits in’ with conventional diplomatic affairs. Equally, they need to be seen against a working hypothesis of the EU’s contribution in the vanguard of a new form of diplomacy.

The EEAS and the diplomatic order: fitting in while innovating

The adaptation of national foreign affairs machineries in EU member states has been gradual, but nonetheless remarkable. Driven in part by global rather than merely EU-specific changes, national foreign ministries in Europe have authorised the creation of a European system for coordinating the workings of national diplomacies. They have created EU diplomatic institutions and procedures parallel to national arrangements, a seemingly appropriate, indeed necessary, step given the changing nature of international relations. Hocking and Spence (2002) in their review of national institutional and administrative adaptations to modern diplomacy described how new coordination procedures had evolved for the conduct of foreign affairs by EU member-state governments as a result of the constitutional changes explicit in successive EU treaties. These resulted from broad trends of reform in all foreign ministries, yet specifically the incentives for reform arising from the context of the European Union. These trends fostered the emergence of formally agreed procedures and norms for EU foreign affairs coordination, while begging questions about the resulting implications of the changing European policy-making arrangements; crucially whether they amount to policy-making that is recognisably more than the sum of the EU’s component parts, and whether they represent an innovative regional foreign-policy mechanism, conceivably destined to serve as a model for other regional organisations.

In historical perspective, even before the Lisbon Treaty arrangements in the field of external affairs and foreign policy, both the European Commission and the Council of the EU had undergone important changes in responsibilities, agenda and staff (Spence, 2010, 2012, 2015). These developments were forerunners of the EEAS, itself designed to decrease perceived pre-Lisbon administrative complexity, political muddle and bureaucratic rivalry. The EEAS was
formally intended to enhance coordination between the EU institutions and the member states, yet for many the unspoken aim was to provide a key step in the creation of what might in time become a ‘European diplomatic system’ – a collection of European institutions and organisations involved in the mediation of relations between the EU and its member states on the one hand and between the EU, third states and other international actors on the other. Significantly, however, the borderline between national responsibilities and ‘EU competence’ has remained essentially contested. Some argue, as does Spence in Chapter 2 in this book, that competing mindsets within the EEAS and member-state foreign ministries are contributing to the maintenance of pre-Lisbon turf battles. Problems clearly do remain; and the notion that the EU is still on a path to ‘ever closer union’, with foreign policy and diplomacy perhaps the last bastions of exclusive nation state power, still remains contested.

In practical terms EU member states rightfully question how well the EEAS has performed in the tasks it was set; and they question whether the EEAS is overstepping limits to the transfer of responsibility to the European level. The analysis in this book focuses on many such relevant questions. Importantly, however, the book’s underlying assumption of an unspoken future, a potential ‘emerging European diplomatic system’, takes the reader beyond a simple examination of costs and benefits of the EEAS. The book seeks out the real potential for a coordinated European approach to global affairs, for learning and innovation in diplomatic representation, for efforts to enhance diplomatic training and for the formation of specifically European diplomatic capacity.

The EEAS and its adaptation to the Westphalian diplomatic order

Following its establishment in 2010, the EEAS entered the deeply entrenched institutional order of modern diplomacy. There were well-established notions of what constituted legitimate diplomatic actions and actors, and relatively stable expectations related to the norms and procedures of diplomacy. If the EEAS was to become a legitimate member of the global organisational field of diplomacy, it was expected to adopt structures and standards on a par with the other members of the field (i.e., other foreign ministries and foreign services). Yet the EEAS represents the EU – an entity that is neither a sovereign state nor any other kind of sovereign actor. Not only this: the EU conducts atypical external policies, such as enlargement and policies on other states’ governance. Including for semi-sovereign entities in its neighbourhood, such as Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for crisis-torn countries such as Ukraine, Syria or Libya. It is thus not immediately clear that for the EEAS to represent, promote and conduct such non-standard external policies this would represent unambiguous policy action commensurate with classical and well-established standards, structures and processes on a par with traditional foreign ministries. This is particularly necessary as the EU
is increasingly an important interlocutor in negotiations with major global partners such as the US or Canada as well as resurgent geopolitical players such as Russia, Iran or China. Here, classical rules and norms of professional diplomacy are the name of the game. Hence, the EEAS finds itself caught between a pressure to standardise; to fit in with the structures and practices of the diplomatic field and simultaneously maintain the practices of the EU’s external engagement and external governance, most notably in the EU’s neighbourhood. And these practices go beyond what states usually do in diplomacy. Caught between the twofold pressure of adopting classical standards of diplomacy and developing new standards emanating from new kinds of functional needs, the EEAS – as any newly established organisation entering an institutionalised field – is unlikely immediately to satisfy both sets of expectations.

The pattern of EEAS development is hence one of copying established standards and practices of the diplomatic field while, at the same time, promoting transformative structures and diplomatic practice. Yet, the entry of the EEAS into the diplomatic field and its copying of established standards does not imply simply fitting into a static context. The organisational field of diplomacy comprised of foreign ministries and foreign services is highly dynamic, regularly adapting to various forms of change in the global environment. Indeed, the last two decades have seen shifts in what some term a global information-intensive environment (Melissen, 1999; Hocking, 1999; Kerr and Wiseman, 2012). When we argue that the EEAS is copying the standards of the diplomatic field, this includes various forms of adaptation to the current environmental dynamics of the field of diplomacy.

Hocking et al. (2012) argue, change dynamics in diplomacy can be recorded in at least four dimensions. First, the contexts and locations of diplomacy are shifting. While previously diplomacy was mostly confined to governmental chancelleries, ministries of foreign affairs, and embassies, the locations of what may be considered diplomatic negotiations are now highly varied. In addition to the traditional channels of bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental diplomacy, the locations include business fairs and headquarters of private enterprises; credit rating agencies, media outlets and various kinds of Internet-based channels and sites. A number of countries have been opening diplomatic missions to important economic regions such as Silicon Valley, California, or Guangzhou, China.

Second, the rules and norms of diplomacy are subject to change. With new agendas and actors, state-centric diplomatic rules and norms have only limited value. New kinds of norm sets and practices are emerging. An example was the so-called Ottawa Process leading to the adoption of the International Convention to Ban Landmines in the mid-1990s. Diplomatic representatives
of governments worked closely with (and some against) networks of advocacy organisations with varying working styles and norms. This created the need for new norms and rules regarding openness, styles and directions of communication, media statements, and so forth (Price, 1998; Hynek, 2012). The process was repeated in the path to the Cluster Munitions Convention, finally entering into force in August 2010.

Third, communication patterns in diplomacy have been changing. Diplomatic establishments have had to engage in a broader array of interaction than traditionally, with a proliferating set of new information and communication technologies. While some institutionalised norms and practices of diplomacy such as secrecy are deeply entrenched and difficult to change (Bátora, 2008), environmental dynamics force foreign ministries to adapt to the pervasive commonality of various information technologies in societies around the globe. Overall, this goes hand in hand with the increasing importance of public diplomacy in promoting countries as well as governmental initiatives (Melissen, 2005; Cross and Melissen, 2013; Cross, Chapter 18 in this volume). It includes the growing impact of ‘social networks’ enabling new patterns of public protest and other forms of political activism in countries worldwide. ‘Wikileaks’ even challenged the traditional secrecy agenda of diplomacy and state security, for example.

Fourth, Hocking et al. (2012) argue that actors and roles in diplomacy are changing. There is a proliferation of non-governmental players involved in diplomatic interaction, including NGOs, private enterprises, representatives of ethnic groups, regions, and so on. The changes involve increasing participation of actors from line ministries and governmental agencies as well as international bureaucracies within the UN system and in other international organisations. The proliferation of diplomatic actorness means the traditional roles of formal diplomats are changing profoundly to encompass a broader set of skills and practices, so as to engage with a plethora of partners and topics.

Added to these four conceptual shifts there has emerged a series of practical and administrative catalysts and constraints on national diplomacy. As the world apparently ‘grows smaller’ and diplomats learn to cope with the new parameters, finance ministries take advantage of the new thinking, urging managers to analyse whether embassies are still necessary, whether premises might be shared with other diplomatic actors and, finally, whether the strength of regional groupings such as the EU might be a locus for a shift in certain practical responsibilities hitherto the task of diplomats. Why 28 reports from posts when one report for the EU-28 would suffice? Why not consider the added value of sharing space and resources, thus gaining wider spread through the presence of the EEAS? Especially for smaller member states, the potential for such joint solutions provided by the EEAS are seen as a useful enhancement of limited national capacities. Slovakia with only three missions in sub-Saharan Africa is a case in point. A review of the
costs and benefits of co-location in purely administrative and managerial terms was, for many observers, deemed to be a likely, and desirable, spin-off from the creation of the EEAS. After all, co-location had long been a theme addressed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) working group on administrative issues (COADMIN), not least in the long yet hardly fruitful negotiations over shared premises in Nigeria’s new capital city, Abuja. Yet, as elsewhere, there has perhaps been more vigour than rigour in intra-EU discussion on the theme. Co-location has remained a national option rather than an EU efficiency theme. Indeed, it is notable that the UK government has involved the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) in many such arrangements, as testimony from a spokesman before the House of Lords exemplifies:

We are now co-located with the Germans in Antananarivo in Madagascar as part of moving the British back into resident representation there, and also in Quito, Pyongyang and Reykjavik. I have visited the building the British and Germans have in Reykjavik on several occasions over the past 10 years. We are co-located with the French in Chisinau and Valetta, with the Dutch and the Danes in Baghdad and Beirut, with the European Union, the Germans and the Dutch for some years now in Dar-es-Salaam and with the EU, the French and the Germans in Bishkek and in Astana, a new national capital, jointly with the EU, the French, the Germans, the Italians, the Dutch and the Austrians. (Wallace, 2013)

In fact, in the case of the UK, an identifiable process of decline of ambassadorial presence seems to have been reversed under the previous foreign minister, William Hague (Hague, 2011). Yet, that no authoritative locus of EU power has decided to take this particular bull by the horns tells a cautious tale, illustrative of the likely pitfalls in terms of competence and national interest definition that such discussions might engender. At the same time, it nonetheless demonstrates how the EU’s diplomatic system provides a potentially useful pool of partners for flexible modes of sharing diplomatic resources – with the simple aim of reducing costs.

Entering such a highly dynamic field of diplomacy has obliged the EEAS to review how other diplomatic actors have adapted to the new conditions in all these dimensions. It is establishing skills, capabilities and functions on a par with established foreign services. There is a focus on classical generalist skills used in bilateral diplomacy such as representation, political reporting, drafting skills, language skills, and so forth. But, in addition there is a focus on the development of specialist competences among EEAS staff relating to the functional or geographic expertise of personnel. Encompassing generalist and specialist competences is typical of traditional foreign ministries, despite ongoing debates about the weighting and relevance of different types of diplomatic skills as a function of the rapidly changing requirements.
of diplomatic work (Hocking, 1999; Melissen, 1999). There is thus a focus on at least three other kinds of diplomatic competence. First, public diplomacy skills may be among the most crucial for EEAS personnel in the field, and wielding soft power is among the key instruments of the EU’s foreign policy. Second, since much of the EU’s diplomatic work is characterised by what Lloveras (2011, p. 9) calls a ‘heavy management component’, project management is also among the top priorities of EEAS training. Third, specific skills concern familiarity with the basic institutional set-up of the EU and at least a basic level of knowledge of the key building blocks of the *acquis communautaire*. While it may seem that these three kinds of skill may be ‘innovative’, when compared with foreign services of major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany or France, or even medium powers such as Canada, one finds that the ‘new’ skills and competences are just as crucial and central in those organisations (Hocking, 1999; Copeland, 2009).

In many ways, as any other newly established organisation, the EEAS has been seeking legitimacy by copying the organisational structures, norms, rules and practices – old and new – of the dominant organisations constituting the diplomatic field (i.e., other foreign ministries). This includes not only established structures and practices but also reform programmes and change management techniques in response to challenges emanating from the environment. Despite high levels of dynamism, this kind of isomorphic adaptation process of the EEAS does not challenge the idea of what diplomatic services are and what they do (i.e., the diplomatic logic of appropriateness). At the same time, though, the EEAS also challenges established structures and practices in the diplomatic field by establishing its own structures and performing activities and practices, which diplomatic services do not usually perform. It thereby challenges established notions of diplomatic appropriateness.

The EEAS and its post-Westphalian structures and practices

The political and scholarly debates on the constitution for the EU in the late 1990s and early 2000s produced the expectation that the EU would establish diplomatic structures and practices on a par with states. The EU was expected to acquire a ‘foreign minister’, a ‘foreign ministry’, a ‘diplomatic academy’, ‘ambassadors’ and ‘embassies’ (Rayner, 2005; Monar, 2000; Duke, 2002). Yet the reality of the compromises struck to allow the Lisbon Treaty to be adopted by the member states was such that none of these expectations was fully met. The EEAS is *not* a foreign ministry. If it were simply that, we would have less trouble defining what it is, how it is to work and with whom. Given its set-up, it is instead better conceived of as an *interstitial organisation*; that is, an organisation tapping into resources, structures and practices common in multiple institutionalised fields, most notably diplomacy, defence and development (Bátora, 2013). In its aims and organisational purpose it
combines the roles and functions usually performed by foreign ministries, defence ministries and development agencies. In the foreword to the 2013 EEAS Review, Catherine Ashton alludes to this arguing that

Europe’s role in the world is one of the major challenges of the 21st century. The EEAS is but one component of Europe’s response to this global challenge. We seek to co-operate with, but not replace, the important work done by Member States. The EEAS seeks to add value by being more than a foreign ministry – combining elements of a development and of a defence ministry. The EEAS can be a catalyst to bring together the foreign policies of Member States and strengthen the position of the EU in the world. (Ashton 2013, p. 2, italics added)

A similar point is made by Federica Mogherini in the foreword to this volume. She argues that by combining resources from diplomacy, defence and development, the EEAS may be able to apply comprehensive solutions ranging from development through exhaustive diplomacy to crisis intervention. While many governments have been seeking innovative solutions to allow for more efficient management of foreign policy delivery as part of a ‘comprehensive approach’, the EEAS may be the first foreign-policy agency actually to incorporate all the organisational elements under one roof (Bátora, 2013; see also Chapters 3 and 17 in this volume). Somewhat paradoxically, this has to do more with limits to the EU’s status as a non-state entity, which do not allow it to develop a fully-fledged state-like executive and prompt it to introduce organisational compromise solutions. In this way, the EU’s often-lamented ambiguous status and structural shortcomings might actually be setting conditions for the generation of institutional innovation more widely relevant to the organisation of diplomacy itself.

When it comes to practice, the EU’s external relations have long been departing from some of the core principles of Westphalian diplomacy defined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, namely the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of a host state (Article 41.1 of the Convention). Intervention in the domestic affairs of third countries has been the rule of the game for the EU and its institutional predecessors ever since it developed embryonic forms of diplomatic actorness in the 1960s (Dimier and McGeever, 2006; Spence, 2006, 2008, 2015; Dimier, 2014). Today, the EEAS and the EU delegations around the world represent the EU and its wide portfolio of external policies, all of which have more or less profound impacts on the internal affairs of the host states in which they operate. Of particular importance here are relations with societies in which the EU supports deep transformations informed by human security principles (Kaldor et al., 2007; Kaldor, 2012). Building on structural diplomacy approaches (cf. Keukeleire, 2003), the EU and its EEAS are involved in various forms of external governance and incite various forms of domestic

Intervention in domestic affairs as a principle of the EU’s external engagement is perhaps most profoundly visible in the processes of EU enlargement. Here, the EEAS and EU delegations do what national embassies normally do not do, namely monitor and guide governance reforms in host countries, as they pass through a gradual metamorphosis from ‘foreign’ states to EU member states (Bickerton, 2012). The EEAS clearly operates here on ontologically different principles from those of national diplomatic services, the key shift being the move away from ‘foreign affairs’ as a specific domain of diplomatic expertise, activity ontologically defined by the principle of territorial sovereignty where ‘the outside’ or ‘the foreign’ is territorially redefined. ‘External affairs’ and ‘enlargement’ are areas of diplomatic expertise and activity where there is no clear line of differentiation between ‘the outside’ and ‘the inside’. This ontological shift is a key characteristic of the EU’s nature as a post-Westphalian entity in world affairs (Bátora and Hynek, 2014).

The post-Westphalian nature of the EU is also visible in structural solutions and practices related to the EU’s presence in international organisations. Compared to states, the EU’s participation in international organisations has been characterised by far higher degrees of ambiguity (Huigens and Niemann, 2009). The EU is recognised as an actor by some international organisations (e.g., WTO, FAO), but not by others (e.g., International Monetary Fund) (Jørgensen, 2009; Gehring et al., 2013). It took high levels of inventiveness and entrepreneurship to promote the EU’s formal role in international organisations, notably the UN, as Spence, Lundin and Laatikainen emphasise in their respective chapters on the EU delegations in Geneva, Vienna and New York in this volume (see Part III). Here, much depends on the willingness of participating states to allow the EU to play a greater role as well as on the ability of the EU’s diplomatic representatives to carve out a role for the EU in practice.

Finally, the EU’s diplomatic actorness and the scope of what the EEAS can do has been developing in the context of high degrees of ambiguity of legal rules. The chapters by Wouters and Duquet and by De Baere and Wessel in this volume (see Part II) demonstrate how this has come to pass. The EEAS has in fact been obliged to stretch the legal rules and adapt them to actual practice in three different contexts: its formal diplomatic conduct in international organisations, its presence in third countries and its daily routines – such as its use of ‘laisser-passer’ diplomatic documents instead of diplomatic passports for its own personnel, which the EU cannot issue, or routines related to accreditation of new diplomats arriving in Brussels, who have to meet the President of the Commission as well as the President of the Council, notwithstanding a separate relationship with the protocol division of the Belgian foreign ministry.4
All these factors contribute to the post-Westphalian nature of the EU as a diplomatic actor. The EEAS as the organisational carrier of this post-Westphalian set of diplomatic structures, norms and practices thereby also functions as a carrier and catalyst of innovation. The EEAS operates in the institutionalised field of diplomacy but is not of this field, and this makes it an actor potentially generating transformational dynamics, leading to reconfiguration and change of the field itself (Bátora, 2013).

Chapter outline

The book analyses the systemic challenges that the EEAS represents in relation to diplomacy as an institutionalised order. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 1 by Rebecca Adler-Nissen reviews scholarly articles analysing the EEAS over the last decade. It identifies the theoretical frameworks involved and maps out the academic field, showing that the study of the EEAS points to innovation in international relations and political science by underpinning analyses by social scientific approaches not usually applied within these fields. Various theoretical frameworks inform the contributions to this book, but the common underlying focus is based on organisational, institutional and legal challenges arising from the hybrid or ‘interstitial’ nature of the EEAS. All contributions seek to tease out various aspects of a deeper dynamic underlying systemic change towards the post-Westphalian patterns in diplomacy discussed above. They explore the extent to which the EEAS is a catalyst of such change. The book is organised into six parts.

The first part focuses on the emergence of the EEAS, its nature as an organisation and its embedding in the EU’s institutional setting post-Lisbon. In Chapter 2, David Spence reviews the emergence and organisational ‘DNA’ of EEAS by revisiting key turf battles present on its establishment. He anchors his analysis in the theoretical approaches to epistemic communities, showing how different types of epistemic communities are being woven together within the EEAS and the kind of challenges this creates for the functioning of the Service. In Chapter 3, Cesare Onestini discusses the ‘hybrid’ organisational characteristics of the Service and its potential to be effective in promoting EU foreign-policy goals. He details the organisational emergence of the EEAS, covering some of the key decisions and choices made in the design of the EEAS. In Chapter 4, Niklas Helwig discusses the changing role of the High Representative (HR) pre- and post-Lisbon. He analyses the actor-ness of the HR in relation to two classical models: the logic of consequences, first proposed by March and Olsen (1989), and the logic of appropriateness. Chapter 5 by Zuzana Murdoch and Jarle Trondal explores what some of the initial experience with recruitment processes in the EEAS reveals about the development of the EU’s executive order. Based on empirical evidence on how member states and the EEAS organise recruitment into the Service, the authors develop arguments about the extent of autonomy of the EEAS and,
more broadly, about its role within the EU’s emergent executive order. In Chapter 6, Isabelle Tannous analyses the potential for discord and turf battles in a review of the challenges facing the EEAS, given differing responsibilities and methods in the management of development aid – a key feature of a post-Westphalian structure, melding foreign-policy norms together with the project management approach of development and international cooperation. Chapter 7 by Kolja Raube explores how the hybrid character of the EEAS and its as-yet-unsettled role play out in terms of democratic accountability and control of EU foreign policy-making. He discusses three models of how the EEAS might be held democratically accountable.

The second part focuses on legal issues. The emergence and operation of the EEAS raises serious legal challenges to established diplomatic practice. Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet focus in Chapter 8 on how the EEAS has been accommodated within rules and norms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. They show how these norms are being twisted and stretched and how states and other actors develop innovative practices for work with the EEAS in a situation where the EU remains a legally ambiguous actor in the diplomatic world. This is followed by the analysis in Chapter 9 by Geert De Baere and Ramses A. Wessel of constitutional and legal implications of the construction of the EEAS and its anchorage in the EU’s system of institutions. They identify a number of areas in which there is a mismatch between the tasks and functions the EEAS is expected to perform in cooperation with various EU institutions and member states, and the imperfect legal regulations that leave all these actors with no adequate legal basis for such cooperation.

The next two parts of the book provide empirical case studies of the work of EU delegations. Part III focuses on their role in international organisations. Chapter 10 by Katie Verlin Laatikainen addresses the EU Delegation to the UN in New York. Her account of the challenges faced by the EU Delegation in its struggle for recognition of its status in the UN illustrates some of the key legal challenges discussed in Part II of the book. In Chapter 11, David Spence follows this with an analysis of the transition processes at the EU Delegation to the UN in Geneva, demonstrating that while some of the legal challenges may be similar to other EU delegations, results may differ from delegation to delegation, concluding that the efficiency of the EEAS in dealing with the challenges is highly dependent on local organisational micro-dynamics. In Chapter 12, Lars-Erik Lundin provides an analysis of the post-Lisbon transition processes in the EU Delegation to the international organisations in Vienna, the seat of many key international organisations. His case study probes the EU’s organisational capacities for involvement in ‘effective multilateralism’.

Part IV turns to emerging patterns of cooperation between EU delegations and member states within the EU and in third countries. Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik explore in Chapter 13 patterns of cooperation and
coordination between the EEAS and the foreign ministries of the member states. They identify three possible forms of change in these relations: top-down harmonisation; bottom-up promotion of national priorities with the use of EU-level capacities; and mutual socialisation into a joint ‘European diplomatic culture’. Chapter 14 by Heidi Maurer analyses the developing nature of the EU Delegation to Washington, the United States representing perhaps the EU’s most important interlocutor. Frauke Austermann provides in Chapter 15 an analysis of the post-Lisbon change dynamics in the EU Delegation in Beijing, showing that while member states’ diplomatic missions continue to be actively present at various levels, the EU Delegation is increasingly a key point of interaction as it channels diplomatic processes in the EU’s relations with various interlocutors in China. Chapter 16 by Bruno Hanses and David Spence, in turn, explores the changing role of the EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With its prime focus on ‘structural diplomacy’ (cf. Keukeleire et al., 2009) and development aid, the EU Delegation in Kinshasa demonstrates variation in the nature of the EU’s presence on the ground in third countries and the differing nature of the resulting challenges. It also provides a focus for analysis of the changes in operational methods between the former Commission delegations abroad and new forms of practice undertaken by the new EU delegations.

Part V turns to organisational and institutional issues related to the nature of the EEAS as a provider of comprehensive diplomatic solutions. In Chapter 17, Alison Weston and Frédéric Mérand focus on crisis management structures within the EEAS. Using concepts from organisational sociology, they discuss the innovative potential and challenges of integrating crisis management structures into a diplomatic service. Chapter 18 by Mai’a K. Davis Cross addresses the potential of the EEAS to become a vehicle for the EU’s public diplomacy around the world, developing the concept of image ‘resilience’ and exploring the extent to which the EEAS might contribute to the crafting of a resilient image for the EU, most notably in response to crises in the Eurozone and in the EU’s neighbourhood. In Chapter 19, Ana Mar Fernández Pasarín reviews the potential for consular functions to be performed by the EEAS, a task hardly envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty as a role to be performed by the EEAS. Organisational capacities and legal regulations still need to be developed, but as the chapter shows, important change dynamics are occurring in third countries, among the EU delegations and national embassies of member states.

In Part VI, the book turns to human resources and diplomatic training in the EEAS as a means of weaving together the various mindsets of officials and supporting the role of the Service as a provider of a comprehensive diplomatic approach. Chapter 20 by Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska analyses attitudes of EEAS officials in the founding years of the EEAS and assesses the potential for the emergence of an esprit de corps within the Service. Building on empirical evidence gathered in interviews, it investigates
attitudes towards EU foreign policy and the degree to which there is staff identification with the EEAS and the EU itself. The chapter explores the potential for the establishment of a joint organisational identity for officials in the Service. In Chapter 21, Tereza Novotná reviews gender issues in the EEAS. Gender issues are an area of relevance for all diplomatic services in the European Union, but Novotná poses the key question of whether the EEAS, a potentially new form of post-Westphalian diplomacy, really does offer something new and post-Westphalian in terms of its staffing practices. Finally, Simon Duke, in Chapter 22, provides a specific angle on socialisation by assessing training processes in the EEAS. He revisits the training available in the pre-Lisbon period and the strategic debates in this area, and he reviews training currently available in the EEAS, discussing steps to be taken towards effective socialisation in support of the EU’s new diplomatic service.

Notes

1. Jozef Bátora’s work on this chapter and on the volume was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, grant no. APVV-0484–10.
2. For a theoretical conceptualisation of such isomorphic processes, see DiMaggio and Powell (1991).
3. For the concept of logic of appropriateness see March and Olsen (1989).

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