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Part I
Introduction
In recent years, International Relations (IR) has seen the introduction of more focused research on the concept of friendship in international politics. Indeed, although the term ‘friendship’ has never been absent from IR, its application has been somewhat loose and without a clear definition or systematic analysis. It has often been used to describe non-confrontational or harmonious interstate relations in empirical studies, but studies have fallen short of giving the concept of friendship thorough analytical consideration.¹

This book advocates a more rigorous appraisal and inclusion of the concept of international friendship. In particular, we argue that international friendship is a special relationship within an already highly stable and integrated area that cannot be captured adequately by related IR concepts. This book does not align the concept of friendship with any particular strand of IR theory. Instead, it proposes a conceptual approach for analysing friendship in international politics. In doing so, the book pursues two main objectives.

First, to demonstrate that friendship can be an agent of change in international politics. Not only does international friendship exist, but the process of building and maintaining friendship actually transforms small pockets of the international system by revealing alternative forms of order as well as alternative patterns of interaction among particular actors, which also affect their immediate environment. In this sense, the book deals with international friendship as a political reality and not as a utopian ideal, and thus exposes its transformative nature.

The second objective of this book is to present a diversity of perspectives on international friendship, thus emphasising different ways of locating friendship theoretically and empirically in international politics. International friendship has been a global phenomenon, but
its meaning varies according to historical periods, cultural and social contexts, and regional spaces. Where we see it depends largely on how it is conceptualised. In this sense, international friendship is to be understood as a concept with multiple meanings – a diversity this volume seeks to reflect and nourish.

While change and diversity provide the main threads of the book, the purpose of this chapter is to sharpen the ‘fuzzy’ concept of international friendship. It does so by proposing a conceptual and analytical framework, which accommodates the various conceptions of friendship discussed in this book. Since there are many ways to study friendship in IR, this chapter deliberately presents ‘a framework’, rather than ‘the framework’, to categorise and distinguish friendship from other concepts in IR.

The aim of the present chapter is thus to delineate the content of international friendship as a distinct category of interstate relations. In order to do so, the first section begins by locating the concept of friendship in IR. The second section offers a non-philosophical defence of the use and application of the term ‘friendship’ in IR, and the third section moves onto situating international friendship vis-à-vis other IR concepts that appear to be close relatives – the Kantian culture of anarchy, zones of stable peace, and security communities. The fourth section elaborates on the differences between these ‘close relatives’ and international friendship. This is a central issue because it addresses directly the question of what the added value is of talking about friendship in IR as different from what other concepts already offer. To this end, we distinguish between two types of international friendship – strategic and normative – and propose indicators to locate and analyse international friendship. Finally, in the concluding section we summarise the main aspects of international friendship and provide an outline of the structure of this volume.

**Mapping friendship in international relations**

Friendship has arguably figured as an integral part of IR research as many scholars have made either implicit or explicit use of the concept. In his classic essay, Wolfers (1962) conceptualises relations among states along an amity/enmity continuum. While some states prefer ‘to go it alone’, he identifies a number of friendly relationships where active cooperation and integration have convinced states of ‘going it with others’. Specifically, he distinguishes between friendship that is ‘inward-directed’ and results from a desire to improve relations with
others, on the one hand, and friendship that is ‘outward-directed’ and is based on mutual assistance against an external threat, on the other hand. Wolfers’ conceptualisation serves as a reference point for the distinction between strategic and normative friendship developed later in this chapter.

In contemporary IR theory, Constructivism (at least in its conventional shape) has provided perhaps the most sophisticated effort to integrate friendship in the discipline. Wendt’s (1999) inclusion of friendship as a type of anarchical order in international politics may feature most prominently here. Apart from Constructivism, notions of friendship can be also claimed to represent a central element of Democratic Peace theory (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993). The perception of reciprocal states as ‘likeminded democracies’ can arguably be linked to the concept of friendship among (liberal) states as opposed to enmity vis-à-vis non-democracies.2 The concept of a security community, defined as a group of people and states that have developed a collective identity and mutual trust, can be understood in this way as well (Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998a). Moreover, Boulding (1978, p. 374) explicitly connects ‘stable friendliness’ to the concept of ‘stable peace’. More recently, practice theorists have ascribed the stability of patterns of cooperation and conflict in world politics to ‘straightforward habitual routines of enmity and amity’ based on non-reflective trust and ‘categorizations, or the “typing” of states as friends and enemies’ (Hopf, 2010, pp. 540, 550; Michel, 2012). Even Realists, who tend to be deeply sceptical about the possibility of friendship in international politics, make frequent use of the term for describing an alliance or a system of collective defence (Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013). Morgenthau’s realism, for example, is explicitly based on the Schmittian conception of enemy/friendship relationships as the foundational structure of international politics (Grieco, 1988; Williams, 2004).

If friendship is already such an integral part of IR, then what contribution can this volume make? Despite the several references to friendship in the IR literature, these threads have remained largely disconnected and have generally lacked systematic conceptualisation. As a result, inter-theoretical discourse or scholarly discussion about the concept have mostly been absent, even more so a systematic integration of the study of friendship in IR. This volume provides an intellectual and interdisciplinary platform for friendship scholars to exchange and develop original ideas and break new paths for the study of international politics. More importantly, it hopes to serve as a reference guide by showing the various ways in which friendship exists in and
impacts on international politics. The remainder of this section briefly reviews the contemporary state of the art on friendship in IR.

The renewed interest in international friendship ‘as a site and tool for analysis both within the state […] and between states’ (Devere and Smith, 2010, p. 347) has produced increasing scholarship. With regard to friendship between states, research has mostly developed along three lines of enquiry. First, it has been advanced to demonstrate the existence of an epistemological and ontological space for friendship in international politics as well as IR theory (Wendt, 1999; Berenskoetter, 2007; Lu, 2009; Digeser, 2009a; Digeser, 2009b; Schwarzenbach, 2011; Smith, 2011; Koschut, 2012). Among other goals, this work has sought to conceptualise ‘friendship as a meaningful relation among states by providing a rationale for why it exists, what its characteristics are, and how it structures international politics’ (Berenskoetter, 2007, p. 648).

A second line of enquiry has concentrated on the use of the term ‘friendship’ in international treaties and the political discourse of international friendship across various historical periods and regions (Roshchin, 2006, 2011; Devere et al., 2011). Mostly through documentary and archival work, scholars have engaged in discourse analysis to identify the rhetorical role of friendship in international politics throughout history. Notably, they have found that the term ‘friendship’ has been present in military pacts and peace treaties, as well as in agreements on trade and colonisation, yet it is argued that its use has been largely instrumental (Devere and Smith, 2010).

The third area of research is centred upon friendship as a category of analysis of international politics. This work seeks to contribute to theory-building through empirical case-study research. Here, the focus has been on interpersonal bonds between political leaders as well as the institutionalisation of cooperation and trust-building at both the intergovernmental and civil-society levels. These types of friendship practices have been ‘presented as exemplar of emerging values of solidarity’ (Oelsner and Vion, 2011b, p. 5), and linked to notions of deep-rooted peace (Oelsner, 2007; Vion, 2007; Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010; Constantin, 2011; Patsias and Deschênes, 2011; Koschut, 2012). This introductory chapter will focus on the third strand, albeit without the in-depth case study element of previous works.

Defending friendship between states

While in the IR literature the term ‘friendship’ has been widely used – albeit with different degrees of conceptual thoroughness – to refer to friendly or peaceful relations at the international level in general and
relations between states in particular, many scholars have preferred to avoid mentioning friendship and instead employ alternative notions. Simon Keller’s (2009) article is the only one we are aware of to make an explicit statement against the use of the term ‘friendship’ to refer to relations between states. The arguments put forward by Keller deserve attention; nonetheless; his open attack on international friendship calls for an open defence of international friendship.

Keller (2009, p. 59) bases his arguments on the assertion that ‘an analogy between interactions between persons and interactions between countries […] is ontologically and ethically dubious. Persons and countries are very different entities, meriting very different kinds of treatment’. Keller (2009, pp. 61–62) finds particularly concerning the fact that (o)ur talk of friendship between countries makes for one of the cases in which we take language that is straightforwardly applicable to persons and their relationships and import it into discussions of countries and their relationships. We should hence ask two questions about the idea that countries should sometimes be friends. First, is it conceptually legitimate? (Are countries really capable of friendship?) Second, is it morally respectable? (Do we fetishise countries when we regard them as entities that should sometimes participate in friendship?)

The dangers of over-analogy and moral fetishism highlighted by Keller are not unreasonable, but they are not unavoidable either. To some extent, when the term ‘friendship’ is used in IR, it is used metaphorically because it resembles interpersonal friendship, not because it can be straightforwardly applied to states. It would indeed be difficult to justify the application of ‘friendship’ to the examples that Keller (2009, pp. 65–68) offers in his article, given that he does not use the term as an analogy but instead attempts to transfer directly the same understanding of interpersonal friendship to interstate relations.

However, even if the term used is itself the same, it would not be the first case where meaning varies from everyday language to academic language, or even from one academic discipline to another. As with most other fields of study, IR frequently employs concepts and categories that in other contexts – be these other spheres of daily life or other academic disciplines – mean something completely or slightly different. In a sense, Keller (2009, p. 71) himself recognises that identical concepts can have distinct contents: ‘when we speak of the virtues of peoples and the virtues of persons we speak about two different phenomena, even if we
use the same words’. Therefore, it does not seem too great a risk to agree with Alexander Wendt (1999, p. 298) when he claims that

while it is important to take the problems of anthropomorphism seriously, if scholars are willing to treat states as enemies then it makes no sense to apply a different standard to ‘friend’. For all these reasons, it seems time to begin thinking systematically about the nature and consequences of friendship in international politics.

As long as researchers and scholars remain aware that international and interpersonal friendship belong to the same family of concepts, thus facilitating the analogy but with no actual claim regarding their nature being identical, then it will still be possible to resort to the term ‘international friendship’ as an additional, meaningful category of analysis in international relations. And indeed, as Graham M. Smith (2011, p. 20) points out, ‘the category is useful insofar as it highlights and allows examination of what would otherwise be hidden’. What may turn out to be more problematic, instead, due to the closer links between IR and diplomacy, is the different meaning that more theoretically and analytically inclined writers have ascribed to international friendship vis-à-vis the more instrumental utilisation it has seen in international treaties and pacts (see Chapter 10).

Having established that it is indeed possible to apply the term friendship to international politics, we now move to the more important question of why it is also necessary to analyse international friendship as a separate type of relationship. This will be done by distinguishing international friendship from what appear to be close relatives – the Kantian culture of anarchy, zones of stable peace, and security communities, and by pointing to the added explanatory value that international friendship provides.

**International friendship’s close relatives**

Growing numbers of scholars have come to recognise that certain regions of the world have moved away from the Hobbesian anarchy and self-help system described (and assumed and expected) by Realists and Neorealists. Processes of desecuritisation (Waever, 1995) and practices of trust-building (Kydd, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Michel, 2012) have allowed for the security dilemma to be significantly reduced and even overcome. As a result, in those regions more benign types of anarchy, such as Wendt’s (1999) Kantian anarchy, dominate relations between states.

According to Wendt, regions sharing a Kantian culture fall within the category of international friendship – for Wendt, states in such regions
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are friends. Yet his characterisation of the logic of Kantian anarchy appears to be too thin and minimalistic when compared with concepts such as Charles Kupchan’s (2010) stable peace and Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s (1998a) security community to merit the label of friendship. Wendt (1999, pp. 298–99) contends that friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid).

In this reading, friendship relates to national security issues only, and need not extend to other issues. Simply put, friendship is an open-ended alliance: ‘Allies engage in the same basic behaviour as friends, but they do not expect their relationship to continue indefinitely’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 299).

Nonetheless, the observation of the Kantian anarchy’s two rules through a Third Degree of internalisation (Wendt, 1999, p. 299) serves as a platform for the development of the more densely defined zones of stable peace and pluralistic security communities. In turn, we argue that it is in the context of regions that can be characterised as zones of stable peace and security communities that international friendship, as a specific form of interstate relationship, can emerge. In other words, zones of stable peace and security communities are conducive sites for friendship relationships rather than its result. Furthermore, they are neither synonymous to friendship nor a sufficient condition for international friendship. In what follows, this section shows the main differences between stable peace and security communities on the one hand, and friendship on the other hand, and claims that international friendship is a dynamic process that develops at multiple levels of government and civil society – as process and practice, international friendship goes beyond what theories of stable peace and security community cover. For example, public opinion in the United States may project negative stereotypes about Arab people but that does not prevent the US government from promoting a friendly relationship with Saudi Arabia. Likewise, US public opinion may harbour little enmity towards Cuba but US Congressional sanctions still remain unchanged. Thus, when one talks about international friendship, one needs to make clear whether one speaks about friendly relations between the policymakers themselves or other groups (Wolfers, 1962, p. 26).
After Kenneth E. Boulding's seminal study Stable Peace (1978), another two volumes dealing specifically with stable peace at the theoretical level have sought to shed further light on its nature – Arie Kacowicz et al.'s Stable Peace among Nations (2000) and Charles Kupchan's How Enemies become Friends: On the Sources of Stable Peace (2010). For Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov (2000), stable peace is defined according to two basic dimensions: first, a cognitive dimension referring to the joint understanding and expectation that interstate disputes are resolved peacefully and that the use or threat of violence between states is unthinkable; and second, a temporal dimension referring to the duration of the peace. Equally, they (Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000, pp. 25–27) identify a number of necessary and favourable conditions for a zone of stable peace to emerge. The necessary conditions for the stabilisation of peace include stable political regimes, mutual satisfaction with the terms of the peace agreement and/or existing status quo, predictability of behaviour and problem-solving mechanisms, open communication channels, and initial (mutual) trust and respect between the leaders. In turn, the favourable conditions are third-party guarantees, and spill-over effects and the provision of non-military public goods. As noted by Kupchan (2010, pp. 21–26), here, the peace stabilisation and mutual expectations of peaceful change come before societal integration, rather than being its result. From Karl Deutsch's et al. (1957) transactional and functionalist perspective, the sequence is different – an approach also shared by Boulding (1978) and Adler and Barnett (1998a). For the latter (Adler and Barnett, 1998a, p. 34), ‘interstate interactions can transform the identities and interests of states and induce dependable expectations of peaceful change’. In turn, Boulding further contributes to our understanding of peace stabilisation by highlighting the importance of reciprocal accommodation in processes of reconciliation and construction of compatible national images.

Absent from Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov's framework, however, is the question of how actors stabilise regional peace – what are the mechanisms or processes that allow domestic perceptions to shift to the point that some of the conditions on their list (such as being satisfied with the status quo, opening channels of communication, etc.) can be met? Elsewhere, Andrea Oelsner (2007) suggests that this question can be addressed by combining the stable peace approach, which focuses on regional relations, with the securitisation/desecuritisation approach – especially with its desecuritisation aspect, which instead focuses on domestic processes of changing perceptions of threat so as to remove issues from the security agenda. Thus, it is claimed that the emergence and maintenance of stable regional peace is connected to domestic
processes of desecuritisation. Stable peace is achieved at the regional level when domestic elites define their own state’s security conditions vis-à-vis the region in terms of *asecurity* (a situation in which neither the security language nor logic apply; see Wæver, 1998), as opposed to *insecurity* or *security*. In this case, states do not perceive security concerns as emanating from their relationships with their neighbours.

But what motivates the desecuritisation process? Who is the first actor/state in a region to initiate a desecuritising move, and why? Oelsner (2007, pp. 268–71) has argued that rationalist approaches – be these based on relative or absolute material gains – bear important explanatory weight in accounting for the beginning of desecuritisation and stabilisation of regional peace. This view is shared by Kupchan (2010, p. 20, see also pp. 35–72), for whom ‘the initial step towards reconciliation … is motivated by strategic necessity and objective national interests’.

Hopeful as the friendship researcher may be, by Kupchan’s (2010) inclusion of the term ‘friends’ in the title of his book, for him relations of international friendship are in fact relations in which stable peace predominates. His is an exploration of the process of stabilisation of peace rather than one of the construction of international friendship. It seeks to identify ‘the conditions that facilitate the emergence and endurance of zones of stable peace’ (Kupchan, 2010, p. 13). Kupchan’s stable peace envisages, nonetheless, a more profound transformation in interstate relations than that outlined by Kacowicz et al. According to Kupchan (2010, p. 19) stable peace is ultimately the product ‘of societal bonds that endow interstate relations with a social character’.

Like Kacowicz (1998), Kupchan identifies pluralistic security communities as one variant of stable peace (see also Holsti, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Oelsner, 2005; Koschut, 2014b). Following the seminal work of Karl Deutsch and his associates on *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957) and the influential contribution by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett on *Security Communities* (1998b), pluralistic security communities have been seen as regions in which the tightest and densest interstate links have emerged short of integration and union. Security communities, having evolved in an environment of stable peace, entail a sense of ‘we-feeling’ and community, as well as higher regional density of institutional links, that make states in these regions as well as their peoples maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998a).10

Security communities rely on a repertoire of practices that simultaneously sustain and are sustained by the community. Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve (2009, pp. 71–72) identify six such practices: self-restraint and abstention from the use of force, which results in dependable
expectations of peaceful change; the practice of routinely undertaking common enterprises, projects, and partnerships, ‘thus turning the community into a day-to-day practice of peace’ (Adler and Greve, 2009, p. 72); a natural sense of practising cooperative security; diplomacy, norms of consultation, and multilateral decision-making as normal community practices, thus institutionalising reassurance rather than deterrence; a disposition towards practices of socialisation or teaching, with the aim of widening the community; and, finally, practices involving military confidence-building measures, close military policy coordination, and non-militarised borders. These practices further contribute to strengthening trust and shared identity within the community.

Mutual trust and collective identity are, in turn, the key elements in Adler and Barnett’s seminal volume on security communities. These are, indeed, the necessary conditions present in the third and final tier of their model (see Adler and Barnett, 1998a, pp. 37–48). These two factors are also crucial in international friendship relations. Because we argue that international friendship evolves more easily in the context of security communities (although it does not have to – it may not evolve at all or it can evolve independently of security communities), all the features of zones of stable peace and pluralistic security communities also characterise relationships of international friendship. So, this being the case, do we need a separate concept?

**International friendship as an analytical category**

In everyday language, the term friendship is typically associated with attachment, bond, tie, camaraderie, comradeship, companionship, fellowship, closeness, affinity, understanding, harmony, and unity. Friends tend to desire what is best for each other and speak the truth in situations where it may be difficult. Friends may even share a feeling of sympathy and empathy, of mutual understanding and compassion. In short, friends trust and care for each other.

Bellah et al. (1996, p. 115), drawing on Aristotle, suggest that there are three types of friendship: friendships of pleasure, utility, and virtue. While the former two are purely based on specific circumstances and self-interest, and will thus immediately dissolve once these circumstances or interests change, the latter type describes genuine and lasting friendship. Aristotle (2000) further spells it out:

> For these people each alike wish good for the other qua good, and they are good in themselves. And it is those who desire the good of
their friends for the friends’ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other for what he is, and not for any incidental quality. Accordingly the friendship of such men lasts so long as they remain good; and goodness is an enduring quality.

By ‘goodness’ is meant a certain type of behaviour that is based on pure and honorable intentions and motives free from greed, violence, or ill-wishing.

To be sure, there are staged forms of friendship in international politics as well as friendship based entirely on mutual interests and utility. For example, when US President George W. Bush referred to Russia as a ‘friend’ during a press conference over Iraq on June 8, 2004, that may have had more to do with the fact that on the same day Russia voted in favour of a US-sponsored United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution endorsing the formation of an interim post-war Iraqi government and less with the development of genuine international friendship. Here, Carl Schmitt’s notion of the friend/enemy distinction as the nature of the political is insightful (Schmitt, 2007). Unlike Aristotle, Schmitt refuses to tie the concept of friendship to ethical considerations or moral categories. For Schmitt, it is perfectly possible to become friends with someone whom one judges to be morally degraded. As Graham M. Smith (2011, p. 18) explains: ‘Schmitt offers no moral framework for friendship at all. Indeed, he is at pains to keep friendship apart from all other systems of evaluation. Schmitt recasts friendship in the Hobbesian mould: friendship, like power, just is’.

Building on Aristotle and Schmitt, it is thus argued here that international friendship can take two forms: strategic and normative. The term ‘strategic’ should not imply that this particular form of friendship is meaningless as opposed to its meaningful normative variant. Both strategic and normative friendship types carry meaning in international politics but refer to different types of meaning. It is helpful to recall Rappaport’s distinction between ‘low-order meanings’ and ‘high-order meanings’ here. Low- or middle-order meanings differentiate and connect social actors with each other based on ‘similarities, analogies, and emotional resonances’. Their prime function is to convey and transport relevant information about the other actors so that a certain congruence of interests may be achieved. High-order meanings, by contrast, run much deeper and transcend the relationship by establishing ‘identity or unity, the radical identification or unification of self with other’ (Rappaport, 1999, p. 71).

- **Strategic international friendship**: Friendship in international politics may be called ‘strategic’ when a set of actors refers to each other
as ‘friends’ in political discourse and treaties without it necessarily resulting in a substantial long-term change of behaviour or mutual perception among these actors. Such a ‘thin’ or strategic type of friendship does not permanently alter an agent’s behaviour since it is purely based on rational self-interest. It is an entirely instrumental, functional, and oftentimes asymmetrical form of friendship. To be sure, strategic friends will certainly rely on each other for mutual support to manage uncertainty, but only under certain structural conditions, such as mutual reassurance through transparency, information flow, and shared interests. In other words, they can be said to rely on each other and yet not trust each other (Michel, 2012, p. 12; see also Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Rathbun, 2011). Since strategic international friendship is based on the congruence of interests (reliance) and not on genuine trust, we expect such forms of friendship to be relatively unstable and temporary in nature, because once conflicts of interest surface and/or interests no longer converge, the structural foundation of such friendships dissolves.

- **Normative international friendship**: ‘Thick’ or normative friendship, by contrast, is most likely to develop among actors who share high levels of ideational and emotional bonds that permit mutual identification and trust (Elias, 1939; Koschut, 2014b). Normative friends genuinely trust each other because their relationship is not based on an instrumental rational thought process (trust-as-predictability or reliance) and utility-based cost-benefit calculations but is manifested as an emotional and moral disposition (trust-as-bond) (Booth and Wheeler, 2008). It assumes that international friendship exists for normative and moral reasons as opposed to strategic calculations (Lahno, 2001, p. 177; Michel, 2012, p. 14). To illustrate this point, people who refer to each other as ‘business friends’ or ‘political friends’ would never expect the other side to be completely trustworthy. In fact, strategic friends would always expect the other side to cheat or defect from contracts or agreements, and they prepare for such a possibility by installing safeguards or backdoor-options. Genuine, normative friendship, on the contrary, does not require structural safeguards. Normative friends expect their counterparts to be honest, truthful, and trustworthy without necessarily demanding any reassurances in return.

Normative international friendship involves three main features. First, normative friends tend to care about each other for their own sake, either by appraising the good qualities of their friends (Annas, 1977; Sherman, 1987; Whiting, 1991) or by bestowing or projecting
some kind of value on them (Friedman, 1993). Second, normative friendship is both deeper and more intimate than other forms of acquaintance. Of course, it is debatable as to what defines such intimacy in international politics. Possible criteria include mutual self-disclosure or ‘bonds of trust’ (Annis, 1987; Thomas, 1987), shared values and empathy (Telfer, 1970; Cocking and Kennett, 1998), mutual identification (Millgram, 1987; Sherman, 1987), or commitment (Friedman, 1993). Finally, normative friends engage in shared activities that are not motivated by self-interest alone but are in part motivated by friendship itself. In other words, state-friends attach a certain value to the relationship itself (Eznack, 2012). In sum, normative friends become ‘plural agents’ who share their experiences, activities, and values and, as a result, build a joint history together (Helm, 2008). Given this high threshold, one would expect normative friendship to be naturally rare and needing considerable time to develop. Also, it is more likely to be limited to dyads or small groups of states and to endure over long periods of time, thus remaining relatively stable.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, we will focus on normative types of friendship. There is perhaps a third category, which can be called the ‘Swiss option’. This category describes a type of relationship in which a state generally avoids choosing sides in international politics but instead tries to convince others of their genuinely good intentions. Wolfers (1962, p. 26) introduces a similar category, which he labels ‘impartial friendliness’ or ‘minimal friendship’. It is, however, not at all convincing to categorise such relationships as ‘friendship’ unless we understand friendship here in the sense of a universal friendliness towards everyone. In that case, it would seem more appropriate to speak of a role structure of an honest broker, neutrality, or mediator than to speak of international friendship.

Based on this conceptual differentiation, it is possible to arrive at a definition of international friendship. Although empirical applications of the concepts ‘zone of stable peace’ and ‘security community’ have studied both bilateral and multilateral relations, the theoretical development of these concepts has taken place with regions in mind – at least, that is what is apparent from the key texts reviewed in the previous sections. International friendship tends to be used to refer to bilateral relations rather than multilateral ones or whole regions. As a result, international friendship appears as a bilateral relationship developing within a multimember security community – it is akin to a ‘special relationship’.
The difficulty is that theorisation on special relationships is virtually absent, most literature on it being empirical studies on Anglo-American relations. Yet, from them, a few ideas of what such a relationship would entail transpire. According to Michael Fry (1988, pp. 238–39), the US–British special relationship existed during the Second World War, and ‘was something above and beyond a mere alliance, founded on more than interest’. It showed a ‘potential to transcend individuals and governments, to continue even as the external threat changed’. For Jonathan Colman (2004, pp. 1, 3), what defined the Anglo-American special relationship is the ‘unusually close institutional bonds, frequent consultations and concerted policies between the governments of Britain and the United States, and, in the most rarefied sense, to regular, cordial and productive mutual dealings between prime ministers and presidents’, derived largely from history, tradition, and mutual affinity. Similarly, John Baylis (cited in Colman, 2004, p. 2) talks about an exceptionally close, intimate, and informal partnership in a wide spectrum of political, economic, social, and especially military fields. The ties seem to have to be exceptionally close not only at the highest level of government, but also between the bureaucracies, involving regular and informal consultations.

International friendship can thus be understood as a special relationship within an already highly stable and integrated area. Just as the Franco-German relationship is ‘special’ within the European Union, and the Anglo-American one is ‘special’ within the transatlantic security community, so do the links, trust, and mutual identification between friends go even beyond, and are deeper than, those existing in the security community as a whole. Thus, mutual trust, present in the security community, permeates most, if not all, policy areas of the bilateral friendship relationship. Furthermore, it reaches most, if not all, levels at which states and societies interact bilaterally, such as intergovernmental, inter-bureaucracies, transnational, business circles, civil societies, etc. And the same goes for the range of areas and depth of levels of analysis to which mutual identification between international friends applies.

Yet one should be careful not to confuse a pure, ideal type of international friendship with a real international friendship. In their article on overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance, Adler and Greve (2009) criticise the tendency of IR to treat varieties of international order as mutually exclusive. Instead, they (2009, pp. 62–63) claim that

the notion of overlap of security systems, and of their related mechanisms and practices, highlights that actors’ dispositions and expectations may respond simultaneously to two distinct systems of rule,
two different ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices – which may be distinguished, not only analytically, but also normatively – and to two different ways of imagining space.

Their observation about the frequent coexistence in political discourse and practice of radically different regional security orders as security community and balance of power is significantly less applicable, although not absent, in the cases of international friendship relations. These will see, in contrast, much less overlap than other types of relationships, and where there is overlap, security community practices will largely dominate over balance of power ones. This is not to say, however, that power is not a factor in friendship relations, just as it is not absent from even ideal types of zones of stable peace and security communities. While it is true that friendships require some form of reciprocity, equality of power is not a condition, partly because within a friendship relationship (as well as within security communities) actors do not respond to the balancing logic (Berenskoetter, 2007). But a state-friend can exert significant influence over another, thus persuading it to turn back on a planned course of action or review a policy decision. This type of power within friendships need not play out in the same way as the ‘power politics of identity’ referred to by Adler and Greve (2009, pp. 70–71), where an actor within the security community is able to determine shared meaning that constitutes practices and dispositions, and conditions access to the community.

Yet it is not only that international friendships are more intensified types and bilateral versions of security communities resorting to fewer balance of power practices. International friendship relationships entail an affective dimension that other relationships do not (see Chapter 4 in this volume). In this respect, Lucile Eznack’s discussion (2011, 2012) on the role of affect between close allies in crises is instructive, and helps to highlight more clearly what makes international friendship different from other types of positive international relationships. In her article ‘Crises as Signals of Strength’ Eznack (2011, p. 241) claims that ‘affect exists in close allies’ relationships, under the form of affective attachment to the latter and to the group – in this case, the alliance – as a whole’. Building upon Eznack’s arguments, states in a friendship relation regard and understand their dyadic relationship as special and unique, and therefore attribute high value to it – a value that goes beyond its instrumental benefits. Moreover, they also attribute value to the common norms and principles that serve as a guide for appropriate behaviour within their relationship and ‘embody the unique quality of
(their) ties’ (Eznack, 2011, p. 239). This highly valued relationship and shared norms of appropriate behaviour generate affective attachment. As in the cases of zones of stable peace and security communities, this attachment grows as a result of a number of different factors, including a history of positive interaction, habits of cooperation, shared membership to specific organisations, and so on. In addition, affect in international friendship can intensify with a so-called ‘defining moment’ (‘an event that had a particularly significant impact on a given relationship, either by founding it or by determining the development of its special quality’), the presence of common culture and traditions between friends, a record of mutual aid at crucial historical times, and the existence of a common project (Eznack, 2011, pp. 242-3; for a similar argument see Berenskotter, 2007; Koschut, 2014a).

Affect, however, is not an abstract concept detached from reality, but rather it influences states’ behaviour towards one another. Elsewhere, Antoine Vion and Andrea Oelsner (2011a) argue that friendship is exemplified through speech acts and institutional facts that construct bonds by demonstrating trust. Like trust, affective attachment can also be read through acts and facts. Speech acts and institutional facts embodying principles like reciprocity, equality, mutuality, altruism, loyalty, and honouring commitments, translate into concrete practices in turn increasing trust, acceptance, honesty, support, cooperation, and protection (see Eznack, 2011, p. 244). These practices themselves sustain and are sustained by affective attachment. Through acts and facts, through principles and practices, friends construct a ‘relational culture’, a culture of their friendship that both friends value and seek to perpetuate, thus influencing their behaviour (Eznack, 2012, p. 24; Hopf, 2010, p. 554).

In a relationship of international friendship, this mutual affect and the affect of both states for their special relation are roughly symmetrical. However, this need not be the case in all relations within an alliance or even a security community. One of the states in a dyad may come to value the relationship more than the other, and hence its affective attachment to it will influence its behaviour to a greater extent than that of the partner. Such asymmetric relations, though, do not qualify as genuine international friendships.

Short of anthropomorphism, Eznack does not argue, nor is it argued here, that states feel affection for one another, or that decision-makers have developed personal affinities that embody the interstate affect. Rather, affective attachment to specific interstate relationships is part of a given state’s culture and practice of foreign policy, and it is internalised and reproduced by the individuals in charge. In this sense, when ‘I describe
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a state as being affectively attached to its relationship with another one, I mean decision makers acting as the state’ (Eznack, 2011, p. 242).

Of this kind of relationship, only very few can be found in the international system. If security communities are hard to come by, international friendships are even harder. Moreover, far from representing an ideal sea of peace and tranquillity, Eznack (2011, 2012) and Koschut (2014a) demonstrate that their crises can take on dramatic dimensions due to the sense of betrayal and loss that a state-friend perceives when it sees that the other has violated a key relational norm. Mostly, friends will attempt to repair the friendship, but Berenskoetter and Giegerich (2010) show that this is not always the case.

Friendship is a highly selective relationship, that is, it must be exclusive (though not necessarily exclusionary) in order to remain meaningful. International friendship is not necessarily defined in opposition to outsiders but is likely to develop as a deeper type of relationship within an already integrated regional space. This implies that the meaning of friendship must differ to some extent and degree from the meaning attached to other relationships. If states could become friends with virtually anyone (like on Facebook) the normative value and meaning would be stripped off the concept. For example, to ensure and maintain exclusivity vis-à-vis outsiders, friends engage in ‘secret’ discourse, develop a language, symbols, and code of their own, and perform joint rituals and practices that highlight the wall between insiders and outsiders (Koschut, 2014a, p. 7). Again, this is not to imply that such insider/outside distinctions need to be framed in an antagonistic way. International friendship may take on different meanings for different actors with various overlapping circles of trust.

What separates the concept of international friendship from related concepts such as security community is thus the degree of closeness and extension of trust to others. Even though most of the empirical work on security communities has been conducted on particular regions, its theoretical implications point towards a universalistic interpretation. A world consisting of security communities may lead to an informal or formal ‘global security community’, as Alex Bellamy (2004, p. 187) points out in his study on the relationship between security communities and their neighbours:

What is quite clear […] is that the proliferation and integration of security communities do not represent the beginning of a Huntingtonian nightmare of a world of civilisational blocs in perpetual conflict with each other. Indeed, […] the more security communities there are and
the more tightly-coupled they become, the more blurred will be the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.

Bellamy bases his conclusion on his earlier observation that the peaceful socialisation of members within the security community reshapes their worldview towards outsiders. In other words, the more the community members internalise the peaceful conduct of international affairs, the more they will be willing to adopt a similar state of mind in their relations with non-members. This would be even more likely if members of one particular security community encountered members of another security community, as despite their regional and cultural differences both would recognise each other as members of the same social order. The same is hardly true for cases of international friendship. Although it is possible that the values, norms, and identities of particular friends overlap with those of other actors, there remains a core (a particular moral and emotional attachment) of friendship that can be understood as creating a separate, yet not necessarily antagonistic, ontological space of meaning (a circle of trust) within a broader regional or global context.

The previous sections point towards international friendship as a separate category of bilateral relationships. But how exactly do we know international friendship when we see it? What exactly should the researcher look for? Put differently, it is necessary to define a set of minimal criteria that have to be fulfilled in order for a particular international dyad to qualify as friends. Based on the cited literature above as well as the contributions in this book, the following conditions can serve as indicators to locate and study international friendship.

1. **Symbolic interaction**: International friendship involves predominantly bilateral social bonds and meanings between political leaders and societies enhanced through summits, meetings, and commemorating events accompanied by the institutionalisation of cooperation and trust-building at both the intergovernmental and civil society levels through intergovernmental institutions, transnational networks and associations, city partnerships, joint trade and research, and cultural exchange. The collective identification among friends is not limited to any policy area but stretches across multiple levels and across different political sectors.

2. **Affective attachment**: Friends build an emotional history together in the sense that they attach positive emotions to shared events, symbols, practices, and institutions, resulting in the establishment of shared meanings and trust. Their relationship is portrayed and
idealised as special and unique, often within already existing and overlapping institutional or regional arrangements. Affective attachment involves the accumulation of emotional memories, founding myths, symbols, and narrative patterns that create mutual awareness of being friends and make sense of the world around them.

3. **Self-disclosure**: Friends will expect each other to reveal more information to each other than to others as well as display a higher level of tolerance towards ‘bad news’. They are also likely to develop a language and code of their own that is reflected in meaningful friendly discourse. This may involve the formation of consultation mechanisms and sophisticated forms of bilateral dialogue (e.g. joint cabinet meetings, exchange of diplomatic and military personnel). In addition, policymakers and elites will frequently refer metaphorically to bonds of kinship, family, and friendship when speaking about their relationship.

4. **Mutual commitment**: Friendship often evolves from previously stable and peaceful relationships within integrated regional areas. Thus, their sharing of dependable expectations that conflicts among them will be settled peacefully is a fertile ground for friendship to flourish. At the same time, friends will protect and defend each other (violently or non-violently) against outside threats and expect each other to lend moral support in times of crisis. Hence, solidarity and reciprocal commitment are key to any form of international friendship.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have put forward the argument that international friendship is a distinct type of interstate and international relationship, and that as such, it can contribute to capturing aspects of international politics that have long remained unattended to. International friendship relations evolve more easily in the context of zones of stable peace and security communities. Yet they can also develop out of strategic alliances and close partnerships not sharing geographical regions. The case of the US–Israeli relationship, for example, falls outside a particular zone, and yet could be catalogued as international friendship.

Although we have talked here of international friendship mostly as a category, it is worth emphasising that rather than being an outcome or a fixed state of affairs, international friendship should be understood as a dynamic process – a demanding and constant exercise. As such, friendships can be undone, just as zones of stable peace and security communities can be unravelled. Deterioration of a friendship, though,
Andrea Oelsner and Simon Koschut

is unlikely to result too rapidly in a situation of unstable peace. As with the construction of friendship, its deterioration is a non-linear process.

All these aspects of international friendship – its link to zones of stable peace and security communities, its bilateral nature, its affective dimension, possible crises, and the chances of it decaying and breaking down – deserve further investigation at the theoretical level as well as with in-depth empirical studies, and make a substantive research agenda. We will return to these aspects in the concluding chapter. The intention of this chapter is to sketch out what should prove useful to analyse this special type of relationship. It may not be the most common kind of dyadic relation in the international system. Still, international friendships as outlined here continue to exist and impact on world politics, yet we know remarkably little about them.

Plan of the book

The book is structured into four main parts. In Part II (Conceptions), we seek to demonstrate the conceptual diversity and transformative nature of friendship in IR from a theoretical point of view. The authors in this section align the concept of international friendship with traditional core concepts in IR such as ‘security’, ‘power’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘order’, thus presenting different ways of approaching friendship in IR. In addition, one chapter deals with the emotional foundation of international friendship.

In Chapter 2 Graham M. Smith explores the construction of the sovereignty of the nation-state in relation to a contrasting notion: friendship. Here it is argued that sovereignty tends to focus on vertical relations (be those relations top-down or bottom-up). These relations are understood in terms of power, authority, obedience and obligation. In contrast, friendship points to a wider family of relations, whose qualities and potentialities are more complex. He suggests that far from being on the margins of IR, friendship should be reconsidered as forming a part of its centre: it is a concern with the bonds onto which other constructs must adhere. From this perspective, Smith advocates the conceptual diversity and multiplicity of international friendship.

In Chapter 3 Felix Berenskoetter outlines the analytical value of a friendship perspective through two of IR’s core concepts: security and power. He first discusses the relevance of friendship as a process providing ontological security to actors, including states, and differentiates this from the function of both strategic alliances and security communities. Building on this reading, the chapter then explores the ways power
operates in and out of friendship relations. Specifically, it looks at the power operating ‘internally’, that is, among friends, and ‘externally’, that is, how practices of friendship affect third parties and international order. In this sense, Berenskoetter’s conception of international friendship is a normative one, which emphasises the transformative nature of friendship as an agent of change in international politics.

In Chapter 4 Lucile Eznack and Simon Koschut open the allies/friends ‘black box’ to determine more precisely whether and to what extent international friendship is affectively charged. This chapter studies the sources of the development of affect in friendly interstate relations. In doing so, it offers a better understanding of the reasons behind the affective value attached by certain countries to their bilateral ties with other countries. It does so notably by looking at the way affective and instrumental factors intersect in the development of countries’ affective attachments to their relationships. In this sense, Eznack and Koschut build on a normative conception of international friendship by further specifying the second indicator (affective attachment) proposed above.

Evgeny Roshchin takes a different approach in Chapter 5. He studies international friendship and its relation to the problem of international order by examining the statements, featuring friendship, made throughout millennia by political actors themselves. The chapter compares the use of friendship in three types of ‘international societies’: ancient society, the European international society, and contemporary international society. Roshchin argues that the use of friendship in public political relations is primarily tailored to conservative ‘managerial’ practices of order. In various epochs the terminology of friendship was part and parcel of the formal language of diplomacy and public international law and, thereby, preserved the corresponding institutions and practices, such as contracts, hierarchies, sovereignty, and balancing. From this vantage point, his conception of friendship fits more into the strategic category of friendship in the sense that it stands in contrast to a moral conception of friendship based on trust and the exercise of virtue.

In Part III of the book (Practices), we move to the political practice of international friendship by presenting empirical cases of international friendship at the regional as well as at the global level. The authors of this section look at how conceptual diversity and the transformative potential of international friendship play out in different regions such as Europe and Latin America. The section closes with a case that shows how friendship in IR exists beyond the state at the transnational level, as well as a historical overview and cultural comparison of various friendship treaties.
Antoine Vion argues in Chapter 6 that recent tensions in Franco-German relations, concerning the debt crisis in Europe and the merging of EADS by BAE systems, seem to have refreshed Franco-German relations. This may of course push critics towards the very idea of Franco-German friendship. To counter this criticism, Vion investigates under what conditions Franco-German friendship has existed through the past decades, and how it has evolved in recent times. His conceptualization of Franco-German friendship employs a dynamic perspective that departs from an essentialist definition of the state. The empirical investigation reveals shifts in the contexts and forms of existing institutional patterns. In this sense, Vion applies a normative conception of international friendship and exposes its transformative character.

In Chapter 7 Lily Gardner Feldman examines the German–Polish relationship by aligning friendship with the conceptual framework of reconciliation. For this purpose, she develops a framework for studying reconciliation based on history, leadership, institutions, and international context as her main variables. While differentiating between reconciliation and friendship, she argues that the two concepts intersect, suggesting utility in comparing them along four dimensions: motives, actors, mechanisms, and outcomes. Her case study emphasises both the importance of societal, emotional, and moral bonds as well as the necessity of charismatic leaders to initiate and steer the process of reconciliation and friendship. In doing so, Gardner Feldman presents another case of normative friendship and outlines its changing nature from a previous relationship of enmity and hatred. By drawing parallels to the concept of reconciliation she also argues for conceptual diversity of international friendship.

In Chapter 8 Andrea Oelsner suggests that international friendship is a demanding process that requires that the ground ‘be prepared’ for it. Her chapter traces the structuration of a series of speech acts and institutional facts that can be interpreted as signs of engagement in, and proofs of, friendship. The cases chosen to illustrate the analysis (the Argentine–Brazilian and the Argentine–Chilean dyads) reflect the historical meaning of the experience of moving away from enmity/antagonism towards building relationships based on mutual trust, which put these dyads at the centre of processes of stabilisation of regional peace. In doing so, Oelsner stresses how normative friendship not only transforms the bilateral relationship itself but also shows how international friendship impacts on its immediate environment and contributes to building a regional order.

In Chapter 9 Caroline Patsias and Sylvie Patsias open an entirely new facet in the study of friendship in IR by showing that friendship can
exist beyond the state between peoples and ideals of social justice, and by illustrating how the recognition of diversity and solidarity plays out at the transnational level. Specifically, their chapter focuses on two forms of friendship within the empirical framework of the World Social Forum: first, friendship as a political ideal or vision that advocates new forms of political participation and, second, friendship as the concrete discourse and practice among participants in social forums. In this sense, their chapter builds a normative conception of friendship that sheds particular light on people-to-people ties.

Finally, in Chapter 10 Heather Devere looks at how friendship has been institutionalised and discursively framed in international treaties. She finds that a few treaties, such as the Soviet–Finnish Treaty of Friendship, may have actually transformed the relationship between its signatories in a normative sense. In most cases, friendship treaties were used as ‘rhetorical diplomatic instruments’ to expand and protect the military and commercial interests of the great powers. In this sense, Devere predominantly analyses cases of strategic international friendship. At the same time, she also points to situations where the two types of friendship (strategic/normative) collide, resulting in cultural misunderstandings and diverging meanings, for example, in the case of friendship treaties between the colonial powers and Pacific island states.

In Part IV (Conclusion), we summarise the main themes of the book and outline an agenda for further research.

Notes
2. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), for example, argue that whenever states share the perception that they are liberal democracies, they are then able to distinguish between like-minded democratic ‘doves’ and non-democratic ‘non-doves’ in the international sphere. As a result, liberal democratic states may form democratic zones of peace by building mutual trust and a democratic identity, and, at the same time, separating themselves from the war-prone world of non-democracies.
3. Examples include discursive analyses of the Anglo-Japanese friendship treaties of the 1850s, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1950, friendship treaties between the United States and Pacific island nations in the 1970s, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Argentina and Chile of 1984, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 2005 (Bederman, 2001; Parish, 2006; Roshchin, 2006; Devere et al., 2011).
On theory-building through empirical research, see George and Bennett, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989.

Some of these works deal with the role of friendship in specific dyads such as German–American relations (Berenskoetter, 2007), US–Canadian relations (Haglund, 2007; Patsias and Deschénes, 2007), rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil (Oelsner, 2007), Franco-German relations (Vion, 2007; Constantin, 2011), and US–Australian relations (Meaher, 2004).

For instance, although they share a common philosophical ground, ‘neoliberalism’ in economics is substantially different from ‘neoliberalism’ in IR. That both disciplines call such different theories by the same name may be a bit confusing if engaging in a multidisciplinary exercise, but has not resulted in any major epistemological damage to either discipline. ‘Securitisation’ is another concept with which finance and IR refer to two different phenomena, and although it was coined in finance, it is now commonly used in international security. Similarly, ‘conflict’ is not the same when it refers to interpersonal relations as when it is used to describe IR. Furthermore, the consequences of conflict between individuals in society and between states (or other politically organised groups) in the international system vary enormously, and we still use the same term to refer to diverse situations. When we talk about ‘agreements’, again, it is not meant the same way in the context of ordinary life or even in the domestic judicial context, and in international politics – not least because of the difficulty of enforcing international treaties due to the absence of a global Leviathan.

Note that this reflects our own understanding of international friendship. The authors in this volume may conceptualise international friendship in very different ways. For instance, Berenskoetter (Chapter 3) points out that friendship can also generate violence.

This is, of course, in addition to the huge literature on democratic peace: see, for example, Babst, 1964; Doyle, 1983; Levy, 1988; Gleditsch, 1992; Russett, 1993; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Ray, 2005.

For a different view about the sources of stable peace within pluralistic security communities, see Lake, 2009. Lake argues that regions often described as security communities are in fact regional hierarchies dominated by the authority of one state that regulates peace and conflict.

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