

# Table of Contents

<i>List of Figures of Tables</i>	viii
<i>List of Boxes</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiv
<b>1 Introduction: Concepts of Security, Conflict and Peace</b>	<b>1</b>
Overview	1
Learning Outcomes	1
Part 1 – Core Concepts	1
Part 2 – Building Peace After Conflict	14
Conclusion	16
Summary of Key Issues	17
Reflective Question	17
List of Core Resources	17
<b>2 Causes of Conflict and Conflict Prevention</b>	<b>20</b>
Overview	20
Learning Outcomes	20
Part 1 – Causes of Conflict	20
Part 2 – Conflict Prevention	29
Conclusion	38
Summary of Key Issues	39
Reflective Question	39
Barometers, Watch Lists and Datasets	40
List of Core Resources	40
<b>3 Building a Safe and Secure Environment</b>	<b>42</b>
Overview	42
Learning Outcomes	42
Part 1 – Why Security is Important	42
Part 2 – A Safe and Secure Environment	44
Part 3 – International Military Actors	48
Part 4 – Activities of International Military Actors	55
Part 5 – Challenges and Lessons Learned	56
Conclusion	64
Summary of Key Issues	64
Reflective Question	65
List of Core Resources	65

<b>4 Promoting the Rule of Law</b>	<b>67</b>
Overview	67
Learning Outcomes	67
Part 1 – The Rule of Law	67
Part 2 – Rule of Law Activities and Actors	71
Part 3 – Challenges and Recommendations	82
Conclusion	91
Summary of Key Issues	91
Reflective Question	92
List of Core Resources	92
<b>5 Transitional Justice</b>	<b>94</b>
Overview	94
Learning Outcomes	94
Part 1 – Historical Context	94
Part 2 – Objectives, Measures and Processes	98
Part 3 – Challenges and Recommendations	112
Conclusion	117
Summary of Key Issues	117
Reflective Question	118
List of Core Resources	118
<b>6 Mine Action and the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons</b>	<b>121</b>
Overview	121
Learning Outcomes	121
Part 1 – Mine Action	122
Part 2 – The Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons	130
Conclusion	139
Summary of Key Issues	140
Reflective Question	141
List of Core Resources	141
<b>7 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</b>	<b>144</b>
Overview	144
Learning Outcomes	144
Part 1 – Defining DDR	144
Part 2 – DDR Actors and Issues	149
Part 3 – Challenges and Recommendations	155
Conclusion	162
Summary of Key Issues	163
Reflective Question	163
List of Core Resources	164
<b>8 Security Sector Reform</b>	<b>165</b>
Overview	165
Learning Outcomes	165
Part 1 – Security Sector Reform – Overview	165

Part 2 – Reform of Justice and Security Sector Institutions	171
Part 3 – Security Sector Governance	186
Part 4 – Challenges and Lessons Learned	190
Conclusion	201
Summary of Key Issues	202
Reflective Question	203
List of Core Resources	203
<b>9 Human Rights, Security and Justice</b>	<b>206</b>
Overview	206
Learning Outcomes	206
Part 1 – International Human Rights	206
Part 2 – Human Rights and Conflict	213
Part 3 – Human Rights Work in Post-Conflict Environments	218
Conclusion	230
Summary of Key Issues	231
Reflective Question	231
List of Core Resources	232
<b>10 Gender, Security and Justice</b>	<b>234</b>
Overview	234
Learning Outcomes	234
Part 1 – Violence Against Women	235
Part 2 – The Gender Dynamics of Peacebuilding	242
Part 3 – Gender Stereotypes, Conflict and Peacebuilding	257
Conclusion	261
Summary of Key Issues	262
Reflective Question	263
Useful Datasets	263
List of Core Resources	263
<b>11 Countering Transnational Security Threats: Terrorism, Piracy and Organised Crime</b>	<b>266</b>
Overview	266
Learning Outcomes	266
Part 1 – Conflict and Global Risks	267
Part 2 – Terrorism	270
Part 3 – Piracy	279
Part 4 – Organised Crime	285
Conclusion	294
Summary of Key Issues	295
Reflective Question	296
List of Core Resources	296
<i>Conclusion</i>	300
<i>Bibliography</i>	310
<i>Index</i>	362

# 1 Introduction: Concepts of Security, Conflict and Peace

## Overview

The opening chapter introduces some of the core concepts commonly used in peacebuilding. It begins by presenting various ways of visualising the different stages of conflict, before reflecting upon the concepts of security and peacebuilding. To provide a context for subsequent chapters, there follows a brief discussion on ways in which to resolve armed conflict and build peace beyond those efforts squarely within the security and justice sector.

## Learning Outcomes

- Critically assess the concepts of conflict, security and peacebuilding
- Evaluate the value and limitations of the curve of conflict
- Recognise that core concepts in peacebuilding have policy implications
- Articulate some of the major precursors to effective peacebuilding
- Be familiar with other peacebuilding activities outside the security and justice sector

## Part 1 – Core Concepts

A number of key concepts are used throughout this book, relating to phases of conflict and third-party interventions, as well as to the underlying principles and wider theories supporting such interventions. Whilst many of these concepts are understood in broadly the same way within the international community, they have no universally accepted definitions. If conflict prevention, mitigation, termination and recovery efforts are ever to be successful, key concepts need to be unpacked and a shared, sensitive and comprehensive understanding arrived at. Without this shared understanding, it is hard for action to be co-ordinated, coherent, efficient and effective. It is also hard to monitor and evaluate progress, identify and utilise lessons learned and best practice, and ultimately improve efforts to prevent and respond to conflict and its challenges.

As Chetail (2009) notes, increased peacebuilding activity, perhaps ironically, has led to the term ‘peacebuilding’ becoming more ambiguous and less sharply defined.

## 2 *Conflict, Security and Justice*

Many different interpretations of this and related terms exist. More problematically, perhaps, many different actors actually involved in post-conflict peacebuilding use different terms to refer to it (Barnett et al., 2007; Chetail, 2009). As Chetail suggests, the use of different terms and the different interpretation of similar terms reflect the different mandates, agendas and interests of the various actors. Not surprisingly, the ambiguity and abundance of related concepts in the field of peacebuilding create some confusion. However, this ambiguity also enables the various actors to work together under the same umbrella without ever having to reach an unlikely consensus on the precise nature of the engagement (for further discussion see Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2019; Barnett et al., 2007; Chetail, 2009).

Given these differences of interpretation, as well as differences (described in the next chapter) over causes and remedies for conflict, there seems little point in devoting this chapter to long and complex arguments about who is right. Those interested can follow the controversies through the references provided. In any event, in this chapter – as throughout the book – the intention is to highlight those interpretations and prescriptions which are politically powerful and which influence the way that governments, international organisations and donors behave in practice.

We will first consider the concept of conflict, before considering the concepts of security and peacebuilding. Other concepts will be addressed later in the book, including justice and the rule of law (Chapter 4), transitional justice (Chapter 5), governance (Chapter 8, when we discuss Security Sector Governance), human rights (Chapter 9), gender (Chapter 10) and terrorism (Chapter 11, when we discuss transnational security threats).

### The concept of conflict

Before attempting to address the ambiguity described above, it is first important to understand what we mean by conflict. Conflict, broadly speaking, can mean disagreement, tension or incompatibility between positions, opinions, interests, principles, demands or needs. From this perspective, conflict, of course, can occur anywhere – in the home, at school or the workplace, within social groups and communities, within and between societies, on the global stage. We can see conflict everywhere: it is part of everyday life. Social groups, communities and societies generally have mechanisms to respond to conflict, to manage it and to guard against it becoming violent: rules and compliance mechanisms, norms and social expectations, and structures and processes for grievances to be aired and addressed, for instance. When conflict does become violent it may still not be considered to be armed conflict.

As described in Jackson and Beswick (2018) there are a number of ways in which to measure and categorise armed conflict. One of the most common ways is to count ‘battle deaths’. This is problematic in itself, not least in securing reliable data, but in determining which deaths ‘count’. For some scholars, when defining armed conflict, ‘battle deaths’ do not include indirect victims of conflict (those who have died as a result of ill-health or malnutrition as a consequence of the conflict, for instance), or civilian casualties. While there is no agreement among scholars that battle deaths are an appropriate way to measure and categorise conflict, even where battle deaths are used to categorise types of violence, there is no broad

agreement on the number of battle deaths that should be the threshold to determine whether or not armed conflict exists. For instance, the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (<http://ucdp.uu.se>) and the Correlates of War Project ([www.correlatesofwar.org](http://www.correlatesofwar.org)), which manage the most comprehensive and authoritative databases on armed conflict, have markedly different thresholds. For UCDP (2019), the threshold is 25 battle deaths per year, while for the Correlates of War Project (2019) it is 1,000.

Moving on to considering how armed conflict (hereafter, conflict) can be conceived, one attempt to deal with the ambiguity described above was made by Lund (1996), who introduced the idea of the ‘curve of conflict’. As shown in Figure 1.1, the curve of conflict maps the point at which the various phases of conflict occur as well as efforts to prevent, mitigate, terminate or recover from it. As USIP’s *Peace Terms Glossary* puts it:

The curve of conflict is a conceptual tool that helps illustrate how conflicts tend to evolve over time. The curve helps in visualizing how different phases of conflict relate to one another, as well as to identify kinds of third-party intervention. Practitioners can use this knowledge in the determination of effective strategies for intervention, along with the timing of those strategies. (Snodderly, 2011: 15)

The intensity of the conflict is shown by the vertical axis and the duration of the conflict by the horizontal axis. So, you can see that conflict prevention precedes peace negotiations which, in turn, precede peacekeeping. However, you do not really know how long each of these phases will last and whether one might lead to the next or, if unsuccessful, remain ‘stuck’ in one phase for a prolonged period of time or even revert to a previous phase. In essence, all phases are about stopping armed conflict – whether its outbreak, escalation, continuance or recurrence. To some extent, therefore, phases often share commonalities, in terms of intent and activities. There are, however, often formal signifiers of a new phase, whether through the outbreak of conflict (leading from conflict prevention to diplomacy, for instance) or the signing




Figure 1.1 The Curve of Conflict (adapted from Lund, 1996)

4 *Conflict, Security and Justice*

of a peace agreement (leading to peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement). As the term suggests, on Lund's curve of conflict, peacemaking refers to efforts to make peace when there is none (at the earlier stages of armed conflict), rather than peacekeeping, which refers to efforts to ensure the peace agreement holds. Peacebuilding, as we will soon discuss, tends to be an all-encompassing term referring to a broader range of activities after conflict to build sustainable peace.

It is important to note that the curve does not depict the level of violence that might exist. While armed conflict can formally begin before diplomacy and peace negotiations and end at the signing of a peace agreement (just before peacekeeping) – or when there is a truce, defeat, or the successful separation of armed factions (peace enforcement) – armed violence can continue and be prevalent throughout all phases, as will be discussed further shortly. And, of course, conflict can continue; even after the signing of a peace agreement, peacekeepers are needed to ensure the agreement is complied with and lay the groundwork for effective peacebuilding, which should include resolving the causes of the armed conflict and ensuring grievances are addressed and do not lead to conflict recurrence.

To add further nuance, in Figure 1.1, activities beyond those focussed on directly stopping the outbreak, escalation, continuance or recurrence of conflict have been mapped onto the traditional conflict curve. Humanitarian relief, early recovery and development are equally critical to building and sustaining peace (see Kamau, 2018), and tend to take place alongside formal efforts to resolve conflict. Humanitarian relief refers to the provision of life-saving food, water and sanitation, shelter and health services to those within or in the aftermath of conflict or other crisis, such as natural disaster. Development is a more nebulous term which refers to a broad range of activities across the economic, environmental, governance, human rights, health and education sectors undertaken to improve well-being and, in this context, help prevent the outbreak of conflict (recognising the relationship between security and development which will be discussed shortly). Early recovery is a less frequently used concept, which refers to activities which bridge immediate humanitarian assistance and longer-term development, with the aim of augmenting emergency humanitarian assistance and establishing the foundations for longer-term development. While humanitarian relief tends to begin when there is a modicum of security, and development once there is more stability, in reality both activities can be ongoing throughout all phases other than during heightened insecurity.

Conflict prevention, conflict resolution and, again, peacebuilding are also identified at the horizontal axis. Some analysts distinguish between these three phases of conflict (i.e. before, during and after) although, as we will soon discuss, the lines between these phases are very blurred. Ramsbotham et al. (2016) refer to distinct stages within each of these phases, in order to help identify responses. So, before armed conflict, the trajectory can be seen to move from 'difference' (requiring attending to cultural factors), to 'contradiction' (requiring attending to structural factors), to 'polarisation' (requiring peacemaking), which if unaddressed leads to violence. After conflict, all being well, the trajectory moves away from conflict, from ceasefire, to 'agreement' (requiring peacemaking), to 'normalisation' (requiring attending to structural factors) and, finally, to 'reconciliation' (requiring attending to cultural factors). It can be seen from the way Ramsbotham

et al. (2016) refer to distinct stages within each of the phases of conflict in order to determine the requisite response, how efforts to build peace are often not too dissimilar to efforts to prevent the outbreak of conflict – we will be looking further into this in the next chapter. We can also use the terms ‘escalation’ and ‘de-escalation’ to refer to the way conflict might develop or intensify and end or resolve (see also Jackson and Beswick, 2018).

Distinguishing between the different phases of conflict can be useful in efforts to resolve conflict, to the extent that different strategies or tactics may be more appropriate than others, depending upon the current phase of conflict (or sub-conflict) (see Brahm, 2003). The curve can also be seen as a useful visual tool, in that it can help show common characteristics of different conflicts and, thus, potentially help in efforts to apply lessons learnt from one conflict to another.

It must be remembered, however, that this bell curve hugely simplifies a complex and messy reality. Conflicts do not progress linearly and successively through the various phases: many setbacks may occur, and conflict can repeatedly escalate or re-emerge, for instance. Similarly, efforts to prevent or resolve conflict or make, keep and build peace, will occur at multiple points during the conflict, and often concurrently. This is because the activities associated with these interventions are not exclusive of each other, and anyway there is no consensus around the terms used. Various actors apply different labels to the phases of conflict and related interventions, which further frustrates efforts to simplify. It is also important to realise that different actors and stakeholders, and even parties to the conflict, will perceive the conflict, the stage it is at and how it is developing, differently. There may also be multiple conflicts within one overarching conflict.

It therefore appears increasingly difficult to distinguish between phases of conflict, and third-party intervention, as activities associated with these phases broaden and definitions multiply. The lines between both the theory and the practice of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement are therefore increasingly blurred.

Thus, the transition from humanitarian action or relief to early recovery to development, for instance, is not as linear and clearly defined as is often implied. Similarly, humanitarian action often continues alongside peacebuilding and state-building efforts and, likewise, development activities often begin during the early recovery stages (and indeed as a conflict prevention measure even before the outbreak of conflict). While a clear understanding of the types of activity required in many post-conflict environments necessitates a delineation of their areas of responsibility, imagining that these activities occur in separate and distinct time frames is not helpful (see Figure 1.2). Recognition of the complexity of recovery efforts does, however, underscore the importance of co-ordination. Whilst co-ordination is widely accepted as a priority among actors involved in facilitating recovery from conflict, divergent and often conflicting or competing priorities, approaches, timeframes, agendas, objectives and perceptions tend to undermine efforts to consolidate a coherent, co-ordinated and effective response.

If we accept that there are inter-dependent relationships between development, security, governance and the protection of human rights, it is perhaps a fallacy to assume that efforts to address insecurity, state fragility and lack of governance,


6 *Conflict, Security and Justice*

Figure 1.2 The Overlapping Stages of Engagement. (This is just one depiction of how the stages of engagement might be depicted. While this image shows the various stages of engagement are often overlapping, there are rarely definitive start and end dates to each stage as this image might suggest.)

underdevelopment, and violation of human rights can always proceed consecutively in logical order or independently of each other. Efforts – and equally, lack of effort – in one area will always impact another area. The risk of insecurity will be greater, for example, in a country in which some or all of the following are present: high levels of poverty and underdevelopment, weak state institutions, widespread human rights violations and limited justice or confidence in the rule of law. Likewise, the credibility of the state will also be jeopardised where there are prolonged or frequent outbreaks of armed conflict and the state does not enjoy the confidence or support of the majority of the population.

Increasing recognition of the interdependencies between security, governance and development, however, has also caused some concern about the blurring of operationally vital boundaries, not least in the protection of humanitarian space. The 2003 Iraq intervention has rightly been criticised for not paying attention to the subsequent rebuilding of the country and only attending to the security aspects of rebuilding a country. Its proponents assumed that after a short, non-destructive

**Box 1.1: Defence, Diplomacy and Development**

The type of peacebuilding attempted in, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Sierra Leone encouraged the belief that there is necessarily a linear transition from war to peace, and that at a certain moment some actors therefore hand over to others. More recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that, in practice, military operations, the search for a political solution and development projects may all be taking place at the same time, and impacting upon each other. Even when military operations are effectively concluded, as in BiH, the existence of a sequential plan does not mean it will be implemented automatically. As in BiH, military security can create the conditions for development and a political solution, but it cannot make them happen.

Intervention failures in the last decade, notably in Iraq, have shown military-only solutions to instability to be inherently flawed. Such failures quickly led to a realisation that, without diplomacy or efforts to promote development, military engagement to foster peace will be destined to fail. Moreover, without 'joined-up-thinking' and co-ordination and coherence of efforts, intervention efforts can work against each other. The establishment of the UK Government's Stabilisation Unit – a triumvirate of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) – is an example of commitment to co-ordinated efforts across defence, diplomacy and development. More recently, there has, however, been a shift to 'hard' security as a priority, at the expense of a wider 'whole of government approach'. An increase in military spending and cuts to international aid across many western countries appear to have heralded this return to a focus on military-only or military-led solutions.

Scholars have also underscored the deficiencies of military-only solutions to conflict. Edward Azar (1990), a leading scholar in international relations who developed the theory of protracted social conflict, argued that such conflicts require problem-solving rather than military solutions. Azar contended that conflicts were the results of unmet basic social needs, such as security, acceptance or economic participation and so military solutions which did not address these causes were destined to fail.

war, the recovery and reconstruction phase would be handled by the local population itself, grateful to be free of the yoke of tyranny. This of course did not happen. Some have suggested that the tripartite (security, governance and development) or, rather, 3-D approach (defence, diplomacy and development, as described in Box 1.1) to dealing with conflict and its aftermath that characterised some western approaches in the aftermath of this failure has led to the securitisation of aid (see Box 1.2). There is clearly a need for efforts across the security, governance and development sectors to be co-ordinated, and for there to be supported efforts in these three areas if there is to be sustainable recovery. However, there runs the risk of development aid being used to respond to security concerns and, thus, becoming securitised. This risks undermining the principles, effectiveness and resources available to development programmes. There are also more practical issues to consider in respect of co-ordination and the protection of humanitarian space, such as

**Box 1.2: The Securitisation of Aid**

The securitisation of aid broadly refers to the use of aid for the security interests of the donor (rather than the recipient). For a discussion on the securitisation of aid see, for example, Saferworld (2011) and Elhawary (2011).

In broader international relations, securitisation theory refers to the process of turning an issue into a matter of security. This, in turn, enables a security response and, often, extraordinary measures to be deployed. Issues that are securitised are not necessarily matters that pose a particular security threat to a state or its people but, rather, those issues which have been successfully categorised by someone as such (see Buzan et al., 1998 – instrumental in introducing securitisation theory to international relations). So, for instance, migration has been securitised and yet communicable diseases and road safety, which pose a direct and significant threat to many people, have not. From this example, it can be seen that the act of securitising is politicised and is often done precisely in order to legitimise certain responses. So, the risk of securitising responses to humanitarian crises or development challenges is that different policy responses are considered to be more acceptable and appropriate. In addition, different actors might become engaged (i.e. security actors), which can undermine humanitarian or development practices or principles, for instance, as well as problematise co-ordination and legitimacy of response.

where humanitarian or development tasks are carried out by the military because the environment is too dangerous for anyone else to operate.

Imagining that the transition from conflict to peace is linear also ignores the prevalence of violence in many allegedly post-conflict environments and many countries ostensibly at peace. Indeed, a high level of violence may historically have been part of the country's culture, and not be greatly affected by the arrival of formal peace. This reminds us that violence, including armed violence, can occur at any stage outside what is formally referred to as armed conflict (see Box 1.3). Violence that occurs in private spaces or against disempowered, marginalised groups can be significant. Violence between or against impoverished male youths is excessive in many countries. Violence and insecurity can, in fact, escalate after the end of armed conflict, due to many factors, including the security vacuum that is often filled by organised criminal groups in the immediate aftermath of conflict. High levels of gender-based violence can also remain after conflict, in the absence of effective security and justice sector institutions, as traumatised combatants return to civilian life, and as gender roles are renegotiated (Grady, 2010; Munala, 2007; Willett, 2010).

It is now generally acknowledged that what were once considered the different stages of conflict are increasingly blurred and overlapping. Indeed, it is better to think of a continuum, with street violence at one end and violent conflict at the other; but even this concept does not account for private violence, structural violence and other harms not so neatly categorised.

As Swanström and Weissmann (2005) point out, the simple bell curve of conflict has received much criticism from academics and policy-makers. They suggest that, in abstract form, conflict may be better represented as a series of irregular

### Box 1.3: Armed Violence versus Armed Conflict

#### Mexico

Criminal gun violence (as in Mexico, for example) can exceed the levels normally associated with armed conflict. The 2013 United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Study on Homicide identified nearly 450,000 cases of intentional homicide in 2012 (43% of victims were males aged 15–29). Significantly larger numbers were injured or crippled. This excludes suicides and accidents with firearms, which would substantially increase the total. More than a third of the homicides occurred in the Americas, reflecting, among other things, the results of the illegal drugs trade and efforts to suppress it (UNODC, 2013).

#### Colombia

In the weeks and months following the signing of the peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Spanish: *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*, FARC–EP or FARC), on 24 November 2016, the number of murders by paramilitaries of activists and community leaders and human rights/women’s rights advocates escalated as these paramilitary groups try to fill the void left by the demobilised FARC, terrorising communities so they can control territories and drug trafficking routes (see HRW, 2017).

waves, in recognition of the fact that the conflict circle recurs and repeatedly passes through different phases, and that no conflict is like another. Moreover, the curve would be specific to each conflict; the path towards peace no longer represented by a universal, simple trajectory. Protracted conflicts, for instance, may be shown by a curve which extensively oscillates between the higher levels of the curve, or conflicts may repeatedly recur over prolonged periods, or there may simply be no clear delineation between war and peace (see Figure 1.3 for what a path might look like, superimposed onto the traditional curve of conflict to




Figure 1.3 How the Curve of Conflict might be More Accurately Portrayed, Overlaid on the Original Curve of Conflict

demonstrate the stark difference often between theory and reality – recognising that even these messy lines cannot capture much either).

For all these reasons, as Swanström and Weissmann (2005) have noted, conflict can never be represented by a single line, not least because each conflict often contains many smaller conflicts, each with its own specific cycle (see Figure 1.3 again for how a conflict with its many smaller conflicts might be mapped). Consequently, different types of intervention may be required simultaneously to respond to different developments and dynamics within a conflict. For example, risk factors from a latent conflict may increase at the point at which armed conflict between two warring factions decreases in intensity, while other sub-conflicts escalate or de-escalate in response to these and other developments.

Whilst visualising or mapping phases of conflict and intervention can be useful, if there is indeed a ‘line of conflict’, it is not linear or singular: it is multi-faceted, multifarious and dynamic. The complexity of conflict is discussed in the next chapter, when we consider the many and varied causes of conflict as well as the broad range of activities that can constitute effective conflict prevention.

Finally, it is important to remember that the way conflict is defined has a direct impact upon policy and practice. If conflict is perceived as linear, logical and one-dimensional, responses to conflict will seldom be appropriate. If conflict is measured in terms of battle deaths, other insecurities will tend to be overlooked and ignored until they too manifest themselves in terms of fatalities. If conflict is something that occurs between states and/or non-state actors, the blurred lines between the state and non-state will be overlooked, as will the impact of armed violence outside places formally considered to be engaged in armed conflict. If conflict is considered to be something that occurs elsewhere and for purely local reasons, we may continue to overlook the involvement of our governments in conflicts and our own responsibility for insecurities at home and abroad. Of course, there are times when simplification is necessary. Measuring a conflict in terms of battle deaths might be necessary, for instance, to enable large-scale statistical research. But there is a difference between the simplification needed for categorisation, study and analysis, and the need to take complexity into account in order to develop appropriate responses.

### The concept of security

In the same way, how we define security determines our thinking about how security is best developed and managed, as well as who or what we believe pose security threats. This, of course, determines how we think we should respond to security threats, as well as who and what we believe are threatened (and who and what are the sources of that threat). The widest definition of security so far offered is that of ‘Human Security’, usually defined as:

... far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and resources to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of

future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – are the interrelated building blocks of human and, therefore, national security. (UN, 2000b: n.p.)

Human security was introduced as a concept by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report (1994), equating security with people rather than territory and encompassing seven broad areas of threat: economic, health, personal, political, food, environmental and community. Human security moves beyond the narrower national security (which previously tended to focus on territorial security), and this shift was a result of the recognition that security and development are related, as well as recognition of the changing nature of threats: conflicts were increasingly intrastate and threats to security came from environmental degradation, pandemics, poverty, criminality and poor governance and not simply from armies and arms (see Kaldor, 2012). However, it is important to note that traditional security thinking included far more than just ‘violent conflict’, and many of the problems identified by human security thinking exist in peaceful societies. In addition, many of the human security objectives have been pursued by governments for generations, but without the use of the vocabulary of ‘security’ and ‘threat’.

The concept of human security has, nonetheless, influenced policy-makers and practitioners in the field of security, justice, development and human rights, and efforts to prevent and respond to conflict and crisis have, at least ostensibly, been undertaken in a more holistic and co-ordinated manner. Since it came to prominence in 1994 it has, however, received much criticism, not least because the concept is so broad and, thus, often, vague that it undermines precisely how to conceive of security and ways in which it can be improved (see Paris, 2001).

In practice, in international development, the broadening scope of security is not yet matched by an expanding arena of indigenous security actors. Informal justice and security mechanisms, while often vital in post-conflict and developing states, are only now being given any real attention by international organisations and governments. Additionally, the role of civil society in the security sector is often restricted to pre-implementation outreach and consultation as well as ensuring the accountability of state security actors through specific Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Moreover, donors have a history of preferring to interact with, and fund, CSOs whose leaders speak western languages and share western ideas. Understandably, perhaps, the focus is generally on how security and justice are delivered, not on how they are received. Donors have their own imperatives, timetables and political limitations, after all.

So, while it is recognised that security is a broad, multifarious and often contested concept, the focus of providing security is very often state-centric and focussed on uniformed state security service providers. This, however, is beginning to change. Consequently, if the Human Security argument is valid, and if it can be made operational, it could be hoped that peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts will be more effective and sustainable, and post-conflict societies will stand a greater chance of not returning to conflict (see Box 1.4 for a definition of statebuilding and its relationship with peacebuilding).

Chapter 3 will further consider the concept of security, and the concept of non-traditional security threats will be considered in Chapter 11.

**Box 1.4: Peacebuilding and Statebuilding**

Statebuilding refers to '[p]urposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups' (OECD, 2008: 15). While there is an assumption that peacebuilding and statebuilding are mutually supportive, there can be tension between peacebuilding and statebuilding. While a resilient state may be considered to be a prerequisite for lasting peace, strengthening a state that has been a party to the conflict, is corrupt or is blamed for what it did not do, can increase tension and the propensity for conflict (see Interpeace, 2010). Conversely, peacebuilding can undermine statebuilding efforts. State legitimacy can be undermined, for example, if non-state providers are relied upon to deliver essential goods in the absence of effective state institutions (see Haider, 2010).

Moreover, the specific form of state–societal relations being created – specifically the transformation of war-torn places into liberal market democracies and the forced democratisation that often accompanies such efforts – often undermines the chances of lasting peace and stability (see Paris, 2004).

The processes of marketisation and democratisation ignore many conflict causal factors and also provide opportunities for those whose interests may be self-serving. In Kosovo and BiH, for instance, these processes tended to further marginalise those who were previously dependent on the land to support themselves, augment the power of many war opportunists and criminals, and tighten the bonds between organised crime and the political administration (see Bojicic and Kostovicova, 2011, for instance).

**The concept of peace**

It is worth taking a moment to reflect on what we mean by peace. Is it simply the absence of armed conflict? Certainly, peaceful societies need more than just a guarantee that there will not be an outbreak of armed violence. Johan Galtung, widely regarded as a leading pioneer of peace studies, was instrumental in drawing a distinction between negative peace (the absence of armed conflict or violence) and positive peace (the presence of all the other factors which contribute to a peaceful society). These other factors would include positive relationships between people, and between people and the state, as well as the presence of co-operation, equity, equality, dialogue and a culture of peace (Galtung, 2013). In the immediate aftermath of conflict, in the absence of armed conflict, therefore, there can be a negative peace; the effort, however, will be on building all the structures, processes and relationships which will make the peace sustainable at which point there might be what could be referred to as a positive peace.

**The concept of peacebuilding**

Fundamentally, security is the core prerequisite of peace, and peacebuilding is generally considered to be the way peace is built after conflict. Peacebuilding has been described as 'a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing

into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development' (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations – UNDPKO, 2008: 18). The term has been widely used since the then-UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, referred to it in his 'Agenda for Peace' in 1992 (UNSG, 1992). It was originally conceived relatively narrowly, but typically for this field, its meanings have expanded enormously (Chetail, 2009; Snodderly, 2011).

Originally the term peacebuilding referred to post-conflict recovery efforts focussed on reconciliation (reconciling formerly warring factions so they can live peacefully together, including through addressing grievances and building trust) and reconstruction (of physical infrastructure, including roads, buildings, transportation and communication systems, and also of state institutions so essential services can be delivered).

Today the term can encompass a wide spectrum of activities. These can include providing humanitarian relief, maintaining security, protecting human rights, facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), aiding reconciliation, supporting the reform of governance structures, and enabling economic recovery and even broader development. The aim is to facilitate sustainable peace, preventing the recurrence of armed conflict and providing mechanisms to enable conflict to be managed without recourse to violence.

In part because the term 'peacebuilding' can be used to cover a huge array of activities, there has been much criticism of its ideological foundations, seen by many as a justification for interventionism, and more to do with promoting domestic interests than protecting the interests of those within countries affected by conflict (see Duffield, 2007). Additionally, as Chetail (2009) points out, high rates of conflict recurrence call into question the effectiveness of peacebuilding activities. Questions about the type of peace being built, the type of activities that should be prioritised, the type of actors who should lead the process, and to whom those involved are ultimately accountable to, need to be critically attended to (see Llamazares, 2005, for instance). There are many examples to show that lack of clarity and shared understanding of the type of peace, and also type of state, being built – and how to do it – have led to peace processes faltering (see Glennie, 2010, for case studies of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, particularly in the immediate aftermath of conflict, different international organisations, including the UN and many of its different agencies, had different priorities, depending upon their specific mandate. Within each organisation and agency there were also many different people with different levels of commitment to or understanding of their organisational goals, some of whom were seconded by their government (or another organisation) and so may have had competing aims. Moreover, actively engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina were many different countries which had different agendas depending upon their often shifting, strategic interests and domestic politics. This not only created confusion, but often competition between individuals and organisations, which undermined prospects for successful cessation of hostilities and sustainable peace and, thus, the prolonged suffering of many people. Returning to the type of peace being

built, it is fair to add that the assumptions behind peacebuilding are essentially those of the liberal state, and its effectiveness will therefore inevitably depend, to some extent, on the relevance of these assumptions when applied to other types of societies (see, e.g., Chandler, 2010; Cramer, 2006; Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2009).

The very complexity of peacebuilding and the enormity of its aims – coupled with the delicate balance between providing sufficient and sustained external assistance and ensuring the processes and results are locally owned and supported – are often overlooked, as are the many examples of significant steps taken towards peace in many places.

This is not surprising, since, as Chetail (2009) describes, in addition to the many activities and actors associated with peacekeeping, a triple transition is often involved:

- A security transition, from a situation of open violence to the progressive establishment of sustainable peace
- A socio-economic transition, from conflict economies to a peace economy which is more open to the private sector and to international trade
- A democratic transition, from an authoritarian system to one of representative government (Chetail, 2009: 8 citing David, 1998).

Just one of these transitions could cause much turbulence in any society, let alone in a society just emerging from conflict and also undergoing other transitions. The huge structural shifts, as well as the multiplicity of actors and activities in many sectors at all levels of society, can generate significant potential for tension and renewed conflict, if not managed carefully – that is, if not adequately planned, co-ordinated or communicated – and without sufficient grassroots understanding, involvement and support. Paradoxically, therefore, peacebuilding efforts themselves, unless sensitively handled, can be destabilising.

## Part 2 – Building Peace After Conflict

Of course, how we define peace and how we define peacebuilding will have a significant effect upon outcomes for societies that have experienced conflict. It is important to note that, while this book focusses upon formal efforts to build security and justice after conflict, many of the critical peacebuilding efforts are informal – the everyday, local-level initiatives that help build tolerance, raise awareness or increase resilience, for instance.

This chapter has introduced peacebuilding at its broadest; the rest of this book looks at ways in which to build security and justice primarily after conflict, after looking at the causes of conflict and conflict prevention more broadly in the next chapter. Engagement in the security and justice sector does not take place in isolation, of course, and will not be successful unless peacebuilding efforts in other sectors, such as the economy, politics and development, are effective. Such efforts include building a sustainable economy (at the macro and micro levels and, not least, generating employment opportunities), supporting political processes (including electoral processes) and developing good governance, enabling the delivery of essential basic

services (including water and sanitation), building the capacity of the health and education sectors, facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, promoting the protection of human rights, delivering humanitarian assistance, supporting reconciliation and providing for the development of a robust civil society.

It is important to be aware of the other types of activities involved, not least in order to anticipate the impact that activities in various sectors can have upon each other and to endeavour to ensure coherence of efforts. For example, those engaged in economic reform activities and those engaged in combatant demobilisation programmes or security sector institution rationalisation (often as part of broader Security Sector Reform programmes) should be aware of each other's desired and planned activities in order to ensure that they resonate with each other and, quite simply, are effective (see Box 1.5 on Kosovo for an example of why such co-ordination is important). Those developing programmes for demobilised combatants or those who may lose their jobs in the security sector through rationalisation need to know the opportunities and constraints that exist or will exist in terms of opportunities for employment or training as well as the constraints that might exist in terms of budgets, policy or other factors.

It is also important to remember that, in order for peacebuilding to formally begin, there first needs to be an end to conflict. Despite significant resources and attention given to trying to end conflict, as Kreuz (2010) and Ramsbotham et al. (2016) show, conflicts usually end without decisive conclusions. Consequently, such conflicts are prone to break out again and become protracted, not least because the root causes of the conflict remain unaddressed. A number of methods have been used to resolve conflicts, including not only military means (Flavin, 2003), but also negotiation and mediation (Ramsbotham et al., 2016), and economic pressures such as sanctions (Escribà-Folch, 2010; Gershenson, 2001). As will be mentioned in the next chapter, often the methods used to resolve conflict are quite similar to those used to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of conflict. As will be discussed, however, there are often many more actors involved in conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, and many more resources and attention given.

As the 2003 Iraq military invasion by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland demonstrates, the military can defeat opposing forces, but that in itself may not terminate, let alone resolve conflicts. Indeed, as in the Iraq War, it may simply provoke new conflicts. Often a combination of tools is required, the type and combination of which will need to be revisited regularly. Given the varied tools and many potential actors involved, it is critical that there is an overarching strategy and integral coherence to the interventions, to which all actors are committed.

### **Box 1.5: Kosovo**

In Kosovo, with the planned stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), it was necessary to know what activities were ongoing or planned in other sectors; were there economic opportunities on the horizon that could be utilised for those in the KPC who would not have a place in the future Kosovo Security Force (KSF); were there budgetary or policy constraints that would impact any planned legislation for veterans?

Various factors can influence whether a conflict recurs: notably, military victories and the deployment of peacekeepers (Fortna, 2004; Kreutz, 2010) are more likely to lead to lasting peace than peace settlements (Licklider, 1995). However, the positive effects of the deployment of peacekeepers may dissipate over time (Sambanis, 2007).

The signing of a peace settlement, significant as it is, is only a step towards lasting peace, which requires a whole series of extra ingredients to be successful. In reality, peace agreements are often not fully implemented and conflict recurs. This may result from lack of commitment, lack of local ownership, omission of wider considerations, deferral of difficult issues and many other factors.

Above all, perhaps, no peace process or agreement can be expected to work unless it reflects a widespread agreement among key indigenous actors that peace is more desirable than continued conflict. Otherwise, only a fragile peace will result. Some have also questioned whether 'peace at any price' is desirable, or even feasible. Others have argued that the cultural context and specificities are often ignored, and reconstruction has sought to impose an alien system on the environment. Others still have argued that peace agreements often do not address power imbalances, oppression or discrimination – and unless they do so, renewed conflict is likely. Certainly, there have been enough failures in peace processes that all of these factors and more can be plausibly blamed. But how to incorporate all these factors into a peace agreement and subsequent peace process – and whether that would provoke new forms of instability and insecurity – is another matter entirely.

## Conclusion

This chapter has introduced some of the core concepts commonly used in peacebuilding, including the concepts of conflict, security and peace. In so doing, it encourages critical reflection upon the concepts that are often taken for granted in practice and sometimes scholarship. We need to question what we mean by peace and security, and whether others share similar views, in order to be able to effectively address or analyse conflict and its causes and manifestations. We also need to question, when considering the broad concept of peacebuilding, whose peace and whose security are we interested in, and who or what are considered to pose threats to peace and security? In so doing, we recognise that these concepts are highly political and often used and misused for strategic gain. Through clarity of concepts, we can aim towards clarity of purpose. More critically, through clarity of concepts, we can also expose those instances where security is not equitable, peace is not meaningful to those beyond dominant or elite groups, and threats to peace are constructed to legitimise otherwise illegitimate interventions or responses.

To provide a context for subsequent chapters, this chapter has also briefly referred to ways in which armed conflict can be resolved and peace – however it is defined – can be built, beyond those efforts squarely within the security and justice sectors, which is the focus of this book. The next chapter provides further context for subsequent chapters by looking at the causes of conflict, recognising that effective peacebuilding needs to be responsive to causes, and conflict prevention,

recognising that effective prevention can save countless lives and much of the huge amount of resources that are invested into peacebuilding.

### Summary of Key Issues

- The stages of conflict and activities aimed at resolving conflict and building peace are often blurred and overlap.
- Violence, including armed violence, can occur at any stage outside what is formally referred to as armed conflict.
- Whilst visualising or mapping phases of conflict and intervention can be useful, if there is indeed a 'line of conflict', it is not linear or singular: it is multi-faceted, multifarious and dynamic.
- The way conflict is defined has a direct impact upon policy and practice; if conflict is perceived as linear, logical and one-dimensional, responses to conflict will seldom be appropriate.
- How we define security determines how actors think security is best developed and managed, and who or what we believe pose security threats.
- Security is a broad, heterogeneous and often contested concept, while the focus of providing security is very often state-centric and focussed on uniformed state security service providers.
- In part because the term 'peacebuilding' can be used to cover a huge array of activities, there has been much criticism of its ideological foundations.
- Effective peacebuilding requires that conflicts end conclusively and causes are addressed.
- Effective peace processes and agreements need to reflect a widespread agreement among key indigenous actors that peace is more desirable than conflict.
- Engagement in the security and justice sector does not take place in isolation, and will not be successful unless peacebuilding efforts in other sectors, outside the security and justice sector, are effective.

### Reflective Question

Consider how to have a shared understanding of peace and how it can be built, while accommodating its subjective, dynamic and complex nature.

### List of Core Resources

#### Concepts

- Call, C. (2008) 'The Fallacy of the 'Failed State', *Third World Quarterly*, 29(8): 1491–1507.
- Chetail, V. (2009) *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon* (New York: Oxford University Press).

- Grimm, S., Lemay-Hébert, N. and Nay, O. (2014) ‘“Fragile States”: Introducing a political concept’, *Third World Quarterly*, 35(2): 197–209.
- Snodderly, D. (ed.) (2011) *Peace Terms: A Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding* (Washington, DC: USIP). Available at [www.usip.org/publications/usip-peace-terms-glossary](http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-peace-terms-glossary).

### **Building peace after conflict (key texts relevant also to subsequent chapters)**

- Alda, E. and Mc Evoy, C. (2017) ‘Beyond the Battlefield: Towards a Better Assessment of the Human Cost of Armed Conflict’, *Briefing Paper, Geneva: Small Arms Survey*. Available at [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP4-Beyond-battlefield.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP4-Beyond-battlefield.pdf).
- Autesserre, S. (2014) *Peacelands* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Autesserre, S. (2018) *Peacebuilding in Africa*, Kujenga Amani podcast. Available at <http://apnpodcast.libsyn.com/sverine-autesserre>.
- Centre for Security Governance (CSG) (2016) eSeminar: *Is Peacebuilding Dying?* (video). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_pc2SgTob1g](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_pc2SgTob1g).
- Chandler, D. (2017) *Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1997–2017* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Chuter, D. (2014) ‘Fighting for the Toolbox: Why Building Security and Justice Post-Conflict is so Difficult’ in E. Gordon (ed.) *Building Security and Justice in Post-Conflict Environments* (Leicester: University of Leicester): 9–25. Available at <https://uolscid.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/scid-reader-2014-bookmarked.pdf>.
- CQ Researcher (ed.) (2011) *Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Selections From CQ Researcher* (Washington: Sage).
- Crocker, C., Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds) (2015) *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift* (Washington, DC: USIP).
- Crocker, C., Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War* (Washington, DC: USIP).
- Duffield, M. (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Gordon, E. (2014) (ed.) *Building Justice and Security in Post-Conflict Environments: SCID Reader 2014* (Leicester: University of Leicester). Available at <https://uolscid.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/scid-reader-2014-bookmarked.pdf>.
- Haider, H. (2014). *Conflict: Topic Guide*. Revised edition with B. Rohwerder (Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham).
- International Peace Institute (IPI) (2017). *Local Peacebuilding Successes: Lessons for the International Community* (video). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbmblAilU0](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbmblAilU0).
- ISSAfrica (2016) *Making Peacebuilding More Effective* (video). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=a1N9gQTPJCM](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a1N9gQTPJCM).
- Jackson, P. (2015) *Handbook of International Security and Development* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing).
- Jackson, P. and Beswick, D. (2018) *Conflict, Security and Development: An Introduction* (3<sup>rd</sup> edn) (Abingdon: Routledge).

- Kaldor, M. (2012) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Kamau, M. (2018) *Peacebuilding in Africa*, Kujenga Amani podcast. Available at <http://apnpodcast.libsyn.com/episode-1>.
- Karlsruud, J. (2015) 'The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali', *Third World Quarterly*, 36(1): 40–54.
- London School of Economics (LSE) (2017) *The Human Cost of Conflict: the search for dignity and rights of Palestine refugees*, presentation by Pierre Krähenbühl, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) Commissioner-General. 04 December. Available at [www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3949](http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3949).
- Mac Ginty, R. (2011) *Peacebuilding by the International Community* (animation). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=zN8rIxoXqWo&t=12s](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zN8rIxoXqWo&t=12s).
- Mac Ginty, R. and Williams, A. (2016) *Conflict and Development* (2nd edn) (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Mason, W. (2014) *A Social Reconstruction Approach to Fostering Security & Justice After Conflict*, University of Leicester (video). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=gER3UI8AXaA&list=PLjQX5EXgm57S0L7nT-QMVhQLKiYNsSPxu&index=3](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gER3UI8AXaA&list=PLjQX5EXgm57S0L7nT-QMVhQLKiYNsSPxu&index=3).
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. and Miall, H. (2016) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (4th edn) (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Richmond, O. (2014) 'The impact of socio-economic inequality on peacebuilding and statebuilding', *Civil Wars*, 16(4): 449–467.
- Visoko, G. (2017) *Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Waterfield, M. (2014) *Conflict Assessments in the Planning of Stabilisation/Conflict Recovery Programmes*, University of Leicester (video). Available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXOPxV0FJcE&list=PLjQX5EXgm57S0L7nT-QMVhQLKiYNsSPxu&index=5](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXOPxV0FJcE&list=PLjQX5EXgm57S0L7nT-QMVhQLKiYNsSPxu&index=5).
- Woodhouse, T., Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Mitchell, C. (2015) *The Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

# Index

*Please note:* page numbers in **bold type** indicate figures or illustrations, those in *italics* indicate tables or breakout boxes.

- access to justice
  - for children, 86
  - displacement and, 73
  - gender and, 72
  - as principle of rule of law, 72, 72–76
  - for SGBV survivors, 73, 74
  - for women and girls, 72–76
- accountability
  - and the DDR process, 148
  - as deterrent, 100
  - hybrid tribunals and, 107
  - as principle of SSR, 169
- affordability, in SSR, 169
- Afghanistan
  - co-ordination between actors, 50
  - inclusion of suspected war criminals into government, 116
  - mine risk education, 126
  - NATO mission, 53
  - police reform challenges, 199
  - role of local and private security actors, 53
  - SSR in, 193
  - Western organisation and training of Islamic fighters, 132
- Africa, growth in under-25 population, 148
- African National Congress (ANC), 271
- African Standby Force (ASF), 50
- African Union (AU), peacekeeping missions, 50
- aid, securitisation of, 7, 8
- AlertNet, 21
- Algeria, 131, 275
- Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support* (NATO), 63
- American Declaration of Independence, 207
- amnesties, 101, 109, 116
  - gendered perspective, 256
- Amnesty International, 178, 217
- Anderlini, S., 235
- Andrieu, K., 112
- Angola, 131–132
  - DDR in, 161
- ‘Arab Spring,’ 28, 36
- Arendt, H., 114
- armed conflict
  - categorising and measuring, 2
  - see also* conflict
- armed violence reduction (AVR), 130
- Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 134, 137
- Ashdown, Paddy, 85
- Australia, incarceration of Aboriginal women, 177
- Aydin, A., 211
- Azar, E., 7, 29
- Balkan Wars (1912–13), 96
- Balkans conflicts, 49, 57, 94, 97–98, 103, 216
  - see also* Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
- Basedau, M., 288
- al-Bashir, Omar, 108, 116
- battle deaths, as measurement mechanism
  - for armed conflict, 2
- Battle of Kursk, 122
- Bauman, Z., 114
- Bell, D., 222
- bell curve of conflict *see* curve of conflict
- Bellamy, A., 38, 211
- Bemba Gombo, Jean-Pierre, 106
- benefits of conflict, 21–22
- Beslan school massacre, 259
- Beswick, D., 2, 267
- Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), 137
- Black Death, 95
- Black Tigresses of Death, 259
- Blair, D., 186
- blood diamonds, 27, 288
- Blue Berets, 49
- Blue Helmets, 49
- Boesten, J., 240
- Boko Haram, 227, 237
- Boraine, A., 110

- Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)  
 and accountability of international organisations, 85  
 American Bar Association's initiative, 81–82  
 challenges for police reform, 175, 176  
 challenges for UNPROFOR, 52  
 co-ordination between actors, 50  
 engagement of former combatants in criminal activity, 160  
 escalation dominance, 57–58  
 EU policing activities, 81  
 EU policing mission, 50  
 failings on the part of the international community, 59  
 human rights violations as part of military strategy, 216–217  
 law enforcement, 56  
 NATO's role, 49  
 peacebuilding intervention, 13  
 peacebuilding priorities, 221  
 post-conflict environment, 60  
 rule of law activities, 81–82  
 scope of CRSV, 237  
 Srebrenica massacre, 98, 104, 216  
 transitional justice measures, 102, 107
- Bourne, M., 138
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 13, 31
- Brahimi, Lakhdar, 53
- Brahimi Report, 52, 53, 79
- Brecht, B., 210
- Brouneus, K., 112
- Brown, G., 27
- Burgoon, B., 274
- Burton, J., 29
- Burundi, 32, 50, 64, 116  
 detention of children, 229  
 traditional justice procedure, 111  
 withdrawal from ICC, 108
- Cambodia, 102, 107  
 mine action, 127
- Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), 127
- Casspir mine-proof vehicle, 122
- causes of conflict, 20–29  
 'ancient hatreds' narratives, 21  
 Balkans, 21  
 diversionary theory, 24–25  
 economic theories, 23  
 First World War, 21  
 general theories, 22  
 greed vs grievance, 27  
 human rights violations, 214–215  
 inter-state conflict, 23–25  
 intra-state conflict, 25–26  
 Iran–Iraq War, 21  
 Iraq invasion, 23  
 MENA uprisings, 28  
 organised crime and, 293  
 resource curse, 27, 28  
 risk factors, 26, 34
- Central African Republic (CAR)  
 escalation of sexual violence, 236–237  
 impact of CRSV, 237, 240
- Chechen Black Widows, 259
- Chetail, V., 1–2, 13–14
- Chilcot Report, 276
- child abuse, correlation between and conflict and, 228
- child soldiers  
 definition of a child soldier, 149  
 identification issues, 150  
 increase in recruitment and use of, 227  
 recruitment of as grave violation of human rights, 228  
 and the victim/perpetrator dichotomy, 114
- Child Soldiers International, 114
- children  
 access to justice, 86  
 Beijing Rules on detention of, 228, 229  
 conscription/enlistment of as war crime, 149  
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 230  
 DDR and, 149–150  
 engaging children in peacebuilding, 229  
 grave violations against, 228  
 human rights, 227–230  
 juvenile justice, 229  
 use of as human bombs, 227
- Chomsky, N., 31
- civil society  
 composition, 219  
 conflict prevention role, 35–36  
 and decisions on intervention, 62  
 and domestic violence, 228  
 influence on Arms Trade Treaty, 134  
 and local ownership, 90  
 and rule of law, 76  
 and SSG, 189  
 and SSR, 11, 78, 188, 192, 250

- civilian casualties, 2, 215, 228
- civilian oversight, as principle of SSR, 169
- Clapham, A., 54
- climate change, 26, 35, 270, 278
- cluster munitions, 122–123, 128
- Convention on Cluster Munitions*, 128
- use of in Syria and Yemen, 128–129
- ‘CNN effect,’ 30, 31, 62, 97
- Cockayne, J., 285, 289–290
- Cohen, D., 237
- Coicaud, J.-M., 222
- Cold War
- change in nature of war since the end of, 235
- and the proliferation of SALW, 133
- use of mines, 122
- Collier, P., 22, 27
- Collins, C., 211
- Colombia
- DDR approach to women, 151
- engagement of former combatants in criminal activity, 160
- experiences of diverse SOGIE groups, 260
- gender dynamics of peacebuilding, 243
- memorialisation Graffiti in Bogota, 111
- organised crime, 287
- peace agreement, 36, 129
- violence in, 9
- Colombian Agency for Reintegration, 152
- Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 75–76, 245, 246, 251, 256
- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Union (EU), 49–50
- concentration camps, 96
- conflict
- causes of, 20–29
- the concept, 2–10
- consequences at international level, 269–270
- consequences at national level, 267, 269
- consequences at regional level, 268
- as a continuum, 8
- ‘curve of conflict,’ 3–9
- direct vs indirect victims, 236
- human rights and, 213–218
- impact of perception on policy and practice, 10
- links with organised crime, 290–292
- positive aspects, 21–22
- recurrence of, 4, 15, 34, 100, 108, 161, 214, 294
- recurrence rate, 131
- relationship with violence, 8, 9
- response mechanisms, 2
- risks for women, 235–236
- underlying social factors, 148
- Conflict, Security and Development* (Jackson/Beswick), 2
- conflict analysis, 29
- ‘conflict deferment,’ 32
- conflict mapping, 29
- conflict prevention, 29–38
- aim of, 30
- benefits of investment in, 32
- biggest obstacle, 37
- Colombia, 36
- early warning, 34
- guiding criteria, 36
- human rights and, 218
- international organisations’ responsibilities, 35
- Macedonia, 33
- missed opportunities, 32
- operational tools, 35
- potential for adverse impact, 38
- responsible actors, 35
- successes and failures, 33
- systemic, 35
- tools of, 34–38
- ‘conflict prevention,’ 29
- conflict resolution
- distinction between conflict transformation and, 29
- rights-based approaches, 215
- conflict transformation, 29
- conflict-affected environments
- combating organised crime, 294
- and piracy, 282
- conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)
- calls for UN monitoring, 239
- in camps for displaced persons, 240
- cessation as goal of WPS agenda, 244
- the concept, 105, 236
- consequences for victim-survivors, 240
- examples of, 237–238
- likelihood of prosecution, 256
- magnitude of the harm caused by, 237
- male victims, 257
- as military strategy, 105, 236
- post-conflict use of, 241

- prevention and prosecution efforts, 238
- reasons for underreporting, 238
- shame factor, 240
- as terrorist tactic, 236
- understanding pattern and scope of, 237
- UNSG description, 236
- context-specificity
  - as core principle of SSR, 195
  - and the DDR process, 148
  - the principle, 83
  - and rule of law, 84, 89
  - and SSR, 169, 195
  - and transitional justice, 101, 117
- Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons*, 127
- Convention on Cluster Munitions*, 128
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*, 128
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, 230
- Cook, Robin, 108
- Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), 133, 138
- co-ordination
  - and the DDR process, 148
  - security challenges, 60–61
  - in SSR, 169
- Correlates of War Project, 3
- Côte d'Ivoire, 139
  - prison escapes, 178
- Crenshaw, M., 278
- crimes against humanity
  - definition, 99
  - Rome Statute definition, 100
- criminal activity, engagement of former
  - combatants in, 160
- criminal tribunals, international and hybrid, 102–107
- curve of conflict
  - the concept, 3
  - context specificity, 9
  - criticisms of the bell curve, 8
  - Lund's introduction, 3
  - portrayal of, 9
  - as useful visual tool, 5
- Daesh, 272
  - see also* Islamic State (IS)
- Dallaire, Romeo, 98–99
- DanChurchAid (DCA), 136
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 136
- Darfur, 45, 116, 240
- Dayton Peace Agreement, 57
- Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 245
- defence reform, 55, 180–186
- demobilisation, 45, 145–147, 158, 181, 192
  - definition, 146
- democratic oversight and control, 187
- democratic peace theory, 23
- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
  - challenges for police reform, 176
  - contributing factors to conflict in, 288
  - human rights violations, 217
  - inclusion of suspected war criminals into government, 116
  - resource curse, 27
  - scope of CRSV, 237
  - trigger for conflict in, 268
- democratic societies, vulnerability to
  - terrorism debate, 274
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 13, 80, 126, 149, 179
- development
  - the concept, 4
  - defence, diplomacy and, 7
  - link between security and (*see also* security-development nexus), 23
- diplomacy, 3–4, 7, 30, 46, 65
- disability, and reintegration, 154
- disarmament, definition, 145
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 144–164
  - actors, 149
  - challenges and recommendations, 155–162
  - and children, 149–150
  - communication and, 157–158
  - the concept, 145–147
  - co-ordination with other peacebuilding programmes, 154–155
  - DDR Process, 146
  - flexible approach, 156
  - gender-responsiveness/sensitivity, 152, 254–256
  - guiding principles, 148
  - and health, 154
  - historical perspective, 144, 155
  - integrated approach, 145
  - link with SSR, 154–155
  - as military activity, 55
  - and the needs of children, 229
  - Nepal, 159

- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (*Cont.*)  
 ‘next generation DDR,’ 161  
 objectives, 147–148  
 political economy, 152–154  
 primary components, 145–146  
 rule of law and, 80  
 and SALW control, 153–154, 155, 161  
 South Sudan, 156, 255  
 stakeholders, 149  
 and women, 151–152  
*see also* reintegration
- displacement  
 and access to justice, 73  
 associated risks, 241, 287  
 as common result of conflict, 217  
 heightened risk for women and children, 228, 240  
 intersectional perspective, 260  
 sexual violence and, 73, 236–237, 240  
 and vulnerability to threat of mines and ERW, 129  
*see also* refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
- diversionary theory, 24–25
- Dodge, T., 29
- domestic violence  
 correlation between and conflict and, 228  
 as indicator of public violence, 235  
 prevalence in post-conflict societies, 242
- Donais, T., 54
- drug trade, organised crime and the, 286–287
- Duffield, M., 24, 62, 211
- duration dilemma, 56–57
- early recovery, the concept, 4
- early warning, criticisms, 32
- Ebert, Friederich, 145
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 136
- economic theories of conflict, 23
- education, relationship with economic growth, 148
- Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (Arendt), 114
- Elhawary, S., 8
- engagement, overlapping stages, 6
- equality  
 and the DDR process, 148  
 as principle of rule of law, 68  
 requirements of actual equality before the law, 82  
*see also* gender equality
- escalation dominance, 57–58
- ETA (Basque separatist group), 271
- Ethiopia, 241
- ethnic cleansing, 37–38, 96, 106  
 establishment of a link between rape and, 106
- ethnic violence, popular explanations, 21
- European Union (EU)  
 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 49–50  
 Non-proliferation Consortium, 136  
 peacekeeping role, 49  
 rule of law missions, 81
- explosive remnants of war (ERW)  
 problems of in Western Europe, 122  
 risks to children, 227  
*see also* mine action; mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
- Falkland Islands, 25
- Fearon, J., 27
- Fischer, M., 110
- Fisher, M., 240
- Flisi, I., 152
- Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 126
- footprint dilemma, 56–57
- Force Balancing, 51
- Force Generation, 51
- Foreign Direct Investment, 147
- former combatants  
 employment and reintegration, 152–153  
 engagement in criminal activity, 160
- Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 50
- former Yugoslavia, 32–33, 102, 104, 113
- fragile states  
 post-9/11 renewal of interest, 267  
 regional security threat, 268  
 as transnational security threat, 269
- Framework Nation Concept (FNC), 51
- France, impact of the Hundred Years’ War, 95
- free press, 189
- Free Syrian Army, 268
- freedom of information, 189
- Frei, N., 211
- French Resistance, 271
- Furundžija, Anto, 105

- gacaca* courts, 111–112
- Galtung, J., 12, 60
- gender
- and access to justice, 72
  - and DDR, 152, 254–256
  - gender dynamics of peacebuilding, 242–257
  - gender mainstreaming, 246–248
  - gendered stereotypes, 257–261
  - ICTY and the advancement of gender justice, 105–106
  - intersectional approach to security, 260
  - legal framework on non-discrimination and equality, 245
  - masculinities, 261
  - and mine action, 256–257
  - and SALW control, 257
  - and SSR, 248–254
  - and transitional justice, 256
  - violence and discrimination against members of the LGBTIQ community and people of diverse SOGIE, 260
- gender crimes, role of international courts in advancing understanding of, 105
- gender equality
- the concept, 247
  - and local ownership, 252
  - SSR and, 197–198
- gender mainstreaming, 198, 234, 245–248, 250
- definition, 247
  - requirements in rule of law and security activities, 248
  - in SSR, 250
- gender-based violence
- CEDAW on, 76
  - post-conflict levels, 8
- gender-responsiveness, in SSR, 169
- Geneva Conventions, 95, 97, 128, 212
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 126
- genocide
- definition, 99
  - reluctance to acknowledge, 97–98
  - Rome Statute definition, 99
  - sexual violence and, 105, 239
  - see also* Rwandan genocide
- German Federal Foreign Office, 136
- Ghimire, S., 199
- GICHD and Handicap Initiative, 136
- Gleditsch, N., 62
- Global Coalition against Daesh, 272
- Global South, deployment of troops from, 52
- ‘golden hour,’ 45
- good governance, as priority for SSR, 169
- Gowlland-Debbas, V., 85
- Grady, K., 240
- greed vs grievance debate, 27
- Guterres, António, 236
- Hague Conventions, 96, 212
- Haider, H., 28
- Haiti, 64
- prison escapes, 178
  - UN peacekeeping operation, 49
- HALO Trust (HALO), 127
- Hapsburg Empire, 96
- Haradinaj, Ramush, 116
- Harding, J., 211
- health, DDR and, 154
- Helsing, J., 215–216
- Herman, E., 31
- High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 52, 53
- Hills, A., 176, 190
- HIV, 154, 289
- Hoeffler, A., 27
- Holocaust, 96–97
- horizontal inequalities, 26–27, 273
- horror sanguinis*, 112
- Hourmat, M., 114
- Hudson, V. M., 235
- Human Development Index (HDI), 24
- human needs theory, 29
- human rights, 206–233
- children, 227–230
  - the concept, 208
  - and conflict, 213–218
  - conflicting rights, 210–212
  - Convention on the Rights of the Child, 230
  - criticisms of the discourse, 224
  - distinctions, 208–209
  - engaging children in peacebuilding, 229
  - fundamental, 177, 209–211, 213, 215
  - historical perspective, 207
  - informal justice mechanisms and, 87
  - international human rights, 206–212
  - juvenile justice, 229

- human rights (*Cont.*)
  - and the military intervention debate, 211
  - non-derogable, 208
  - perception of inalienability, 208
  - post-conflict prioritisation, 210
  - potential impact of mines and ERW on, 128
  - principles, 209–210
  - and rule of law, 68, 70, 78
  - sidelining, 221
  - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 207
  - universalist vs cultural relativist perspectives, 209
  - vulnerable groups, 226–227
  - see also* human rights violations; human rights work
- human rights violations
  - as causes of conflict, 214–215
  - as consequences of conflict, 216–218
  - continuation in the aftermath of conflict, 218
  - correlation with armed conflict, 213–214
  - military intervention debate, 211
  - natural resources and, 217
  - as part of military strategy, 216–217
  - state responsibilities, 222
- human rights work
  - in post-conflict environments, 218–230
  - power, evidence and context challenges, 222
  - principles, activities and actors, 220
  - recommendations for improving effectiveness of, 225–226
  - resource, co-ordination and cultural challenges, 222
  - resource access, co-ordination and cultural challenges, 222–225
  - security, priorities and justifications challenges, 220–221
  - value of ‘conflict-sensitivity,’ 215
- human security
  - introduction of the concept, 11
  - meaning of, 43
- human trafficking
  - displacement and, 241
  - and organised crime, 287
  - risks for women and children, 227, 240
  - statistics on, 287
  - UN resolutions against, 246
- humanitarian principles, 46, 55
- humanitarian relief, the concept, 4
- humanitarian space, definition, 47
- Hundred Years’ War, 95
- Hurwitz, A., 84
- hybrid approaches, to SSR, 196
- hybrid criminal tribunals, 102–107
- Ignatieff, M., 210–211
- Implementation Force (IFOR), 57
- improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 129
- In Larger Freedom* (UNSG), 213
- independent judiciary, 78, 189
- indirect victims of conflict, women as, 236, 241
- Indonesia, 81
- inequalities, horizontal, 26–27, 273
- informal justice mechanisms, 76–77, 86–88, 174
- information technology, 31, 271
- Ingelaere, B., 112
- International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 133
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 123, 128–129
- International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 116
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 136
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 97, 126
- international courts, 102
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 245
- International Criminal Court (ICC)
  - establishment, 95–96
  - and the limits of political will, 115
  - overview, 107–108
  - shortcomings with SGBV cases, 106
  - and understanding of gender crimes, 105–106
  - see also* Rome Statute
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), 136
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 97, 102–103, 105–106, 108
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
  - and the advancement of gender justice, 105–106

- establishment, 97, 102
- function, 103
- structure, 103
- international criminal tribunals, 102–107
- International Human Rights Law (IHRL), 212
- International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 212
  - see also* human rights
- International Maritime Organization (IMO), 136
- international military actors, 48–53
  - challenges for in UN peace operations, 51–53
  - co-ordination between actors, 50–51
  - humanitarian and reconstruction tasks, 55
  - law enforcement tasks, 56
  - regional organisations, 49–50
  - security tasks, 55–56
  - UN peacekeepers, 48–49
- International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), 125–126
- international organisations (IOs), conflict prevention responsibilities, 35
- international security threats, 266–299
  - see also* transnational security
- International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), 133, 138
- International Tracing Instrument (ITI), 133, 137
- intersectional approach to security, 260
- inter-state conflict, causes of conflict, 23–25
- intervention
  - moral argument, 62
  - use of pre-existing models, 59
  - see also* military interventions
- intra-state conflict, causes of, 25–26
- Iran–Iraq War, causes of, 21
- Iraq
  - access to justice for SGBV survivors, 73
  - decline in terrorist attacks, 273
  - role of local and private security actors, 53
- Iraq intervention, 15
  - criticisms, 6
  - Lieberfeld’s explanation for, 23
- Irish Republican Army (IRA), 271
- Islamic State (IS)
  - background and history, 272
  - Chilcot findings, 276
  - continuing decline, 271, 273
  - use of children, 227
  - use of IEDs, 129
  - use of sexual violence, 237
- Izetbegović, Alija, 113
- Jackson, P., 2, 267
- Jenkins, K., 186
- Jones, S., 45
- justice
  - the concept, 68
  - ICTY and the advancement of gender justice, 105–106
  - and rule of law, 68–69
  - traditional justice procedure, 111–112
  - see also* access to justice; security and justice; transitional justice
- justice reform, 172–174
- ‘justice vs security’ dilemma, 83
- juvenile justice, 229
- Kaldor, M., 131, 215, 268
- Kaplan, O., 160
- Katanga, Germain, 106
- Katz, L., 38, 212
- Kenya, 116
- Koning, R., 288
- Kony, Joseph, 108
- Korea, US use of mines in, 122
- Kosovo
  - administration of justice, 107
  - co-ordination between actors, 50
  - defence reform, 185
  - EU rule of law mission, 81
  - impact on NATO, 53
  - integration of former combatants, 182
  - Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), 196
  - languages used, 158
  - law enforcement, 56
  - local ownership and SSR, 169, 195
  - national security strategy, 195
  - NATO’s role, 49
  - peacebuilding activities, 15
  - police training school, 81
  - post-conflict priorities, 210
  - SALW control, 135
  - SSR in, 192, 195
  - transitional justice measures, 102, 107
  - UN policing mandate, 81

- Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 277  
 Kovač, Radomir, 105  
 Kreutz, J., 15  
 Krstić, Radislav, 98, 106, 216  
 Kunarac, Dragoljub, 105
- Laitin, D., 27  
 landmines *see* mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)  
 Lauderdale, P., 270–271, 274  
 law enforcement, role of international military actors, 56  
 Lay, J., 288  
 Lebanon, 60  
 Lederach, J. P., 29  
 legal aid, 72–73, 75  
 Levy, J., 22  
 LGBTIQ community  
   and gendered harms, 259  
   violence and discrimination against, 260  
 Li, Q., 274  
 Liberia  
   DDR approach to women, 151  
   human rights violations, 217  
   post-conflict justice environment, 172  
   SALW control efforts, 139  
 Libya  
   intervention in, 32, 38  
   SALW control, 136  
 Lieberfeld, D., 23, 25  
 local ownership  
   and the DDR process, 148  
   gender equality and, 252  
   and rule of law, 89  
   and SSR, 169, 193–197  
 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), 108, 114, 116, 150  
 Löwenheim, O., 34  
 Lubanga Dyilo, Thomas, 106  
 Luck, E., 38, 212  
 Lund, M., 3  
 Lyck, M., 116
- Macedonia  
   conflict prevention, 33  
   EU policing activities, 81  
   UN peacekeeping force, 57  
 Malawi, 268  
 Mali  
   SALW trade, 137  
   SSR in, 191  
 Mani, R., 68, 84  
 Martin, G., 273–275  
 Mazurana, D., 258  
 McMullin, J., 289, 292–294  
 Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), 103–104  
 memorialisation, 110  
   Graffiti in Bogota, Colombia, 111  
 men, as victims of sexual violence, 257, 259  
 Mertus, J., 215, 216  
 Mexico, 131  
   violence in, 9  
 Middle East and North Africa (MENA),  
   uprisings, 28, 36  
 military, special status, 55  
 military engagement in peace support operations, guiding principles, 63–64  
 military interventions  
   and blurred boundaries, 59–60  
   criticisms, 62  
   neo-colonial implications, 211  
   time pressures, 58–59  
 military strategy, human rights violations as part of, 216–217  
 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 24  
 Milošević, Slobodan, 103, 116  
 mine action  
   activities, 125–126  
   actors, 126–127  
   advocacy, 126  
   Cambodia, 127  
   challenges and recommendations, 129–130  
   clearance, 126  
   definition, 125  
   funding challenges, 129  
   gender and, 256–257  
   Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 126  
   information challenges, 130  
   risk education, 125–126  
   standards, 126  
   stockpile destruction, 126  
   victim assistance, 126  
   *see also* mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)  
 Mine Advisory Group (MAG), 127  
 Mine Ban Convention, 128  
 Mine Ban Convention, 122  
 Mine Ban Treaty, 127  
 Mine Risk Education (MRE), 121, 125, 130, 256

- mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
- consequences for female victims, 257
  - continuing threat, 129
  - extent of the problem, 123–125
  - financial cost, 125
  - historical context, 122
  - legal instruments, 127–129
  - and post-conflict insecurity, 45
  - prevalence in post-conflict environments, 121
  - risks to children, 227
  - South African development of mine-proof vehicle, 122
  - and SSR, 191
  - vulnerability of children, 123
- Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), 49, 79, 80
- Mladić, Ratko, 105
- mobile courts, 75
- Modernity and the Holocaust* (Bauman), 114
- Montreux Document, 53
- Moscow theatre bombing, 259
- Mozambique
- conflict related deaths, 241
  - impact of conflict on trade and GDP, 268
  - traditional justice process, 111
- Muggah, R., 161
- multinational peace operations
- challenges, 51–53
  - co-ordination between actors, 50–51
- Munive, J., 153
- Myanmar, government use of mines and IEDs, 129
- National Centre for Peacekeeping Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMCEC), 127
- natural resources, 21, 23, 26–28, 217, 286, 288
- Nazi Germany, 62
- Nazi Party, 145
- Nazi policies, 96
- Nazis, treatment of civilians, 96–97
- negative peace, 61
- Nepal, 182
- integration of former female combatants into the Nepal Army, 252–253
  - SSR and SSG, 190
- ‘new wars,’ 215
- Ní Aoláin, F., 254
- Nietzsche, F., 114
- Nigeria
- SALW trade, 137
  - sexual violence in, 237
- 9/11, impact on perception of security threats, 55, 267, 278
- non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
- defence reform role, 183
  - and human rights, 220, 222
  - mine action work, 126
  - North-South inequity, 222
  - oversight provision, 167
  - SSR role, 170, 201
- non-state actors, 54–55
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- adoption of Framework Nation Concept, 51
  - Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*, 63
  - impact of Kosovo and Afghanistan missions on, 53
  - military component in Kosovo and Afghanistan, 50
  - peacekeeping role, 49
  - SALW control, 136
- Norville, V., 244
- Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), 135
- Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 127
- Nussio, E., 160
- O’Donnell, C., 161
- Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), 80, 179
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 222
- Oliverio, A., 270–271, 274
- On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic* (Nietzsche), 114
- Ongwen, Dominic, 114, 150
- Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 50
- organised crime
- attractiveness of post-conflict states for, 268
  - and the causes of conflict, 293
  - combating in conflict-affected environments, 294
  - defining, 285
  - and the drug trade, 286–287
  - the fight against, 289–290
  - links with conflict, 290–292
  - and peace processes, 293

- organised crime (*Cont.*)
  - relationship between armed conflict and, 291
  - the threat, 288
  - trafficking of people, 287
  - types of, 286–288
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 81, 136
- Organization of American States (OAS), 127
- Ottoman Empire, 96
- Oxfam, 241
  
- Paris, R., 38, 57, 212
- Paris Principles, 149–150
- Parlevliet, M., 218
- Patrick, S., 267–268, 277, 290, 292
- peace
  - the concept, 12
  - positive and negative, 61
- peace agreements
  - blanket amnesties in, 256
  - and child DDR, 148–150, 163
  - compliance monitoring, 45
  - and coordination of DDR and SSR, 181
  - failure rate, 131
  - power imbalances and, 16
  - references to women, 242
- peace operations, UN history of, 49
- peace processes
  - marginalisation of women from, 242–244, 256, 259
  - organised crime and, 293
- Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 131
- ‘peace vs justice’ dilemma, 115–117
- peacebuilding
  - activities, 14–15, 48
  - the concept, 12–14
  - democratic peace theory and, 23
  - differing interpretations, 1–3
  - engaging children in, 229
  - gender dynamics, 242–257
  - inclusive approaches to, 54
  - spectrum of activities, 13
  - triple transition, 14
- peacemaking, activities, 48
- penal reform, 177–180
- Pergantis, V., 85
- Peru
  - gender inequality, 240
  - Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 260
- Pfister, D., 285, 289
- phases of conflict
  - distinctions, 4–5
  - formal signifiers, 3
- Picciotto, R., 32, 38
- piracy
  - conflict-affected environments and, 282
  - cost to the international economy, 279
  - current threat, 280
  - defining, 279
  - effects of, 279–280
  - fighting, 281–282
  - piracy–conflict nexus, 284–285
  - reasons for decline in, 280
  - Somali piracy, 266, 282, 283–284
- Piza-Lopez, E., 235
- planning, in SSR, 169
- Plowden, W., 186
- police reform, 174–177
- political violence, reasons for engagement in, 273–274
- positive peace, 12, 60, 61
- post-conflict environments
  - attractiveness to organised criminal networks, 268
  - community priorities, 210
  - gender balance of deaths in, 240
  - human rights work in, 218–230
  - key actors, 170–171
  - neoliberal perspective, 147
  - violence against women (VAW), 240–242
- post-conflict peace, average length, 131
- post-conflict reconstruction, sequence of events, 60
- post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 259
- poverty
  - effective criminalisation of, 177
  - impact on security and stability, 6, 23
- pre-emptive war, 215
- preventive diplomacy, 35
- prison escapes, in conflict-affected environments, 178
- private military and security companies (PMSCs), 53
- private security companies (PSCs), 53–54
- Proctor, K., 258
- prosecution initiatives, 102
- prosecutions
  - domestic and third-party, 102
  - limitations, 108
  - and the victim/perpetrator dichotomy, 114

- protracted social conflict, 7, 29  
 proxy wars, 25, 283  
 public violence, indicators of, 235  
 purification rituals, 112
- al-Qaeda, 272  
 Qatar, 268
- Ramsbotham, O., 4, 15
- rape  
   as crime against humanity, 106  
   prohibition under the Geneva Convention, 105  
   as war crime, 105  
   *see also* sexual violence
- Rathmell, A., 45
- reconciliation, DDR and, 145, 155  
 reconstruction, reform vs, 166
- refugees  
   potential impact on receiving countries, 268  
   vulnerability to threat of mines and ERW, 129
- refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), 48, 76, 125, 129  
   *see also* displacement
- Rehn, Elisabeth, 237
- reinsertion, definition, 147
- reintegration  
   challenges for, 152  
   challenges for women, 255  
   definition, 146  
   disability and, 154  
   gendered nature, 254  
   importance of gender-responsiveness, 153  
   key objective, 147
- reparations, 110–111
- resource curse, as cause of conflict, 27, 28
- Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 37, 38, 211–212  
   criticisms, 38
- restorative justice, 110
- Rieff, D., 212
- Riley, K., 45
- risk factors, for intra-state conflict, 26
- Rogers, P., 274, 278
- Rome Statute, 95  
   on conscription/enlistment of children, 149  
   definition of crimes against humanity, 100
- definition of genocide, 99  
   definition of war crimes, 101  
   and ‘Geneva’/‘Hague’ traditions, 95–96  
   signatories, 108  
   transitional justice and the, 98
- Ron, J., 215
- Rosen, N., 211
- Rost, N., 213
- rule of law, 67–93  
   access to justice, 72, 72–76  
   accountability and, 84–85  
   accountability of international organisations, 85  
   activities, 71–79  
   actors, 79–82  
   American Bar Association’s BiH initiative, 81  
   children and access to justice, 86  
   the concept, 67–70  
   conceptual challenges, 82–83  
   context-specificity and, 84, 89  
   contextual challenges, 83  
   equality as fundamental principle, 68  
   as focus of UN mission in Haiti, 79–80  
   guiding principles for UN rule of law activities, 78–79  
   human rights and, 70  
   implementation shortcomings, 83–88  
   importance for sustainable peace, 94  
   inclusion and, 86–88  
   lessons learnt/recommendations, 88–91  
   local knowledge and, 85  
   local ownership and, 85–86, 89  
   origins, 69  
   prerequisites and associated activities, 77–78  
   as principle of SSR, 169  
   recommendations and associated principles, 89–91  
   UN definition, 71  
   UN police, 87
- rule of law vacuum, 72, 221
- Rules of Engagement (RoE), 51, 58
- rules of war, international codification, 95
- Russia, engagement in Ukraine and Syria, 25
- Rwanda  
   failings on the part of the international community, 59  
   invasion of DRC, 268  
   traditional justice procedure, 111–112

- Rwandan genocide, 59, 97–99, 103, 112, 116, 237  
 scope of CRSV, 237
- safe and secure environment, 42–66  
 activities of international military actors, 55–56  
 challenges and lessons learned, 56–64  
 core principles, 63  
 definitions, 44–45  
 establishment requirements, 45  
 importance of security, 42–43  
 literature review, 61  
 managing expectations, 61–64  
 overlapping activities, 48  
 peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 47–48  
 stabilisation, 46
- Saferworld, 8
- SALW control  
 actors, 136–137  
 challenges and recommendations, 137–139  
 cultural perspective, 134–135  
 gender and, 257  
 international standards and policy documents, 133–134  
 Kosovo, 135  
 Libya, 136  
 as military activity, 55  
 in post-conflict environments, 134  
 and the post-conflict trade in used weapons, 153–155, 161  
 Programme of Action (PoA), 133–134, 137–138  
 and SSR, 139  
 wider considerations, 134–135  
*see also* small arms and light weapons (SALW)
- SARS epidemic, human rights perspective, 210
- Saturday Courts, Sierra Leone, 72, 74–75
- Saudi Arabia, 268
- Save the Children, 241
- Scheffer, D., 37
- Schmeidl, S., 235
- security  
 blurred boundaries, 59–60  
 the concept, 10–11  
 co-ordination challenges, 60–61  
 defining, 42  
 duration and footprint dilemmas, 56–57  
 escalation dominance, 57–58  
 ‘hybrid forms of security provision,’ 54  
 importance of, 42–43  
 international military actors, 48–53  
 intersectional approach, 260  
 link between development and, 23  
 local and private actors, 53, 56  
 non-state actors, 54–55  
 post-conflict window of opportunity, 45  
 safe and secure environment, 44–48  
 spoilers, 43–44  
 state control, 43  
 time pressures, 58–59  
*see also* transnational security
- security and justice  
 informal providers, 200  
*see also* building security and justice after conflict
- Security Council (SC), decision-making role, 51
- security sector  
 definition, 167  
 the sector, 168
- Security Sector Governance (SSG), 186–190  
 actors engaged in, 187  
 challenges and recommendations, 189–190  
 the concept, 186  
 democratic oversight and control, 188–189  
 importance of, 187  
*see also* Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- Security Sector Reform (SSR), 205  
 aims and principles, 167  
 challenges and recommendations, 190–201  
 common features of effective and accountable security sectors, 167  
 the concept, 166  
 context-specificity, 195  
 defence reform, 180–186  
 disparity between principles and practice, 193  
 as feature of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts, 170  
 and gender equality, 197–198  
 gender mainstreaming in, 250  
 gender-responsiveness/sensitivity, 248–254  
 holistic and comprehensive, 198–199

- hybrid approaches, 196
- informal security and justice providers, 200
- integration of former female combatants into the Nepal Army, 252–253
- justice and security institutions, 171–186
- justice reform, 172–174
- key activities, 171–172
- key actors in post-conflict environments, 170–171
- lack of resources as challenge for, 191
- link with DDR, 154–155
- local ownership, 193–197
- measuring success, 200–201
  - as military activity, 55
  - and the needs of children, 229
- overlap with rule of law activities, 78
- overview, 165–171
- penal reform, 177–180
- police reform, 174–177
- policy guidance resources, 249
- principles, 169
- programmes and activities, 170
- public opinion surveys, 197
- risks, 190, 193
- SALW control and, 139
- sector specific activities, 172–186
- the security sector, 167
- state-centric focus, 199
  - see also* Security Sector Governance (SSG)
- security sectors, common features, 167
- security vacuum, 8, 45, 46, 65, 134, 192, 241
- security-development nexus, 24, 26, 166
  - and the blurring of boundaries, 59–60
- sequencing
  - as challenge for post-conflict reconstruction, 60
  - in SSR, 169
- sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
  - access to justice for survivors of, 73, 74
  - expansion in post-conflict environments, 45, 241
  - ICC shortcomings, 106
  - neglect of male victims, 259
  - post-conflict use of, 241
  - reluctance to report by people of diverse SOGIE, 260
- sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), by international agencies, 241
- sexual orientation and gender identity and expression (SOGIE)
  - and gender mainstreaming, 247
  - and gendered harms, 259
  - and SSR, 169
  - and violence/discrimination, 260
- sexual violence
  - conflict-related *see* conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)
  - displacement and, 73, 236–237, 240
  - and genocide, 105, 239
  - men as victims of, 257, 259
- sexual violence in armed conflict (SVAC), 236
  - see also* conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)
- Al-Shabaab, 227
- Sierra Leone
  - access to justice for SGBV survivors, 74
  - contributing factors to conflict in, 288
  - defence reform, 183
  - human rights violations, 217
  - justice app, 75
  - resource curse, 27
  - scope of CRSV, 237
  - transitional justice measures, 102, 107, 110, 112
- Singapore, 147
- Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 237
- Sisk, T., 57
- Sjoberg, L., 259
- small arms and light weapons (SALW)
  - availability in post-conflict states, 121, 131, 268
  - deaths in so-called peaceful states, 132
  - definition, 130–131
  - durability and mobility, 131
  - impact of illicit trade, 137
  - potential contribution to exacerbation of conflicts, 131–132
  - potential impact in post-conflict environments, 132
  - and SSR, 191
  - trade in, 138
  - see also* SALW control
- Small Arms Survey, 136
- Social Darwinism, 96
- social media, 29, 31, 37
- Solomon, R., 37
- Somali piracy, 266, 282, 283–284

- Somalia, 50, 279–280
- South Africa  
 challenges for police reform, 176  
 defence reform, 181  
 development of mine-proof vehicle, 122  
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 109–110, 114
- South Korea, 147
- South Sudan  
 DDR in, 156, 255  
 human rights violations as part of military strategy, 216–217  
 mine clearance, 126  
 reintegration priorities, 153
- Spanish Civil War, British foreign fighters, 278
- Specht, I., 160
- spoilers, 30, 43–44, 181, 200  
 examples of, 44  
 managing, 45  
 potential, 43–44, 83, 153–154, 226–227, 229
- Srebrenica massacre, 98, 104, 216
- Sri Lanka  
 involvement of women in terrorism, 259  
 reinforcement of gender stereotypes in the DDR process, 254
- Sriram, C., 27, 71, 116, 218
- stabilisation, 46  
 definition, 46–47  
 UK Stabilisation Unit, 7, 46, 221
- Stabilization Force (SFOR), 57
- Stahl, D., 211
- state armed forces, integrating members of non-state armed groups, 182
- statebuilding, 12
- States of Denial* (Cohen), 113
- Steinberg, D., 256
- Stepanova, E., 289
- Stewart, F., 27
- Sudan, 33, 50
- sustainability  
 local ownership and, 148  
 in SSR, 169
- Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 24, 137
- sustaining peace, 30  
 the concept, 30
- Swaine, A., 259
- Swanström, N., 8
- Syria, 268  
 cluster munitions used in, 128  
 deaths in government custody, 178  
 government use of mines and IEDs, 129  
 impact on children, 227  
 interventions in as diversionary strategy, 25  
 nature of the conflict in, 25  
 terrorism related deaths, 273
- Tadić, Duško, 105
- Taef Accords, 60
- Tamanaha, B., 68
- Tamil Tigers (LTTE), 271
- terrorism  
 blurred lines between terrorist, militants and insurgents, 276  
 causes of, 273–274  
 counter-terrorism, 274–275  
 countries with highest number of battle deaths and fatality rates, 277  
 defining, 270–271  
 driving factors, 278  
 link with conflict, 275–278  
 media role in modification of the threat, 279  
 motivation for terrorist groups, 275–276  
 and neglect of other threats to international security, 278–279  
 number of deaths globally, 273  
 the terrorist threat, 271–273  
 vulnerability of democratic societies to, 274
- testifying, benefits and harms of, 104
- Thatcher, Margaret, 25
- Theros, M., 211
- third-party interventions, 1, 3, 5
- 30 Years' War, 95
- Thoms, O., 215
- Timor-Leste  
 post-conflict justice system, 172, 175  
 UN policing mandate, 81
- Tito, Josip Broz, 21
- torture  
 against people of diverse SOGIE, 260  
 of children, 227, 229  
 of prisoners, 177–178  
 rape as form of, 105  
 as strategy in conflict-affected environments, 178, 216, 222  
 US government definition, 209  
 of women, 237
- trafficking of persons *see* human trafficking

- transitional justice, 94–120  
 aims and objectives, 99, 101  
 challenges and recommendations, 112–117  
 the concept, 94, 99  
 crimes addressed by, 99  
 cultural perspective, 112  
 DDR and, 155  
 domestic and third-party prosecutions, 102  
 evidentiary challenges, 115  
 gender and, 256  
 goals, 100  
 guiding principles, 101, 117  
 historical context, 94–98  
 institutional reform, 111  
 international and hybrid criminal tribunals, 102–107  
 International Criminal Court (ICC), 107–108  
 measures and processes, 101  
 memorialisation, 110  
 and the needs of children, 229  
 peace vs justice dilemma, 115–117  
 prosecution initiatives, 102  
 reparations, 110–111  
 and the Rome Statute, 98  
 as rule of law activity, 78  
 traditional procedures, 111–112  
 truth-seeking processes, 108–110  
 UNSG definition, 99  
 and the victim/perpetrator dichotomy, 113–114
- transnational security, 266–299  
 conflict and global risks, 267–270  
 effects of conflict at national, regional and international levels, 270  
 organised crime, 285–294  
 piracy, 279–285  
 terrorism, 270–279  
*see also* organised crime; piracy; terrorism
- Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), 49, 51
- truth, assumed dichotomy between justice and, 110
- truth-seeking processes, 108–110
- Tudjman, Franjo, 113
- Turkey, 268
- Uganda  
 indictments against the LRA, 116  
 invasion of DRC, 268  
 LRA leader's refusal to sign peace accord, 108
- United Kingdom (UK)  
 Falklands intervention, 25  
 Stabilisation Unit, 7, 46, 221
- United Nations (UN)  
 Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 58–59, 98  
 Charter, 48, 213  
 Children's Fund (UNICEF), 81, 179, 229  
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 75–76, 245, 246, 251, 256  
 Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), 57  
 conflict prevention activities, 30  
 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 279  
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 230  
 Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), 133  
 culture of prevention, 33  
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 13, 80, 126, 179  
 Development Programme (UNDP), 81, 149  
 Firearms Protocol, 133  
 Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), 145  
 Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 149  
 Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 56, 107, 116  
 mine action responsibilities, 126  
 Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 80, 126, 136, 257  
 Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 81  
 peacekeepers, 48–49  
 Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), 57  
 Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 52, 57  
 Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 49  
 UN Women, 81, 246  
 unnecessary spending on peacekeeping, 33
- United States (US)  
 diversionary theory of Syria intervention, 25  
 and policing in Haiti, 81  
 primary focus of US national security, 55  
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 218, 245  
 children, 230

- Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 3, 214
- use of force
- as challenge for multinational operations, 51
  - peacemaking and, 48
  - state monopoly, 43, 45
  - unconsidered, 57
  - under R2P, 37
- Van Buren, P., 62
- Vietnam War, 127, 131
- violence
- relationship with conflict, 8, 9
  - see also* conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV; sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); violence against women (VAW)
- violence against women (VAW)
- in conflict, 235–240
  - UNSCRs on Women, Peace and Security, 238–239
- von Lampe, Klaus, 285
- Vuković, Zoran, 105
- vulnerable groups
- examples of, 226
  - human rights, 226–227
- Wallström, Margot, 235
- Walter, B., 22
- war crimes
- conscription/enlistment of children, 149
  - definition, 99
  - rape, 105
  - Rome Statute definition, 101
- war criminals, inclusion in governments, 116
- ‘War on Terror,’ 276, 278, 283
- Ward, M., 34
- We Meant Well* (Van Buren), 62
- weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 138, 290
- Weber, Max, 43
- Weinke, A., 211
- Weiss, T., 211
- Weissmann, M., 8
- Welsh, J., 38
- Westendorf, J.-K., 131
- Western interventionism, Duffield’s argument, 24, 62
- Wilson, J., 45
- women
- and DDR, 151–152
  - engagement in terrorism, 259
  - engagement in violence against civilians, 258
  - marginalisation from peace processes, 242–244, 256, 259
  - representation in UN Police, 87
  - UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 75–76, 245, 246, 251, 256
  - women combatants, 258
  - see also* violence against women (VAW)
- Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
- agenda, 244–246
  - UNSCRs, 238–239
- women and girls, access to justice, 72–76
- Woocher, L., 37
- Wood, E., 237
- World Bank (WB), 126
- World Customs Organization (WCO), 136
- World Food Programme (WFP), 126
- World Health Organisation (WHO), 126
- World War I (WWI), 96
- brutality, 96
  - use of landmines, 122
- World War II (WWII)
- and adoption of the UDHR, 207
  - and German treatment of Soviet prisoners, 96
- Xu, X., 210
- Yemen, cluster munitions used in, 128
- Zala, B., 278
- Zimbabwe, 131, 268
- Zoellick, Robert B., 268