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Chapter 1

Classical Rhetoric: Artistic Proofs and Arrangement

1.1 Introduction: rhetoric, oratory and persuasion

Rhetoric is the formal study of persuasive communication and is described by Aristotle as the art of discovering all the available means of persuasion in any given case. Classical rhetoricians were interested in how speakers achieve their desired effects on audiences in particular contexts, and viewed rhetoric as an art capable of influencing civic life and shaping society. Classical rhetoric trained speakers how to persuade in public forums and institutions such as courtrooms and assemblies. Developments in communication technology have led to a convergence between the styles of written and spoken language. Contemporary professions that place high value on communicating persuasively include public relations, the law, marketing and advertising. Entrants to professions such as the law employ training methods that trace their origin to classical rhetoric, such as practice in debating competitions (moots) that simulate authentic scenarios.

It is worth asking why it is that ‘rhetoric’ has sometimes developed a negative meaning in contemporary English – almost as a synonym for ‘spin’, ‘manipulation’ or even ‘coercion’. For example, if we look in the British National Corpus (Davies, 2004) we find that the most common adjectives that precede ‘rhetoric’ are ‘political’, ‘public’, ‘mere’, ‘radical’, ‘empty’, ‘official’, ‘populist’, ‘nationalist’ and ‘revolutionary’. Others include ‘simplistic’, ‘violent’, ‘hostile’ and ‘tub-thumping’. A very common pattern is to contrast ‘rhetoric’ with ‘reality’, as in the following extract:

Mr Baker: That is the trouble with the Labour party: one has to distinguish between its rhetoric and reality when it comes to law and order. This morning, the right hon. member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr Hattersley) said that he wanted to see more policemen on the beat, yet when he was a member of the last Labour Cabinet he cut the number of policemen and left the police force under strength. (House of Commons Debate, 23 June 1992 [emphasis added])

This illustrates a typical semantic pattern in which ‘rhetoric’ is equated with hypocrisy or falsehood, and ‘reality’ with truth. Does this just reflect contemporary scepticism towards politicians because of their poor track record in resolving society’s woes? Well, up to a point, but in reality the origin of this opposition between reality and rhetoric has deeper roots and can be traced back to a dispute between Plato and the Sophists over whether argument should be based primarily on dialectic or on rhetoric. The purpose of dialectic, as advocated by Plato, was the discovery of knowledge, whereas the interest of rhetoric was in how persuasive effects could be achieved in specific circumstances – rather than in an abstract concept such as ‘Truth’. Plato believed that the purpose of philosophy was to discover knowledge that was independent of any special calculation of interest; he was suspicious of any approach that questioned the primacy of Truth and placed this above all other considerations. By contrast, although rhetoric was not unconcerned with truth, its focus was different: it was concerned with how certain ways of using language contributed to beliefs about what was true in political and judicial circumstances.

An opposition therefore developed between rhetoric and dialectic: dialectic gave equal weight to both sides of an argument and proceeded by contrasting these with each other, whereas rhetoric was concerned with persuasion from a particular perspective, rather than giving both sides of the argument. A dialectical method of reasoning was by putting forward an argument, identifying a contradiction or inconsistency in the argument so that the original argument could be modified. For Plato, rhetoric therefore was inherently deceptive because it only gave the perspective that reflected the speaker’s point of view, and ignored inconsistencies. However, for rhetoricians, logical methods were just one of the means of persuasion. Plato would sympathise with the disdain towards rhetoric that is frequently shown in public communication, as in the following from a Trades Union Congress:

John Major himself, when they put adverts in every press in Europe, Come to Britain, our employees have no rights and they are cheap labour. So it’s not rhetoric, it’s truth … The Thatcherite experiment was a failure, no nonsense, a failure. There was no economic miracle. Britain’s industry is weaker now than it was fifteen years ago, and sure as anything Britain is a much nastier place to live in. Forget the rhetoric about the enterprise economy. Forget the bullshit about the Citizen’s Charter. If you want to find the reality of Britain today, after fourteen years of Conservatism, go to a DSS [Department of Social Security] office, or a Job Centre, or a Citizens Advice Bureau, and look at the misery of a country that will not provide sustenance and dignity for its people. (Trades Union Annual Congress, 6 June 1993 [emphasis added])
Here, Plato would focus on the argument: the claim that things had got worse because of the Thatcherite experiment. But a rhetorician would consider how impassioned and self-righteous anger is communicated by word choices such as ‘cheap’, ‘failure’, ‘nonsense’, ‘weaker’, ‘nastier’, ‘bullshit’ and ‘misery’. Plato resisted the idea of persuasive appeals to interest groups because he believed in a permanent and abstract truth – one that would be to the benefit of all: Thatcherism would be either right or wrong, irrespective of whether one was speaking to a group of businessmen or to a trade union. But a rhetorician would demonstrate how, by showing his anger, the speaker is both establishing himself as a man with moral judgement and conveying commitment to an argument that is likely to win over a trade union audience.

Aristotle restored the position of rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic by arguing that persuasion was an essential part of civic life and that rhetoric co-ordinated human action by allowing people the opportunity to debate alternative policies: this was preferable to having a specific policy forced upon them, and therefore rhetoric contributed to democracy. He claimed that the origins of rhetoric are closely related to the origins of democracy because, if power was to be negotiated and distributed to the people, there would need to be those who were skilled in persuasion. Rhetoricians such as Aristotle and Quintilian recognised that different contexts required different methods of persuasion: influencing political decisions would not require the same methods as arguing legal cases or commemorating fallen heroes. Rhetoric therefore involved identifying, analysing and understanding the available means of persuasion, and working out which were appropriate in particular circumstances. Rhetoricians still sought to distinguish between truth and manipulation. But the development of rhetorical theory in ancient Greece was motivated by the idea of a truth that varied according to time, place and situation, rather than Plato’s idealised and permanent truth. Aristotle also assumed that rhetoric could be learnt, which is why he wrote The Art of Rhetoric.

Audiences are only persuaded when the speaker’s rhetoric is successful. In classical antiquity, the definition of rhetoric was *ars bene dicendi*, ‘the art of speaking well in public’ (Nash, 1989). This definition assumed that some people spoke better than others – the same assumption that underlies debating competitions, parliamentary debates and debates between candidates for president or prime minister-or even Twitter debates. The most rhetorically successful speech is the most persuasive one, as measured by audience response – which in the long run, in democracies, is by voting. Rhetoric may be said to have failed when an audience expresses opposition to the speaker’s underlying purposes. Western thought has oscillated between, on the one hand, the Platonic tradition – based on an abstract notion of truth – and, on the other, a ‘rhetoric’ that is concerned with how truth can be represented so that it persuades. Both Platonic and Aristotelian traditions survive.
Exercise 1.1

➢ Write a definition of rhetoric based on your own understanding of the concept, using web-based and library sources.
➢ Undertake a search of the word ‘rhetoric’ in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008). Note whether collocates of ‘rhetoric’ (i.e. the words found in close proximity to ‘rhetoric’) are more or less negative than those in the British National Corpus (Davies, 2004). Explain why you think this is the case.

1.2 Branches of oratory

Classical rhetoricians identified three branches of oratory: deliberative, forensic/judicial and epideictic. These can be differentiated by analysis of circumstances, so the typical context of deliberative oratory is in parliamentary or local governmental meetings; the typical context of forensic/judicial oratory is in law courts; and the typical context of epideictic oratory is in ceremonial events such as public commemorations or funerals.

Deliberative oratory is delivered to a decision-making body with the general purpose of establishing the benefit or harm that may be expected from a certain course of action. Deliberative rhetoric considers different possible outcomes from different courses of action and arrives at a recommendation as to decisions about future action. The orator seeks to recommend a particular argument, drawing on whatever means of persuasion are appropriate to win support for the action he or she is advocating. According to Aristotle, deliberative speeches typically consider one of the following subjects: whether to go to war or to make peace, defence, imports and exports. The general purpose (skopos) of a deliberative speech is to judge the course of action that would be most likely to enhance human happiness. Aristotle went on to propose that what are useful or advantageous are the measures for achieving happiness; these can be understood in terms of actions that contribute to socially valuable outcomes.

Forensic speeches are addressed to a court or legal assembly that requires judgements to be made about guilt or innocence in relation to past actions, such as a crime. The orator seeks to accuse or defend a suspect by drawing on evidence and arguments for either upholding or rejecting an accusation of guilt. Forensic rhetoric considers different possible interpretations of evidence to arrive at a recommendation as to the guilt or innocence of those on whom judgement is being passed. So a typical forensic speech is that made by the counsel for the prosecution in a courtroom. The purpose of forensic oratory is to arrive at a just decision in keeping with the law.
Originating from the Greek word for ‘show’ or ‘display’, epideictic oratory is addressed to an audience that is not required to make a decision but is assembled to honour or commemorate a particular individual, or individuals, in an event such as a death or a marriage. The orator seeks to display his own eloquence in evaluating another by praise or criticism, and to arouse the emotions that are appropriate to the ceremonial occasion. We may think typically of funeral eulogies or speeches remembering the war dead as typical of this genre. But there are other types of epideictic speech, such as motivational talks given by chief executives to their employees, or by head teachers in schools, or speeches given by recipients of awards – such as Oscars.

The three branches of oratory vary in three ways:

- The types of response they expect of the audience – voting (deliberative), passing judgement (forensic) or applauding (epideictic).
- Their social purpose – for example, whether they are concerned with influencing policy (deliberative), ensuring justice (forensic) or celebrating someone’s life (epideictic).
- Their time orientation – towards the future (deliberative), the past (forensic) or the present (epideictic).

It follows that the methods of persuasion need to be modified in keeping with what is most likely to be effective in the specific speech context. Consideration of effect or impact makes speech-making an art rather than an exercise in philosophical enquiry, and speech-making could both create a reputation for the speaker and influence the social world. Figure 1.1 summarises the branches of oratory according to classical rhetorical theory:

![Figure 1.1 Branches of oratory.](image)

What is interesting about the identification and analysis of branches of oratory is how closely they relate to modern ways of thinking about how language is influenced by considerations of social purpose and context. The division between these branches could be modified to reflect blending between these genres, as a speech can be oriented towards a future course of action (deliberative) but at the same time honour the contribution of an
individual (epideictic). However, overall these three branches of oratory have stood the test of time quite well, as they highlight how a speech event can be classified according to its social purpose, its audience and the role played by this audience.

**Exercise 1.2**

Draw a table with three columns, giving each one a heading with one of the branches of oratory. Now position the following speeches in the table:

- An Oscar awards acceptance speech (a)
- An objection to an application at a council planning meeting (b)
- A pre-match address by a coach to his team (c)
- A defence speech given by Tony Blair at the International Criminal Court (d)
- A speech given at a college prize-giving (e)
- A post-match address to the team by the coach (f)

### 1.3 The proofs

Irrespective of the branch of oratory, Aristotle proposed a distinction between artistic and inartistic proofs. The inartistic proofs were not based in language at all, but in sources of persuasion that existed before oratory, such as laws or evidence from witnesses, evidence taken under oath or even evidence from slaves obtained by torture. The artistic proofs were known as ethos, logos and pathos, and these were created through oratory. From these terms, we derive the words ‘ethical’, ‘logical’ and ‘empathetic’, which provide insight into these appeals. As with the tripartite classification of speech types, Aristotle’s identification of three artistic proofs has generally been accepted by classical scholars and is still considered relevant in understanding persuasive language and rhetoric. The type of appeal that was to be employed was likely to depend on the type of speech, its position in the speech and the style that the orator was adopting. We shall now consider each of the artistic proofs in turn.

#### 1.3.1 Ethos: character

Initially, when an orator is seeking to establish a relationship with an audience, the appeal should be based on the character of the speaker: that is, his or her ethos – practical wisdom, goodwill and virtue – which together would contribute to his or her overall ethical credibility. For example, when an orator commences a speech by rejecting the eulogies with which he has been introduced, he displays the virtue of modesty. Or when an orator
argues a case for a course of action ‘because it is right’ (as did Thatcher, Blair and Cameron), he is assuming a set of values that are shared with the audience. Demonstrating ethical credibility is necessary to establish trust, and trust is an equivalent in contemporary oratory to ‘goodwill’ in classical oratory. Both ‘goodwill’ and ‘trust’ are based in a belief that someone in a position of authority is concerned primarily with the interests of the people he or she is representing rather than his or her own personal interests, since only then will they be persuaded by his arguments. Politics is about building trust, and because of an increasing awareness of manipulation of public opinion through media presentation and the ‘massaging’ of consent, trust has become a rare commodity in democracies. Orators need to convince followers that they and their policies can be trusted. I shall illustrate this with reference to two contemporary examples: one from British and one from American politics.

When announcing his candidacy for the Labour Party leadership in May 2007, at a critical point near the beginning of the speech Gordon Brown made an appeal to ethos:

For me, my parents were – and their inspiration still is – my moral compass. The compass which has guided me through each stage of my life. They taught me the importance of integrity and decency, treating people fairly, and duty to others. And now the sheer joy of being a father myself – seeing young children develop, grow and flourish – like for all parents, has changed my life. Alongside millions juggling the pressures of work, I struggle too to be what I want to be – a good parent. (Speech announcing candidacy for Labour Party Leadership, May 2007 [emphasis added])

By using the phrase ‘moral compass’, Brown represents himself as someone motivated by a desire to pass on the legacy of good parenting he has inherited from his parents. This is an appeal based on moral character, to imply that he shares the same values as the British people. But ethos is established in different ways according to the political style of the individual and their culture; the British politician Boris Johnson seeks to establish trust through humour, because in Britain audiences tend to trust someone who they can laugh with. Consider the following:

Over the last couple of months I have sat in all kinds of EU meetings vast and ruminative feasts of lunch or dinner in the castles of Mitteleuropa washed down with the finest wines known to man and on one occasion a splendid breakfast that seemed to stretch, for course after course, from 8 am to 11 and I have enjoyed them all. I have made friends, alliances and had wonderful conversations in my various euro-creoles but I have to tell any lingering gloomadon-poppers that never once have I felt that
this country would be in any way disadvantaged by extricating ourselves from the EU treaties and indeed there are some ways in which we will be liberated to be more active on the world stage than ever before because we are not leaving Europe. (2 October 2016)

By contrast with Brown’s ‘moral compass’ Johnson represents himself humorously as the beneficiary of extravagant hospitality consumption, because his image is not that of the high moral ground. He coins new expressions while making a serious point to enhance his credibility by not appearing to be too serious a person. Later he continues:

I am not going to pretend that this country is something we are not. Every day I go into an office so vast that you could comfortably fit two squash courts and so dripping with gilt bling that it looks like something from the Kardashians …

He appeals to ethos by being frank about the material benefits of his position – while maintaining a humorous tone.

A major argument of Obama’s criticism of the preceding presidency was that the Iraq War had cost so many lives and resources that it had led to a loss of trust by the American people in their elected leaders:

When it comes to the war in Iraq, the time for promises and assurances, for waiting and patience, is over. Too many lives have been lost and too many billions have been spent for us to trust the president on another tried and failed policy opposed by generals and experts, Democrats and Republicans, Americans and many of the Iraqis themselves. It is time for us to fundamentally change our policy. It is time to give Iraqis their country back. And it is time to re-focus America’s efforts on the challenges we face at home and the wider struggle against terror yet to be won. (30 January 2007)

The need to regain trust, then, became a major theme of Obama’s election campaign; for example:

We can seek to regain not just an office, but the trust of the American people that their leaders in Washington will tell them the truth. That’s the choice in this election. (22 April 2008)

Making an explicit statement about his own moral character would have undermined the appeal of virtue, since immodesty is not compatible with humility. So his strategy was to imply that he had a better character than the present leader, because Bush could not be trusted.
A similar appeal to ethos was made by Trump in his election campaign when he presented an image of himself as a much more reliable and trustworthy individual than Hillary Clinton:

If we let the Clinton cartel run this government, history will record that 2017 was the year America lost its independence. We will not let that happen. It is time. It is time to drain the swamp in Washington, DC. This is why I’m proposing a package of ethics reforms to make our government honest once again. (18 October 2016)

His major argument was that his major rival for office was dishonest and, by contrast, he embodied honesty. He used the expression ‘drain the swamp’ at least 62 times in his campaign speeches and it became a metaphor that symbolised his claim to ethos. For example, supporters would write the slogan on a sign:

Drain the swamps, you’ve gotta ‘drain the swamp’ sign back there; we’re going to drain the swamp, believe me. (27 October 2016)

Trump was alert to the potential of the phrase ‘drain the swamp’ for interacting with audiences and his use of it grew in both length and frequency through his campaign until it became his prime metaphor for establishing ethos:

My contract with the American voter begins with a plan to end government corruption. I want the entire corrupt Washington establishment to hear the words we are all about to say. When we win on November 8th, we are going to drain the swamp. I keep telling people, I hated that expression. I said it’s so hokey. And then one group heard it, they went crazy. Another group heard it, then we had a big, big rally in Florida. They went crazy about it, and now I love it. It’s true. It’s very accurate. (28 October 2016)

Notice how the image of ‘draining a swamp’ is a synonym for ‘end government corruption’ but also how he claims to have disliked the phrase initially, and only come to love it because of its popular appeal. This implies that he is a leader who establishes credibility by not allowing personal preferences to override popular choice. In subsequent campaign speeches he further elaborated the theme of adaptability to the people’s taste in imagery:

I want the entire corrupt Washington establishment to hear and heed the words we all are about to say, we all – you ready? Isn’t it amazing how this phrase has gone up? I didn’t like it. I thought it was corny. I thought it was really sort of a corny phrase – I didn’t like it. When we win on November 8th, we are going to Washington, DC, and we are going to drain the swamp. I thought it was corny, and then I went to one rally and another, and they’re all screaming, “Drain the swamp.”
But Frank Sinatra didn’t like ‘My Way’ – he didn’t like it until he sang it – the audience went crazy, sang it again, became number one. All of a sudden, he loved it very much. (4 November 2016)

The phrase established Trump’s ethos in two complementary ways: in terms of semantic content, the idea of draining the swamp refers to actions that improve the moral basis for government. At the same time, the catchphrase shows him as credible because he accommodates to popular style: by ‘doing it his way’ he is also doing it the way that his supporters prefer. Situations that lead rapidly to loss of trust are corruption scandals, when politicians siphon off public funds or make unjustified expense claims or use their positions to earn sexual favours. These are especially damaging for orators, since they imply that they are acting in their own self-interest rather than in the interests of the group. Trump was able to reject accusations of self-interest by attributing these entirely to his rivals. But ethos is an appeal in which behaviour has to match language and subsequent criticisms of Trump have sought to undermine his ethos by arguing that he is morally contaminated – both by his chauvinism and by claimed collusion with Russia to win the election.

### Exercise 1.3

Read the first and last two paragraphs of Barack Obama’s inaugural speech (see Core Text 1 at the end of the chapter), and identify any appeals to ethos (the character of the speaker; his wisdom, goodwill and virtue). Discuss these values.

### 1.3.2 Logos: reason

Logos, or the appeal to arguments based in reason, was the second of the artistic proofs. As we shall see when looking at ‘arrangement’, argument was the only obligatory stage in a speech according to Aristotle. It is also central to the rhetorical canon of invention, as it is necessary to have ideas that are based on arguments grounded in reason. Logos represents a proposition so that it can be judged according to whether it accords with everyday experience. The most persuasive means of arguing is by a syllogism; this is a structure in which there is a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion. For a conclusion to be accepted, both premises need to be things that the audience already accept as true. Figure 1.2 illustrates a typical syllogism to support an argument on the financing of university education.

Acceptance of the conclusion is only possible if the audience accepts an ideal of social equality, and the proposition that a graduate tax is socially equitable. One way of attacking the logical structure of this syllogism would be to challenge the assumptions behind one of the premises. For example, the assumption that social equality is desirable could be rejected on the grounds that it encourages a lack of effort and a tendency to rely

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1. see p. 234 for a detailed analysis of the phrase as a metaphor.
on others; this might lead to the counterargument that universities should be financed entirely by the students. Conversely, someone could attack the idea that a graduate tax is socially equitable, because if everyone in society was to benefit from higher education it could be argued that it is more equitable to have a completely free system of education.

Classical rhetoricians preferred to use incomplete syllogisms by leaving part of the argument unstated, as this could draw the audience into making an inference in the conclusion. This type of argument based on an incomplete syllogism is known as an enthymeme. Figure 1.3 illustrates this.

![Figure 1.3: Structure of an enthymeme.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major premise</th>
<th>Universities need a socially equitable means of funding.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor premise</td>
<td>A graduate tax is a socially equitable method of funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>Therefore universities need to support a graduate tax.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2 Structure of a syllogism.

Here the audience is implicitly invited to supply, or infer, the missing premise: ‘A graduate tax is a socially equitable method of funding’. The rhetorical effect is that the audience believes they have arrived at the conclusion on their own, rather than because of an argument supplied by the orator.

Logical argument can be strengthened by backing up one of the premises with a persuasive reason; so the enthymeme in Figure 1.3 could be modified as in Figure 1.4.

![Figure 1.4: Reason.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premise</th>
<th>A graduate tax is a fair way of funding universities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>After all, with taxation, the more you earn, the more you pay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>So people should support a graduate tax.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.4 Reason.

Here the reason explains the principle of progressive taxation to justify why a graduate tax might be viewed as socially equitable. Figure 1.5 shows another way of strengthening an argument – that is, by some kind of comparison.

![Figure 1.5: Comparison/analogy.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premise</th>
<th>Universities need a socially equitable means of funding.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>After all, with taxation, the more you earn, the more you pay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>Graduates pay tax, just like everyone else in employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>So people should support a graduate tax.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.5 Comparison/analogy.

The analogy here removes any distinction between graduates and non-graduates when it comes to taxation.
1.3.2.1 Refuting arguments

A common way to refute and reject an argument is by presenting an opponent’s argument in the form of a counterposition as a preliminary to refuting it with a counterargument. This also provides an opportunity to introduce an alternative position.

Here is an example of a typical way of refuting an argument:

1 Present a counterposition

   It might be thought that higher tuition fees and putting universities completely into a free market situation is the only way they can get sufficient funding.

2 Refute the counterposition

   But in reality that is not the case, because there are other ways of funding universities.

3 Offer an alternative position

   They could be funded entirely through general taxation, through a combination of general taxation and lower fees, or by a graduate tax.

I shall illustrate refutation in the context of the second American presidential debate on 9 October 2016; two days before the debate, the 2005 Access Hollywood Tape was released, which records Trump having made lewd comments about women: ‘You know I’m automatically attracted to beautiful – I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it – you can do anything … grab them by the pussy. You can do anything.’ The recording became a topic in the debate and was introduced by the moderator:

   MODERATOR: We received a lot of questions online, Mr Trump, about the tape that was released on Friday, as you can imagine. You called what you said ‘locker room banter’. You described kissing women without consent, grabbing their genitals. That is sexual assault. You bragged that you have sexually assaulted women. Do you understand that?

   TRUMP: No, I didn’t say that at all. I don’t think you understood what was – this was locker room talk. I’m not proud of it. I apologise to my family. I apologise to the American people. Certainly I’m not proud of it. But this is locker room talk.

In his refutation, Trump first denies the accusation, then mitigates the original offence by contextualising it as ‘locker room talk’; the metonym of the ‘locker room’ implies that in all-male environments such language is normal; he does not deny the offence, but apologises before returning to a defence based on the ‘locker room’ euphemism. Seeking to develop the opportunity offered her, Hillary Clinton developed the attack on Trump’s character by refuting his defence:
What we all saw and heard on Friday was Donald talking about women, what he thinks about women, what he does to women, and he has said that the video doesn’t represent who he is. (1)

But I think it’s clear to anyone who heard it, that it represents exactly who he is. Because we have seen this throughout the campaign. We have seen him insult women. We have seen him rate women on their appearance, ranking them from one to ten, we’ve seen him embarrass women on TV and on Twitter. We saw him, after the first debate, spend nearly a week denigrating a former Miss Universe in the harshest, most personal terms. (2)

So, yes, this is who Donald Trump is. But it’s not only women, and it’s not only this video that raises questions about his fitness to be our president. Because he has also targeted immigrants, African Americans, Latinos, people with disabilities, POWs, Muslims and so many others. (3)

Here she refutes his self-defence by:

1 Presenting a counterposition – She puts forward the counterposition that Trump denies that this is a fair representation of him and implies that he has changed.

2 Refuting the counterposition – She puts forward the premise that he insults women. She then provides reasons in the form of examples of how he has not changed: during the campaign he has rated women on their appearance, embarrassed them and insulted a former Miss Universe.

3 Offering an alternative position – Clinton develops her alternative position by extending the premise that he insults women to other groups, including immigrants, non-whites, disabled people, Muslims, and so on. By broadening the claim, she seeks to undermine his ethical credibility through reasoned argument. In terms of logical argument, she is persuasive, but although she may have been winning in the appeal to reason through logos, she was losing the appeal to the emotions, and it is to these that I turn next.

Exercise 1.4

Analyse the structure of this syllogism by identifying (1) the major premise, (2) the minor premise and (3) the conclusion:

- Going to university requires young people to take on a large debt.
- It is unwise for young people to go to university.
- It is unwise for young people to take on large debt.

➢ Rewrite the syllogism in the form of an enthymeme.
➢ Add a further reason in support of the argument.
➢ Add an analogy to support the argument.
➢ Now write a refutation of the argument.
1.3.3 Pathos: emotion

Aristotle emphasised the importance of making appeals based on emotion, and described these as the artistic proof of pathos. Emotions could be aroused by evoking fear of injury, sympathy with an aggrieved party or anger arising from an insult. Aristotle’s definition of emotion was that it was characterised by pleasure (e.g. happiness) and by pain (e.g. anger and fear). His view of emotions is that they are cognitive in nature because they have a cause, such as a source of fear or anger, and because they lead us to make evaluations which in turn influence our opinions and judgements. He identified emotions as having an object and a ground (Fortenbaugh, 2007, p. 117), this means that they are directed towards something, so, to use a contemporary example, someone might be angry with the North Korean leader (the object) because of his testing of nuclear weapons (the grounds for feeling angry). But emotions could also be aroused through humour; a good example of this was when Ronald Reagan was asked by Bob Hope what it felt like to be president. He replied, ‘It’s not a lot different than being an actor, except I get to write the script.’ The arousal of emotion was a controversial issue in classical rhetoric, as rhetoricians debated the extent to which it was acceptable in developing arguments. Perhaps the most eloquent case arguing for the connection between language and emotion occurs in the speech Praise of Helen by Gorgias:

Speech is a great prince, with a tiny body and strength unseen, he performs marvellous works. He can make fear case, take away pain, instil joy, increase pity … For just as various drugs expel various humours from the body … Some speeches give pain, some pleasure; some fear, some confidence. (Konstan in Worthington, 2007, p. 413)

As we have seen, Plato believed the purpose of philosophy was to discover the truth, and he saw emotion as opposed to reason because it was likely to impair judgement. By contrast, Aristotle argued that because emotional responses could be influenced by reason – for example when someone is upset about the irrationality of an argument – so it was also acceptable that rational argument could be influenced by the emotions, and so pathos was acceptable as an artistic proof. As Fortenbaugh (2007, p. 117) puts it: ‘An orator of wisdom, virtue and goodwill advances reasonable arguments, and in doing so, he excites emotional responses that are appropriate to the situation.’ Aristotle therefore held that cognition and emotion were not independent of each other, but interrelated: because thought could cause emotion, so emotion could reciprocate by contributing to an intelligent response to an argument. This recognition that emotional appeals could also be reasonable ones was an important development.

This can be illustrated with reference to the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom: while some supporters of Brexit based their arguments on...
reasonable claims, overall emotional ones were more significant: these included the emotions aroused by the idea of being ‘free’ or ‘independent’ from an external source of power, the emotion of fear of being overwhelmed by immigration from Europe and emotional antipathy towards the bureaucratic style of the EU and the claimed arrogance of its leaders. The pro-Leave supporting Boris Johnson is a politician whose reputation was established primarily through his appeal to pathos by humour as in the opening to a speech during the referendum campaign to the big business logistics group, Europa:

Well thank you very much, Andrew, and good morning everybody. What a pleasure, what a privilege to be here at this incredible firm Europa, which of course is the single market. This is it; this is the absolute quintessential British success in Europe and will remain so in or out of the European Union. I apologise for being late—we need to take back control of Southeast trains [LAUGHTER], apart from anything else and about time [that] TFL [Transport for London], about time TFL were given the run around. (11 March 2016)

Here he commences by implying that leaving the European Union does not equate with leaving the single market, he then alludes humorously to the most effective of the Brexit campaign’s slogans ‘Take back control’ – eliciting laughter from the audience. A further illustration of his command of pathos is in the following:

If we vote to leave the EU, we will not be voting to leave Europe. Of all the arguments they make, this is the one that infuriates me the most. In a hotly contested field [LAUGHTER FROM AUDIENCE], I am a child of Europe. I am, as I say, a liberal cosmopolitan; my family is a genetic equivalent of the UN peacekeeping force. I can read novels in French—I think I’ve even read a novel in Spanish—and I can sing the ‘Ode to Joy’ in German [audience shout encouragement for him to sing and laughter] and I will; if you keep—if you keep accusing me of being a Little Englander, I will. [Three-second pause] Hang on, Freude, schoener Goetterfunken. [Laughter] Anyway, you know it—you know it. (9 May 2016)

Laughter and other forms of approval indicate that the audience’s emotions were aroused by his choice of language and his singing performance. Conversely, although some opponents of Brexit were emotionally allied to a European identity, a greater number relied on arguments based on reason: the threat that loss of trade with Europe presented to the economy and the danger of loss of cheaper labour for specific industries such as vegetable and fruit picking and in the National Health Service. The success of the Brexit campaign therefore illustrates the primacy of arguments based on pathos over those rooted in appeals to logos.
Pathos was also employed directly after the Leave campaign won the referendum in Nigel Farage’s stinging rebuke delivered to the European Parliament:

Funny, isn’t it? Funny, isn’t it? Thank you very much for that very warm welcome. Funny, isn’t it? When I came here 17 years ago, and I said that I wanted to lead a campaign to get Britain to leave the EU, you all laughed at me. Well, I have to say, you’re not laughing now, are you?

This rebuke was followed later by a personal attack on the MEPs:

I know that virtually none of you have ever done a proper job in your lives or worked in business or worked in trade or, indeed, ever created a job, but listen, just listen. [Jeering from other MEPs (members of the European Parliament)] (28 June 2016)

However, his real audience comprised remote supporters whom he knew would hear the speech if he was sufficiently provocative, there is no doubt that many of these would have found the criticism of MEPs amusing in the intensity of its satire. I will discuss Farage’s rhetoric further in relation to the theme of impoliteness as entertainment in Chapter 7.

**Exercise 1.5**

Examine the following extracts from Donald Trump’s inaugural speech, and decide what emotions are being aroused:

1. For too long, a small group in our nation’s capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country. Their victories have not been your victories. Their triumphs have not been your triumphs. And while they celebrated in our nation’s capital, there was little to celebrate for struggling families all across our land.

2. That all changes – starting right here and right now, because this moment is your moment: it belongs to you. It belongs to everyone gathered here today and everyone watching all across America. This is your day. This is your celebration. And this, the United States of America, is your country. ...  

3. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first. ...  

4. A new national pride will stir our souls, lift our sights, and heal our divisions. It’s time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget: that whether we are black, or brown, or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots. ...
1.4 Arrangement in classical rhetoric

The five canons of rhetoric were invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. Initially there is a need to gain hold of the audience’s attention through *heurisis* (‘discovery’) and then to develop or ‘invent’ arguments in the way that is described in the section on logos. This section focuses on arrangement, or *taxis*. We may think of arrangement in terms of the distinct stages or parts of a speech and how the sequence of these parts could influence an audience. It was at the planning stage of a speech that orators would need to consider the sequence of the various arguments they had identified at the invention or *heurisis* phase, and which artistic proofs would be most persuasive for each part. There were discrepancies among classical orators as to the number of parts into which a speech might be divided and what types of appeal might be most effective in each of these. In the fourth and fifth centuries, there was a division into four parts, however, and in the standard work on rhetoric in Renaissance times, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, there were six parts. In my account below, I take a compromise position by outlining five parts.

Although there is no generally agreed canonical order, according to Aristotle, speeches required a minimum of four parts: an introduction (known in Greek as *prooimion* and which I shall refer to as the ‘prologue’) and a narrative phase followed by a proof and a conclusion (or epilogue). The form of the narrative would vary according to the branch of oratory; for example, an epideictic speech would require only a narration, whereas a deliberative speech would require an argument, and a forensic speech would require proof in support of an argument. In forensic speeches, there would also be a part where the opponents’ arguments were rejected (refutation). More important than enumerating parts is the rhetorical purpose of each part and how this contributed to the overall argument, as I illustrate below.

1 The Prologue (*prooimion*)
The first part was a prologue, in which the orator sought to create rapport with the audience and to arouse interest. Some techniques, such as flattery or an appeal to goodwill, were directed towards the audience; others, such as a confession of inadequacy or of a lack of expertise on the part of the speaker, were directed more towards establishing the ethos or character of the orator. Frequently, an orator would establish empathy by demonstrating that he shared the same values as the audience by using the first person plural pronoun, ‘we’, and by displaying his humility towards the audience. Interest could be aroused by emphasising the importance of the topic of the speech or creating surprise; consider the opening to Obama’s speech against the Iraq War, given in October 2002:
I stand before you as someone who is not opposed to war in all circumstances. The Civil War was one of the bloodiest in history, and yet it was only through the crucible of the sword, the sacrifice of multitudes, that we could begin to perfect this union and drive the scourge of slavery from our soil.

The decision regarding whether to go to war is probably the most important of all topics of deliberative speeches, and Obama, who had become associated with opposition to the Iraq War, starts by refuting the argument that he is opposed to all war. The directness of the opening arouses interest in the audience, and the statement of ethical position seeks to establish common ethical ground with his listeners. He shares with them a favourable disposition towards war in some circumstances and that he is not a pacifist, and refutes a possible counterargument to the main argument of his speech that opposes the war in Iraq.

An attention-arousing prologue also characterises Trump’s speeches; these frequently commence with a direct attack on the present government policy:

Thank you. Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE] Thank you very much. So amazing. Rudy just left. He just said, ‘I don’t believe this. This is unbelievable.’ Nobody believes it.
The crowds we’re getting – I’m the messenger, but I’ll tell you what, the message is the right message. We’re tired of incompetence. We’re tired of not taking care of our military. We’re tired of not taking care of our vets, who are being taken care of very poorly. (9 August 2016)

A similar highlighting of failings of the current government occurs at the start of a speech:

Our movement is about replacing a failed and corrupt political establishment with a new government controlled by you, the American People.
There is nothing the political establishment will not do, and no lie they will not tell, to hold on to their prestige and power at your expense. (13 October 2016)

This style of prologue anticipates the narrative and reflects politeness norms in which it is acceptable to go directly to the crux of the argument rather than paying extended attention to the face of the audience: it contributed to ethos by avoiding the accusation of being obsequious. It is driven by the desire to hold attention by not beating about the bush and the demands of competing forms of interest on contemporary audiences who do not have the time to listen to extended appeals to their goodwill.
2 The Narrative (narratio)

The purpose of the narrative is to outline the main arguments by setting out the central facts of a case; the way these facts were laid out would frame whatever arguments might follow, so the orator uses the narrative to establish key information in a way that will provide a springboard for his main argument. Unlike the prologue, which is usually oriented towards the orator, the narrative is directed towards the events that it is claimed have occurred or will occur, and which will form the topic of the argument. In a Democratic National Convention speech, Obama continued a brief autobiographical account with the following:

I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt to all of those who came before me, and that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible. Tonight, we gather to affirm the greatness of our nation, not because of the height of our skyscrapers or the power of our military or the size of our economy. Our pride is based on a very simple premise, summed up in a declaration made over 200 years ago, ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’

Notice how Obama frames his argument in support of Democratic policies within a epideictic ‘grand’ narrative that makes the transition from his personal life story – ‘my story’ – to ‘the larger American story’; he then frames this larger, social story by quoting a section from the American Declaration of Independence, which it is assumed that all his audience will both recognise and support. He argues that such a transition is only possible in America because the country is founded on ideals of equality. Trump’s narrative in his campaign speeches was to outline the dual arguments that internally America was suffering from corrupt government and that externally it was being cheated by overseas governments – either by unfair trade arrangements, or by relying on the US economy for its defence protection. This is evident in extracts 1 and 3 shown in exercise 1.5 above. It also occurs elsewhere:

The Washington establishment, and the financial and media corporations that fund it, exists for only one reason: to protect and enrich itself. ... But the central base of world political power is here in America, and it is our corrupt political establishment that is the greatest power behind the efforts at radical globalization and the disenfranchisement of working people. Their financial resources are unlimited. Their political resources are unlimited. Their media resources are unlimited. And, most importantly, the depths of their immorality is unlimited. (13 October 2016)
In his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention:

Tonight, I will share with you my plan for action for America. The most important difference between our plan and that of our opponent is that our plan will put America first.

[APPLAUSE]

Crowd: USA. USA. USA. USA. USA.

[APPLAUSE]

Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo. As long as we are led by politicians who will not put America first, then we can be assured that other nations will not treat America with respect. The respect that we deserve.

[APPLAUSE]

The American people will come first once again.

My plan will begin with safety at home. Which means, safe neighborhoods, secure borders, and protection from terrorism. There can be no prosperity without law and order! (Speech to Republican National Convention, 21 July 2016)

Trump’s narrative is one in which it is ethically right both to put a unified and homogeneous ‘people’ as the centre of policy and for nation states to put their own interests first: whatever differences exist within a single nation are backgrounded while differences of interests between nation states are foregrounded.

The Proof

Following the narrative (or sometimes integrated with it) is the ‘proof’ – a part in which the orator identifies whether the argument will draw primarily on the artless or artistic proofs and which of the artistic proofs are most likely to be persuasive. The proof is at the very kernel of a speech, and its nature varies according to the speech circumstances. In the Party Convention speech, Obama’s proof of his argument that social need should override individual interest took the form of citing a number of cases that illustrated human interdependence:

A belief that we are connected as one people. If there’s a child on the south side of Chicago who can’t read, that matters to me, even if it’s not my child. If there’s a senior citizen somewhere who can’t pay for her prescription and has to choose between medicine and the rent, that makes my life poorer, even if it’s not my grandmother. If there’s an Arab American family being rounded up without benefit of an attorney or due process, that threatens my civil liberties. It’s that fundamental belief – I am my brother’s keeper, I am my sister’s keeper – that
makes this country work. It’s what allows us to pursue our individual dreams yet still come together as a single American family. ‘E pluribus unum.’ Out of many, one. (Speech to Democratic National Convention, 27 July 2004)

By personalising the argument in this way, he is appealing to pathos. In his campaign speeches, Trump’s proof took the form of elaborating the theme of government inefficiency or corruption:

The political establishment that is trying to stop us is the same group responsible for our disastrous trade deals, massive illegal immigration and economic and foreign policies that have bled our country dry.

The political establishment has brought about the destruction of our factories, and our jobs, as they flee to Mexico, China and other countries all around the world. ...

It’s a global power structure that is responsible for the economic decisions that have robbed our working class, stripped our country of its wealth and put that money into the pockets of a handful of large corporations and political entities. ...

This is a struggle for the survival of our nation. And this will be our last chance to save it. (13 November 2016)

While arousing the emotions, Trump’s appeal is also rooted in appeals to ethos as he represents himself as a saviour of the people who will end policies whereby large corporations drive government policy. In his inaugural speech, he puts forward proof that America’s national interests have not been upheld by the policies of previous governments:

For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry, subsidised the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military. We’ve defended other nations’ borders while refusing to defend our own. And we’ve spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay. We’ve made other countries rich while the wealth, strength and confidence of our country has dissipated over the horizon. One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores with not even a thought about the millions and millions of American workers that were left behind. The wealth of our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed all across the world. But that is the past, and now we are looking only to the future. (Inaugural Address, 20 January 2017)
By arousing anger in the harm that has been done to America, Trump seeks to further establish his ethos as a leader who can project American interests and overcome the harm that has been done.

3 The Refutation

The refutation can either be treated as part of the proof (as we saw in the discussion of Obama’s proof) or as a separate part, where the orator tackles his opponents’ arguments; this can involve naming the opponent, attacking his character or ethos and presenting an opponent’s argument prior to its rejection. Obama used an interesting strategy for refutation in the 2008 election campaign to refute the policies of his opponent:

We already know what we’re getting from the other party’s nominee. John McCain has offered this country a lifetime of service, and we respect that, but what he’s not offering is any meaningful change from the policies of George W. Bush (1). John McCain believes that George Bush’s Iraq policy is a success, so he’s offering four more years of a war with no exit strategy; a war that’s sending our troops on their third tour, and fourth tour, and fifth tour of duty; a war that’s costing us billions of dollars a month and hasn’t made us any safer … (2) We already know that John McCain offers more of the same. The question is not whether the other party will bring about change in Washington – the question is, will we? (3) (Pennsylvania, Indiana, 22 April 2008)

In (1) Obama rejects an appeal based on attacking his opponent’s war record, because it was known that McCain had had a successful military career; instead, Obama establishes his own ethos by showing himself to be above making cheap personal gibes. This allows him in (2) to put forward a counterargument that ‘McCain believes that Bush’s Iraq policy is a success’ followed by refutation based on the proof of logos. The general argument is that similar policies to those of George W. Bush would be continued by John McCain. He provides three reasons why the war is unsuccessful: (i) there is no plan for ending it; (ii) it is expensive; and (iii) it has not achieved its objective of ensuring security. In (3) he links his opponent very clearly with a widely discredited George W. Bush by assuming that McCain’s reluctance to withdraw from Iraq implies a continuation of Bush’s policies. The Democrats offer more possibility of change because Obama has proved in the foregoing argument that McCain will simply continue with previous (discredited) Republican policies. Notice how, through repetition of McCain’s name, he keeps the focus of his attack in clear sight, but it is an attack based on ethos and logos rather than on pathos.

In section 1.3.2.1, we saw examples of how Trump refuted the claims that he supported sexual harassment of women and then how, in turn, Clinton refuted his claim to have changed in his behaviour.
4 The Epilogue

Lord Mancroft made an insightful and imaginative analogy to emphasise the skill required in the epilogue: ‘A speech is like a love affair. Any fool can start it, but to end it requires considerable skill’ (Reader’s Digest, February 1967). Rhetorical theory proposed that the purpose of the epilogue was to bring the focus of the speech back to the orator by summarising or recapitulating the main arguments and by an arousing appeal to the audience’s emotions. This was especially important in situations where an audience might be taking a decision following the speech – for example a vote in a deliberative speech, a verdict in a forensic one or applause in an epideictic one. Consider how Obama ends the Pennsylvania campaign speech:

It is now our turn to follow in the footsteps of all those generations who sacrificed and struggled and faced down the greatest odds to perfect our improbable union. And if we’re willing to do what they did; if we’re willing to shed our cynicism and our doubts and our fears; if we’re willing to believe in what’s possible again; then I believe that we won’t just win this primary election, we won’t just win this election in November, we will change this country, and keep this country’s promise alive in the twenty-first century. Thank you, and may God Bless the United States of America. (Indiana, 22 April 2008)

The purpose of this ending was to motivate Democratic activists in the final stage of an election campaign with the prospect of the longer-term idealistic benefits of a Democratic success. It is noticeable how he uses the collective pronoun ‘we’; this is in contrast to Trump’s epilogues that typically project himself personally as the catalyst of social change:

My opponent asks her supporters to recite a three-word loyalty pledge. It reads, ‘I’m with her.’ I choose to recite a different pledge. My pledge reads, ‘I’m with you, the American people.’

[APPLAUSE]

I am your voice. So to every parent who dreams for their child, and every child who dreams for their future, I say these words to you tonight: I am with you. I will fight for you. And I will win for you.

[APPLAUSE]

To all Americans tonight, in all of our cities and in all of our towns, I make this promise: We will make America strong again. We will make America proud again. We will make America safe again. And we will make America great again. God bless you, and good night. I love you. (21 July 2016)
A similar egocentric style based around the cult of the individual occurs in the following:

Our great civilization has come upon a moment of reckoning. I didn’t need to do this, folks, believe me. I built a great company and I had a wonderful life. I could have enjoyed the fruits and benefits of years of successful business deals and businesses for myself and my family. Instead of going through this absolute horror show of lies, deceptions, malicious attacks, who would have thought?

I’m doing it because this country has given me so much, and I feel so strongly that it’s my turn to give back to the country that I love.

I’m doing this for the people and for the movement, and we will take back this country for you and we will make America great again. (13 October 2016)

Consciously or unconsciously, Trump positions himself deictically at the centre of his speeches: for him politics is about personalities and deal-making more than it is about abstract ideas such as freedom, equality, justice and democracy and a ‘we’ politics readily shifts over to a ‘me’ politics.

Table 1.1 summarises the parts in the arrangement of a speech and shows Aristotle’s advice on the type of artistic proof that was likely to be most persuasive in each part.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Rhetorical Purpose</th>
<th>Artistic Proof</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prologue</td>
<td>Introduces the topic to the audience; establishes a relationship between orator and audience to make the audience well disposed towards the speaker, attentive and receptive</td>
<td>Conciliation by appeal to ethos through character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
<td>Sets out the facts of the case from a perspective favourable to the orator</td>
<td>Appeals can be made by ethos or logos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof</td>
<td>Presents arguments in favour of the speaker’s case</td>
<td>Conviction by argument by appeal to ethos, pathos or logos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refutation</td>
<td>Rejecting opponents’ arguments (could be incorporated with Proof)</td>
<td>Appeals could be based on logos or ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue</td>
<td>Summarises the most persuasive points in the previous parts so that the audience is left with a favourable disposition towards the speaker and his or her arguments</td>
<td>Emotional appeals to audience (pathos) prior to an outcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exercise 1.6

1. Analyse the parts of core text 1 (below). Try to identify transition points between parts, and do not feel that the patterns will necessarily correspond directly with those shown in Table 1.1.
2. Decide which artistic proof predominates in each part of the speech.
3. Evaluate the effectiveness of the speech with reference to the artistic proofs and the arrangement.

1.5 Summary

In spite of disparaging contemporary uses of the term ‘rhetoric’, the concept provides the basis for much of our current understanding of how persuasion operates in language. A classical framework for oratory still contributes to how speeches are classified in terms of three major types: deliberative, forensic and epideictic. These can be differentiated by analysis of the speech circumstances, taking into account the types of responses they evoke, their social setting and their orientation towards time.

Following Aristotle, persuasive appeals can be made on the basis of the three artistic proofs of ethos, logos and pathos. These are, respectively, appeals grounded in the speaker’s morality, in his or her ability to form rational arguments, and in his or her ability to arouse the emotions of the audience. Arguments can be analysed in terms of their logical structure by identifying syllogisms comprised of a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion, though to stimulate inference on the part of an audience the minor premise may be omitted. Where this occurs, it is known as an enthymeme.

The arrangement of a speech may be analysed into a sequence of parts, commencing with a prologue, continuing with a narrative, then a proof followed by a refutation, and concluding with an epilogue. There are variations according to the branch of rhetoric, because, for example, a refutation is more likely in forensic oratory although this may not occur in an epideictic (i.e. ceremonial) speech. Speeches may be analysed by matching the artistic proofs with the parts of a speech, so, for example, appeals to emotion are likely to be especially effective in the epilogue, whereas the prologue needs to establish the speaker’s credibility by appealing to the audience’s ethos.

Core Text 1: Barack Obama, inaugural speech, 20 January 2009

My fellow citizens: I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors (1). I thank President Bush for his service to our nation, as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition (2).
Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath (1). The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace (2). Yet, every so often the oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms (3). At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because ‘We, the People’, have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents (4). So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans (5).

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood (1). Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred (2). Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age (3). Homes have been lost; jobs shed; businesses shuttered (4). Our health care is too costly; our schools fail too many; and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet (5).

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics (1). Less measurable but no less profound is a sapping of confidence across our land – a nagging fear that America’s decline is inevitable and that the next generation must lower its sights (2).

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real (1). They are serious and they are many (2). They will not be met easily or in a short span of time (3). But know this, America – they will be met (4). [CHEERS]

On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord (1). On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn out dogmas, that for far too long have strangled our politics (2).

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things (1). The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness (2).

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given (1). It must be earned (2). Our journey
has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less (3). It has not been the path for the faint-hearted – for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame (4). Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things – some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom (5).

For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life (1). For us, they toiled in sweat-shops and settled the West; endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth (2). For us, they fought and died, in places like Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sahn (3).

Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life (1). They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction (2).

This is the journey we continue today (1). We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth (2). Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began (3). Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year (4). Our capacity remains undiminished (5). But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions – that time has surely passed (6). Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America (7). [CHEERS]

For everywhere we look, there is work to be done (1). The state of the economy calls for action, bold and swift, and we will act – not only to create new jobs, but to lay a new foundation for growth (2). We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together (3). We will restore science to its rightful place, and wield technology’s wonders to raise health care’s quality and lower its cost (4). We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories (5). And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age. All this we can do. And all this we will do (6).

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions – who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans (1). Their memories are short (2). For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can
achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage (3).

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them – that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply (1). The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works – whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified (2). Where the answer is no, programs will end (4). And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account – to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day – because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government (5).

Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill (1). Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control – and that a nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous (2). The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our Gross Domestic Product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart – not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good (3). [APPLAUSE]

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals (1). Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations (2). Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake (3). [APPLAUSE] And so to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more (4). [CHEERS and LONG APPLAUSE]

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions (1). They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please (2). Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint (3).
We are the keepers of this legacy (1). Guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort – even greater cooperation and understanding between nations (2). We will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people, and forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan (3). With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet (4). We will not apologise for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you (5). [CHEERS and APPLAUSE]

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness (1). We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus – and non-believers (2). We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace (3).

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect (1). To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society’s ills on the West – know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy (2). [APPLAUSE] To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist (3). [APPLAUSE]

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds (1). And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders; nor can we consume the world’s resources without regard to effect (2). For the world has changed, and we must change with it (3).

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains (1). They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper...
through the ages (2). We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves (3). And yet, at this moment – a moment that will define a generation – it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all (4).

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies (1). It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break, the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours (2). It is the firefighter’s courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent’s willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate (3).

Our challenges may be new (1). The instruments with which we meet them may be new (2). But those values upon which our success depends – honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old (3). These things are true (4). They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history (5). What is demanded then is a return to these truths (6). What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility – a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task (7).

This is the price and the promise of citizenship (1). This is the source of our confidence – the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny (2). This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed – why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall, and why a man whose father less than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath (3). [CHEERS and APPLAUSE]

So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have travelled (1). In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river (2). The capital was abandoned (3). The enemy was advancing (4). The snow was stained with blood (5). At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people: ‘Let it be told to the future world … that in the
depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive … that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet it (6).’

America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words (1). With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come (2). Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations (3).

Thank you. God bless you and God bless the United States of America. [CHEERS and APPLAUSE]

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